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SUMMARY
This thesis inve sti gates the connect ion be twe en s o c i a 1 
relations and the d evelo pm ent of s c i e n t i f i c  thought in 
Wes tern Eur op ean soc ieties from the s e v e nteent h century to 
the present.
S ci ent ifi c knowled ge of the natural world (cosmos! is 
contrasted with scien ti fic knowledge of the mind (psyche), 
and with n o n - s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge of both.
It is argued that scientif ic thought can be und er stood  
as a social relation. T h e  fundamental ideas of the 
scientific revolut ion are analysed, therefore, as 
express Ions of the relations generat ive of aeve 1 oping 
capitalism. In order to clarify the central issues raised 
by such an approach, the scie ntifi c w o r l d v i e w  is 
distin gui shed from three other ’c o s m o l o g i e s ’ which 
a n t a g o n i s i t i c a 1ly co-exist with it.
The thesis is therefore divided into four parts, each 
devoted to a sociological re c o n s t r u c t i o n  of one of the
separate but co nnecte d ’c o s m o l o g i e s 7 associated with the 
development of capitalism* Each part focuses on a 
particular relation be tween cosmos and psyche and their 
co nnection to the social re la tion di st inctive of its 
parti cular ’w o r l d ’ .
Part 1 deals then with the ’i r r a t i o n a l ’ cosmol ogies
held to be c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of children, ’p r i m i t i v e ’
societies and the insane; Part 2 with the hierarchical
symbolic order most fully realised in ’f e u d a l i s m ’ . Part 3
*
ana iyses the central ideas of the scie ntifi c revol ut ion 
itself and Part 4 descr ib es the impact of ’m o d e r n i s m ’ on 
the image of natur e and psyche.
It is argued that the de ve lopment  of science could not 
eradicate irrational or sym bolic  views of the world, or 
prevent the deve lopme nt  w i th in itself of ’n o n - c l a s s i c a l ’ 
ideas. And it is con cl ud ed that the inc ompletene ss of the 
scientific world vi ew  can be u n d e rs to od so c i o l o g i c a l l y  in 
terms of the changing nature of the social relations most 
fundamental to the deve lo pm ent of capitalism.
PART ONE
FUN
the tragedy of our age is reason
ioren n
n every man there is a world, a u n i v e r s e ’
e r k e g a a r d
G i o rd an o Bruno
INTRODUCTION
We are all cosmoiogists. Few of us, of course, are 
scientists or can claim anythi ng beyond the fl ims iest grasp 
of mo der n physical theories of the origin and s t r u ct ur e of 
the universe. We can nonetheless, by virtue of our normal 
social ac ti v i t i e s  rather than in the po ss e s s i o n  of 
s ys tem ati c and spec ialise d knowledge, claim to be 
pr actising cosmoiogists.
Such a claim, unexc eptional when appl ied to an 
’e x o t i c ’ pr imi tive s o c i e t y , 1 is diff icult to take seri ously 
in relation to ourselves. In our soc iety ’e v e r y d a y ’ social 
activities seem to have nothing at all to do with the 
abstract, techn ica lly difficu lt and imagina tively es o t e r i c  
speculations of the professional cosmoiogist. The 
s c i e n t i s t ’s world is highly specialised. It seems both 
more profound and less ’r e a l ’ than the world in w h i c h  we 
all, including the scientist, have to live.2 If we 
contribute at all to the imposing edifice of mo de rn  
cosmology it is surely only in the ne ga ti ve and 
un int erestin g sense of sustain ing  in our mu nda ne  a c t i v i t i e s  
the social world from which it departs. We pr ovide in 
other words the resources of time and o p p o r t u i n i t y
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essential to the p r o f e s s i o n a l i s a t i o n  of s cie tn ific 
activity. We give the c osmo io gist the freedom to abandon 
the constraints of the ’o r d i n a r y ’ world. H i s t o r i a n s  of 
science therefore have felt justified on ’common s e n s e ’ 
grounds in c o ncent ra ting their efforts upon elucida ting 
the develop ment of modern cosmology  as an ’ i n t e r n a l ’ 
monologue. The pr esent state of scie ntific theory it is 
held depends ent ir ely upon its immed iat ely prec ed ing state.
A ppear an ces are deceptive. The cosmoiogist, in our 
society no more than in any other, cannot escape the 
imperatives of a particular  way of life. S o c i o l o g i s t s  have 
for the most part taken this as an art icle of faith. 
’S o c i e t y ’ as a param ou nt reality can be r e d i s c o v e r e d  in any 
aspect of human activity. Its constrai nts and con venti on s 
must as it were reappear in the most recondit e of 
theoretical endeavours. Such argum ent s have gener ally been 
couched within the fra mework of inclusive ’t h e o r i e s ’ of 
society and depend there for e upon general arguments. And 
where sociolog ist s have taken a part i cular interest in the 
dev elopment of science it has freq uen tly bee n as part of a 
defensive gesture bestow ed upon hostile critics. As a 
synthetic discipline, that is to say, s o c i o logi st s ought to 
have something to say about science, but in d e f ending a 
’s o c i o l o g i c a l ’ ap pr oach they have usually been satisfied 
with rather vague blandish me nts in favour of the social 
’c o n t e x t ’ of scientifi c ideas. They have said little about 
the meaning of scie nti fic ideas t h e m s e l v e s . 3
If the c o n t ention  that we are all co smoiogists is 
taken seriously howe ver neither an ’ i n t e r n a l ’ history nor a 
’contextual' sociolog y will reveal the full sign ifica nc e of 
either sci en tific  or n o n s c i e n t i f i c  forms of thought in our 
society. The j u st if icatio n of any particular sociological 
approach in this matter is the insight which it allows into 
specific problems. Thus, rather than engage in another 
’methodological* or ’t h e o r e t i c a l ’ disp ute  the ar gu ment will 
be developed subs t a n t i v e l y  and by example.
The quest io n is sp ec ific but daunting. It involves 
nothing less than a sociological analysis of the bour ge ois 
worldview. Cl early within the 1 imitations of a single 
volume justice can hardly be done to any aspect of such a 
question. Yet it is a quest ion that hardly allows of a more 
modest a p p r o a c h . Some initial distinctions, if they do not 
make the task any the more manageable, might serve at least 
as guides to the argum en t that follows.
The bo urgeois worldview, appr oached in terms of its 
content rather than its form is first of all qua li ta tive 
division between ’c o s m o s ’, as the order of the material 
world, and ’p s y c h e ’ , as the structu re of experience.
Neither can be fully u n d e rs to od in isolation. And the 
relation betwe en  them can only be grasped as a specific 
social relation.
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Al tho ug h the bo urg eois worldv ie w prides itself on its 
scientific rationality, its rel at ionshi p to psyche reveals 
the pe rsistence wi thin it of other, nonrational elements. 
These ele ments on closer e xa mi nation suggest the c o ­
existence of four separate but related pictures of the 
world. These distincti on s can be indicated in a number of 
ways, but to draw particular at te ntion to their ’d e v i a t i o n ’ 
from the o r t hod ox y of rational science ’subjective* terms 
have seemed the most appropriate.
ft
Fun thus opposes all fixed and ordered relations  with 
its abs olute inner freedom. The difficul t and cha ng ing  
re la tionshi p be twe en  bo urg eois ’rationality' and the 
u n comp ro mising ’ i r r a t i o n a l i t y ’ of fun is th erefore explored 
in Part 1. In ad d i t i o n  to repr essing f u n ’s subv er sive 
liberty the bou rg eois world vi ew has to ov ercome a longing 
for H a p p i n e s s . It attemp ts to do this by ascr ib ing it to 
the society it has replaced. F e u d al ism is thus regards as a 
symbolic reality. Thisr particular re c o n s t r u c t i o n  of 
feudalism forms the subject matter of Part 2.
Sc ie nt ific rati onality  faces challenges as it were 
from the future as well as the past. Modern science and 
modern psyc ho logy is filled with an as s o r t m e n t  of non- 
classical aberrations. Its o pposit io n to ort h o d o x y  is all 
the harder to deal with in being episod ic  and 
unpredictable. Part 4, Exc i t e m e n m t , attempts to pin down
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some of these elusive objections. Partly for aesthetic 
reasons therefore, but also to hig hl ight a widely 
mi scons tr ued relation, Part 3, wh ich  deals with the central 
ideas of the scient if ic revolution, is titled P l e a s u r e .
These terms are chosen as s u g g est iv e not only of 
different ’s u b j e c t i v e ’ disposi ti ons but as indicative of 
separate formal and existential ’w o r l d s ’ expre ssed in and 
expressive of their own social relation. They contain and 
reproduce a series of other distinctions. Each must be 
approa che d on its own t e r m s . Each part therefore  tries to 
enter as sym p a t h e t i c a l l y  and com p l e t e l y  as pos sible into 
its particular world. An order of s i gns is replaced by a 
hierarchy of s v m b o 1s , before being reduced to a system of 
causes , which is ha rdly formed before di ssolving into a 
network of i m a g e s .
The bourgeois w o r l dv iew is only the ’m e s s y ’ 
interaction of these i n c o m m ens ur able parts. It is not 
identical with either ’s c i e n c e ’ or ’r e a s o n ’ however they 
are defined. Nor is it founded upon a single type of 
social relation. It is not possible, thus, to express it in 
a wholly syst ematic and n o n - c o n t r a d i c t o r y  manner. This 
might as well be admitted at the outset, and has the 
advantage of making the a u t h o r ’s pref erenc e for Part 4 more 
obvious than it ought.
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ONE
THE DREA D OF CHAOS
Life in bourg eois society is conta ined w i thin a series 
of inescapable contradictions.
No descript io n of the human reality of c a p i t a l i s m  can
resist, nor any history of its culture avoid, the
brutalising ex clusiveness  eng endered by a l mo st four hundred
*
years of inconclusive struggle. Its loving polarities, 
subject/object, mind/matter, theory/fact, form/content, 
being/nothingness, exchange/use, are so many ways of 
rendering expe rie nce coherent by dividing it ag ain st  
itself. In its world a 1 1 possible phenomena are ca te gorised 
through the successive invocation of a universal E i t h e r / O r . 
In this, of course, bourgeois society is not unique. ’Dual 
o r g a n i s a t i o n ’ is the central or ganising p r i n ciple  of many 
cul tu res. 1 And the bourgeois world cannot be defined, 
therefore, solely in terms of such formalisms; it must be
6
des cribed by reference to the entire range of social 
meanin gs embedded in the an ta g o n i s t i c  d i f f e re nces specific 
to its ideal order.
A direct analy sis of these meanings, however, tends to 
reproduce rather than to interpret the very c a t e gor ie s we 
wish to investigate. A cautious, elliptical ap p r o a c h  has to 
be adopted. Before looking more clo sely into the favou rit e 
antitheses  of bou rg eois culture, the larger implicit 
d is ti nction  between  the p ossibil it y of any such ideally 
ordered exis tence (reason) and its a p p a r e n t l y  i nc onc e i v a b 1e 
negatio n (unreason), must be examined.
Bour ge ois cosm ology includes, that is to say, not only 
the familiar rational orderi ng of na ture and human 
experience, but also and sim ul t a n e o u s l y  a kind of n e g at ive  
image of itself. It is thus something more than that self- 
conscious ’w o r l d v i e w ’ that generations of ’t h e o r i s t s ’ have 
tried to make safe for reason by a s s i d u o u s l y  exc lu ding from 
it everything chaotic or frivolous. It was a process of 
p ur if icatio n that never quite succeeded. Fun could not be 
co mp letely excluded from the rational cosmos. It pe rsiste d 
in the diminishin g but never elim in ated residue of 
’u n e x p l a i n e d ’ phenomena. Its awkw ard presence was felt more 
generally, within the literary tra di tion at least, as an 
uncomf or table intuition of cosmic d i s o r d e r . 2 And it 
challenged, with growing confidence, a ce ntury  of 
metaphysical radical ism with a number of rather obvious
’f a c t s ’ of experience.
If bo urgeois society was the rea li sation of universal 
order, then human nature must be, in itself, the em bodime nt  
of reason. The evidence  of history told aga ins t such a 
view, but for the phi 1o s o p h e . secure in the new 
co smo politan  world of com me rce and letters, history could 
be viewed (with some d i f f i c u l t y  it is true) as a perverse 
story of ignorance and error. Those ob sta cles removed, 
reason, nature  and soc iety could be linked together in 
mutually r e-enfo rc ing e n l i g h t e n m e n t . 3
More r e c a l citrant  than the broad sweep of narrat iv e  
history, the spectacle of children, savages and lunatics 
posed special d i f f i cul ti es for any c om fo rtable theory of 
human self- improvement. Human, yet by no means reasonable, 
each existed a l a r mi ngly w i t h i n  s e 1f - e n c 1osed worlds of 
their own. They did not share, it seemed, in the uni ve rse  
illuminated by Newt o n  and Locke. A brief sketch of the 
p h i 1o s o p h e ’s response to defiant irr ationa li ty reveals the 
extent to which they failed to exclude from the realm of 
en lig htenmen t all that was dang e r o u s l y  incoherent.
Simp lif ying a good deal, we can say that through out 
the eightee nth century, e s p e ci ally in Scotla nd and France, 
men of letters gave them se lves to the task of self- 
examination. As rational individu als they could, in 
following an int rospect ive method, recover a universal
human •nature. This am b i t i o n  is as evident in the 
magisterial coolness of H u m e ’s Treatis e on Hum an Nature as 
it is in the flam boyan t e m o t i o n a l i s m  of R o u s s e a u ’s 
Confess i o n s . Both in fact sought to expose, syst e m a t i c a l l y  
and unre s e r v e d l y  (one might almost say carelessly) the 
elements of a shared humanity. In this proj ect reason came 
to play a dual role. It served to designate both the common 
criteria of the human as a species, and the me thod  by which 
such an en quiry  should be c o n d u c t e d . 4 Wi thout reaso n we 
could not be human, and in the absence  of reaso n we could 
not begin to descri be  the special character of hum anity 
bestowed upon us by its possession.
In other words, during  the period of confi de nt 
capital ist  expan si on reason was not simply a logical or 
intellectual faculty. It was that certainly, but it was 
also more than that. R e a s o n  was the synt hetic  unity of 
human nature itself, and not just one of its ’p o w e r s ’ . It 
must therefore be the c o mm on  pr operty of mankind, and could 
not, by being made de p e n d e n t  upon a technical function, 
become a mon op ol y enjoyed e x c l usive ly  by the educated. 
Reason propelling before it a spirit of d e m o cr acy must 
constitute the very ’frame of man'.
The divisions proper to reason (the comp onents  of 
human nature) u n d e rw ent con tinu ou s m o d i f i c a t i o n  t hrough ou t 
the eightee nth century. The simp lic ity of those a b s trac t 
dualisms which had their origin in Descarte 's pr oject of
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pure thought, gave way before the claims of moral and 
ae sthetic s e n s i b i l i t i e s . 3 T e r m i n o l o g y  varied but some such 
set of distinctions, c ompara bl e to that of i n t e 11e c t , 
emot i o n , and w i 1 1 was general. H u m e ’s T r e a t i s e , for 
example, was divided into three books, ’Of the 
U n d e r s t a n d i n g ’ , ’Of the P a s s i o n s ’ and ’Of M o r a l s ’ 
co rrespond ing in an a p p r o x i m a t e  fashion to such a threefold 
classification. The point of such schemes was to defin e the 
ab so lutely irreducible and ’simple* processe s commo n to 
human nature; those internal ’m e c h a n i s m s ’ whi ch tr ansformed 
the contents of a sensory ma ni fold into per ce pt ions of the 
world.
Human nature could be defined, therefore, as an 
internally ordere d system of relations among intellect, 
emotion and will. The E n 1ightenment might then be 
characterised as the choice of intellect, as the mediu m o f 
h a m a n i t y ’s syn the ti c unity. Re ason progr e s s i v e l y  came to 
stand both for the irres is ti ble e x p a nsion  of knowled ge  and 
understanding, and for the mechan is m of' co herence unique to 
human n a t u r e . 4 It ought perhaps to be noted that there was 
no necessity in such a view. In principle either e m o ti on  or 
will (or some more remote ’t r a n s c e n d e n t a l ’ faculty) might 
have furnished such a mechanism, as indeed they were 
subsequently held to do. B o u rg eo is culture however, even at 
a later date when in full po s s e s s i o n  of S c h o p e n h a u e r ’s and 
Freud’s
alternative r e const ru ctions of the human subject (the first
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from ’will* the second from ’e m o t i o n ’ ), remained remark ably 
faithful to its first choice; to Man as Reason, and to 
reason as t h o u g h t , 7
Socially, these internal div isions can be related to 
the major spheres of c ol le ctive life; to circulation, to 
p ro duc tio n and to consumption- Such a c o n n e c t i o n  can, for 
the moment, only be sugge sted intu it ively.8 P r o d u c t i o n  and 
the will ’belong  t o g e t h e r ’ as the energy of all human ly  
creative processes. C o n s u m p t i o n  and emotion, di ssolvi ng  
into an access of ple as ure or grief, are linked as the 
termini of pro cesse s of exchange. And circulation, 
especia lly  during the eigh t e e n t h  century, e v i d ent ly  shares 
with the intellect a realm of ideal freedom. Neither in 
’t h o u g h t ’ nor in the c i r c u l a t i o n  of com mod it ies can 
anything be created or destroyed. Both are per f e c t l y 
conserved worlds filled wit h objects of terr ifying 
a b s t r a c t i o n . 9 The epoch of merch an t capital is not 
acc ide ntal ly  also the era of enli g h t e n m e n t . 1° D e s e r t i n g  
sy stematic metaphysics, however, the p h i 1osophe cul ti vated 
a form of literature (varied, self-possessed, h u m a n e ) , t h a t 
exemplified the virtues of syn th etic reason rather than 
those of ’cold l o g i c ’ .11
These parallel div isio ns  allow us to grasp more 
securely the sig nf icance of children, lunatics and savages 
as p r o t o t y p i c a 11y d i s o rdered lives. There was more than 
academic issues at stake here. It was not just a game about
11
the limits of conce i vab i 1 i t y . It was a matter- of c o n d u c t . 
Reason, it seemed, could be ne ga ted  and the human world 
inverted. Children, lunatics and savages were human and yet 
they were not rational. They were living paradoxes whose 
exi stence u n d e r m i n e d  every certainty. Each, in addition, 
was non-rational in a pa rticular way so that together they 
formed a str ang el y logical sequence; an organised 
m ultip li ci ty in the forms of chaos; an u nd ergrou nd  system 
to mock the careful e l a b o ra tions of the orthodox 
c o s m o 1og i s t . 1 2
* •
U n r e a s o n a b l e n e s s  might be app ro ached then in two 
rather di ff erent ways: as a ’n o r m a l ’ human synth esis of one 
or more ’ i n a d e q u a t e ’ faculties, or as an inadequate 
synthesis of n o r m a l l y  fun ctioni ng  faculties. In practice, 
of course, both int erp retiv e technique s were emp lo yed in 
the effort to shed light on these dif fi cult subjects.
Caprice
’We know no th ing  of c h i l d h o o d ’ , Roussea u flatly 
declares, setting out to explo it his own i g n o r a n c e . 13 
Childhood for him as for his c o n t e mporar ie s had b e co me  a 
cultural enigma and c h i ldren  held for them all the 
fascination of an alien species. However ax ag g e r a t e d  or 
ov er-simpl ified the claims of a generat ion of s ociolo gi sts 
directly linking the ’e m e r g e n c e ’ of the modern nuc lea r
family  with the rise of the bo ur g e o i s i e  may be, there seems 
little doubt that the image of childhood has un dergon e  
sign if icant changes during the d e v e l opme nt  of capitalism.
It was s p e c ifica ll y in bou rgeois society that an 
asso c i a t i o n  b e t ween age and d epende nc e was established. 
A r i s t o c r a t i c  you ng st ers of the sixtee nt h and seve n t e e n t h  
cent uri es could lead lives as liberated and inde pendent as 
those of their parents, whi le during the same period 
e c o n o mica ll y unfree peasants, unable to marry or to 
es tab lish households  of their own, were held to exhibit 
well into their thirti es those intellectual and moral 
cha racte ri stics the bo ur geois age came to regard as 
’c h i l d i s h ’ .14 L i b e ra ted from the n e c e s s i t y  of labour yet 
excluded from the adult social world, c h i ldhood  be ca me an 
incr eas ingly puzzlin g phenomenon. Its s e q u e s t r a t i o n  was 
justified on the grounds of c h i l d r e n ’s ’ i m m a t u r i t y ’ and 
’h e l p l e s s n e s s ’ , on their evid ent need to be ’ looked a f t e r ’ . 
Yet, as a general type, dhildhood could not be u n d e rst oo d 
solely in terms of a ’d e v e l o p m e n t a l ’ process. The n o n ­
ratio nal ity of the child was not simply the ab sence of 
’a d u l t ’ qua lities which would, in due course, make their 
appearance. Were they, for example, co m p l e t e l y  be reft of 
intellect? If so, then from what source did logical 
faculties subsequ en tly spring? And what of the will? In 
some ways children seemed poss es sed of a will more highly 
’d e v e l o p e d ’ than that of the typical adult. C l e arly  there 
was not just a change in scale here but an internal re-
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orderi ng of the ba sic elements  of human nature.
The key to the d i f f erent ’s t r u c t u r e ’ of ch ildhood
su bj ecti vi ty was found in the special ch aracter of the
ch ild is h ’will*. This follows di rectly from the fact of
their e x c l us ion from the process of production, which is
the social form best ad apted to the e x p r es si on of the will.
The c h i l d ’s will, in being wholly ’ l i b e r a t e d ’ from the
n ec es sity of labour, appears perverse, violent,
unpredictable, t r a n s p a r e n t  and insincere. As a critic of
*
b ou rgeois d o m es ti c in dulgence as well as a r i s t o c r a t i c  
indifference, therefore, Rouss e a u  complains t h a t , ’ If we did 
not spoil our chi 1 d r e n ’s wills by our blunders, their 
desires would be free from capr i c e s * .13 And he notes 
elsewhere that, more properl y speaking, chil dr en cannot be 
said to have desire s at all. They want nothing in 
particular, and in e x p r essing their wishes they are subject 
to nothing more substantial than a whim. C h i ld re n 
altogether lack that settled sel f- identi ty  whi ch is the 
prec on dition and con s e q u e n c e  of the will. They can only 
wish; a free and lively mobili ty  of feeling that is 
directed towards nothing but the growth of their own 
faculties (if they are left alone), or the b o r rowed va nit y 
and pres umpti on  of their elders (if they are not).
C h i l d r e n ’s actions are remote from their ’r e a l ’ needs 
which depend for their s a t i s faction  upon the i ndu lg ence of 
adults. Wishing therefore, which is the subjec ti ve
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coro lla ry to a d e p e nd en t relationship, is held to be 
typical of their ’ i n n e r ’ life.16 The ’n a t u r a l ’ act iv ity of 
children thus came to be defined as play. L o c k e ’s letters 
to Edward Clarke  are an early re co gnition  of this 
fundamental proposition. Children, ’must play and have 
p 1 a y - t h i n g s ’, he insists; a view echoed from a diffe rent  
perspect iv e by R o u s s e a u  and every child p s y c h o l o g i s t  
s i n c e .17
Play supposes a world of ut op ia n abundance. Ignorant 
of the practical n e c e ss ity of labour, there is no material 
reality to resist the c h i l d ’s tyrannical caprice. In play 
all things be com e possible, or rather no thing has yet 
become impossible. The ’objec t w o r l d ’ , v a r i ou sl y  
differ e n t i a t e d  as the toys ef for t l e s s l y  co nj ured into being 
by the m o m e ntary e xi ge ncies of a game, is dio s s o l v e d  and 
reformed w i t ho ut  limit. Pla y treats the ’o b j e c t i v e ’ 
characte ri stics of the world as the p a r a p h e r n a l i a  of fun. 
And, since its endless me tam o r p h o s e s  are pu rel y subjective, 
the ’ laws of n a t u r e ’ can be ignored or contradic ted. Who 
has not at some time swooped e f f o rt lessly  over dist ant 
countryside, enra ptured by the liberty of unaided flight?
The play world c o m p let el y absorbs the child. Wi thin  
it nothing is difficult. Rou ss eau noti ced that, while 
playing, children freq ue ntly ’endure withou t complaint, 
hardships they would not submit to othe rwise w i t ho ut floods 
of t e a r s . ’18 Fatigue is alien to its spirit of con ti nuous
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originality* Even a simple repetit ive game is never 
tedious; the h u n dr edth bounce and catch of a ball is as 
fresh and lively as the first* The child thus enga ged  is 
unaware of* our world surr oundi ng  and thr eate ni ng his own.
This subj ec tive freedom is neither private nor 
egoistic. It cannot be ’p l a n n e d ’ or d e l i b e r a t e l y  invoked.
It has me rel y to be granted its own p o s s i b i l i t y  to 
’h a p p e n ’. And if it does not ’come o f f ’ ch i l d r e n  com pla in 
of ’b o r e d o m ’ and ask in b e w i l d e r m e n t  ’what shall we 
p I a y ? ’19
Such a world is sensed rather than concept ualised .
’The c h i l d ’s first mental expe ri ences are purely affective, 
she or he is only aware of pleasure and p a i n ’ , claims 
R o u s s e a u , ant i cipating Freud, and goes on to sugges t that 
the child takes, ’a long time to acquire the de fi n i t e  
sensations which show him things outsid e h i m s e l f . ’20 The 
senses, indeed, are ori-ginally undifferent iated, ’ in the 
imperfect state of his sense organs he does not d i s t i n g u i s h  
their several i m p r e s s i o n s ;a 1 1 ills produce one fee ling of 
s o r r o w .’21
The c h i l d ’s wis h f u l n e s s  is part of a general physical, 
moral and emotional mobilitiy. C h i ld re n are never still, 
their lives oscilla te  wildly betw een extremes that we find 
difficult to comprehend. See mi ng ly incapable of the 
stoicism espoused by Hume or Ferguso n ’A hi Id has only two
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distinct feelings, he laughs or he crys. The c h i l d ’s 
u nr ea so n a b l e n e s s  is d a n g e r o u s l y  r a d i c a l , his ’ i d e a s ’ , if he 
has any at all, are without order or connection. It is a 
ve ritable ’sleep of r e a s o n ’ , that function of the mind 
which ’c o m p o u n d e d ’ of the rest of our faculties ’ is the 
last and choices t g r o w t h . ’22 We cannot the re fo re infer from 
speech or action  anything about the ’state of m i n d ’ of the 
child, ’the c h i l d ’s sayings do not mean to him what they 
mean to us, the ideas he att aches  to them are d i f f e r e n t . ’23
’Who of us is ph il osopher enough to be able to put 
himself in the c h i l d ’s p l a c e ? ’ asks our cel e b r a t e d  author, 
discreetly prop osing himself for the honour. But if 
Rousseau could ce leb rat e the absolute inner freedom 
contained wi thin the bo urg eoi s image of childhood, others 
(almost all others), less secure in their po s s e s s i o n  of 
adult reason, were more ambivalent. Vi e w i n g  capr i ce 
(mistakenly) as r e c a l ci trant will, they set ab out  br eaking  
its resistance. Ideologically opposed to personal 
submissiveness, the bourgeo is parent n o n e t h e l e s s  rec og ni sed 
the necessity of imposing auth or ity upon the child. It was 
no longer a matter of extr actin g tokens of' o b e d ienc e or 
affection, but of disc i p l i n i n g  the a n a rchi c p l a y fulness  to 
which children seemed na t u r a l l y  d i s p o s e d . 24 If ch ildren  
were not to be forced to work, they could neither be 
permitted an un lim ited licence to play. Schooling, 
therefore, was as much a means of ’r a t i o n a l i s i n g ’ play as 
it was of ’d i s c i p l i n i n g ’ w o r k . 25
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The u n r e a s o n a b l e n e s s  of children, that is to say, 
consisted in a p e r v ersi ty  of the will, so their ’e d u c a t i o n ’ 
had to take the form of ’t r a i n i n g ’ . No abs tr act pe da gogic  
procedure could impart to the un reasoning child the 
c or re ctn ess of conventional behaviour, nor any system of 
rules be made to appear to him as a logical ne c e s s i t y  
derived from some general principle. The child could not be 
’r e a s o n e d ’ with. The benefits of enlightenment, wh ich  was 
the goal of the educational process, had to be held in 
trust by adults rather than explici itly invoked. It was a 
goal reached only by way of a long detour through mindless 
obedience. This was a view espoused by ’p r o g r e s s i v e ’ 
educators, who sought to subvert the natural pro cess of 
play in order to harness it to rational ends, as well as by 
the t r a d i t ion al ly b r u t i s h . 26
Reason was introduce d to the child, in fact, not 
through personal exampl.e or intellectual precept, but in 
the o r g a nisat io n of the classroom. The c l a ssroom  operated 
as a small enclosed market. Each of its members, init ially 
regarded as equal, was differ e n t i a t e d  through a proc ess of 
exchange (marks for exercises) which e st ab lished  a 
’r a t i o n a l ’ order among them. Di ffere nces were inst itu ted 
and re-enforced through co ntinuous m e a s u re me nt of 
’a b i l i t i e s ’ , in seating arrangements, in the a l l o c a t i o n  of 
tasks, in the ritual of p u n i s h m e n t . 27 A ’u n i v e r s a l ’ code 
of rules gave rise to the disti nc tions of individuality,
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and to inequ aliti es ju stifi able by an appeal to a general 
principle of justice (reward for effort).
The practical schooling  of ch ildr en  was in augurat ed 
well be fore the practise of developmental psychology. The 
separate ’r e a l i t y ’ of chi ld ho od was given r e c o g n i t i o n  
directly in response to the moral and political problems 
that it posed. It was only much later that such a reality 
became the object of ’s c i e n t i f i c ’ interest and the literary 
imagination. Bou rg eo is s o c i e t y ’s ’ s e r i o u s ’ interest in 
childhood, its f a s c i n a t i o n  with the dangerous ro mance of 
play, only developed  with the adopt io n by adult so ciety  of 
’c i v i l i s e d ’ m a n n e r s . 28 The peculiar status of the child 
became ma rke d by the do m e s t i c  boun daries  of separate  
mealtimes and special f o od s;29 a particula r g e o g r a p h y  and 
archite ct ure (nursery and school); and by the e m e r g e n c e  of 
’experts* (govrnesses, teachers, doctors) who pa t r o l l e d  the 
ambiguous boun dar ies of the rational w o r l d . 30 C h i l d r e n  
were dressed with sumptua ry p r e c isio n in clothes sud denly  
appropriate to their years, and enco urage d to enjoy the 
’f r e e d o m ’ of ap proved games. Outsid e the classroom, the 
’o f f i c i a l ’ life of the child in pr act ice became a he avily  
censored version of E u r o p e ’s p r e - i n d u s t r i a 1 popular 
culture. The carnival, ru th lessl y suppres sed by the 
demands of the new rationalism, thus survived in a d e g ra ded 
form as the variety of ’childis h a m u s e m e n t s ’ .31
The emerg ence of the bou rg eois family, with its
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internal n o n - mark et  rel at ionship s of a f f e c t i o n  (however- 
idealised a picture that might be), could appear at times 
to threaten the coh erence of the society instituted on its 
behalf.. Might not such a family become ex cessive ly  
introverted and, coming to dote too muc h upon its 
offspring, forget the larger world? The bourgeois 
i n d i v i d u a l ’s double role as man and ci ti ze n crea ted a 
painful conflict. As a private individual he was indulgent 
and loving towards his children, but as a ci ti zen he 
realised the n e c essity  of educ at ion ou tside the p r o t ectio n 
of the family. Th’is conflict, a ve rs io n of the more 
per vasive but less well def ined cont est be t w e e n  the freedom 
of play and the ne c e s s i t y  of work, was re solved in favour 
of the latter. C h i l dhood  became a phase, a short, 
di sor derly period safely containe d w i t h i n  the categorical 
divisons of the do m e s t i c  life-cycle.
Childhood, one prot ot ype of the world of fun, could 
not however be comp le te ly annihilated. For a somewhat 
later period (though Ro u s s e a u  once ag ai n a nt ic ipates the 
general tendency), chil dh ood and its play wo rld came to hold 
a somewhat dif fe re nt significance. Ev e r y o n e  after all has 
been a child, and though for tunat el y we cannot a ccura te ly 
or com plet el y recall the experience, its presence as 
unreliable recolle ctions preserves with i n  us an 
una ckn ow ledged  residue of disorder. The more the b o u rg eo is 
rationalist heaped upon ch ild hoo d the degra de d forms of 
subjecti vit y for whi ch he no longer had any legitimate use,
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the more cer tainl y he gave way to its caprice and.the more 
intimate he became with its image of careless freedom.
Hence the fas cinati ng  a m b i v a l e n c e  of childhood as a 
suppressed but unco n q u e r e d  ’c o s m o l o g y ’ , as a way of seeing 
the world so radically  opposed to reason that we cannot any 
longer remember what it is like.
Hence, too, the e m e rgenc e of the aut obiogr aphic al  and 
confessional genre that became so much a feature of post- 
Re nai ssance Eu r o p e a n  l i t e r ature.32 R o u s s e a u  is be tter 
known still for his Confess i ons than for E m i 1e ♦ It is the 
childhood of the author, as the hi dden source of his 
creative inspiration, that interests us. Yet even the 
Confessions would have lost their savour if they served 
only to ’e x p l a i n ’ the ar t i s t i c  a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s  of their 
mature author, or co nveyed in the process no th in g but 
gossip that has long since lost its value as scandal. We 
need share nothin g of the a u t h o r ’s immediate social world, 
however, to remain enthralled. What we share with him, 
which is much more important, is the longing to rediscover  
a primordial e xper ie nce of ourselves, and to sense the 
richness of the world, sensuous, u n b o un ded and playful, 
which has slipped from us. The charm, similarly, of 
S w a n n ’s Way is the glimpse it offers of our own, rather 
than its a u t h o r ’s, childhood.
The attr active na iv ete as well as the in furiating  
temper of children, consi sted pr im arily in the s p e cta cl e of
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un for me d will,. Subject, to the uncon t r o 1 I ab 1 e per vers i t.v of 
wishes, they were absorb ed in restless fl uctuations  of mood 
and behaviour. Their ’i n t e l l e c t 5 could be no more than an 
amorphous p r e - c o n c e p t u a  1 ’m i n d ’, incapable of .those acts of 
discri m i n a t i o n  and synthesis in whi ch  genuine reason 
existed. Chi l d h o o d  existed as a perpetual wish, yet the 
nature of the world and of man was ordered by a rational 
will. In a rather deep and perp le xing sense then the world 
of ch ildho od must be illusory: it was at any rate an obiect
lesson in the shortcomin gs  of any s i m p li stic emp irici st  
psycho logy.33
Childhood  with its playworid, in knowing nothingof 
nature was r e a s o n ’s most u n s e l f c o n s c i o u s l y  host ile critic. 
It was not, however, its only critic.
Bew i 1derment
P r e c a pita li st Europe enter ta ined a long history of 
contact with ’ai.ien’ p e o p l e s . 34 The philosophical pro bl ems 
posed by the ’s a v a g e ’ were con ta ined however, for some time 
at least, wi thin a generous view of of human universality. 
The plenitude of creation demanded nothing less than the 
existence of all p o s s 1b 1e variants  of human being. The 
variety of the savage, thus, c o n s t it uted for the si xt eenth 
and seventeen th centuries, so many mar vels of nature: 
e x o tic phenomena to be col 1 e c t e d a n d d i s p i a y e q in the
cabinets de curio sites e nc ou raged by amateur en th usiasm  
for the inductive sciences. They belon ged with the newly 
founded botanical coll ec tions and zoological gardens as 
evidence of G o d ’s providential a b u n d a n c e / 5 3
Problems app ea red when the vari ety of customs and 
diversity of manners seemed to ou trun any credible 
defintion of human nature. Could the br e t h e r n  of Noah, 
within such a short period, come to live so di fferently?
Was it simply the case that, forgetful of religion, some 
had fallen into b a r b a r i s m ? 36 More serious still, for the 
eighteenth century humanist, the savage m a n i f e s t l y  lacked 
reas-on. And, as re aso n and human nature  were m u t ua lly  
defining, the co mmon sense ap p r o a c h  was to regard the 
savage as a literally inhuman or no n h u m a n  creature.
Even among the phi 1osophes such a view be came popular. 
Lord Monboddo became  pro mi nent in the wide-ranging, 
serious, and inconcl us ive debates over the prec ise nature 
of recently d is co vered o r a n g - u t a n g s 3 6 The idea that they 
might be a spe ci fic subspecies of the human seemed 
plausible to those who held it to have been already 
adequately demon s t r a t e d  that in the same area there lived 
tribes bereft of all the ’arts of life: lacking in speech,
the social c on vention s of marriage, do m e s t i c  settlement, 
the rudiments of cooking, or the most pri mi tive forms of 
e x c h a n g e ’ .38 In such a condition, regulated only by the 
periodic fl uct uatio ns of natural appetites, no moral or
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aes th etic  dist incti on s were possible and a fortiori no form 
of reaso n could be sustained. Cannibalism, for example, 
existed among such peoples be cau se no action had yet been 
defined as disgusting.
More mo dera te  comme nt ators agree d that savages lived 
in a state of perpetual intellectual confusion. Lord 
Karnes, for example, who enjoyed consid er able au t h o r i t y  upon 
such matters, c o n s idere d all savages ’capable of higher 
p o w e r s ’ , and detecte d in reports of their customs a kind of 
rudimentary religion, a ’sense of D e i t y ’ . Yet so 
impoverished were their mental faculties that, lacking a 
suf fi ci ently develope d language, they were inc apable of 
giving shape, in the form of explic it ’b e l i e f s ’ , to their 
diffuse feelings. About na tur e they were, not 
surprisingly, held to be, ’ grossly ignorant of cause and 
ef f e e t ’ .3 9
The savage lacked the most ru di mentary  of c o n c e p t s .
His language being res tric te d to the names of co nc re te and 
particular thiongs, he was unable to carry out the 
elementary ope ra tions of comparison, ge n e r a l i s a t i o n  or 
a n a l y s i s . 40 As a consequence, he remained innocent of 
himself as an individual and as a moral being. His 
behaviour was inconsistent, his actions unreliable. The 
initial friendliness, for example, with whi ch Col um bus was 
met by the Caribs turned quickly and ine xpl ic ably to 
hostility. The tre ac hery of the savage became  legendary. It 
was not, however, malice <a ra ti onall y c o m p r e h e n s i b l e
motive) but t h o u g h tlessne ss  that made them wh olly
untrustworthy*
Savages had not really succe ede d in sepa rating  
th emselves f rom n a t u r e , whi ch was the first step in 
bringing life under control of the intellect* Their 
instincts, which were in the circums ta nces more or less 
adequa te to the purpose, guided all their behaviour*
Indeed, they had survived only by a quirk of n a t u r e . 'Living 
in lands of natural abundan ce  they had no need to labour to 
pr oc ure their daiTy subsistence. ’We possess a l r eady  all 
that is nec e s s a r y  for our e x i s t e n c e ’ points out the 
Tahit i a n  native. Un mo ve d by necessity, they could not make 
the initial effort of the mind w h ich  s u b s e q u e n t l y  revealed 
itself as the first stage in the progre ss of the arts and 
sciences; the foundati on of all human se lf -improvem ent.
Unres p o n s i v e  to the prom pting of reason the savage 
could be ens laved  but not e m p l o y e d . 42 He might even be 
d om es ticate d and, with  training, become a loyal servant; 
but he could not, given his lack of cal cu lative a b i l i t y  and 
insecure self-identity, survive if released onto the marke t 
place- To become the b e n e f i c i a r y  of reason the savage must 
therefore, first of all, be deprived of his natural 
livelihood. The colonial trader and the m i s s i o n a r y  
justified one a n o t h e r . 43 In int roducing the savage to the 
life of reason he must first be made to feel the n e c e s s i t y  
of work and the ex cha nge of commodities.
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Th r o u g h o u t  the e i g h teenth century, in numerab le tours 
were also con du ct ed to imaginary islands whose fabulous 
inhabitants sati sfied  an insatiable demand for the exotic 
and threw into yet bolder relief the technical, moral and 
commercial a d v a ntages  of civ ilised life.44
The s i m p licity  and b r u t ish ne ss of savages prompted, in 
addition, a number of conjectural ’h i s t o r i e s ’ of the 
de velopm ent of the civil is ed state. The authors of the best 
known of such accoun ts divi ded m a n ’s put at iv e histor y into 
’e p o c h s ’ , arrange d c h r o n o l o g i c a l l y  and s y s t e m a t i c a l l y 
(narrative and system happily coinciding) a c c o rding  to the 
relative ’p r o g r e s s ’ of reason whi ch was the a c c o m p l i s h m e n t  
of e a ch.45 And even those scorning c o m p lace nt  histories, 
such as Rou s s e a u  in his prize w i nn ing D i s co urse on the
Sciences and the A r t s , or those, such as Swift and Diderot,
who used their hypothetical voyages of disco ve ry as 
vehicles for s a t i r i c a 1^and critical intentions, concu rre d 
in viewing the savage as a ’n a t u r a l ’ and therefo re 
thoughtless being.
Ro uss ea u s ub se quently  dev el op ed his ideas on the 
nature of savage man in his important essay, A Di s c o u r s e  on
1n e q u a 1i t y . This is not an att empt to write an empirical
history of human society; such an u n d e r t a k i n g  would be 
impossible if for no other reason than the absence of the 
materials upon whi ch it might be based. It is rather an
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analyt ic description, sugge sted by the spectacle of 
con te mp orary savage life, of m a n ’s ’o r i g i n a l ’ condition.
His method, he feels, avoids the major di f f i c u l t y  of 
the well known ’c o n t r a c t ’ school who, in invoking a ’state 
of n a t u r e ’ , succeed only in hy po s t a t i s i n g  the less visible 
but no less conventional institut ions of their own society; 
’All those philo s o p h e r s  talking ceas e l e s s l y  of need, greed, 
oppression, desire and pride have tr ansported into a state 
of nature con cepts  formed in s o c i e t y ’ .46 As cl ea rly as he 
had seen the dif f i c u l t y  in descr ib ing the real e x p e ri en ce 
of childhood, Ro u s s e a u  takes seri ou sly the gulf be t w e e n  
ourselves and a pres u m p t i v e  ’o r i g i n a l ’ state of man.
Society (Reason) ca nn ot  be deduced from itself; it must 
spring from someth ing other than itself. R o u ss ea u 
therefore suggests a ’m e c h a n i s m ’ thro ugh which society 
might have come into existence. This hinges on two related 
principles whose in te raction led ’b l i n d l y ’ to the 
establi shm ent of social life. ’The first gives us an ardent 
interest in our own w e l l being and our own preservation, the 
second inspires in us a natural a v e rs ion to seeing any 
other sentient being perish or suffer, espe ci ally if it is 
of our own k i n d . ’47 From these principles, which Ro u s s e a u 
takes to be self-evident, he deduces the possibility, 
though not the necessity, of private property, the di vision 
of labour, the de ve l o p m e n t  of language, and the birth of 
reason. ’ In this way we are not o b l i g e d ’ , he comments, ’to
make a man a ph il osopher  befo re we can make him a m a n - ’43 
Reason does not ’d e v e l o p ’ of its own accord as if by some 
inner necessity, it springs to life as an adjunc t of 
passion: ’we seek to know only because we desire ‘to enjoy;
and it is impossible to concei ve a man who had ne ither 
desires nor fears giving himself the trouble of 
r e a s o n i n g . ’49 In spite of its heretical imp licat io n (that 
civilised man tended to an ’u n n a t u r a l ’ s u p p re ss ion of 
passion in favour of intellect), R o u s s e a u ’s vision of 
original man en joy in g a ’solitary  and i d l e ’ ex i s t e n c e  that 
demanded no th in g of him beyond instinctual responses, 
seemed far from implausible.
The c o n t e m p o r a r y  savage can be understood, then, not 
as an ’o r i g i n a l ’ man, but as a being nonet he less in many 
ways closer to that primordial co nd ition than that of 
civilised man. His intellect is little developed, and the 
urge to s e l f - i m p r o v e m e n t  has not yet taken hold of his 
passions. His needs are simple, his wants easily 
satisfied. He lives i mmed i ate 1y , incapable of the act of 
abst rac tion whi ch so compl icates our relation to the world: 
’his soul, whi ch  no thing disturbs, dwells only in the 
sensation of its pres ent e x i s t e n c e . ’50 He cannot env i s a g e  
anything beyon d the ’end of the d a y ’ , which is the ’extent 
of the for esight of the Car ibbea n I n d i a n . ’51
Sunk wi th in  himself, as absorbed as the child at play, 
’everything appears to remove the savage man both from the
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tem pta tion to quit the savage c o n d it ion and from the means 
of doing s o . ’52 The original impersonal ’h a p p i n e s s ’ of man 
is som ething u n r e c o g n i s a b l e  to us; it is a worl d anterior 
to the metaphysical nic et ies upon which our own particular  
existence has been stretched.
Re jec ting R o u s s e a u ’s method of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  Adam 
Ferguson, at alm o s t . t h e  same time, des cr ib ed the society of 
’rude n a t i o n s ’ in rather similar terms. A sober and 
reserved phi 1o s o p h e , he also re jected M o b o d d o ’s popular 
natural history. ’Men have always appeare d among animals 
as a distinct  and superior r a c e ’ , he notes, ’he is, in 
short a man in every condition; and we can learn noth ing of 
his nature from the an alogy of other a n i m a l s . ’53 The 
distinctions among men are ex cl u s i v e l y  social and cultural, 
but between man in a ’r u d e ’ c o n d it ion and the more 
developed ’b a r b a r i a n ’there is what amounts to a q u a l i tat iv e 
distinction. A c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  d i f f er ence even more evident 
in the later emerg en ce o*f ’civil s o c i e t y ’ as a u n i qu ely 
sophisticated way of life.
The social relat ions of the savage resemble, ’more the 
suggestion of instinct, than the invention  of r e a s o n . ’ And 
while the co nd ition of ’r u d e n e s s ’ is not to be taken for a 
’state of n a t u r e ’ it recalls the 'nascent s o c i e t y ’ to which 
some of the most imaginative pages of A Di sc ourse on 
InequaIi ty had been devoted.
urawin? un b o m e w m lCCG U T i t S M y + v,
1 T ‘ 1 H I  ;American and Ca r i b b e a n  Indians, Ferguso n 
the general ch ar ac t e r i s t i c s  of those societies in which
m e  r s ’ 1 ittie at t e n t i o n  to p r o p e r t y . ’■ Subsist snc
there a daily renewed process of hunting and gathering, 
is the di fficult y rather than the ease in securing a 
livelihood dir ectly from the wild that, he argues, preve 
the emer gence of the instituion of pri vate p rope r ty and 
intellectual e l a b o r a t i o n  that goes with it. The savage 
acts in direct response to his appetite, without 
calculat ion or co-operation. And since pr ope rty depends 
upon a 'method of defining  p o s s e s s i o n ’ and a ’habit of 
acting with a view to distant o b j e c t s ’ , he concurs with 
Rousseau in d e s c ri bing the savage world as an immediate 
ov er whelmin g rea lity confined wi thin a timeless present.
Knowing nothing of the exchange of goods (or the 
ci rc ula tio n of ideas), savage relatio ns are formed from 
’commerce of a f f e c t i o n ’'. Incapable of the intellectual 
detachment of cynicis m or hypocrisy, their sent im ents ax 
open and honest. A gift, for example, is always the 
expression of a pure act of kindness: ’they delight in
them, but do not consider them as a matter of 
o b 1i g a t i o n . ’5 " F e r g u s o n ’s ad mi r a t i o n  of their benevoler 
fortitude and skill in warfar e does not b 1ind him. howev 
to the ’childish i m b e c i l i t y ’ , of their ’grovelling and . n 
s u p e r s t i t i o n ’ .56 Prompte d by appet it e alone they ’go ir 
pursuit of no general p r i n c i p l e s ' , 57 are incapable of
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The intellectual fee bleness of the savage is the most 
striking feature of his un reasonablenes s* His will, in 
consequence* is weak and amorphous. When not pressed by an 
immediate need, savages do not even exercise themselves in 
play. ’Their a v e rs io n to every sort of e m p l o y m e n t ’, remarks 
Ferguson, ’makes them pass a great part of their time in 
idleness or s l e e p . ,5S
Neither ch ildren nor savages, it was held, have the 
po ssi bility of mas te ring themselves. They were beyond 
reascn. The former, in being exclude d from labour, acted 
wishfully; the latter, subsist ing direct ly from nature 
without labour, existed in a state of bewilderment.
De ran gement
T h e  n e a r n e s s  o f  l u n a c y  m a d e  t h e  p h i  1 o s o p h e  u n e a s y ,  
' h e  c h i l d  a n d  s a v a g e  c o u l d  b e  e x c u s e d  o n  t h e  g r o u n d s  o f
IRIS ttU i  X L. Y from the r e s po ns ibiliti es  of reason. But trn
a o u  i l  w h o  h  e  c  a  me a  l u n a t i c  d i d  s u  i n  u  p  e n  d e f i a n c e  o f  h  i  s 
a 1 r e a d y  e s t a b l i s h e d  n a t u r e .  I n  t u r n i n g  h i s  b a c k  o n  r e a s o n  
t h e  m a d m a n  c r e a t e d  a  g l a r i n g  c o n t r a d i c t i o n .  N a t u r e  c o u l d  
n o t  a c t  a g a i n s t  i t s e l f .'* Mo s e i  t - p o s s e s s e d  i n d i v i d u a l  
c o u l d  d e n y  h i m s e l f  b y  p l u n g i n g  v o l u n t a r i l y  i n t o  t h e  a b y s s
o i
j f c h a o s ; vet madness could not be ether- than unreasonable.
This had not always been the case any more than it had 
always been the case that childr en or savages had been seen 
in the image of disorder- F o u c a u l t ’s p io neerin g work draws 
at tention to the inconspicuo us origins of such an image 
and- in chartin g the emer gence  of new visions of lunacy, 
reveals the hi story also of a specifi c conc e p t i o n  of 
r e a s o n - * 0 The a nt ithesi s of reason and madness- Fo uc ault 
argues- is founded upon the imperative order of the market 
conceived as a set of logical relations- The mad 
’d i s t i n guishe d the ms el ves by their ina bility to work and to 
follow the rhythms of collective  l i f e . ’61 The ab il ity to 
labour becomes a badge of reasonableness. Those unable or 
unw illing to work are absor be d into the residual category 
of unreason and con sign ed  to the safety of the asylum.
The se duc tiv e r ati on alism of the market is not 
restricted, however, to the o r g a n i s a t i o n  of work; it 
embraces the social process as a whole. Fo u c a u l t  imputes 
to eighteenth century writers a view of madness (as 
disordered intellect), which is c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  in fact of a 
somewhat later p e r i o d . 62 The p h i 1osopne viewed madness, 
first and f o r e m o s t . as d er an gement of the a f f e ct ions or 
passions. This was a view quite c o n s is te nt with the 
signific anc e they accorded the passions in the ’moral 
e c o n o m y ’ of human nature. 63 There were other and better
examp 1es of i nteI 1e c t u a 1 confu 
character of madness, then, sh 
sphere of cons u m p t i o n  (the soc 
a f f e c t i o n s j , rather than in th 
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inks of nothing but h i m s e l f ’ , 
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f natur e felt by normal 
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u a m u e 1 Johnson provides a com p a r■ s.d 1 e a.no equs 1 1 y - uc i o 
e xp osi tio n in his b i o g r a p h y  of that ’strange, gifted 
p s y c h o p a t h ’ . Richard  S a v a g e . 6 E ’His mind was in an un co mm on  
degree 'vigorous and a c t i v e ’ , we are toid, ’his judgment was 
accurate, his a p p r e h e n s i o n  q u i c k . ’6* The madness that 
af flicted him had n o t hing  to do with pertu rbed thought, his 
intellectual powers were acute and, ’his at t e n t i o n  never 
deserted h i m . ’70 It was rather ’an irregular and dissip at ed 
manner of l i f e ’ , a l r e a d y  indicative of unruly app etites 
that led him to be co me  the ’slave to every passion that 
happened to be e x c it ed by the presence of its o b j e c t . ’71
P r o f e s a s i o n a 1 obs erver s adopted a similar standpoint. 
Tuke, for example, went so far as to, ’concei ve that mind 
is incapable of injury or d e s t r u c t i o n ’ ,72 claiming with 
Pinel that, ’passions are the most frequent causes of 
mental a b e r r a t i o n s ’.73 Affe ctions as the ’i n w a r d n e s s ’ of 
acts of consumption, might logically be dis order ed  in two 
rather differe nt ways. This gives to lunacy its basic 
division be tween melancholia, a disease of under­
consumption, and mania, the frenzy of excess.
The m e l a n c h o l i c  suffers from passivity, lassitude and 
disinterest in the world. Since E l i z a be th an times, 
mel ancholia had been the a ff liction  of the sensitive, the 
cu11 1vateg shq the scholarly. As a ’character type’ it 
already enjoyed a rich cultural heritage, which B u rton was 
able to draw upon in fashioning his medi co - p h i l o s o p h i c a l
A n a t o m y « 7 4 The old humoral psychology, however, had 
un dergone a profound change. It was replaced first by vague 
’animal s p i r i t s ’ flowing through fine channels in the 
nerves, and subse q u e n t l y  by a more strictly mechanical 
image of orga nic fibres vibrating under various states of 
’t e n s i o n ’ . The m e l a n c h o l i c  are, literally, too relaxed: 
their nervou s fibres, weak and flaccid, refuse the 
stim ul ation of the senses. The outside world, in 
consequence, is rendered  vague and insignificant.
The nerve fibres of the maniac on the contrary, 
stretched to bre ak ing point* are s e t vi ol ently in mo ti on  at 
the slightest external stimulus. The deli ri um typical of 
the maniac is a c o n s eq uence of the dist orting  and 
magnifying effects of these taut, vib rating n e r v e s . 73 The 
tension of the nerves regulates appetite. Nerv ous 
afflicti ons could be treated, therefore, by physical means. 
This had been the orthodox view since Thomas Willis  had 
linked h y s te ri a to dis turba nc es in the brain and ’nervous 
s t o c k ’ .7t The mela n c h o l i c  requires the world to be brought 
close to him, he needs the ’s t i m u l a t i o n ’ of physical 
extremes. A l t e rna ti ng hot and cold baths was a good 
starting point. He could also benefit, from a rich diet, 
narcotic tonics and the d i s t r ac ti on of music and lively 
c o m p a n y , 77 The violent gyrations imparted by a v a r ie ty of 
specially designed  pieces of apparatus  might also prove 
beneficial. The ’r a v i n g ’ lunatic, conversely, needs to be 
constrained, secluded, isolated and calmed. The ’vice or
fault of the b r a i n 5 , was d i f f ic ult to control and much 
ingenuity was spent in pursuit of ef fec tiv e measures. In 
this regard ’m a n a gement  did much more than m e d i c i n e 5 , and
Deriod of calm al lo wing the ’n a t u r a l ’ tension of the n?i-
fibres to be restored: ’c o n f inement  alone is often times
suf f i c i e n t . ’7 s
There was no question  here of ’s u p p r e s s i n g ’ the 
emotions or affections. Each ’f a c u l t y ’ cont ri buted to 
human nature its essential element. The emotional life, 
therefore, required c u l t i v a t i o n  rather than simple 
restraint. The s i g n i fi ca nce of ae sthetic s in the Sco tt ish  
E n l i g hten me nt finds its coun t e r p a r t  here in the ad op ti on of 
specific codes of civilised  ’m a n n e r s ’ . The mode of 
expe rie ncing bod ily se ns ations itself became an as pe ct of 
’c u l t i v a t e d ’ fee lings .79 And it is in lust those forms 
(ordered, calm, predictable, friendly and in ev er ything 
moderate) that we discover the civ ic virtues of consumer 
rati o n a 1i t y .
In setting the bo undaries of rational consumption, 
melancholia and mania were, for the most part, as sociat ed  
wi t h d i f f eren t ranks of m e n .5 0 H e 1 anchoii a r ema i ned an 
affliction of the privileged. Their material wants 
satisfied they withdrew' from society and en joyed the 
company of their own imagination. Johnson, c o n t i nuall y 
struggling against the tem ptati on to melancholia, was saved 
by the insecurity of having to earn a living.05 Mania, as
an u n c ou th display of emotionality, co r r e s p o n d i n g l y  found 
its place among the pauper lunatics that came to litter the 
asylums of the n i n e t e e n t h  century* There were of course 
exceptions. Waves of a more fas hionable frenzy swept the 
b o u r ge oi sie from time to time. Hale, wr iting in 1720 and 
comme nti ng on the c o n s e que nc es of the South Sea 'Bubble, 
draws a t t e nt ion to the numero us respectabl e people, ’whose 
heads were turned b.y the immense riches which fortune had 
suddenly thrown their w a y ’ , releasing in them a ’force of 
insatiable a v a r i c e ’ that quickly suc ceeded in ’de st roying  
the rational f a c u l t i e s ’ .62 A loss of cult i v a t i o n  alluded to 
more c r y p tic al ly  by Pinel who notes that, ’The storms of 
the revo lut ion stirred up c o r r e spon di ng tempests in the 
passions of m e n ’ .
Madness was not a matter of quan t i t a t i v e  extremes 
alone. The aff e c t i o n s  were perver se as well as inflamed or 
flacid. The lunatic consumes, immoderately, things that 
are worthless. J o hn so n fearing that ’all power of fancy 
over reason is a degree of i n s a n i t y ’ ,83 con ceives of a 
m e 1 a n c h o 1i c as a per son who consumes o n 1y himself 
emotionally, who lives upon ’ f a n c y ’ . Then, ’fictions b e gi n 
to operate as realities, false opinions fasten upon the 
mind, and life passes in dreams of rapture and a n g u i s h ’ -84 
The maniac, on the other hand, has no emotional interior, 
he is com plet el y ’o p e n ’ and unmannersd. His extr a v a g a n t  
pas s i o n s , e x p r es si ng unbo unded  appet i t e , betray a com pl ete 
lack of discrim ination. He tries to consume the entire
world, but in rage and b e w i l derment  his rage can only 
alight upon a s u c c essi on  of t r i v i a l i t i e s . 81
Self-control was admi tte dly difficult to achieve. The 
madman, an e v e r - p r e s e n t  p os sibilit y to us all, could be 
tolerated only by b e ing confined. A hundred years of 
prof i teer i ng d e m o n s t r a t e d  the super ior e f f i c i encvy of a 
system of ’moral m a n a g e m e n t ’ within the a s y l u m . T h e  
introduction of ’e n l i g h t e n e d ’ treatment was little more in 
fact than a technical improvement in the art of 
incarceration. ’T h e r a p y ’ was slow to be introduced and was 
rarely practi ce d wi th conviction. The minute r e g u la ti on of 
daily life wi th in the safety of a ’r e t r e a t ’ ideally' 
provided a Sal lean ’s c h o o l i n g ’ of the passions. But while 
the child had first to submit to the au thorit y of a master 
as a preco n d i t i o n  of instruction, the doctor ought to forge 
a relat io nship of equ al ity with his patient. He must trust 
in the hum an ity of the madman. This was an ’e x t r e m e ’ but 
consistent view, most frequently  practise d by way of some 
’s a f e ’ and te ntativ e g e s t u r e . 87
During the e i g h teenth  century, the prototy pes of 
u n r e a s o n w e r s o r g a n i s e d c o n c e p t u a 1 1 y a. s c a p r ice, 
bewilderment and derangement; politically as education, 
slavery and confinement: comme r c i a l l y  as the school, the
plantation and the asylum. Each excluded  from the general 
social process those incapable of acting in c o n f o r m i t y  with
reason. And each was defined by inadequacy or per ver si on 
in one of those specific faculties whose synthesis normal 1' 
co nstitu ted human nature. An impe rfectio n in one faculty 
thus corrupted the others. The child was, to a degree, 
bew ild ered and deranged as well as capricious: but he was
so because of his o ve rw helmin g prope ns ity to playfulness. 
The general u n r e a s o a n b i e n e s s  of the savage and lunatic 
stemmed si milarl y from their particular and res pe ct ive  
defi cienci e s .
W ith in their secure encl osures the u n r e a s o n a b l e  were 
made the subjec ts of small ut opian s o c i e t i e s . Be Sh eltere d 
from the harsher reality of capitalism, they enjoyed a 
special kind of ’h u m a n i t a r i a n ’ protection. The slave and 
the madman, like the child, was s u ffici en tly ’h e l p l e s s ’ to 
require con sta nt supervision. They needed the perpetual 
care of professional custodians, It was an ideological 
opportunity that proved i r r e s i s t i b l e . 89
The y w e r e c o n t a. i n e d h u L n u t f o r gotten. The
fascination with unruly passion and the exotic, d i s o rdered 
intellect was un di m i n i s h e d  by the growth of
’e n l i g h t e n m e n t ’ . Bedlam, for over a century, was a place 
of popular entertainment, an at tracti on  as popular as any 
literary B o u g a i n v i 1 1i er and as mora lly ambiguous as the 
growth of 'a sent i menta 1 attachment to c h i l d h o o d . 90
United as it was in the acc eptan ce  of the co mmerc  i a 1
world and the image of m a n ’s rational nature it supported, 
the en li ghtened bour ge oisie could not suppress an urge to 
look upon the world in its primordial nakedness. There was 
something of s sense of loss in their relation to the 
varieties of unreason. A hint of regret that gradually 
intensified into a longing, infr equently and timidly 
expressed, to renounce civilisation. F u n , as r e a s o n ’s 
antithesis, b e c a m e _the subiect matter of the new sciences 
of child psychology, a n t h r op ology and psychiatry. it was 
through them that reason could be cleansed of its 
impurities, but it was also through them that a f r i s s on of 
contact with the cos mo logy of fun could still be f e l t . 91
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Notes to the Introduction
1. See, for- example, Lea ch (1982), p. 212-20.
2. On the di st i n c t i o n  bet wee n ’e v e r y d a y ’ reality and 
theoretical constructs; see Schutz (1976), and Sc'nutz and 
Luckmann (1974) pp. 3-18.
3. Or the di scussi on  becomes almost exclus ively 
methodological, for a recent example see Komesaroff (1986). 
There are of course .some no ta ble  exceptions, see below 
notes (1) and (2) to c h . 8.
Notes to Chapter One
1. This includes many pri mi ti ve societies. See Du rk heim  
and Hauss (1970), D u r kheim (1915), Lev i-Str au ss (1968), pp. 
132-67,
Needham (1973).
2. As diver sely as, for example, in S w i f t ’s Tale of a Tub 
and D o s t o e v s k y ’s Notes from Under g r o u n d .
3. Gay (1966), pp. 120-5; a theme de veloped generally in 
Turgot (1973), and Cond or cet (1955), a good deal less 
co mpl acently  than in their n i n e t e e n t h  century followers.
See also Simon (1963).
4. Cassirer (1966), p. 5, remarks that: ’’’R e a s o n ” becomes 
the unifying and central point of this c e n t u r y ’ , and makes 
it plain that even as i nte i 1ect reason had a much wider 
meaning that is common for us. ’Th ou gh t consists not only 
in analysing ana dissecti ng but in actual ly  bringing about 
that order of things which it conceives as necessary, so 
that by this act of fulfil lment it may dem on st rate its own 
reality and t r u t h ’ , ibid., p. viii. See also Hazard
(1965), pp. 37-55.
5. Notable p a r t i cu larly in H u t c h e s o n ’s An Enquiry into the 
Original of our Ideas of Beauty and V i r t u e , a vigorous
argument in defence of the autonomy of aes th et ic
sensibility. A line of thought whic h influenced Hume, see 
Norton (1982), p. 92; Vereker (1967), p. 56.
6. Goldmann (1973), crit ic ally fol lowing Kant (1963), takes 
a somewhat narrow view in ca stigat in g the E n 1ightenmant 
ambition to liberate ’t h o u g h t ’ from ’r e a l i t y ’ . See above,
note (4). Not all of course were as subtle as Hume,
Holbach, for example, declares bluntly: ’theology is only
the ignorance of natural causes reduced to a s y s t e m ’ ,
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quoted in Manuel ed. (1965), p. 58* While Reid, from a 
completely d i f fe re nt s t a n dpo in t argues  no netheless  
similarly that, 'philosophers, pitying the cred ulity of the 
vulgar, resolve to have no faith but what is founded upon 
reason', Ro bi nson ed. (1961), pp. 139-40.
7 . The imp lication of such a view is that The World as Will 
and Rep re s e n t a t i o n  is no more than Locke's Essay Co n c e r n i n g  
Human Unde r s t a n d i n g  a genuine ’p r e c u r s o r 'of The 
Interpretation of D r e a m s .
8. The d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of social life into production, 
circ ul ation and co ns u m p t i o n  is more often than not simply 
taken for granted. The most impressive recent at te mpt to 
utilise these disti n c t i o n s  is to be found in the work of 
Braudel (1979, 1983 and 1984), see p arti cu larly (1983), pp.
20-3.
9. This a r g ument  will be pursued below, Chs. 9 and 12, the 
basic insight is cpnta in ed in Sohn-Rethel (1978), T h o mpson  
(1961), and before them Lukacs (1971) and Simmel (1979).
10. For detail ed p ersu as ion see Febvre and Marti n (1976), 
pp. 143-66, and more ge ner ally Braudel (1983).
11. Hume wro te more on hi story than on philosophy, Rou ss eau 
wrote on mu sic and chemis tr y as well as everything else.
And it was for his v e r s a t i l i t y  that, as Cassirer notes, 
Diderot was idolised. See also Gay (1966), ch. 1.
12. A system as p o t e n t i a l l y  complex as that sketched for 
the rational cosmos by F o u caul t (1970), who somewhat 
surprisingly o v ersimp li fies the internal relations of the 
unreasonable.
13. Rousse au  (1911), p. 1.
14. Aries (1973), pp. 60-2, 98-111. But note critical 
remarks by Polloc k (1983), pp. 33-67, and Hunt (1970), pp
32-51. See also Porter (1982), pp. 284-6, Stone (1979), 
pp. 254-303, W r i g ht son (1982), pp. 108-18, Davidoff and 
Hal 1(1987), pp. 335-56, MacDo na ld (1981), pp. 85-8.
15. Rou sseau (1911), p. 50. Children, he says, exp eri en ce 
'desires which are not true needs, desires which can only 
be satisfied with the help of others'. Childhood, as a 
consequence, 'has its own ways of seeing, thinking, and 
f e e l i n g ’ , ibid., p. 54.
16. Ferguson (1983), pp. 146-51.
17. Locke (1968), p. 143. Th ough Locke as represen ta tive 
of a declining ar is t o c r a t i c  tradition in this respect was 
less w h o l e hear te d than were his followers. Bantoc k (19801), 
vo i.1, p . 277.
18. Rousseau (1911), p. 95.
42
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TWO
. THE F E A RFUL C O S M O G R A P H E R
The close and d i f f i c u 11 r e 1 a t i onshi p be tween Hume and 
Roussea u exposes the inherent ins tability of reason in the 
Age of E n l i g h t e n m e n t * 1 Aspiring to the broadest freedom 
within the rep ub li c of letters, they pushed bey ond the 
boundaries more cautio us philosop hes had accepte d as the 
limits reco mm ended by Nature to human conduxct. But while 
Hume remained secure and at ease within  an eve ry day worid 
that his intellect had time and again completely 
undermined, Rousseau, the less radical met aphysician, could 
not resist the temp tation to expe ri ence directly, as will 
and passion, the world's u nr ea sonabl e aspect, Ro ussau's  
emotionalism, his ’terrifying e l o q u e n c e ’ , testify to an 
existence just beyond the reach of conventional reason; an 
existence Hume could only grasp i n t e 11e c t u a 11y . Eac h  
clinging to the co nventions discarded by the other, their 
mutual a dmirati on  as writers could not withsta nd the shock' 
of a personal encounter.
4 9
Rou sseau  and Hume in fact, from the per spect iv e of a 
later period, become twin critics of the E n l i g h t e n m e n t . 2 
If reason were a genuine synthesis of human faculties, then 
it must be a goai beyond the reach of practical life. Most 
people, however, including most phi 1a s o p h e s , were less 
exacting and less disturbed. The harmonious inter -r elati on 
of will, intellect and emotion was largely taken for 
granted. The subversive genius at the heart of the 
En li g h t e n m e n t  was ignored and their writings, during the 
ni n e teenth  century, became unfashionable.
The d i s t i n c t i o n  be tw een reason and unrea so n became 
simplified in acc ord ance with new social imperatives.
Reason, at once more specific and more practical, became 
defined as an e x c l us ively intellectual function. It was 
not, however, simply another term for- the intellect.
Reason was the i n s t r u m e n t a 1 use of intellect: a practical 
intelligence. It was only in pursuit of a practical goal 
that thought became reason. More specifically, it was the 
form given to thought in the process of our gaining mastery  
over the natural and sociai world. Reason was both the 
precondit io n and cons equence  of our power to subdue nature: 
a power represented primarily  by s c i e n c e . =
In this context the shrinkage  in the scope of reason 
is as so cia ted with a growing awareness of the u n d e r l y i n g  
productive mecha ni sm of social life.' C a p i t a l i s m  is viewed
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more as the means of pro du cing co mmoditie s and less as the
universal system of their exchange. Reason, mo delle d upon
this process of production, becomes the most general
'means' at our disposal. Distin g u i s h i n g  itself from the
complex of 'civic virtues', it takes on a hard, un yielding
aspect. As the social logic of production, it reduces all
forms of u n r e a s o n a b l e n e s s  to equivale nt instances of the
irrational. Thus, while  many ei gh teent h century writers
might for the sake of literary embel li shment draw
compa ris ons between, say, childr en  and savages, ni ne teenth
. •
century sci entists saw the deve lo pment of child psychology, 
a n t h r opol og y and p s y c h i a t r y  as genuinely cognate 
disciplines.
This was given formal and somewhat belated r ec og nition 
in Ernst H a e c k e l ’s 'b iogenet ic  law'.3 The conceptual 
c o nden sa ti on which allo we d madness, for example, to be 
viewed as o n t o g e n e t i c  and p h y l o ge netic 'regression', 
however, had taken place a good deal earlier. And, more 
generally, the theory of 'development' of which  such views 
were a part was e n u n ci ated well in advance of Darwi n' s 
de mo ns tratio n of its spe ci f i c  scienti fic validity.
Auguste C o m t e ’s Cours de ph iiosoph ie positive might be 
taken then as one of the earliest, and certa inly the most 
sy stemat ically ambitious, ex pr essions of the new point of 
v i ew.6 It remains the most comprehe ns ive attempt to render 
history int elligible through the use of 'intellectual
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evol uti on as the p r e p o nd er ant p r i n c i p l e . ' 7 W r it te n during 
the 1830's, and de liv ere d first in the form of private 
lectures, Comte assembl ed  what he took to be the materials  
requisite to an inductive demon s t r a t i o n  of his cele brated 
' law' of the three stages. At the outset, he makes 
explicit the a s s u m p t i o n  which  justifies merg ing  into a 
single cate go ry of the irrational all previous va rie ties of 
the unreasonable. 'The point of departu re  of the individual 
and of the race being the same', he claims, 'the phases of 
the mind of man co rrespon d to the epochs of the mind of the 
race'.0 Both are to be measu re d and judged by the standard 
of the 'positive s c i e n c e s ’ .
It is a standa rd est abl is hed by the totality of human 
historical development. In opposition, therefore, to his 
En lig h t e n m e n t  predecessors, Comte insists upon the 
inhere ntl y p r o g ressiv e character of religion. The 
'theological stage' through which all forms of thought must 
pass, is not viewed negatively. It is not simply an 
obstacle to the a tt ai nment of a rational truth but a 
necessary  stage in the dev elop me nt of a science that will 
ul ti mately free itself from fi nalistic prejudices. There 
is indeed nothing in the past which  is not in some sense 
'progressive'. This dog ma tism is a co ns equence of Com te' s 
convictio n that sociology, in bec om in g a positive science, 
can express the entire history of humanity in terms of 
invariable laws. All discer nible differen ces in modes of 
thought and ways of living must be reducible to ele me nt s
withi n an u n b r o k e n  series. Ail events must find an 
app ro pr iate place within  the continu ous process that 
finally de li ve rs reason into the w o r l d . 9
In resting his entire ’p h i l o s o p h y ’ upon an historical 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  of the sciences, Comte for cefully express es 
the i n t e 11e c t u a 1ist vision that was to domina te the rest of 
the century. He insists that, even at the earliest stages 
of development, man requires the world to be c o n c e p t u a l l y  
ordered. And, in cons tructin g such an order, Comte assumes 
the pr im it ive ’must begin by supposing himself to be the 
centre of a 11 t h i n g s . ’1 ° B ew il dered by the world of 
appearances, a r c ha ic  man can organise the world only upon 
the basis of his own inner experience. His kn o w l e d g e  is 
excl usive ly  know le dge of himself. It is his internal states 
and feelings, p a r t i c u l a r l y  the fear generated by his 
impotence in the face of nature, that prompts his first 
stumbling efforts in conce ptualisation. The most p r i mitive 
form of thought is thus a direct proj ection of s u b j e c t i v i t y  
upon the external world. This fetishism is the initial 
disp ositi on  towards the world of t h i n g s . 11 Behind every 
natural phenomenon, each event or occurrence, there is held 
to stand some spiritual entity as its ’c a u s e ’ . Fetishism, 
’allowed free exerci se to the tendency of our natur e by 
which Man concei ve s of all external bodies as a n i mate d by a 
life, an ala gous to his own, with di ffe rences of mere  
i n t e n s i t y ’ .12 Subject iv e ’f e e l i n g s ’ , in other words, were 
held to ac count (directly) for human experi ence and
(p r o j e c t i v e i y ) for the natural world.
The fundamental difference, therefore, be tween the 
savage and ourselves  is not that we possess reason where he 
has none, but that our reason has been ’ l i b e r a t e d ’ from the 
feelings in which it was origina ll y e n t a n g l e d . 13 Even in 
the ear liest  times, man sought the causes of things. The 
savage reasoned, however, on the basis of false a s s u mptions  
and un te sted judgments of reality. Only very slowly could 
the rational faculty es tablis h its supremacy. That human 
history is the story of this gradual asce n d a n c y  Comte  has 
no doubt. For him, it is s elf-e vi dent that the 
’d e v e 1opmen t which brings after it the i m p r o v e m e n t  in human 
s o c i e t y ’ , is a process of subjecting, ’ail our passions  to 
rules imposed by an ev er - s t r e n g t h e n i n g  i n t e l l i g e n c e . ’14
This ’d e v e l o p m e n t ’ is not an unequivocal blessing. 
’Savages, like c h i l d r e n ’, he notes, ’are not subjec t to 
muc h ennui while t h e i r t p n y s i c a 1 activity, whi ch alo ne is of 
any importance to them, is not interfered w i t h ’ .13 The 
lassitude of reason is, nonetheless, much to be p r e fe red to 
the terrors of fetishism. Comte purges himself of all 
sentimental att ach me nt to the primitive. The primordial 
world has no value of its own. It exists only as an 
initial, faltering, step towards the a c c o m p l i s h m e n t  of that 
rational control over every aspect of life. The u n d e r l y i n g  
in ter conne ct ed ness of nature making itself felt, as it were 
intuitively, through m a n ’s improving a d a p t a t i o n  to the
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world, gradu ally expresse s itself as a system of spiritual 
forces. When fully de veloped the powerful intellectual 
apparatus of the theological stage mutates into a 
mat aphysical extravagance, the prep arato ry  interlude to the 
wholly d i s e n chan te d positiv e stage. The preh is tory of 
p os iti vis m is in fact reduced to a series of inadequate but 
inescapable an t i c i p a t i o n s  of s c i e n c e ’s final triumph.
As soc ia ti ons
V ic to rian social thought, in calling on the sci e n t i f i c 
evide nce  of evolution, gave fresh impetus to what remained 
a broadly Co m t i a n  ve rsio n of p o s i t i v i s m . 16 Increasing 
emphasis was placed, however, on the character of the 
savage cosmos itself, rather than the narr ative of r e a s o n ’ s 
ineluctable progress beyond it. Since all such 
descrip tio ns were, in practice, r e c o n s tructio ns  by west ern 
academ ic r a tion al ists of the un r e l i a b l e  tes timony of 
mis sio naries and travellers, the result is liable to tell 
us more about the image of the cosmos the bourg eo is scholar- 
felt com pelled to renounce than it is to inform us di rectly  
of the prim itive  worldview.
An aura of impr opriety clung to even the most austere  
of these works. In dwelling on the irrationa lities of 
primitive life, a way was opened to discuss ever ything 
enlightened opinion and good manners had already settled.
It was there for e the et hno g r a p h i c  detail and not the 
theoretical ref lections they contained that made such books 
p o p u l a r . 17 Their neg l e c t e d  analys es were, notwithstanding, 
of con si derable  significance. If reason is defined 
instru men tally as efficiency, and in e vo lutiona ry  terms as 
adaptation, then the u n r e a s o n a b l e  becomes irrational and 
can be nothing other than a form of maladju sted thought.
An ineffectual and ther efore  misguided  science.
Sir Edward T y l e r ’s P r i mitive  C u l t u r e , publ is hed in 
*
1871 best illustrates these tendencies. As c o n f i d e n t l y  as 
Comte, he holds to the ’s cien ti fic n a t u r a l i s m ’ 
c h arac te ristic of the p e r i o d . 18 The present state of the 
’ industrial a r t s ’ in W e s t e r n  Europe and Amer ica could be 
adopted wi thout a r g um en t as the standard  agains t w h i c h  the 
’ le vel’ of deve l o p m e n t  of any other society might be 
j u d g e d . 1 9
At various points, 'Tylor also makes an open 
comparison b e t we en  the ’stage of t h o u g h t ’ typical of the 
savage and of the child in modern advanc ed society. 
C h i l d r e n ’s games, for example, ’keep up the record of 
primitive warlike a r t s ’ .20 And in childr en we see the same 
facility in the imitative fun ction of speech that had 
proved, ’so important in the for mation of l a n g u a g e . ’21 
There is, in addition, a similar fascinat ion with riddles, 
games of chance and, most s i g n i fic an tly of all, in a 
propensity to magical t h o u g h t . 22
56
The child, the savage and our archaic ance stors are
alike in their tho ught world being m y t h i c ; ’ in our
c h i l d h o o d ’ , he assures us, referring to our co llective
chi ldhood in a r c ha ic  society as well as our personal
infancy, ’we dwelt at the very gates of the realm of
m y t h ’ .23 And myth is an outgrowt h of the same basic
mov em ent of pr o j e c t i o n  that Comte had defined as fetishism.
’First and foremos t among the causes which tr ans figure into
myths the facts of daily experience, is the belief in the 
*
ani ma tion  of all nature, rising at its highest pit ch to 
p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n ’ .24
This is for Tylor, however, an aspect of a broad 
philosoph y of natu r e  rather than a ’m e c h a n i c a l ’ reflex.
The animism  typical of chi ldren and savages springs 
directly from primordial intuition of nature. Incapable of 
reducing the world to an ordered set of relations, they yet 
strive to dis cover wit h i n  it a meaning deeper than 
appearances. The oper at ion of an un an a l y s a b l e  intuition, 
proper names are given to natural phenomena; the sun and 
moon, for example, become the living em bo dim ent of sexual 
difference. It is a cosmology ’deeper than m e t a p h o r ’25 
Against Max Muller and the dominant philological school, 
Tylor argues that, far from be traying an eleme nt ary 
linguistic confusion, the u ni versali ty  of such a vi sion of 
the world (the diurnal romance of the sun and moon, the 
living monster of the rainbow, the sky popu lated  with
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ancestor spirits co nde nse d into points of light), springs 
from an original and ’deep c o n s c i ousness  of n a t u r e ’ .26 It 
involves ’a direct co m p a r i s o n  of object with object and 
action with a c t i o n ’ , resting ’on a basis of real and 
sensible a n a l o g y ’.27 Myth indeed is more profound than 
poetry which survives as its linguistic echo. And, in 
passages re miniscen t of Rousseau, he argues that language 
itself begins in myth, in the a d a p tation  of imitative 
sounds to proper names pro jecte d into the cosmos as the 
’grammar of n a t u r e ’ . T h r o u g h  it, the savage does not simply 
communicate, he draws himself into the ’reflecti on of a 
my thi c w o r l d ’ .Ifl
The rom ant ic and vis i o n a r y  side of T y l o r ’s work has 
been somewhat neglected, yet there is little in Lang that 
is not taken dir ec tl y from the m a s t e r . 29 Pri miti ve  Cu lture 
is no netheles s fundamental 1 unl ike R o u s s e a u ’s Pi s c o u r s e .
The Vic to rian  mo ra list restrains and finally su pp res ses the 
initial tendency towards romanticism. Magical th oug ht and 
the myths grown from them may be formed intuitively, but 
from the p er spect iv e of our own controlled reflection, we 
can detect the asso c i a t i v e  m e c ha ni sm which in fact guides 
savage thought. The a ssoc ia ti on of ideas, that is to say, 
a principle central to our own rationality, covertly 
organises the savage cosmos. It is ’a faculty whic h lies 
at the very foun dation  of human r e a s o n ’ , and, he adds 
soberly, ’in no small degree human un reaso n a l s o ’ .30 Once 
formed, the most superficial asso ci ation s tend to persist,
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’frozen* into sup erstit io us and magical beliefs. Tylor 
exposes the c o n t e m p o r a r y  popular ity of spiritualism, for 
example, as just such a vestigial belief.
The savage finds connections everywhere. it is ail
too easy to di sc over ’s i m i l a r i t i e s ’ among things. The
netw ork  of sy m b o l i c  rel ati onships expands a l a r m i n g l y  and
quite unsyst ema tical ly. New links are conti n u o u s l y
generated, drawing the savage into a richly inte rc onnecte d
and intera ctive  world. It is the a s s o c i a t i o n  be t w e e n  
%
e xp er iences in dreams, reveries and imagination, on the one 
hand, and the events of the ’r e a l ’ world, on the other, 
that prove p a r t i c u l a r l y  powerful and pernicious. These 
metaphorical re la tions are taken, as are all re lations of 
similitude, to be ca usally effective.
R ea lit y and its r e pr es entatio n is confused. The 
process of association, the psychological m e c h a n i s m  whi ch 
carries the potentiai of reason, remains at an u n c o n s c i o u s  
and th erefore u n c o r recte d level. It acts in an 
u n c o n trol le d fash ion as an intermediary b e t we en  an original 
intuition of nature, and the completed mytholo gical world 
within w h ich ev erything stands transformed. Thus, ’any idea 
shaped and made current by mythic fancy may at once ac qui re  
all the d e f i n it en ess of a f a c t . ’31 The u n d e r l y i n g  process 
remains opaque, and causal relations, u n c r i t i c a l l y  inferred 
from every a s s o ciati ve  bond, are underst oo d as spiritual 
forces. The cosmos thus becomes a web of immaterial forces
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giving rise, at various un p r e d i c t a b l e  points, to the
sensible tra ns formati on s of the physical world. Given that
it is a ’t h e o r y ’ resting on noth ing but accidental
relations, the intimate cos mology of the savage is a kind
of spiritual terrorism. The savage is helpless in the face
of nature. Divining relations within it, he represents
these u n s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  as the cont ro lling spiritual forces
to which he also is subject. U n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y  is
h y p o s t a t i s e d ; yet his securit y depends upon regularity. The
savage creates for himself an u n c o m f o r t a b l e  cosmos; a
*
reality more frighte ni ng than the ’r a w ’ nature from which 
it sprang.
T y l o r ’s work became  the foundation, in c o n c eptio n and 
method, for a gene ratio n and more of e t h n ographi c 
compilations. His ideas were c o n t inuall y discussed, often 
distorted, and rarely s u r p a s s e d . 32 V i c toria n 
i n t e 11e c t u a 1ism found ample confi r m a t i o n  with in the 
generous pr op ortions of Pri mitiv e Cu lt ur e before losing 
itself comp le tely in the luxuriant growth of The G o ld en  
B o u g h . Vi cto ry over the Ge rm an  philological school 
secured, Frazer could go on to de vel op T y l o r ’s me thod on a 
global sc al e . 33 First pub lished in 1890, The Go lden Bough 
was subjected to a cont inuous process of revision and 
enlargement. Not content with  reviewing e t h n o g r a p h i c 
literature from all' parts of the savage world, Frazer 
arranged his sources ? d e v e l o p m e n t a l i y T in such a way as to 
lead effo rt lessly  into the more complex mythological field
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of ancient n e a r e a s t e r n  civil is ations and their cont e m p o r a r y  
degraded remnants that clung still to Eu ro pean soil in the 
form of peasant superstitions*
Frazer asse rts the unity of human thought not only in 
terms of a single underly in g me ch anism (association) commo n 
to primi tiv e and to advanc ed peoples, but also h i s t o ricall y 
in terms of its content. ’The mela n c h o l y  cry of the 
Egyptian r e a p e r s ’ , he tells us in a typical generalisation,
’ which down to Ro man  times could be heard year after year
ft
sounding across the fields. Similar c r i e s . ..were also heard 
in the harvest fields of We ste rn Asia... And to this day 
Devonshire reapers utter cries of the same s o r t ’ .34 Cries 
that is to the corn god, that might still be fl eetingly 
sighted makin g its way across the edge of half-cut fields 
into wooded areas. For people ’un able to d is crimina te  
clearly be t w e e n  words and t h i n g s ’ , the natural world could 
take on a living appearance; it must certai nly be 
experienced as a pro found ly  different  place to the world in 
which we lived.35 Nature, for them, was not a system of 
fixed relations. It was constantly, and quite literally, 
chang i ng s hape . The corn-spirit, for ex amp i e , might appear­
and reappear in the guise of any number of a p p a rent ly  
different beings. The savage cosmos was possessed of such 
an ex traordinary  liberty of m e tamor ph osis that, ’magical 
change of shape seems perfectly c r e d i b l e ’ .36
Frazer c o n s i de rably elabora tes on T y l o r ’s basic
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insight into the origins of magical thought. The 
associa ti on of ideas cnn follow either of two fundamental 
paths. Similitude, which reduces to the simple idea that 
’.like produces l i k e ’ , is the foundat ion of ’m i m e t i c ’ magic; 
and continuity, w h ich  assumes that things once in contact 
remain ’ l i n k e d ’ by invisible forces, flowers into chains of 
’s y m p a t h e t i c ’ magic. Both principles are slavishl y 
followed as the invaria ble indicators of efficie nt 
causality, b i n di ng the world into an un broken  but chao tic 
network of determinism. It is to the latter that Frazer
ft
traces the spirit  of scientific  enquiry, ’Whenever 
sy mpa thetic magic occurs in its pure un a d u l t e r a t e d  form, it 
assumes that in na ture one event follows another 
nec es sa rily and invaria bly wit hout the inte rv ention  of any 
spiritual agency. Thus its fundamental con c e p t i o n  is 
i d e n t i c a 1 with that of mo de rn s c i e n c e . ’3 7
it is a c o n v i c t i o n  of determinism, however, in the 
absence of a s u i t a b l e ' c o n c e p t i o n  of nature. It is ap plied 
universally, to every accident of immediate experience, in 
complete ignorance ’of the nature of the pa rt icular laws 
which govern its s u c c e s s i o n . ’38 In a t t e mp ti ng to render 
the co mp lex ity of empirical reality dir ec tl y into a 
science, magic, rather as Comte had com pl ained of political 
economy, ’sys te ma tises a n a r c h y ’ .3 9
Again echoing Comte, Frazer goes on to suppose that 
this purely intellectual error was itself the stimulus to
progress: ’the shrewder intelligences must in time have
come to perce iv e that magical ceremonies and incantat ions 
did not really affect  the results which they were designe d 
to p r o d u c e . ’ 40 As a technology, magic was a failure; the 
mere repetition, s y m b o li ca lly or actually, of specific 
events or c i r c u m s t a n c e s  associat ed with some desirab le  
state of affa irs was held to be suffici ent for the 
reap pe arance of such a state. The coincidence, of course, 
is not ge nerally repeatable, and it is this failure, Frazer 
suggests, w h ich prompts the dev el opment of r e l i g i o n . 41
Frazer goes to some lengths to dist i n g u i s h  the 
separate intellectual mechanism s and motives at the roots 
of religion and magic. Re li gion is not just the 
’a p p l i c a t i o n 1 of magical thought to specific p r o blems  of 
life. Magic, he had pointed out, is in fact beref t of 
spiritual forces so that T y l o r ’s di scovery  of a n i m i s m  was 
in reality a d e s c r i p t i o n  of. the most primiti ve form of 
religion rather than the beginnings of science. ’Our 
primitive p h i l o so ph er must have been sadly p e r p l e x e d ’ , he 
remarks, ’by the impotence of his magical t e c h n i q u e ’ .42 
This failure must be due to the de facto control of the 
world by be ing s more powerful than man, ’beings, like 
himself, but far stronger, who, unseen themselves, directed 
its course and br ought about all the varied series of 
events which he had hitherto believed to be de p e n d e n t  on 
his own m a g i c ’ .43 Magical practices the refore gave way to 
religious rites, to rituals, that is, designed to influ enc e
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by paying tribute to those spiritual beings r espons ib le for 
nature*
In subse q u e n t l y  c o n c e nt rating upon the de ve l o p m e n t  of 
re 1igious be 1iefs and practices, Frazer renders the 
s im ultaneo us dev el opment of ’r a t i o n a l i t y ’ a so mew hat 
mysterio us process. Is the growth of reason a slow 
liberation at the hands of the unu sua ll y insightful, or a 
series of happy accid en ts co ns equen t upon m i s g uided  
tec hno logies?  The latter poss ibility  is sugg es ted in 
relation, for example, to the Matlock Islanders who, 
conscious of the practical advanta ge s of reliable 
navigational aids, ’ incident ally stumbled upon the elements 
of another science, which is a s t r o n o m y ’, without fully 
u nd er s t a n d i n g  its rational p r i n c i p l e s . 44
The r a t i onalist  rejection  of magic can also be seen as 
an i n t e 11e c t u a 1isation of its world; a means of m a i n t a i n i n g  
’at a d i s t a n c e ’ our rel ation with its primordial 
irrationality. By tracing its distance in e v o l u t i o n a r y  
terms from our own, sci ent if ic concepts a chain of 
continuity was established, lending empirical w e ight to the 
abstract simi li tude said to link modern ra tional it y with 
the most prim it ive mode of thought. It was itself, in other 
words, a piece of intellectual ’m a g i c ’ , whi ch served to 
legitimate the tan gi bl e closeness of the vanished cosmos, 
allowing us once again the sense the ’real and subst antial 
b o n d ’ betw een  words and things. Among ’c i v i l i s e d ’ people,
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it was not only the peasants w h o ’ ’ in their hearts (could) 
never really a b and on  their old s u p e r s t i t i o n s ’ .4S
Frazer was only the most pro minent of .a widely held 
v i e w p o i n t . T h r o u g h  a theory of animism, the Vic t o r i a n  
rationalist m o m e n t a r i l y  escaped into the cosm ol ogy of fun.
It is a un iverse  wi thin  which all things become contig uous  
and the simili tu des uniting all things spring s p ontan eo usly 
to light. The only law of change wi th in such a cosmos is 
the u n r e s t r a i n e d  free dom of metamorphosis. W h olly enmeshed 
in boundless a s s o c i a t i o n s  the ’s u b j e c t ’ is dr awn into 
’n a t u r e ’ . All the d i stinct io ns proper to his individuated 
ego are obliterated. The separateness  of the human body is 
barely recognised, the d is ti nction  be tw een ’ i n s i d e ’ and 
’o u t s i d e ’ barely applies. ’S u b j e c t i v e ’ d ispo si tions cease 
to be the primar y experiences, upon which is mo delled  a 
picture of the cosmos, and become instead the real forces 
of n a t u r e .
Frazer and most of his contemporaries, however, shrank 
from the im pli catio ns of their theories. They av oi ded  
direct contact with the cosmos of fun, pre feri ng  in the 
mechanism of a s s o c i a t i o n  and the theory of a n i mism a 
glimpse of chaos from the safe perspecti ve of an 
undisturbed ego. This hal f-hear tedne ss  is precis el y the 
weakness of their ’t h e o r y ’ . From Comte to Frazer (and 
beyond), an individu at ed ’b o u r g e o i s ’ con sc iousne ss  lurks 
just beneath the surface of ethnography. The fo un dation  of
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animism, the p r o j ec ti on of su bj e c t i v i t y  on to nature, 
assumes an elemental separat io n of ’s u b j e c t ’ from ’o b j e c t ’ 
the e vo lu tionar y p e r s pecti ve  had itself denied to those 
societies in which it was made to play a leading role. The 
whole process of projection, that is to say, is 
inc omp rehensi ble unless we assume the savage, as well as 
his theoretical observer, is posse ssed of a typical ly 
modern ego.
It is as if the social theorist, sud de nly finding
to
himself in the mid st of a primi ti ve society, assumes 
everyone else there has similarly arrived, as if in a time 
machine, just a minu t e  or so before him. Bereft, but not 
forgetful, of civilisation, they assess their p red ic ament 
sti 1 1 encumb ered by many of the psychological featur es of 
’a d v a n c e d ’ cultures. The world th erefore becomes a 
fr igh teningl y dan gero us  place. W i t hou t the control over 
nature exerc ise d by instrumental reason, e thnog ra pher and 
savage live in a co nd ition of perpetual insecurity. Natur 
appears ferocious and u n p r e d i c t a b l e . 47 Magic develo ps 
spo nta neou sl y in a vain attempt to avert per iodic
catstrophe, illness and hardship. Having failed, religiou
rites are ins tigated to enlist the aid of those responsibl
for forces beyond human control.
The concept io n of reason as the instrument of n a t u r e ’ 
sub jugation and of the irrational as intellectual 
confusion, brings together the prev iously separated
prototy pes  of u n r e a s o n a b l e n e s s  within  a single category. 
Madness, whi ch had been viewed as a disorder of the 
affections, thus became  a disease of the mind whose 
’s y m p t o m s ’ might have been culled from the e t h n o g r a p h i c  
1 i terature.
Bar on Ernst von F e u c h t e r s 1e b e n ’s Pri nci ples of Medical
Psycho  1o g y , publ is hed in Vi enna in 1845, and generally
regarded as the first mode r n  psyc hiatri c text is not,
therefore, just a ’m e d i c a 1i s a t i o n ’ of previo us notions. He
defines ’h e a l t h ’ as ’the perfect adaptat io n of the body,
wit hout injury to its integrity, to the purposes of the
m i n d ’ .4 a As m a n ’s ’material nature is not wholly
m a t e r i a l ’ , ma dnes s is quickly transfor med into a di sease of
the m i n d . B o di ly  app et ites are effective only when
repres ent ed to the mind as desire. And the mind itself, to
remain healthy, must es tab lish its own internal order as
s el f-consc ious r e a s o n . 49
*
Just as Tylor, therefore, cri ti cised  popular 
spiritualism, Feu ch te rs 1 eben attack ed an earlier- 
fashionable interest in ’m a g n e t i c ’ st a t e s . 30 Such a l ter ed  
states are ’not a more  exalted but a more fettered state of 
m i n d ’ . Mo longer an instrument of se lf -c onscio us  reason, 
the mind, like the body, falls under ’s e l f - d e l u s i o n s ’ .51 
It destroys the ’free s e 1f - r e g u l a t i o n ’ which alone is 
genuine rationality.
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The co mmo n general cause of madness is traced to ’ the
err oneous co mb i n a t i o n  of man ifold ideas often united with
the p a t i e n t ’s own inc linations without his being aware of
the error, or being able to overcome i t ’ .32 The patient
begins to ’s e e ’ causal relations where none exist and, in
consequence, his perceptual world becomes distorted. The
process, if unchecked, ends in individual cases of
’a n i m i s m ’ . Exampl.es of such ’mental a l i e n a t i o n ’ a b o u n d . 33
Thus, the m a d m a n  ’ is not called mad be ca use his br ain is
o v er-e xc ited but because he judges and acts a b s u r d l y ’.34 
*
Once the process of ass oc ia tion bec ome s disordered, ’fancy 
rules w i th out c o n t r o l ’ and reality, as the savage myth 
world, b e c o m e s ’ ’a waking d r e a m ’ . Quoting R e i 1 wit h 
approval he argues that ’ Fools have no ruling idea... 
Besides their general craziness there is a rem arka bl e 
weakness of all the powers of the mind, e s p e cial ly  of the 
j u d g m e n t ’ .33 It is just in this intellectual fee ble ne ss 
that F e u c h t e r s 1eben recognises the ’r e g r e s s i o n ’ typical of 
the madman, ’am using 'themselves and playing pranks like 
chi 1d r e n . ’3 * ■
The ma dm an was then, like the savage, a poor 
scientist. He formed hypothetical conne ction s amo ng things 
without ever sub jecti ng them to the test of experiment. The 
subsequent errors were never correc ted and became 
magnified, ult i m a t e l y  into a wholly delusional reality.
That u n c o n t r o l l e d  a sso ci ation was respo nsibl e for 
individual cases of lunacy, became an orthodox do c t r i n e  of
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the new science of p s y c h i a t r y •37 It survived to receive 
its most e l a bo rate expo s i t i o n  in Eugene  B l e u l e r ’s 
authori ta tive text De m e n t i a  P r a e c o x . It was in this work 
that Bleuler introduced the term schizoph re nia to describe 
a loose grouping of symptoms cha racter is ed by a 
di sorga n i s a t i o n  of the a ss ociati ve  f u n c t i o n . =B The train 
of ass oc ia ti ons may lose its continuity, or be subject to 
periods of re lentless sponteneity; to pathological 
’blocking* or the ’flight of i d e a s ’ . Thoughts  are not 
related and or ganise d through a hie ra rc hy of logical 
concepts but are led from one to another by way of 
superficial and accidental relations: ’a senseless
co mpu lsion to ass o c i a t e  may replace thinking p r o p e r ’ .39 
Thought is reduced to ’an a u t om atic compulsion, quite 
independent of its c o n t e n t ’ .i0
The same irratio na lity (the ma la d a p t i v e  absence of 
self-conscious control over the process of association) 
defined the world of childhood. Inspired by the di fferent 
works of Darwi n and Froebei, there emerged a specif ic genre 
of works on the ps yc hology of c h i l d r e n . 4,1 Fir st hand 
observa tio ns of children, usually the a u t h o r ’s children, 
were adduced as evide nc e of the c h i l d ’s unde v e l o p e d  powers 
of thought. The child was c o n c e p tual is ed as an 
u n d i f f er entia te d sen so rium undergo in g a gradual process of 
orga nis ation into specific functions. The entire process 
was viewed from the perspe ctive of the mat uring  intellect; 
it was its gradual discov er y of logic which most cl eal ry
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exp ressed the u nde rl ying process of development observabl e 
in all aspects of child life. A leading spokesman outlines 
the general approach: ’The infant is con tem pl ated in the
process of gaining command over himself. His sense organs 
gradually become ava ilable for perception; his musc les 
become cont r o l l a b l e  by his will. Eac h new a c q u i s i t i o n  
becomes in turn an instrument of further p r o g r e s s ’ .62
The fact that chi ldren ’n a t u r a l l y ’ grew up gave to 
these works a somewh at dif fe rent tone to et hn o g r a p h i c  or 
psyc hiatr ic  texts. The optim is m of a s so ciation is t 
psychol ogy  rem ai ne d unclouded. The many arbitr ar y and 
’m i s t a k e n ’ c onne ct ions formed in the mind of children, 
their c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l I y  ’m y t h o l o g i c a l ’ fantasies, their 
confusion over the limits of reality, were reported as the 
charming details enli vening  otherwise sober works. 
Intellectual development, the central process of 
maturation, was guarant eed as the natural u in foldin g of an 
immanent power of thought.
The unc om p r o m i s i n g  sensu ousne ss of the playworld, 
celebrated by R o u s s e a u  and Schiller, was reduced, 
therefore, to a sen sori-m ot or ’p r a c t i c e ’ for adult life.63 
The new pedagogy  si milarly subverted the pla yworld by 
harnessing it to the goal of s e 1f - d e v e 1o p m e n t .64 Play, 
from being beyond reason, be cam e the most powerful of 
educative techno 1o g i e s . This ’d e v e l o p m e n t a l ’ a p p roach 
distorts the work of the most per cep tive of p r e - F r e u d i a n
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child psychologists. James Sully, for example, begins his 
Studies of Ch il dhood with a percep tive analysis of play as 
the ’imaginative tr a n s f o r m a t i o n  of o b j e c t s ... the sheer 
liveliness of w a n t o n ' a c t i v i t y ’. But he was unable .t o free 
himself from i n t e 11e c t u al is t prejudices. The child, he 
insists, ’when at play is possessed  of an i d e a ’ ♦6 s Play 
is the ill-formed m e d i u m  more or less adequate for the 
expression of immature ideas. It is reduced to being an 
initial ’s t a g e ’ of d e v e lo pment whose sign ificanc e rests 
solely upon its re lation  to later, more adequate, 
conceptions. S u l l y ’s original deeply felt chapter on play, 
like T y l o r ’s i ntrod uc tion to the mythic world, is rap idly 
forgotten in the over w h e l m i n g  onrush of ’r a t i o n a l ’ 
analysis: ’We are learning at last that the inventive
fantasy of a child, prodigal as it is of delightful 
illusions, is also a val ua ble c o n t r ib ution to the sober 
work of t h o u g h t ’ .66 Play, in bec om ing sel f-cons ci ous as 
thought, becomes ’ like that of primi tive r a c e s ... a crude 
attempt at a con nect ed  s y s t e m ’.67 At first ’a p i c t ur es que 
fancy, and a crude atte mpt  at e x p l a n a t i o n ’ , it rapidly 
gravitates towards ’sober r e a l i t y ’ . 6B
Child, savage and madmen belong m o m e ntar il y together  
as instances of the irrational. They are beings who have 
failed, or have not yet learned, to subjugate nature to 
human intentions, intentions to intellect and int ellect to 
science.
Identities
The mystery of gr owing-up remained and could not, by 
an appeal to the b i o g e n e t i c  law, be ignored or a v o i d e d . 49 
What governed the su cc ession  of stages in the o n t o g enetic 
deve lo pment of thought? Did not the c o n c ept io n of ’s t a g e s ’ 
lead ultimately, in a formal sense at least, to the 
reje cti on of any no ti on of continu ous m at uratio n?  Such 
d if fi cultie s (together with cir cumsta nc es to be examined 
later) combined to promote a g e s t a 1t ap p r o a c h  to child 
psychology. In its nasc ent  form, this is al re ady evident 
in C o m p a r y e ’s pio nee ring book, and it c onstitu te s the real 
advance of S t e r n ’s work, both of which were w r i t t e n  well 
before B u h l e r ’s th eo r e t i c a l l y  more s o p h i st ic ated 
ex amina ti on  of the issues inv ol ve d.70
The atte mpt  to grasp chi ldhood s u b j ec tivity  as a 
whole, and to u n d e rsta nd  its prin ciple s of o r g a n i s a t i o n  
from within, was not acco mp anied  by any fundamental 
revisi on of the br oad ly  functio na list and i n t e 11e c t u a 1ist 
standpo int  from which the analysis was conducted. 
’D e v e l o p m e n t ’ thus becomes a series of disco n t i n u o u s  jumps 
and rearrangements; a pro gr essiv e shifting of int er -relate d 
elements through whi ch the familiar adult ’f a c u l t i e s ’ 
become crystal Iised. Such schemata were ordered, however, 
ac cording to a cer tain vision of intellectual ’p r o g r e s s ’ : 
an order e stabl is hed by an uns we rving comm i t m e n t  to the
nor m of adult r a t i o na li ty as self-poss essed 
instrumentality. What might easily be regarded as a 
fundamental change in the history of psychology, is a much 
less decisiv e break with the past than it at first appears. 
Rea son remains the t e 1 os of development, and is still 
con ceived as the inst rument of ada p t a t i o n  to the world.
The change in- meth od and approach, however, is real 
enough and by no means re st ricte d to child psychology. 
P i a g e t ’s d e s c r i p t i o n  of ’s y n c r e t i c ’ thinking in children, 
for example, echoes Bl eu ler's depiction  of the ’a u t i s t i c ’ 
intellect in s c h i z o p h r e n i a  and L e v y - B r u h l ’s e v o ca tion of 
the ’p r e - 1o g i c a l ’ m e n t a l i t y  of the primitive. The 
irrational here is not simply the mi s t a k e n  result of 
reasoning logically upon faulty assumptions, it is a ’m o d e ’ 
of thought whi ch is in itself incoherent by our standards.
In P i a g e t ’s early work, as in S u l l y ’s, the c h i l d ’s 
world is both a playworld  and a world of thought. It is 
not, however, com po sed only of intellectual fallacies. We 
cannot unde rstand  the c h i l d ’s thought if we assum e that it 
is nothing but a feeble version of our own mode of 
reasoning. The c h i l d ’s utterances, thus, should not be 
viewed as efforts to arti culate feelings or intentions, but 
should be seen rather as part of the material resou rces of 
p l ay.71 Chi ld re n of four or five talk together but do not 
really converse. Their speech is not ’adapted to r e a l i t y ’ , 
and ’creates for itself a dream world of i m a g i n a t i o n . ’72
Chi ld ho od thought, whi ch  is hardly thought at all, so 
di fferent is it from our own, is f u n d a me ntally  ’e g o ­
c e n t r i c ’ ’ » Adult intellig ence and e g o - c e n t r i c  thinking, 
’represent two d i f f er ent forms of reasoning, and we even 
say without paradox, two diffe rent forms of l o gic.’73 It 
is a thought world ar isi ng s pontan eo usly on the basis of 
primitive d i s t i nctions  rather than being c on st ructed on th 
foundation of conceptual classification. Piaget argues 
that chi ld ren do not arti cu late their e g o - ce nt ric wor ld to
any great extent because they do not be lieve it is
* -
n ec essary to do so. For them, thought is as ’r e a l ’ as 
anything else. And, not being disti n g u i s h e d  from physical 
reality, it is there fore ’o b v i o u s ’ to all. Every child 
thus ’has his own world of hypit heses and solutions which 
he has never c o m m u nicated  to a n y o n e . ’74 Young chi ld ren 
live in a stra ng ely lucid world. Like sch izophre ni cs they 
believe themsel ves to be ’t r a n s p a r e n t ’ to others.
L og ically r e l a t i o n s ’ remain virtua ll y unknown. E g o ­
centric thought jumps intuitively from premise to 
co nclusion by making use of general ’s c h e m a t a ’ of imagery 
and analogy. ’The c h i 1d ’ , Piaget points out, ’does not 
compare pe rcept ions but perceives c o m p a r i s o n s . ’75 For the 
purpose of forming perceptual wholes identities rather 
than associatio ns have to he established.
In childhood, that is to say, reality is not 
constructed from associations. The child does not vent ure
general con cep ts upon the basis of chance contiguiti es  or 
similitudes. He lives, rather, as part of a complex 
subject ive  synthesis within which everythin g is immediately 
interconnected. New, unfamiliar objects may not arouse 
curiosity, therefore, because all possible objects are 
defined in adv anc e as aspects of one, single, known 
w o r l d . 7* This ’s y n c r e t i s m 7 is just another aspect of the 
’r e a l i s m ’ ch ildre n ascribe to their subjectivity.
Piaget, in spite of all this, is not prepared to 
ab andon his general biological functionalism. ’There is 
nothing u n i n t e l l i g e n t  in these s c h e m a ’ , he c l a i m s . 77 The 
’c o n d e n s a t i o n ’ and ’d i s p l a c e m e n t ’ of child thought may be 
reminiscent of' dreams rather than sel f- conscious intellect, 
but it is to the latter that these intellectual 
perversi tie s is somehow ’a i m e d ’.
P s y c h i a t r i c  studies similarly had challeng ed 
i n t e 11e c t u a 1ist assumptions. Bleuler, beg inning his 
analysis of the s c hizop hr enic with a conventional ac co unt 
of his confus ed and distorted associations, went on to 
explore the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  symptoms as expres sions of 
’a u t i s t i c ’ or ’d e r e i s t i c ’ thinking. It is a ’c a r i c a t u r e ’ of 
reality, a ’c o m p u l s i v e ’ form of thinking which ap pears to 
the patient as c omplete ly  ’o b j e c t i v e ’ . His thoughts are 
assimilated to the work of nature. They are no longer due 
simpiy to an ’accidental insufficiency of log ic’ , but are 
the co nse quence of an ’inner n e e d ’ . 70 Delusions, he
points out, as if direc tl y ch allenging  Frazer, ’have their 
ps ych ological an alogy not in error but in b e l i e f ’ .79 It is 
the power of their personal (mistaken) conv iction s that 
creates the world anew for them, making of ’r e a l i t y ’ a 
sim ul ac rum of their ideas.
A new e t h n o g r a p h i c  pe rspective com pletes this reformed 
i n t e 11e c t u a 1i s m . L u cien Levy-Bruhl thus makes conceptual 
indiffer enc e the central feature of ’primitive  m e n t a l i t y ’ . 
The prim it iv e of course dis tin gu ishes innume rab le ’o b j e c t s ’ 
in the ev er y d a y  world: if he did not, he would not survive.
His mental world, nonetheless, sustains a good deal of the 
p r e c o n c e p t u a 1 innocence of the child. A l t ho ugh his world 
is filled w ith an overwhel mi ng abund ance of c o n cr et e 
differences, he is able to suppress a b s t ra ctly all 
pa rtic u l a r i t y  in favour of an immaterial h o m o g e n e i t y  that 
binds all things together. The primi tiv e intuits a ’m y sti c 
r e a l i t y ’ which, including himself wi thin it, al lo ws  him to 
’p a r t i c i p a t e ’ directly' in the fullness of the cosmos. Its 
un de rlyi ng  unity  is ’felt rather than r e p r e s e n t e d ’ .80 
Every co nc e i v a b l e  thing ’participates  in the same essential 
nature, or in the same ensemble of qua 1 i t ies ’ 8 1 The 
intellectual a m b ition  of the primitive is r e p r e s e n t e d  for 
us by Spin oza rather than Aristotle. The task of d i v i s i o n 
and cla ssification, where it takes place at all, is 
sub ord inated to the task of revealing in any p h e n o m e n a  the 
degree of the ’s o u l ’ possessed by its particularit y.
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To grasp the thought world of irrational sub jectiv it y 
we must * imagine a being, knowing nothin g of the 
distinct io n be tween mind and b o d y * . 32 Within such a world, 
animist ic  ’p r o j e c t i o n ’ is the basic form of cognition. And 
as the n o u m e n a 1 essence of things is directly per ce iv ed as 
at times both thr eaten in g and benevolent, the task of 
kn owledge is to probe nature for its moral secrets. 
’E very th ing happens as though nature were the outcome, or 
rather the r e f l ec ti on of a mental act iv it y whose reasons or 
intentions the child is always trying to find o u t . ’83 Each 
object is related, not di re c t l y  to another, but to the 
qua nti ty of mana or imunu it c o n t a i n s . 84
The psychotic, alone in his cosmos, disco ver s a world 
he does not u n d e r s t a n d  and cannot control. He adopts 
an imi stic ’t h e o r i e s ’ as a mea sur e of self-defence. The 
ne ces sity of prim it ive thought becomes clearer in this 
context. The p s y chotic  is identical with a world that 
threatens him with ind escri bable torments. As the world is 
contained wi thin himself he must, if he is to survive, 
’p r o j e c t ’ it into some other domain.
The si multaneous s u b j e c t i v i t y / o b j e c t i v i t y  of 
experience is viewed by the outside observer as a hid eo usly 
mistaken ’o m n i p otenc e of t h o u g h t ’ . The ps ych oti c 
’i n t r o j e c t s ’ the cosmos and t h e n ’p r o j e c t s ’ its fearful, 
threatening aspect in a single, u na na lysabl e movement. The 
most remote regions of space and time become int imately
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personalised. Equally, portions of the body may become  
’d e t a c h e d ” and appear as lumps of inert matter. Less 
ominously, in young children, the dis co very that parts of 
the body respond directly to his wishes conveys the magical 
charm of ’action at a d i s t a n c e ’ . In the i n f a n t ’s smile on 
watching himself m a n i pulat e his own limbs, ’one has the 
impression of the joy felt by a god in di rectin g from a 
distance the mov em ent of the s t a r s ’ .83
Th r oug h the logic of identities, the ’a p p u r t e n a n c e s ’ 
of the individual (secretions, hair, nail clippings, 
shadow, footpri nts etc.) possess ’m a g i c a l ’ attributes.
They retain, di rectly rather than me rely  by association, 
the und imini sh ed essence of the person. The ’ac tion at a 
d i s t a n c e ’ typical of symp at hetic  mag ic is not a 
(fallacious) logical m an ip ulation  so much as an attempt at 
direct physical coercion. The distance is illusory. To 
manipulate the ’p a r t ’ is in fact no dif feren t to operatin g 
with the whole. The Des’chagga mother thus hides nail 
clippings and hair stolen from her sleeping child so that 
he will not stray, during the day, from the v i l l a g e . 86
Hardly surpris ing then that the names of things are 
also the things themselves. The word ’s u n ’ contai ns the 
quality of hotness. ’What are names f o r ? ’ Piaget, asks 
obscurely of one of his young philosophers: ’They are what
you can see when you look at t h i n g s ’ , comes the prompt 
reply.87 Some, wi th out  the benefit of A n s e l m ’s guidance.
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claim that God in creating  things s i mu ltaneo us ly planted 
their names in m e n ’s heads. In like fashion, a man and his 
shadow, or the p s y c hotic and his spiritual persecutors, are 
not conjo ine d by a mechanical a sso ci ation of ideas, so much 
as sepa rately  express the und er ly ing unity of a single 
substance.
I n t e n t i o n a 1ity and purpose, as soon as they can be
felt as subjecti ve  dispositions, thus becom e n a t u r e ’s
organis ing  principles. The sun and the moon follow  the
* "
young child about. They  move, ther efore they are alive.
And their movement s are governed, as are the c h i l d ’s, by 
purposes given in the nature of living things themselves. 
The sun exists ’ in o r d e r ’ to keep us warm and give us 
light. Rain falls ’b e c a u s e ’ we need water to quench  our 
th irst.as Nature exists by virtue of the moral final ism 
manifest in the fact of our own existence. Life, w h ic h is 
the essence of things, exists to preserve the harm on ious 
relations among its various aspects. The Descha gg a for 
example conduct prec ise rituals in relation to bees, a 
species abundant  in the human spiritual essence, in order 
to gain access to the resrvoir of their own inner being, 
and in doing so rea ff irm their nature as human b e i n g s . 89
All things, appe aring ideally as m o m enta ry  as pects of 
an undivided substance, become interchangeable. Man, plant 
and animal undergo endless spontaneous tra nsf ormations. 
Every creatur e is p ot entia ll y deceptive. A frail b od y may
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house a dange rou s animal. A man might be a me t a m o r p h o s e d  
tiger. A child, intuiting such transformations, believ es 
himself capable of flight. The psyc h i a t r i s t  become s a 
*fle etingly improvised f i g u r e ’ con cea li ng the divine 
presence intent upon the destr uc tion of his final v i c t i m . 90 
These relations, once again, are not the outcome of distant 
metaphorical connections; they are aspects rather of an 
immediately sensed .reality. It is only the existen ce  of 
such a reality, indeed, that allows analogi es s u b s e quent ly  
to be drawn.
This is an intimate cosmos. Ev erythin g is close at 
hand because, di rectl y sensed, it cannot extent bey on d the 
range of the senses themselves. The child sees the moon 
resting in the b r a nc he s of a near by tree. No th ing can 
reach higher than the top of the tallest visible 
bu i l d i n g . 91 The p s y c h o t i c ’s intimacy with the cosmos grows 
more exalted. E x p an ding himself he literally explores  once 
distant regions of space. He too can reach up a hand and 
touch the stars. Time is no more a barrier to the senses 
than space. The an ces tor s are only our cont em p o r a r i e s  who 
happen to exist in a somewh at different way to the 
living.92
The primal thought world is a veritable ’orgy of 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ’ .93 It is constructed, formally, by the 
su bstitution of' parts for wholes, rather than through the 
ass ociation of pre- existin g elements. Identical p r e d i c a t e s
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are tran sf ormed  into identical subjects. ’The Virgin Mary 
was a virgin, I am a virgin, therefore 1 am the Virgin 
M a r y ’ claims one mo dern  s c h i z o p h r e n i c . 9 4 And Bleuier tells 
us of a man who claimed to be Switzerland; ’Switze rland 
loves freedom, I love freedom, 1 am S w i t z e r l a n d . ’95
The formal ’s i m i l i t u d e s ’ linking the world of
children, p r i m it ives and psyc hotics as forms of primal
thought are the focus of a c o mprehe ns ive ’m o r p h o l o g i c a l ’
study by W e r n e r . 9i And the stress on ’ i n t e 11e c t u a 1
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d e v e l o p m e n t ’ recedes in favour of bringin g to light the 
subtlety, depth, and internal coherence of each 
evolutiona ry  ’s t a g e ’ .97
Common to both a s s o c i a t i o n i s t  and id en tificatory  forms of 
i n t e 11e c t u a 1ism is the view of primal sub jecti vi ty as 
responsive p r i m a r i l y  to fear of the ’e x t e r n a l ’ world.
Reason is the ’p r o p e r ’ instrument of a d a p tatio n to the 
world; irrational beings' who do not possess the 
intellectual ’m a t u r i t y ’ ade quate  to the tasks of life, are 
therefore consc ious of the world as a th reate ning and 
terrible place. The practical exigencie s of life are 
’a s s i m i l a t e d ’ to their own irrational view of the cosmos. 
Kelsen, for example, holding genuine causal think ing to be 
’utterly beyond the grasp of primitive m a n ’, argues that 
nature is first c o ncept ua lised f i n a 1i s t i c a 11y as 
retribu ti on.93 Revenge, he supposes, is a simple and 
easily un de rstood motive, physical har dships are the re fo re
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viewed as the pun ishme nt s for moral t r a n s g r e s s i o n . 99
A s s o c i a t i o n i s m  was overthrown, in part at least, 
because it assu med an ’a d v a n c e d ’ ind ividuated ego where 
none could be expected to exist. L e v y - B r u h l ’s great merit 
was to show that the savage did not project his ego upon 
the natural world for the simple reason that he had not yet 
di sc overed his e g o . 100 Yet the process of i d e n t if ication  
appears often to rest upon a sim ilarly indiv id u a l i s t i c  
account of ’m o t i v e s ’ as the content of consciousness. Why 
should fear and retr ib ution be ass umed more ’p r i m i t i v e ’ 
than any other feeling? The c h i l d ’s anx ieties indeed ought 
not to be confused with adult fears. They do not yet know 
of what they should be a f r a i d . 101 And psychotics, Bleuler 
remarks, will de scrib e the most hor rifyi ng de l u s i o n s  in a 
calm 'and ’u n n a t u r a l l y ’ detached m a n n e r . 102 More generally, 
since it is the u n p r e di ct able which is held to"be a 
particular source of terror, the pr imitive can only be 
expected to recognise such a catego ry of events as 
deviations from a view nature as a c o n t in uously f u n c ti oning 
and integrated order. The very conception, that is, denied 
to him by the i n t e 11e c t u a 1ist tradition.
The bourg eois world of course, as a rational order, 
ought alread y to have transcended fear. The intellect, as 
the instrumental master y of nature, ought to have
sup ers eded the magical or religious techniques of coping 
with threats to life* Yet fear, 1 ike play and superstition, 
persists* The fear that is said to motivate the primal 
cosmos is really a bo ur geois unease ’p r o j e c t e d ’ upon it as 
an unwel come an ac h r o n i s m  inexplic ably persisting  wi thin  the 
midst of its world.
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THREE
THE RO MANCE OF SIGNS
Has reason a b a ndo ne d the relation betw een  means and 
ends? Surely not. It is, nonetheless, tempting to argue 
that increasi ngl y througho ut the twentieth  century the 
self-con sci ous iden ti f i c a t i o n  of reason with rationality, 
and rationality  with instrumental efficiency, has been, if 
not broken, then cert ai nly weakened.
Our society, of course, is just as dedi cated to the 
pr oduction of commodities, and our lives just as 
constrained by this necessity, as before. Yet in 
est ablishing its openly acknowl ed ged and uncha l l e n g e d  
supremacy over the social world, the entire process of 
production has been rendered strangely invisible. In being 
revealed as the most fundamental of social relationships, 
production h a s .been stripped of any lingering e n c h a n t m e n t . 1 
It is only the most, fundamental of social relations?
important but i n t e r e s t i n g . 2 Reduced to being the u 11imate 
cause of lif e ’s start ling diversity, pr od uct ion relations
are c o n s tit ut ed as a brute, insensitive f o rc e. 3
It is the e x t r a o r d i n a r y  ’o b j e c t i v i t y ’ of the moder n 
p r o d uc ti on process which makes it both more fundamental and 
less sign ifica nt  than ever before. It provides, un d e r n e a t h  
ail the interesting .superficialities of mo dern c ul ture,i ts  
own dull account of things; an explanation, a p p ealed to on 
the point of conversational exhaustion  only ’ in the last 
r e s o r t ’ .4
Pr o d u c t i o n  no longer, or appears no longer, to depend 
upon a v o l u n t a r i s t i c  commitm en t on the part of all those 
whose acti vit ies are in fact required for its daily 
reconstruction. Demand in g no more than.pass ive as sent it 
persists rather from neglec t than from sedulous a c t i v i t y . 5
It is as if the goal of mechanical e ffici en cy (the
reciprocal inter de pende nce of ratio nal ity and production), 
had been achieve d once and for all, releasing the subject 
into a new ' l i b e r a t e d ’ existence outside of all exterior 
necess i t y .6
This is just another way of expressing  the critical 
u n ders ta nding of capit alist society as so many forms of 
’a l i e n a t i o n ’ .7 It is within  this pe rspecti ve that a 
specifically ’m o d e r n ’ notion of reason emerges. ’M o d e r n i s t ’ 
revisions have not so much transcended, as viewed from a
different angle, the c 1 ass i c a 1 bourgeo is notion of reason. 
Bour geo is rat io na lity could be seen as just another 
’v e r s i o n ’ of the process of a 1lena t i c n m . B S o c i e t y ’s vital 
processes, however, having been whol ly ’o b j e c t i f i e d ’ as the 
direct ex pressi on  of n a t u r a 1 laws, its members could be 
allowed an unlimited, inner, ’s u b j e c t i v e ’ freedom of 
thought and feeling. ’ Ide o l o g y ’ has co nse q u e n t l y  become 
oddly insignificant. This is not to say that ’v a l u e s ’ have 
ceased to play a meaningful part in p e o p l e ’s lives or that 
mo der n culture, in being radically secularised, has been 
s i m u l t an eousl y emasculated.'’ All such consi d e r a t i o n s  have, 
however, been trivial.ised into ’a e s t h e t i c ’ categories, or 
the spiritual turmoil of private u n e a s i n e s s . 10 
S ub je ctivit y would hardly have been liberated had it been 
otherwise.
Reason is no doubt still o rg an ically  linked to the 
process of production. But it cannot any longer be defined 
as instrumentality. The' new freedom of s u b j ec tivity  has 
led to a certain blurring of once well defined boundaries. 
Once it has been ’d e t a c h e d ’ from production, s u b j e c t i v i t y  
is able to discover, or rediscover, a rational image of 
itself in hitherto neglected or deg raded  forms of life. 
Having passed, in turn, from the sphere of c i r c u l a t i o n  to 
the sphere of production, reason (partially) eva porat es  
into the sphere of consumption. The d i s t in ct ion be twe e  
reason and unreas on con se quently  becomes more dif f i c u l t  to 
sustain. Both undergo a thorough r e 1 a t i v i s a t i o n .11
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The primordial forms of experience unt ou ched by reason 
have not simply been ab sorbed into general philosophical 
discourse, they have secured cert ain metaphysical 
privileges. Children, primitives and the insane have 
p reo ccupied  m o de rn writers to an u n p r e ce dented extent.
Their f a s c in at ion has intensified. From being e qu iv alent 
examples to a commo n irrationality, they have once again 
drawn apart and e st ab lished around themselves a dense world 
of unique experience. They have become  the centres of 
co smo logies unl ike but related to each other and to our 
own. What had been ’m e r e l y ’ the irrational is reveal ed as 
the ’h u m a n ” ; a fullness and purity of thought and fee ling 
that reason had led us to neglect. Here are located those 
’u n a l i e n a t e d ’ worlds out of which our own was born, and 
from whic h it has becom e severed. Their thought worlds, 
therefore, could not be the antithe sis of reason; rather, 
they co nstitute d the plenitude from which the life of 
reason must itself be replenished. ’ I r r a t i o n a l ’ beings, 
thus having a value of their own, were quite suddenly 
discove red  to have ’r i g h t s ’, and to be due the respect we 
demanded for o u r s e l v e s . 12
How that reason, in being stamped upon the world as 
m a n ’s ’second n a t u r e ’ , has achieved an enviable security, 
man himself has been freed of the r e s p o n si bi lity of taking 
it altoget her seriously. The timidity of the V i c t o r i a n  
Theorist lay in his belief that the ’r e a l ’ world still
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depended in some way upon his own efforts; upon his ability 
to think and act rationally. Now we are able to relax. 
Li berated by impotence we can begin to dream again. But we 
have almost for go tten  how. No matter, the primitive  lives 
near by on the di mi n i s h i n g  margins of the ci vilised world, 
the insane can be resc ued from their hiding places and 
subjected to yet another torm enting examination, or we can 
simply recall som et hing  of our own early childhood. These 
primordial worlds are inexhaustible. And cl ose nes s to them 
can still shock our im aginat io n back to life.
Reaso n has ceased to be an instrument of human 
perfection, or a tool of adaptation. It seeks dominion, 
not over nature, but over a realm truly its own. It is 
master of a purely subj ective domain which exists for 
co nsciousn ess as a var iety of s i g n s . Neither syn th esis nor 
causality are of much importance here. Those are the goals 
of r e a s o n ’s previous incarnation when, still a m b iti ou s to 
define a reality ’other*' than itself, it was c o n s t i t u t e d  as 
a ’m e c h a n i s m ’ linked direc tly to n a t u r e . 13 Reas on as a 
system of signs, however, is composed, as it were, from its 
own substance. it no longer points beyond itself. It 
seeks only the perfe ct ion of an i n n e r  order, m a t c h i n g  by 
analogy rather than ref lection the crystall is ed st r u c t u r e  
of the modern p roducti on  process. The sign, as pure 
relation (humanity), has no material reality of its own and 
remains indiff ere nt to the medium  through which it 
expresses i t s e l f . 14 It is an elementary partic le of huma n
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subjectivity, a quantum of meaning. And as such can only be 
defined in relation  to other such e l e m e n t s . 13
The mo de rn c oncept io n of reason then seeks to perfect 
itself in the image of man as a consumer of s i g n s . lh It 
becomes the sy s t e m a t i s a t i o n  of play, and in m a i n t a i n i n g  a 
strictly a r b i t r a r y  r elation sh ip to the object worid, 
finally frees thought from the dead weight of matter.
The social world, that is to say, as a process of 
*
productio n has be com e ’f r o z e n ’ into fixed r e la tionsh ip s 
’ independent of our w i l l ’ . The human can be realised, 
therefore, only s ubje ct ively in the absolute freed om of 
aesthet ic  categories. The division betwe en  reason and 
unreason gives way to the gradation from the human to the 
social. No longer an instrument of calculation, re as on 
presides over a reconst ru cted pla yworld of signs. Its task 
is to illuminate the inner meaning of these signs by 
revealing the syste ma tic relations they ma intain  one with 
another. The human sciences are diss olved in this process 
into the s p e c ialise d techniques of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
Reason loses its clarity. A victim of c r u mblin g  
dichotomies, it recognises itself in the midst of its 
opposites. The primordial worlds of childho od or ins anity  
or the prim it ive are equally rational and n o n - r a t i o n a 1.
The irrational, strict ly speaking, has almost ceased  to 
exist. Its only meaning now can be that of a ’m e a n i n g l e s s ’
act; the c o n t r a d i c t i o n  of an empty s i g n i f i e r . 17 The
semictic view of reas on begins with a clear di st inctio n
be twe en the ’m e a n i n g l e s s ’ and the ’i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l ’ .10 It
is, in fact, p r e cisely  in the trivial debris of
c on sc iousne ss  and ac ti o n  that the modern p s y c h ol og ist and
anthro p o l o g i s t  have found the special signs of the human.
It is just among those cultural objects, uncl u t t e r e d  with
older rat ional is t as so c i a t i o n s  and freed from the
prejudi ces  of his to r i c i s i n g  myt holog ie s and u t i l i t a r i a n
banalities, that the fullness of reason can redisc over
*
itself. It is, then, outs ide the realm of eve ryd ay 
ne ces sity that reason can observe itself as the power of 
signification.
There is no c o n d e s c e n s i o n  in extending hu manity to 
pr eviously  stig matise d cases of the i r r a t i o n a l ; we do so 
entirely upon our own behalf. We hope to borrow  back from 
them the u n l i mi ted free dom of signif ic ation in w h ich we 
think our lives c o n s i s t ! 1’ We have com pl etely  inverted the 
judgment of the Enlig htenment.  The primordial world is a 
semiotic wonderland. Lin guis ti cs therefore becomes the 
first of the human sciences, the disci pline to which all 
others must turn for their m e t h o d . 20 And it is in F e r d i n a n d 
de S a u s s u r e ’s Co urse in General Lingui stics that we find 
one of the first clear sta tements of the mo dern c o n c e p t i o n  
of reason. The long trek through historical ph i l o l o g y  
comes abr up tly to a h a l t . 21 It is a me ani ngless story. 
Language is best un dersto od  sync hr onously  as an
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i nt er connected system of signs, each of which is 
construc ted a r b i t r a r i l y  and maintai ned by convention. 
Lan gua ge resists ’r e d u c t i o n ’ to expl anati on  in terms of the 
materials from w h ic h it is composed. It is a reality sui 
gener i s and, as such, furnishes reason with its model.
Signatures
Within the order of signs con stit utive  of b o u rgeoi s 
culture, those def in ing personal identity have be come 
p ar ti cularl y problematic. Bourg eoi s society pr es u p p o s e s  a 
set of r e la tionsh ip s among individuals, each one of which 
is con ceived as an integrated ’e g o ’ . The ’e g o ’ is the 
function of reason withi n a personal context and ope ra te s 
by an a p p a re ntly infinitely exp anding memory. M e m o r y  and 
personal identity are simply dif ferent aspects of the e g o ’s 
function. So it was with the problems clus tering a r ou nd  the 
memory that a d i s t i n ct iv ely ’m o d e r n ’ psyc holog y began.
Every act of memor y has become guided by the 
over whe lming n e c e s s i t y  of sustain ing  the ’s e l f ’ as an 
imaginable entity; an entity which is in fact noth ing but 
the ope ration of repeated acts of recollection. In this 
way the world is re co n s t r u c t e d  from a unique viewpoint. 
’There is no p e r c ep ti on whi ch is not full of m e m o r i e s ’ , 
Bergson i n s ists; 22 so t h a t ,inverting the directi on  of the 
rational faculty, he can claim that ’our co n s c i o u s n e s s  of
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the present is already memory’.23
Classical r a t i onalism  had insisted upon a p r a c tic al ly 
d em on strati ve  reason. Mo dern consciousness, aware of its 
own impotence, seeks to test itself inwardly. Kierkegaard, 
before Freud or Proust, thoroug hly explored the baffling 
p sy ch ology of ’a d v a n c e d ’ co ns ciousness and co ns t r u c t e d  an 
autobiogr aph ical work, Ei ther/Or as a testament to its 
p a r a d o x e s . 24 Yet, in spite of himself, his wr itings  turned 
into dialectical m a s t e r p i e c e s  that led, u n p r e d i c t a b 1y but 
inescapably, towards a revised version of traditional 
religious salvation.
A purely  secular psy ch ology had to make do with me mory  
alone. But, unaided, memor y could not pierce the mystery 
of our own origin. The foundat io n of our identity rem ai ned 
a secret to ourselves, and the frustr ating  am nesia 
obscuring our early ex periences  only heighte ned  the 
conviction of its o v er whelmi ng  but undefined 
s i g n i f i c a n c e . 23 Nor could observational studies of other 
children a d e q uately  substitu te for this failure of 
recollection. Other childre n (or even our own for that 
matter), as they are reinteg rated into bourgeois so ci ety as 
consumers (and are dig nified therefore as at least quasi- 
rational beings), cease to exert their c h a r m . 26 The simple 
fact of childhood amnesia, once reason had settled upon 
memory rather than foresigh t as its vehicle, be ca me 
tormenting. Why did our active, rational memory fail to
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stretch back to the very origin of ourselves? It was not 
simply the distan ce it had to traverse. It could only be 
because our initial exp er ience  of the world was so 
p rofou nd ly different  from that of the mature ’e g o ’ that our 
memory could not grasp its ’o t h e r n e s s ’ . Our initial 
expe ri en ce of ourselves was forgo tten as a co ro llary to the 
growth of reason wi th in  the personalise d p s y c h e . 27 The 
primordial world was, in other words, literally and 
pr ofoun dl y irrational; a pure sen suo usnes s from which 
nothing could ’e s c a p e ’ into the d isemb od ied world of 
signification. Such sensuous density could not simpl y 
wither away thr ough neglect or distance in time. Its being 
’f o r g o t t e n ’ was a clear indicat ion of the active  role of 
me mor y in creating  the ego from pr otean subjectivity.
R eas on began with an act of r e p r e s s i o n . 28
Repressed, forgotten, but not a n n i hi la ted childhood  
lies still within us, revealing itself from time to time in 
small inexplicable ’a c c i d e n t s ’ , or momentary, 
inco mpr eh ensible  pleasures. Di st ributed over our body, 
expres sed  in sudden clumsiness or local paralysis, in tiny 
rebellions against our will, in u n p r e d i c t a b l e  sensatio ns of 
dissolution, there is a curious, mute form of personal 
m e m o r y . 29 S u p e r f ic ially no more than bo dil y jokes these 
parapraxes, like dreams or minor ne u r o t i c  ’s y m p t o m s ’ , seem 
quite meaningless. But proper ly approached, with a relaxed 
u n calc ul at ing consciousness, such tiny i r ra ti onaliti es  
spread within us a rich network of ’a s s o c i a t i v e ’
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c o n n e c t i o n s . 30 Spontane ous recollections, which Proust  
noticed never failed to announc e themselves in an 
anti c i p a t o r y  and quite generalised thrill of pleasure, are 
not quite meaningless. This is me mor y of another sort. It 
does not so much lead us back in tel lectually  (and falsely) 
through an u n b roken  sequence of events to a p r e s um ptive  
origin, as reveal to us, with the vividness of an original 
perception, fragments of our buried p a s t . 31 Bergson, as 
clearly as Freud or Proust, dist in guishes  betwee n these 
f u n d a m entally  differe nt  m e m o r y - i m a g e s , betwee n the rational 
ego and the primordial world of pure sensuousness. ’The 
first, conquered by effort, remains de pendent upon our 
will; the second, entirely spontaneous, is as ca pr icious in 
reproducing as it is faithful in p r e s e r v i n g . ’32
Freud is often credited with ’d e m o n s t r a t i n g ’ the 
persistence of the ’ i r r a t i o n a l ’ impulses in normal and 
pathological behaviour;' in fact he achieved something  much 
more important. In succeed ing in inter preting  dreams, 
symptoms, parapraxes, he shows the manner in which the 
residues of our sp ontaneous recol l e c t i o n  are formed into 
systems of signs. He thus extends a ra ti onalising p r i nc ip le 
over the entire content of the psyche.
F r e u d ’s intial approa ch to the problem was somewhat 
’m e c h a n i s t i c ’ . In a famous phrase from the ’P r e l i m i n a r y 
C o m m u n i c a t i o n ’ to the Studies in Hy st eria he claims that
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hyst eri cs ’suffer ma inl y from r e m i n i s c e n c e s ’ .33 A 
spontaneous r ecol le ction which could not be expre ssed as a 
rational me mory is ’c o n v e r t e d ’ into a physical symptom.
This is almost  always the result of some initial 
’t r a u m a t i c ’ event, the circum st ances of which prohibited 
the discharge  of a powerful affect whi ch had been aroused. 
Rage, or shame, or sexual ex citement for example, whi ch it 
would have been in ap propriate to express openly, was 
actively and c o n s c io us ly s u p p r e s s e d . 34 The event was 
’f o r g o t t e n ’ but another occasion, perhaps years later, 
which bore some superficial ’a s s o c i a t i v e ’ r esembl an ce to 
the suppres sed original, recalled the u n d i s char ge d emotion. 
Now however, as circumst an ces are never more than remotely 
similar, the orig inally ’n a t u r a l ’ response no longer ’makes 
s e n s e ’ . The affect is now discharged, however, in its 
’c o n v e r t e d ’ form as a physical symptom. The ’c h o i c e ’ of 
symptom is always ex tre mel y cunning. It both con ce al s and 
reveals. It is a physical ’r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ’ of the original 
event, but in using an alien me diu m expresses itself 
cryptically. Symptoms, as coded me ssages rather than 
conscious memories, always require i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 35 They 
exist somewhere between rational, abstract me mo ry  and 
spontaneous, sensuous recollection. It is only 
incidentally that an individual may ’fall i l l ’ from them.
F r e u d ’s an aly t i c  work, and e sp eciall y his self- 
analysis, convinced him that such symptoms were always 
unconscious reco lle ction s of childhood events. For a time
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he favoured a ’s e d u c t i o n ’ theory which he qui ckly 
abandoned, partly on empirical grounds, but more 
compel lingiy in response to a deepe ning insight into his 
own method of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 34 Hysterical symptoms were 
not re mi niscences of actual events, but of fantasies; 
wishes whi ch it was just as necessa ry  and just as diff icult 
to s u p p r e s s . 37 Symptoms, that is, recalled sup pressed 
wishes by expl oi ting the consc iou s m e m o r y ’s a ssociat iv e 
network.
In all this there was little that was spe ci fi c to the 
neurotic. The wishes preserved in symptoms were the common  
inheritance of us all. Their suppression, however, was 
usually so effective that when Freud reminded us of them 
many were u n w i lling to ac cep t their re a l i t y . 38 The 
n e u r o t i c ’s t roubl es ome rem ini scences were the result of 
inadequate forgetting, and analysis was designed as an aid 
to forgetting more than as a techn ique of recollection. By 
revealing the meaningful c o n n ec ti on between the sy mp tom and 
the wish it par tiall y expressed, the symptom could be made 
to vanish. This, however, was a temporary relief. A 
purely inteliectual method could not serve to a n n i h i l a t e  
the wish which remained, tempora rily thwarted, to pour 
itself into a new deformity. Just as in a joke, an al ys is 
destroys its eff ectiv en ess but does not erradica te  the idea 
contained within  it.39 The aim of analysis became, 
therefore, a c o mpr eh ensive r e- ed ucation  of the heart, 
rather than a mechanical removal of specific symptoms. A
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’c u r e ’ could be ef fe cted only through tra nsfere nc e and 
c o u n t e r - t r a n s f e r e n c e 4 0 ; that is, by a ’r e p e t i t i o n ’ of the 
process of growing up through which the patient could 
finally forget those wishes which had survived his first 
attempt to do so.
Symptoms, then, do not join two events dist ant in time
so much as connect two separate and c o n t i nu ously present
realms of meaning. Like dreams they point si m u l t a n e o u s l y
in diffe rent directions. In referring to some c o n t e m p o r a r y
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situation, they take on the guise of me mo ry  and addr ess 
th emselves to the conscious, rational ego; but in carrying 
within themsel ves  the remains of older wishes, they 
preserve a ps yc hic life that knew noth ing whatev er  of the 
ego. To be interp reted a symptom must be ’r e a d ’ as a sign 
of this ’primary p r o c e s s ’ . Freud is at pains to poi nt  out 
that such a prim ary  process is not to be identif ied with 
simple organic functioning. Sensuousn es s cannot, any more 
than memory or reflection, be grasped bio 1o g i c a l 1y . 41 It 
should be u n d e rs to od rather as wishes. The wish is a kind 
of approximation, tol erable to the ego, of the u n f a t h o m a b l e  
primordial psyche. The primary process is known only as the 
u n l i m i t i e d m o b i l i t y  of the wish. In place of the fixity of 
the self, pre se rv ed in del iber ative acts of memory, there 
is the absolute inner freedom, the ’polymorph p e r v e r s i t y ’ , 
of uncor rupted libido. It is the shock of this freedo m 
that we feel as the thrill of spontaneous r e c o l l e c t i o n . 42 
Less intensely, but more regularly and predictably, it is
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in dreams that we r e - e x p eri en ce the world of f u n .
Reason breaks into this freedom, sel ecting through a
process of p r o g r e s s i v e  inhibition, specif ic aims and
objects to which wishes might be attached. It is
misl ead ing to see this process as the supercedi ng of an
original ’pleasu re p r i n c i p l e ’ by a ’reality p r i n c i p l e ’ . No
such simple dualism is implied by F r e u d . 43 Re al ity (which
can hardly be a pr i nci p i e ) is created from the pr im ary
process; it is a sp ec ific ’s e l e c t i o n ’ from its infinite
*
possibilities, a part of its whole. Nor should the process 
of inhibit ion whi ch  defines reality be regarded as the 
’repress ion of p l e a s u r e ’ . It is fun, not pleasure, whi ch  
must be forgotten. Pl easure  indeed is the reward we gain 
for underg oing the process of i n h i b it ion.44 As a re lat i o n  
of the ego pleas ur e must await the loss of c h i l dh ood to our 
conscious memory. Then, when we can no longer enj oy the 
immediacy of the wish, we taste its socialised a f t e r t h o u g h t  
as pleasure. Bourgeois'- culture, in F r e u d ’s view, bei ng 
directed towards the psychi c completion  of the ego, is 
built upon the pur su i t of pleasure.
The r enu nc iation of fun is the renunciation, but not 
destruction, of the ’pri mary p r o c e s s ’. In a deeper sense, 
pleasure may be seen as its con tinu ation in an ’a d u l t ’ 
form. The inhibition and diffe r e n t i a t i o n  of the p r i ma ry 
process, its cont inuou s fragment at ion through the
106
’d e v e l o p m e n t a l ’ stages of psyc hic organisation, and its 
es tab l i s h m e n t  of the opposit io n betw een  the ego and its 
’object w o r l d ’ , preserves  an echo of itself. Ple a s u r e  is 
itself ’s y m p t o m a t i c ’ of primary narcissism, and all its 
forms derive from a common  source. Pl easu re  is yet another 
form, in fact the most general possible form, of 
recollection. The n e u ro tic symptom is a physical 
perversion, a r ecoll ec tion of a forb idden wish. But normal 
pleasur e is qu a l i t a t i v e l y  the same; no pleasure is wholl y 
’ i n n o ce nt *.45 In satisf ying legitimate desires, the ego is 
in fact ’b o r r o w i n g ’ psyc hic satisfa ctions rooted in the 
primary process. All pleasur e leads back (whatever its 
functi on in consciousness ) to the p r i m o r d i a 1, un d i v i d e d  
world. Hence, once again, the n e c ess it y for disguise, 
cen so rs hip and amnesia. L e g i ti mate pleasu re must be 
separated, arbi tr arily but categorically, from the 
forb idd en wishes of the primary process. If it were not, 
we would c ont in ually fall back into infancy.
If the conn ec tion be tween pl easure and fun were 
actually severed, the real aim of co nscious ps ych ic  life 
would be lost. To disguise itself as ’i n n o c e n t ’ pleasure, 
the primary process must make use of a richer set of 
structural principl es than those allo wed by Tylor or Frazer 
as constitu tive of ’m a g i c a l ’ thought. Processes  of 
’c o n d e n s a t i o n ’ and ’d i s p l a c e m e n t ’ conceal the real origin 
of p l e a s u r e . 44 These processes are ’p l a y f u l ’ 
tr ans formati ons of the ’r a t i o n a l ’ sign system of n a r r a t i v e
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memory. ’C o n d e n s a t i o n ’ loins together elements us ua lly 
sep arated along what Saussure terms the ’s y n t a g m a t i c ’ or 
linear axis of speech. In dreams, for example, events and 
places distant from each other in time and space, can 
appear contiguous. And bv ’d i s p l a c e m e n t ’ any sign can be 
replaced by another lying along its ’a s s o c i a t i v e ’ axis.
Drearns, jokes, symptoms, parapraxes, are the dif fe rent 
mat erials from which the same system of s i g n i f i c a t i o n  is 
c o n s t r u c r t e d . Each effects in its own way the 
tr a n s fo rm ation  of fun into pleasure, of primary n a r c i s s i m 
into object love.In doing so, each threatens a dang er ous 
prox imi ty to our own chi ldhoo d and its su bversive freedom 
f r o m t h e e g o .
Chil dho od has become a personal ’s i g n a t u r e ’ , the 
hidden origin of ourselves. Within us it still wishes, 
inexhaustibly, for what it can never have. Happily, the 
advanced econo mies need more than the s p e c i f 1 c de sir es of 
the p l e as ur e- seeki ng  ego to sustain their passion for 
commodities; they need the insincerity of the wish. A 
little more of the child, therefore, can be a I lowed to 
reappear, and in our relation to the commodity  world even a 
c e r t a i n - ’p l a y f u l n e s s ’ can be e n c o u r a g e d , 48
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Gestures
it is only super f i c i a l l y  that the re co l l e c t i o n  of our 
chi ldhood charms us. However much we might he at tr acted by 
the idea of intimate self-knowledge, we take care to shield 
ourselves from the primary process. Direct contac t with 
the primordial ex perien ce  of ourse lves is an abyss of 
se nsuousnes s from which we might never return. We pro tect 
ourselves therefore by interposing between  ourselves  and 
the un comp r o m i s i n g  radi ca lism of fun a complex string of 
personal signifiers.
These signifiers serve also to protect us from the 
equally u n c o m p r o m i s i n g  ab st r a c t i o n  of reason. Those who 
cannot or will not exp er ie nce themsel ves in terms of such 
images we call insane. Here more than a n y wh er e the 
historical o pp osition  be twe en  reason and un r e a s o n  has been 
in practice clouded, yet nowhere else has the conceptual 
language of its outmode d dualities per sisted with such 
tenacity. The o p p o s 11 1on betw een reason and madness has 
nonetheless finally succumbed to the terrifying 
co n v e n tio na lity of the d is tincti on  be tw een sanity and 
i n s a n i t y . 4 15 —
The social logic of consumption, which is the general 
context of moder n views of reason, cannot afford  to be 
neatly prescriptive. As use values are held to be 
subjective and the refore arbitrary, it must begin by
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ac k n o w l e d g i n g  a realm of conventionality. A part icular but 
constantly' shi fting boundary  of tol erable e c c e n t r i c i t y  is 
defined. This is a cl ass i f i c a t i o n  which cannot yield in 
advance to the e s t a b li shment of a fixed ’r a t i o n a l ’ norm.
It has to be allowed the general freedom of s u b j e c t i v i t y  in 
respond ing  to ’f a s h i o n ’ .30
Ho we ve r insecure the boundary, beyond it insanity 
luminously beckons. In Kan di nsky' s circles, A r t a u d ’s 
p h y s i o g n o m i c  essays, N i e t z s c h e ’s apho r i s i t i c  genius, art, 
literature and phi losop hy  all suddenly side with m a d ness as 
the realm of t r u t h . 31 They share with the insane a vision 
of life dep ri ved of its personal mythologies.
The traditi on  of e n l i g htenmen t has been finally and 
com ple tely abandoned. For the eigh teenth century, to be 
mad was to be under the sway of illusion; now it is just in 
the c o n v ic tion of a certain kind of conventional illusion  
that we can claim to be’ sane. We cannot defend this san i ty 
by a sincere appeal to ’r e a s o n ’ ; it has deserted  to the 
other side. In const !tuing itself as a system of signs 
’d e t a c h e d ’ from the impurities of immediate experience, 
reason dis covers in itself an analogy to the ’pr ima ry  
p r o c e s s ’. Reason, that is to say, as pure 'mediation, 
enjoys the unlim it ed freedom of t r a n s f ormat io n among 
arbitrary signifiers. Being wholly abstract, reaso n 
accepts no practical limit upon the range of its internal 
s e l f - r e f e r e n c e . 32 And. as pure ’r e l a t i o n ’ , it av oids  the
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comp romis es  and c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  of empirical reality. Sanity 
exists, however, in tolerating  the contradictions, 
inconsistencies, and incompleteness, which has been 
ex pun ged from the life of reason. Our ’s i g n a t u r e s ’ are 
composed from lust such impoverished and imperfect 
materials. Insanity, therefore, is as much a t e m p ta ti on to 
reason as a resur ge nce of the primary process. Both 
tendenc ies  are vi sible in the abundance  of modern 
psychopathology.
In using their inner freedom, perversely, to refuse 
the c o n s olat io n of ’s i g n a t u r e s ’ the insane become 
transp are nt to u s . 23 Efefenceless before the world, they 
act as passive recordin g devices of ail its most 
fundamental processes. There is an appallin g di re c t n e s s  in 
the gesture of the insanity. It is the t ruth fu lness of 
their symptoms wh ich  frightens us, their h el pl essness  as 
signifiers.
The neurotic, burdened with par tial ly  discar ded 
wishes, is too hones t to accept the cunning of consci ou s 
memory, and too demandi ng  to be satisfied with the 
intermittent ple as ur e of sponta neous recollection. The 
as su mpti on  of continuity, implicit in the o p e ra tion of 
conscious memory, is too great a leap of faith for the 
n e u r o t i c . 33 The neuro ti c tries to live without the 
illusions of time. E xp er ie nce is deco mpose d into dis c r e t e  
moments a c c i d e n t a l l y  occuring as a linear series. Each
moment might be the last. None carry the promise of a 
successor which, should it materialise, might do so in some 
un imagi na ble wav. Equally, however, as their lives are only 
’g e s t u r e s ’ to the truth, the neu ro ti c tries to co-exis t 
with a conventional' world  in which he cannot believe.
There is no escape to the play fulness of the instant. The 
work of inhibit ion proves irreversible. Instead theref ore 
of a release into the atemporal paradise of fun (the 
primary process), the ne u r o t i c  suffers the torment of 
anxiety, wh ic h is simply a fear of time. An xiety mani tests 
itself in the ’f r e e z i n g ’ of movement. It is an ina bility 
to act. Each moment, heavy with doubt and possibility, 
threatens both to appear or not to appear. The neur otics 
defensive gestures, the r i tualisa ti on .of behaviour, 
sy mp toma ti c o b s e ssiv e acts, endless pre pa ra tions for 
actions which never take place, prolong the pres ent beyond 
its ’n o r m a l ’ d u r a t i o n . 56 Anxiety, like play, is open before 
the world of infinite possibilities. But whereas in play 
each moment ar y m e t a m o r p h o s i s  is withou t consequence, in 
a nxi e ty each instant becomes an absol ut ely deci s ive cho i c e . 
Reason is helpless; only the biographical fictio n of an 
extended ’s e l f ’ , project ed  into the future by a reflex of 
the will, can guide the subject through such fearful 
d i s c o n t i n u i t i e s . 57
’Hovering above e x i s t e n c e ’ the neurotic in a sense 
retains an ideal humanity. Refusi ng to become one person 
rather than another he contains, crammed into the an xi ety
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of each timeless moment, the unal ie nated essence of endless 
poss i b 1e identities. The neurotic, to put it crudely, 
cannot make up his mind; or, more accurately, tries too 
hard to make up his mind. In at tempting to ’think a h e a d ’ , 
the n e u ro tic suffers from a surfeit of reason as w e i 1 as an 
excess of s e n s u o u s n e s s .5 * He cannot ’r e a l i s e ’ himself in 
spo ntaneous ac tion because his ’s e l f ’ exists as a kind of 
vola tilis ed  essence de spe rately leafing throught a 
ca tal og ue of its own future. In seeking to be led by 
reason the ne u r o t i c  comes to a standstill, unabl e to decide 
upon the correct p a th .60
The ne urotic cannot rid himself of childhood. En dless 
metamorphoses, interiorised and made anxious, ci rculate 
within him, Attempts to ’s o l v e ’ the problem (avoidance 
rituals, obsession, hysterical symptoms), rather than 
crystal li sing from the flux of subje ct iv ity a fixed 
personal identity simply make him more ’n e r v o u s ’ . It is 
tempting to interpret these signs as an appeal to be 
’ looked a f t e r ’ . But there is no hypoc ri sy here, N e u r o t i c  
helplessne ss  is more a measure of seriousness than 
irresponsibility.61
The neu rotic  is all terrified openness, un able to pick 
his way through the overwhel ming com ple xity of the ob ject  
world, For the ps ych oti c the moment of choice lies 
irretrieva bl y in the past. E v e r ythi ng  is settled and 
complete. He must set about conformi ng  the object wor id to
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his decision. He has traversed the entire length of the 
road upon whic h the n e u rotic cannot set out. He has become 
the unique individual which is said to be the goal of 
rational sel f-d evelopment. He has an abs ol utely clear and 
dete rmi ned identity which ’r e a l i t y ’ must vindicate. The 
ps ychotic withdrawal from the world is a logical 
t r ansf or mation of the n e u r o t i c ’s anx ious sign-systern.62
The p s y c hotic ’ i l l n e s s ’ is primari ly  a disease of 
space. The literature reveals a truly form idabl e va ri ety of 
e x a m p l e s . 63 The object world is di ss olved into a pla stic 
medium from which can be created, effortlessly, an entire 
cosmos to confi rm and threaten the p s c h o t i c ’s chosen 
identity. Not simply unique among other unique beings, the 
psycho tic  leads a solitary existence. He is the o n 1y 
individual, the sole survivor of a cosmic catastrophe. 
Empirical reality is a deceptive a p p e a r a n c e  p o p ul at ed by 
the ’fle etingly i m p r o v i s e d ’ creatures ’m i r a c l e d ’ up by his 
e n e m y . 64 He is co nt inually threate ned by the world he 
creates, which appears to him as the maca bre inven tion of a 
demiurge. Spatial relations are ar bi t r a r i l y  transformed.
He finds himself stretched across vast reaches of space. 
Distant stars are felt as the pores of his own s k i n . 62 But 
he might just as easily shrink to nothing. The interior of 
his body becomes a laboratory of hid eous ex perimenta tion,
It is meta mo rphosed  into a series of m e c h anised 
contraptions. S c h r e b e r ’s desc ription  of ’m i r a c l e s ’ 
perpetrated on his body is the most ample of mode rn
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pornographies. All those di stinctions normal to the 
deve lop ed ego, self/other, inside/outside, body/world, melt 
s w a y . 66 If h_e is wholly ’objectified* and fixed then all 
else must be ’subjective*, malleable, and transitory. The 
world is dange rous beca use it is never still; each contact 
with it threatens the frozen p erso na lity of the psychotic. 
Space itself is dangero us and must be contained. Wh er e the 
neurotic seeks safety in the abolition  of time, the 
psychotic, fearful of everything other and ther efore  be yon d 
himself, an ni h i l a t e s  extension. He takes the cosmos into 
himself and attempts  phy sical ly to master it.67 N o t hing 
should be ’ left over*, no place remain un co lonised  by the 
psychot ic* s expanding  sou l. 65 But realising he cannot 
succeed, he fears that the cosmos will master him, that he 
will be ’absorbed* by it. that already every other human 
being has been sucked into some hideous ma chine of 
destruction.
The fear of time and the fear of space c o n s t i t u t e  the 
fundamental axes of psychopathology, the signs of 
in sanity.66 In this respect conf irmin g the judgment of the 
Enlightenment, the unre as o n a b l e n e s s  of the insane is 
manifest in disturb ed  consumption. The neurot ic  is too 
anxious to consume. He cannot bear the doubt of selection. 
He wants ev e r y t h i n g  and has nothing. The psychotic, having 
already swall owed the cosmos, can find nothing else to 
consume and beco mes a voracious anorexic.
Gabel ing eni ou sly argues that these opposing 
tendencies can be readily concei ved as r e s p e cti ve ly an 
u n d e r e s t i m a t i o n  and an o v e r e s ti mation  of the level of 
a l i e natio n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of ’n o r m a l ’ social r e l a t i o n s . 70 
We cannot tol erate the truth of capitalism. We resist, 
psy cho logically, the fact of our a lien at ion into 
’o b j e c t i v e ’ relat io ns and live instead under the illusion 
of personality.
The n e u r o t i c  goes too far in this refusal. He insists 
upon the real individual humanity of everyone he sees. He 
cannot act in a partial or fragmented fashion. He cannot 
accept the fa ci lity of stereotypes. His is a di sease of 
sensitivity. Bu rd e n e d  with the duty of a u t h e n t i c i t y  in a 
wholly u n a l i e n a t e d  world, he is over wh elmed by its 
plenitude. The psychotic, on the contrary, does not resist 
enough. In ac ce pting the present reality of alienation, he 
refuses to accept the comfort of an imagined past. His life 
is absorbed into the gfeneral process of production. As the 
last human survivor, he realises his pr ed icament  when it is 
a 1 ready too late, and shr i nlis from a won i o whoss touch 
would tr ans form him into a lifeless commodity. Nei ther can 
tolerate the superficial inconsis tencies of sanity.
Our normal pers on ality is ’o p a q u e ’ . It reaches 
towards the ’pr imary p r o c e s s ’ , retracing its own pat h of 
’d e v e l o p m e n t ’ , by an indirect route. It exists in the 
small de lus ion s of a personal ’s i g n a t u r e ’. By comparison.
the ’gestures’ of' the insane are ’ transparent’ . I n s a n i t y
then, like childhood, comes to enjoy a privileg ed status, 
not as some exotic deviation, but as an exem pla ry instance 
of the life of reason.
R e p r e s e n t a t i o n
Si gna tures are ’r a t i o n a l ’ illusions, gestures 
’r a t i o n a l ’ disillusions. In the age of consumption, reason 
spills over from the totali ty of the prod uc tive pro cess 
(instrumentality) to reappear, f ragmen te d and transitory, 
in the most ’p e r v e r s e ’ forms of subjectivity.
The rad ica li sm once espoused by reason beco mes 
softened by innumerable relativi si ng t e n d e n c i e s . 71 The 
ex tremism of any view of life as an integrated totalit y is 
found only in the limiting cases of ’sensuous i m m e d i a c y ’ 
(childhood) or ’a b s t r a c t i o n ’ (insanity). Our view of the 
primitive has si ill 1 1 3 rly been revised: from the a n t i t h e s i s
to the epitome of rationality. S ig na tures and gestur es are 
but fragments of modern  culture, isolated forms of the new 
subje cti vity of reason. The primitive, however, as a type 
’b e y o n d ’ our own society, provides us with an image of 
reason which can be both moder n and holistic. Here are 
recombined into actual iiving matter the dispar ate 
tendencies of sens uousn ess and abstraction, the 
simultaneous and opposing tempt ation s of the c o s m o l o g y  of
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Re aso n consists only in the relation  among signs: and
signs are indif ferent to their material ’c a r r i e r s ’ . There 
can be no society wit hout signs and no thought withiout  
difference. D u r kheim realised this very clearly and, 
aban do ning his initial picture of simple socie tie s as 
undivid ed  unities, inaugurated the modern view of the 
primitive with an arb it rary act of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . 72 The- 
very notion of society implies d i v i s i o n . 7 3 .Ue w l 11 never 
arrive at an u nd erstan di ng of the rational f o u n da ti on of 
society by an appeal to some alien form of ’n e c e s s i t y ’ . 
Reason, as a system of signs, must be u n d e rstood  from 
within; society com prehen de d from its very b e g i n n i n g  as a 
reality sui g e n e r i s . In claiming th ere fore that, ’the 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  of things repr oduces the classifi cati on of 
m e n ’ , D u r khei m implies a common pr inciple of d i v isi on  that 
is necess ar y to b o t h . 7 * It was this common p r i n ci ple which 
provided, he believed,, an e x p l a natio n of the u n i v e r s a l i t y  
of primitive religion.
The El em e n t a r y  Forms of the Re ligious Life is, if 
nothing else, an important st ate ment of the mo dern  
conce pti on of reason. The ne cessit y which reason  and 
society share begins in an artifical act of sep aration; in 
the dif f e r e n t i a t i o n  of the sacred and the profane. All 
societies, in order to exist at all, create and ex pr ess an
internal order. This order has no basis other than its own
conventions: rules which cannot be deduced from the laws of
nature or the prin ciple of u t i l i t y * 75 D u r khei m claims in
The Ele m e n t a r y  Forms that, whatever their content, all
co nv enti on s pres uppose an original distinction, ar bi trary
and universal, which is the fo undation of s o c i e t y . 74 It is
the first divi si on which creates the cosmos. All objects
must be either sacred or profane: 'there exists no other
example of two categorie s of things so pro found ly
di ff er entiat ed  or so radic ally oppo sed to one a n o t h e r ’ .77
It is a t r a n s pa re ntly sub jective distinction, since ’the
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sacred character  ass umed by an object is not implied in the 
intrinsic pr operties of this latter; it is added to 
t h e m ’ .7 a The sacred is defined by a s p e ci fic at ti tude and 
by rituals of avoidan ce  which sets apart a spe cif ic 
category of objects from eve ry da y use.
The sacred exists as the most general of social 
conventions. It is a ’p u r e ’ rule. It draws an a r b i tr ary  
line and insists upon its being observed. The sacred is 
the p o s s i b i 1 ity of society and and evades any more specific 
definition in terms of its purpose or consequences. It is 
an empty rule, a d e m o n s trati on  of m a n ’s power to create 
social life.7<? In positing society, the d i s t i n c t i o n  
between sacred and profane also rouses reason to life. The 
social order, as conventionality, is rational not by virtue 
of any ideological judgment but because reaso n and society 
are composed of the same system of repr esentatio ns.
The s a c r e d/pro fa ne distinction* as the first system uf 
classification, is the principle of re pres e n t a t i o n  itseif, 
D u r k h e i m ’s students develop ed this insight in a vari ety of 
c o n t e x t s . 80 Again, it was less a case of cla im ing that 
primitive thought ’m o d e l l e d ’ itself upon a primordial 
social o p p o s i t i o n  as the disc overy at every turn of 
divisions ’p a r t i c i p a t i n g ’ in the arbit ra ry ex c l u s i v e n e s s  of 
the sacred. However ’o b v i o u s ’ or ’n a t u r a l ’ they might 
appear to us, cla s s i f i c a t o r y  distinctions* such as 
left/right, living/dead* male/female* depend upo n the 
continuous a p p l i c a t i o n  of a social rule. Reason* liberated 
from nature, must be capable of redis co vering itself in 
every social relation.
The pecu l i a r i t y  of primitive thought lies not in its 
lack of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  as such, but in the n o n s p e c i a 1ised 
nature of its signs. ' T h o u g h t ’ does not c o n s ti tute for 
primitive soc iet y a ’c a t e g o r y ’ separate from any other 
relatio n, 31 In like fashion, the ’g i f t ’ is not a speci fi c  
economic relation, or ’s a c r i f i c e ’ its peculiar religious 
rite.82 The totality of society is r epr es ented in each 
domain of its activity, all conjo ined through a co mmon  
’spiritual m a t t e r ’ .83
Magic is not then a kind of d i s s o lu tion of so cie ty  
into a mass of u nc ontroll ed  identities. In a p p r e h e n d i n g  
mana and its cognate forms, the primitive generates a 
complex series of relations* each prop ag ating as it were
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the conventional order of his society. The same 
co nventi ons are discovered, in each div is ion of the natural 
world, in every possible arrang ement of its parts. Magic 
is neither inadequ ate science nor impoverish ed religion, 
but a form of perception. Its aim is neither e x p l anati on  
nor under standing, but r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . 84
Magic r e n d e r s .the social process into a system of 
s i gns. a= In pu rsuing this approach, the trad it ion of 
Durk h e i m i a n  soci ol ogy slowly un de rmined its own foundation. 
If all repr es e n t a t i o n s  in pr imitive society are versions of 
the same thing, the most mun dane of acts becomes laden with 
the 'sacred'- signs of social totality. The ’sociological' 
interpreta ti on of the dis tincti on  original ly offered .by 
Durkneim (that the sacred represents the totality of 
society where the mundan e does not), is lost.05 In 
primitive society a 1 1 is totality, therefor e ever y t h i n g  is 
sacred and the radical exclusive ness upon which all 
distinction was based dissolves into nothing.
L e v i - S t r a u s s , sensing this difficulty, returns beyond 
Durkheim to Ro u s s e a u  in search of the d iff er ence immanent 
in social life. In society there is nothing whi ch is not a 
sign. R e p r e s e n t a t i o n  therefore is not a specific 'faculty' 
of social life to be grasped fun ction al ly in terms of its 
consequenc ia  1 ' s o l i d a r i t y ' . 57 Dur kh ei m's fundamental 
insight is em bra ce d more radically. All social life is 
sacred, and its various a s p e c t s . which can be de sc ribed
br oadly  as a series of exchanges, are ordered g rammat i c a 1 1v 
as tra ns f o r m a t i o n s  of each other. The rules, implicit and 
explicit, for example, in the prep aration  and c o n s u m p t i o n  
of food are just as bas ic to our u n d e r st anding of pri mi tive 
society as are the convent i ons orderi ng kinship, or hunt i ng 
or warfare. They are, indeed, the same conventions, 
variously ’e m b e d d e d ’ in practical activities. Just as Freud 
could reveal the va ri et y of chi ldhood wishes in the 
ar bi tr ary di v e r s i t y  of dreams, jokes and parapraxes, so 
L e v i -S tr auss seeks to uncover the ’savage m i n d ’ from the 
ins ign ificant details of primitive social o r g a n i s a t i o n . 38
P r i m it iv e co s m o l o g y  is ther efore ’ lived' as much  as it 
is ’ t h o u g h t ’ . The demand for intellectual order and 
coherence, for rationality, is just as imperative as it is 
for the bou rgeoi s theorist, but the signs through whi ch it 
is expressed  serve s i m u l t an eously as the d e s c r i p t i v e  labels 
of the sensory world. The dif f e r e n t i a t i o n  of animal 
species might be used, thus, to represent certain 
differences among the groups within a s o c i e t y . 3 q These 
totemic relations  are ’s t r u c t u r a l ’ rather than * symbolic*. 
There is no direct rel at io n betw een a specific species and 
a social group. A par ticul ar animal is not ’a d o p t e d ’ out 
of a dmira ti on for some specific physical or moral a t t r i b u t e  
imputed to it.Nor is totemism simply indicative of 
primitive ’c o n f u s i o n ’ over the boundary between the human 
and the animal. To te mi c species rather form a system 
through which the order of society can be expressed.
It would be misleading, however, to regard totemi sm  as 
only that. It is a system of repres entati on s rather than 
the r e p r e sentat io n of a system in some sense other than 
itself. L e v i - S t r a u s s  never returns to D u r k h e i m ’s 
functionalism. To t e m i s m  ’e x p r e s s e s ’ social relat ions only, 
as it were acc identally. it is because  social relations 
are themselves sys tems of re pr esenta ti ons that such 
analogies appear compelling. It is in both being 
c ons tituted  as orders of signs that they can be said to 
represent each other. The relations among separate  domains 
of social exc ha nge (food, women, stories), do not therefo re 
replicate one anot her met aphorically, but are linked 
according to rules of grammatical t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . 90 This 
formal linguistic ra ti o n a l i t y  of r e p re se ntation s is not 
1 added* to their primary  fun cti on of de si g n a t i o n  and 
discrimination. For L e v i - St rauss it appears indeed that 
grammatical c or re ctness  were the first cons traint  upon 
human action. ,
Le vi -S trauss  n on etheles s di ssociate s himself from any 
such f o r m a l i s m .91 Re p r e s e n t a t i o n s  are always
represe nta tions of something, and must always be c o n s i d e r e d  
in relation to some specific content. Like dreams, they 
can only be interpreted in relation to a complex 
et hnograph ic c o n t e x t . 92 The ’ latent c o n t e n t ’ of' all sign 
systems, however, is the power of re p r e s e n t a t i o n  itself.
All specific signs embody the general d i s t i n c t i o n  be tw ee n
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natur e and culture. Mature is transforme d into signif'iers. 
As a realm of necessity, nature is ’u s e f u l ’ pr ima rily in 
prov idi ng ’r e a s o n ’ with a series of empirical di fferenc es 
(species, gender, se'ason etc.) which can stand as the 
’p h o n e m i c ’ elements of c u l tu re .93 ’Social s t r u c t u r e ’ , 
therefore, as the grammar of social life, ’has no th ing  to 
do with empirical r e a l i t y ’ .94
The structural rules implicit in re pr ese n t a t i o n s  are
as well dis gu ised as the primary process is in our
*
’s i g n a t u r e s ’ .93 L e v i - Strauss  turns consequently, like 
Freud, to what appears to be the most u n p r o m i s i n g 1y 
’ i r r a t i o n a l ’ of signs (myth and ritual) to d e m o n s t r a t e  the 
generality and cohe re nce of such rules. Divested, of its 
spurious nar r a t i v e  form, primitive myth is rev ea le d as a 
un iversal form of sel f-consciousness. In ana 1ys i n g its 
comp lex i n t e r n a 1 relations the anthropolo gist, as much as 
the psycho-analyst, is engaged in the pursuit of self- 
knowledge. Myth operates according  to a logic immanent in 
the human power of representation. The c o m m entary upon the 
myth itself beco mes part of the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t ’s 
mat e r i a ! . 9A His own analysis does not escape the magic  
circle of re fl exive signifiers. Myth ’a b s o r b s ’ human 
thought in much the same way that play absorbs human 
activity. From its perspective, bourgeois science be co mes 
yet one more tr ansfor ma tive pattern within whi ch to 
inscribe its c o d e . 97 In.being liberated from material 
constraint, reason first takes on the character i st i cs of
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’s u b j e c t i v i t y ’ (relativism, malleability, plasticity, the 
marks of consumption), before recon struc ti ng itself as the 
formal relations w h ic h m a k e - s u b j e c t i v i t y  p o s s i b l e * 96 Reason 
proclaims then, as its only necessity, a pr inciple  of inner 
f r e e d o m ..
The subject as well as the object become pred icated 
upon reason. The ex empla ry  types of u n r e a s o n a b l e n e s s  are 
tr ans formed in c o n s e q u e n c e  into the most free and there fore 
the most truthful of signifiers. As the hidden fou nd at ion 
of i n d i v i d u a 1ity, * as the frank inhu manity of social 
relations, as the universal power to generate meaning, 
signatures, gestures and re pr es entati on s are three orders 
of signs ’in but not o f ’ bourgeois society. They lie 
uneasily along the mar gins of the produc ti ve order. We 
often wish they might refer excl us ively to a ’m y t h o l o g i c a l ’ 
world beyond our reach. Each is in its own way quite 
dreadful, at once att r a c t i n g  and rep elling the ego with 
the i r pur i t y . ,
THE CO SM IC  BODY
’Fun* is the diss o l u t i o n  of all concepts  and
c a t e g o r i e s ; ”  a subver sive germ we cannot live without. In
its absol ut e freedom, no pri nc iple is a c k n o w l e d g e d  ox-
served other than the po ss i b i l i t y  of its own u n r e s t r a i n e d
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mobility. It therefore exists as the limit to the known 
world. Yet we feel as a palp able real ity its co nt inuing  
presence in the very form and struct ur e with wh ic h we lend 
order to e x p e r i e n c e . 100
The bou rg eois  order, like any conventional order, is 
built first upon the renu nciatio n of fun: in fact upo n a
stern re jection of the plenitu de of i ts p o s s i b i l i t i e s  in 
favour of the creation, in reality, of a single conceptual 
and practical world. In bourgeois society, the co ntrast  
betw een  this reality and its d i s s o lution as fun has, for 
the most part, been c o ncept ua lised as the opp o s i t i o n 
betw een  reason and unreason. Fun, however, evading all 
linguistic designation, playf ully insinuates itself into 
the life of reason itself.
In the develo pment of rational cosmology, fun has been  
more than a boundary  of logical speculation. It has
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nurture d its own vi sion of the world. The co smo logy of 
fun, paradoxical as the n o ti on  might appear, has remained 
integral (by negation, exclusion, division), to the 
bourgeois w o r ld view and appears time and again as r e a s o n ’s 
shadowy companion.
As a ’mode of t h o u g h t ’ , fun refuses to leave the body. 
It ’begins with the m o u t h ’ and does not flatter itself by 
’e s c a p i n g ’ into some other, more ethereal m e d i u m . 101 The 
body, as appetite, m e c h a n i s m  or m e m o r y-i ma ge is its 
exclusive locus. Its cosmos is di re ctly felt.
Sensuousnes s is not simply the empirical ’b a s i s ’ upon which 
its concepts are erected, it is itself the c o s m o s . 102
The ’thinking b o d y ’ is, with the es ta b l i s h m e n t  of 
capitalism, an evid ent  co nt radi c t i o n . T h e  body is here 
defined first of all as the source of unruly perversities, 
the origin of all u n r e a s o n a b 1 e s s . It is in a regr ettable  
lack of se l f - p o s s e s s i o n ' t h a t  the irrati onality of fun is 
manifest. Then, as reason is identified with 
instrumentality, the co smology of fun takes shape as a 
universal ’u n d e v e 1 o p e d ’ c o n s c i o u s n e s s . But as the initial 
point of a linear process of change, fun can be separ ated  
from reason only by an ar bit rary act of cla ssification. A 
process of ’r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n ’ must then be present from the 
outset and immanent in the. variety of sensuous 
n m e t a m o r p h o s e s . The ’m o d e r n ’ forms of subjectivity, 
finally, have carried fun into the very heart of reason.
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The frankness, c on creten es s and lack of constraint typical 
(but not definitive) of fun suddenly appears in a new light 
favourably co nt rasted to the ’f r o z e n ’ artif i c i a l i t y  of 
reason founded upon the ineluctable order of production'.
In terms of its ’o b j e c t - r e 1a t i o n s ’ rather than its 
’c o n s c i o u s n e s s ’ ’ fun is unlimite d playfulness. Its 
unfettered mo ve me nt . creates from the empirical world a 
theatre of dreams. There is not hing ’b e y o n d ’ its own 
transforma tions to resist the p r o d i g a 1ity of its own 
creativity. Its world  is the mo m e n t a r y  cr eatio n of an 
interior whim. It is actio n outside of the cons traint of 
labour, which, as the ’r e a s o n e d ’ use of the body to serve 
its own ’n e e d s ’, is ded icated to a single reality.
The co smic body  enjoys unlimi te d freedom without 
’e v a p o r a t i n g ’ into abstraction. As sensuous imm ediacy it 
performs ’i n t e l l e c t u a l ’ operations by metamorphosis. It is 
a direct sensing of internal relations we can only grasp 
conceptually. For a long time, ’a d v a n c e d ’ rat io na list 
thought found the primordial world of fun somewhat 
distasteful. ’Pr imitive  t h o u g h t ’ in all its guises, 
appeared obs es sively ’s t u c k ’ in physicality; in w i d e s p r e a d  
mythologies about the origin of the world as a proc ess of 
b i r t h , 103 as neurot ic  wishfulness, or psychoti c delusion, 
as the primary process. But now, as r e a s o n ’s double, it 
enjoys a new respectability. The body as a c o n c r e t i o n  of 
signs is a thinking mechanism, the first and most
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fundamental site of r e a s o n ’s a r c h i t e c t o n i c s . 104 In the 
di ffer e n t i a t i o n  of bodily feelings we feel the impulse of 
reason. The categorical op positi on  with which we began: 
mind/body, subject/object, theory/fact, begin to 
disintegrate. Each term is recognisabl e in the other. 
Metamorp ho sis is reborn. And just for a moment we bel iev e 
that the primordial world is once again wi th in  our reach.
Fun however cannot be reached by rational a c tion or
reflection. It cannot becom e the aim of social life. The 
' *
moment we d e l i b e r a t e l y  seek out the infinitisi ng mo vement 
from se ns uousn ess to abst r a c t i o n  and back again it 
dissolves into n o t h i n g n e s s . 103 To make the atte mpt would be 
to suppose that fun is no more than a d i fferent ia ted
segment of a larger world of experience. But this
contra dic ts the only thing we might ’r e a s o n a b l y ’ know of 
fun: that it is infinite. Our world is already co ntaine d
within its count less possibilities.
Re sp ondi ng  to a fugitive presence, a new style of art, 
the ’ little p h r a s e ’ of a sonata, a face glimpsed a g a i n s t  a
ba ckd rop of s e a , 104 we pursue, in order to make it our own,
the object in which it seems embodied. We are
disappointed. Fun is not to be ma stered by deli be rate  
a p p r o p r i a t i o n . 107 It remains t a n t a 1i s i n g 1y beyond our 
grasp. Fascinated, we cannot stop analysi ng its litter of 
aba ndoned forms; a process which, playing host to the 
spirit inadvisedly sought in objects themselves,
129
o cc as ionall y springs to lif e.100
130
Notes to Chapter Three
1. Marx, it should be remembered, presents his analys is of 
prod uc tion as a c r i t i q u e -of political economy. Pie rc ing the 
my ste ry obs cu ri ng the source of profit is here something 
rather more than the provisi on  of an ade quate causal 
account of its origin. See Marx (1976), vol.l, pp. 163-77. 
Value ’transfo rms every pro duct of labour into a social 
h i e r o g l y p h i c ’ , ibid., p. 167. In this respect Marx might be 
considered a modernist. See B e r m a n  (1982), pp. 90-115, 
Fris by (1985), pp. 20-7.
Freud and Proust, it is worth noting, deve loped  a similar 
’critique of bou r g e o i s  psychology*, by unco vering  the 
source of ple as ure a c c u m ula ti ng in the normal pro cess of 
ps ychic exchange.
2. ’Uninteresting,’ that is in K i e r k e g a a r d ’s precise use of
the term. See, The Co nc ept of D r e a d , p. 16. The
interesting always retains at its core som ething of
personal significance, in being ’o b j e c t i f i e d ’ social 
relations therefore become  uninteresting.
3. And, paradoxically, beco mes d e m a t e r i a l i s e d . C f .
B a u d r i 11ard (1975). Again, fo llowing K i e r ke gaard (1967), 
the ’s y s t e m a t i c ’ is taken up into purely reflective 
cat egories and becomes met aphysical. Genuine m a t e r i a l i s m  
must, in a rather particular sense examin ed below, ch. 11, 
remain unsystematic.
4. Thus Engels well known letter to Joseph Bloch,
’According to the m a t e r i a 1ist co n c e p t i o n  of hi story the 
u 11 i m a t e 1y d eter mi ning ele ment in hist ory is the 
pro du ctio n and r e p r od uc tion of real li f e ’ . Feuer ed.
(1959), pp. 397-8. ’
5. Weber (1965), p. 181,' notes that ’The Purita n wanted to 
work in a calling; we are forced to do s o ’ .
6. See p a r t i cu larly Kier ke gaard (1968), pp. 169-224, Lo wit h 
(1964), pp. 235-51.
7. Marx (1975), pp. 243-58, 323-34. And for useful 
comments, Oilman (1971), pp. 131-225, Mesza ros (1970), pp. 
93-122, Schacht (1970), pp. 65-112.
8. As in Lukacs (1968), and Sohn-Rethel (1978).
9. See Abercrombie, Hill and Turner (1980) for a vigorous 
argument. This is not to be confus ed of course with the 
once popular notion  of the ’end of i d e o l o g y ’, traceable to 
Saint-Simon, but in its c o n t em po rary revival owing most to 
Bel 1 (1960).
10. Once again Kie rkeg aa rd provid es the first and most
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compelling examples, particularly, in this instance, in the 
Either of Either/Or.
l l . S e e b e l o w c h . i l .
12. For example, L e v i - Srtraus s (1973), Szasz (1961), Holt 
(1974).
13. A tra dition ana ly sed by Rorty (1980). Freud S.E., 
v o l . 14 p. 122, it should be remembered defined ’ i n s t i n c t ’
(T r i e b ) as ’the psychical rep rese ntative  of the stimuli
ori ginating from wi thin  the organism and reaching the 
m i n d ’ .
14. Saussure (1966),. p. 66, expresses it thus: ’The
lingu-isitc sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a
conceptand a sound-image. The latter is not the material
sound, a purely physical thing, but the psychological 
imprint of the sound, the impression that it makes in our 
s e n s e s ’. And Dela cr oix (1934), p. 131: ’ Le signe
1 i n g u i s t i q u e , dans son essence, est incorporei; ce qui le 
constitute, ce n ’est pas sa substance son image acoust iq ue  
de toutes les a u t r e s ’ .
15. Saussure (1966), p. 120: ’in language there are only 
d i f f e r e n c e s ’ . See also Barthes (1967), pp. 38-9. Ma rt inet 
(1969), pp. 20-2.
16. C a s s i r e r ’s P h i l o s o p h y  of Symboli c Forms vol.l, p. 69, 
as a ’" m o r p h o 1o g y ” of the human s p i r i t ’ , which aims at ’the 
specification of pure s u b j e c t i v i t y ’ , is one of the most 
impressive efforts along these lines. It is a simila rly 
’m o r p h o l o g i c a l ’ p e r s p ec tive which informs U e x k u l l ’s 
romantic biology. For example: ’No attempt to discover the
reality behind the world of appearances, i.e. by neg l e c t i n g  
the subject, has ever come to anything, because the subject 
plays the decisive role 'In con stru cting the world of 
appearances, and on the other side of that world is no 
world at a l l ’ . Uexkull (1926), p. xv. And again: ’ In the 
world of the phy sicis t there are only objects which react 
on one another through the medium of space; in the world of 
the biologist there are only appearanc es which react on one 
another through the medium of the s u b j e c t ’ , ibid. p. 31.
17. A limiting p o s s ib il ity approached, ironically, in the 
cont emp orary relations of production. The ’b o r e d o m ’ of work 
has been comme nt ed upon for well over a century.
18. A di stinct ion implicit in both the title and the bold 
opening sta tement to The Interpretation of D r e a m s , ’every 
dream reveals itself as a psychical structure which has a 
m e a n i n g ’ . It is equally evident in many of S i m m e l ’s finest 
essays, for example Simmel (1971), pp. 121, 179-86, 294-
o o o 0 ^ . 0  *
19. Particul ar ly striking in Jaspers monumental Ge ne r a  1 
P s y c h o p a t h o l o g y , a work which more than any other succeed s
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in con vin cing us of the profound  a r b i t ra riness in the 
sys te ma tic structure of what we take for ev eryday reality.
20. Levi - S t r a u s s  (1968), pp. 55-100. And mak ing use of an 
older anthrop ol ogical tr adi tion Onians (1951), and 
B e n v en is te (1973).
21. Koerner (1973), pp. 168-74.
22. Bergso n (1911), p. 24.
23. Ibid., p. 195. Thus: ’Per c e p t i o n  is never a mere 
contact of the mind with the object p r e s e n t ’ , ibid., p.
170. ’With the immediate and present data of our sensesw e 
mingle a thousand details out of our personal past 
experience... In most cases these remains supplant  our 
actual perceptions, of which  we then retain only a few 
hints, using them me rely as ’’s i g n s ” that recall to us 
former i m a g e s . ’ Ibid., p. 24.
24. Fe rg u s o n  (1983), pp. 51-7.
25. Freud S.E., vol. 7, pp. 174-5, asks ’Why should our 
memory  lag so far behind the other activities of our 
m i n d s ? ’ An an oma ly  that appears even more striking when we 
realise that there is ’good reason to believe that there is 
no period at which the capacity for rec eiving and 
reproducing impressions is greater than pr ec isely during 
the years of c h i l d h o o d ’ .
26 . The ’golden a g e ’ of childhood stretches a p p r o x i m a t e l y  
from the p u b l ic at ion of Alice in Wonderl an d (1857), to The 
Wind in the Willows (1908).
27. The process described by Jaspers (1963), p. 348, as a 
’release from the obscure bondage of the u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d ’ .
28. Comp are  an incisive passage from N i e t zs ch e (1969), pp. 
57-8: ’For ge tt ing is no mere vis inertiae as the
superficial imagine; it is rather an active and in the 
strictest sense a pos it ive faculty of repression... to make 
room for new things, above all for the nobler functio ns and 
functionaries, for regulation, for foresight, p r e m e d i t a t i o n  
(for our organ is m is an oligarchy) - that is the purpose of 
active forgetfulness, which is like a doorkeeper, a 
preserver of psychic order, repose, and etiquette: so that
it will be immediately obvious how there can be no 
happiness, no cheerfulness, no hope, no pride, no p r e s e n t , 
wit hout f o r g e t f u l n e s s . ’
29. Proust (1966), vol.l, pp. 58-62, is as devo ted as Freud 
to these sensory remains. Like Be rgson he sees the 
perceptual world as suffused with memory, co n d e n s i n g  into 
fleeting sensations, ’the vast stru cture of r e c o l l e c t i o n ’ . 
Recoll ec tions that become part of our ’b o d y - i m a g e ’ , ’Our 
legs and our arms are full of torpid m e m o r i e s ’ , ibid.,
v o l . 12, p. 2. See also P o u 1et (1977), pp. 3-4, De leuze
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<1973), pp. 39-50, who argues that such reco lle ction s are, 
for Proust, the accidental in termediari es through which the 
Narrator gains access to a world of ’p u r e ’ signs.
30. Freud provides many examples. For a general statement 
of this ’fundamental r u l e ’ see Freud S.E., vol. 22, pp. 10- 
4, and for an early example ibid., v o l . 2, p. 56. By 
following the paths of ’free a s s o c i a t i o n ’ rather than 
’r a t i o n a l l y ’ r e co nstruc ti ng the p a t i e n t ’s recol le ctions 
Freud was also able to display his literary talent to great 
effect. We need not accep t at face val ue his claim to find 
it ’s t r a n g e ’ that his case historie s ’should read like 
short s t o r i e s ’ , ibid. v o l . 2, p. 160.
31. Proust (196 6) ,. v o 1.1, p. 61, also clea rly d is tinguis he s 
be tw ee n these two types of memory; b e t wee n a pr e d o m i n a n t l y 
visual ’ i n t e 11e c t u a 1 m e m o r y ’ which ’pr eserves  no th in g of 
the past i t s e l f ’ , and inv oluntary r e c o l l e c t i o n  carried in 
chance enc ounters with the world of c o n t e mpo ra ry 
sensations, es p e o i a l l y  of taste and smell, ’but when from a 
long-distant past nothin g subsists, after the people are 
dead, after the things are bro ken and scattered, still, 
alone, more fragile, but with more vitality, more 
unsubstantial, more persistent, more f a i t h f u l , the smell 
and taste of things remain poised a long time, like souls, 
ready to remind us, waiting and hoping for their momwent, 
amid the ruins of all the r e s t . ’ See also Sperber (1974), 
pp. 115-19, and D e l e u z e  (1972), pp. 51-64.
32. Berg son  (19111, p. 102.
33. Freud S.E., v o l . 2, p. 7.
34. Ibid., pp. 3-17.
35. F r e u d ’s major case studies provide the f u n d a m e n t a 1 and 
u nsu rpassed  d e m o n st ration  of this contention.
36. Anzieu (1986), p. 234.
37. The argumen t was fully de veloped in the cont ext of the 
'wolf m a n ’ analysis, Freud S.E., v o l . 17, pp. 29-47.
38. There seems little doubt that Freud himself exag g e r a t e d 
the opp osi tion to psycho-analysis. See Ell enb er ger (1970), 
pp. 783-4.
39. Analysis may therefore become ’ i n t e r m i n a b l e ’ . Freud
S.E., vol. 23, pp. 216-54.
40. Ibid., v o l . 12, pp. 97-108, 157-74.
41. See note (27) above. Sul lo way (1980) it seems to me 
mi sre present s F r e u d ’s work by viewing it e x c l s u i v e l y  w i t h i n  
the context of ni ne teent h cent ury biology.
42. Proust traces it differently, to an intuition of the
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ess ence of things, to art. Deleuze (1972), pp. 39-50.
43. Freud S.E., vol. 14, pp. 146-58. ’We recall the fact 
that the mo tive and purpose of repres sion was nothing else 
than the avoid an ce of u n p l e a s u r e ’ , ibid., p. 153.
44. This is the major theme of F r e u d ’s Three Essays on the 
Th eo ry  of S e x u a l i t y . See particularly, ibid., pp. 232-33.
45. ’The symptoms co nstitute the sexual activity  of the 
p a t i e n t ’ , ibid: v o l . 7, p. 163, (emphasis added).
46. Analys ed  firstly in relation to dreams, ibid., v o l . 4, 
pp. 279-304, 305-9. But quickly extended  to jokes, v o l . 8, 
pp. 19-33, slips of the tongue and pen, v o l . 6, pp. 58-9, 
61-2, and symptom formation, v ol.5, p. 671.
47. Saussure (1959), p. 123, defines sy nt a g m a t i c  and 
as so c i a t i v e  relat ions as follows: ’ In the sy ntagm a term
acquires its value only because it stands in o p p o s i t i o n  to, 
ev erything  that precedes or follows it, or to both... 
Outside discourse, on the other hand, words acqu ire 
rel ations of a dif fere nt  kind. Those that have something 
in common are a ssociat ed  in the memory, resulting in groups 
m a rk ed by div erse r e l a t i o n s . ’
48. Rojek (1985), pp. 18-33.
49. Anticipated, as with almost ever ything  ’m o d e r n ’ , by 
Nietzsche, himself an ideal madman. See Dele uz e and 
Guattari (1977), pp. 20-2.
50. At the turn of the cent ury n e u r a s t h e n i a  was more 
’p o p u l a r ’ than schizophrenia. E lle nb erger (1970), pp. 242- 
3, and more gene rally  Sontag (1977).
51. Jaspers (1963), p. ^309, in par ticular stresses the 
aff in ity be tw ee n mo dern cre ati vi ty and ce rtain p a t h o 1og i c a 1 
states. ’Patie nt s see into depths which do not so much 
belong to their illness as to themselves as in div iduals 
with their own historical truth... in psyc hotic re ality we 
find an abunda nc e of content re pre senti ng fundamental 
problems of philosophy; nothingness, total destruction, 
formlessness, death. Here the ext remest of human 
po ssi bilitie s actual ly  breaks through the ord in ar y 
boundaries of our sheltered, cairn, ordered and smooth
ex i s t e n c e .’
52. The point at which Marx and Kierkegaard, in diffe re nt 
ways, parted company from Hegel. Lowith (1964), pp. 137-61.
53. Jaspers (1963), p. 127: ’Why do you ask me - you know
it a 1 r e a d y . ’
54. Thus, Del euze and Guattari (1977), p. 35: ’The
sc hiz op hr enic deliber at ely seeks out the very limit of 
capitalism: he is its in he re nttend en cy brou ght to
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f u l f i l m e n t .’
55. A pat ient of M i n k o w s k i ’s believed, each night, that he 
would be killed and was never consol ed by the discovery 
that he was still alive. For him quite literally, ’each 
day life began a n e w ’ , May, Angel and E l l e nber ge r eds.
(1958). The ’s e l f l e s s ’, therefore, live spatially.
56 . This is quite apart of course from their ’m e a n i n g ’ as 
' s i g n a t u r e s ’ . Freud, ibid., 16, p. 269, ’N e u ro ti c symptoms 
have a sense, like par apra xe s and d r e a m s . ’
57. A reflex whi ch reason, as self-cons ciousness , tends to 
undermine. See belo w ch.il.
58. Ki er kegaa rd  (1971), v o l . 2, pp. 161-75, The ’a e s t h e t i c ’ 
’ loses itself in the m u l t i f a r i o u s ’ .
59 . Many of F r e u d ’s patients were m a r kedly  ’ i n t e l l e c t u a l ’ in 
temperament. S u 1Joway (1980), p. 57. Any simple du alism 
here must be avoided, reason and sen suousne ss  do not form a 
’z e r o - s u m ’ relation.
60. The abst r a c t i o n  and nec es sity of reason tends ’to bring 
eve ryt hing to a s t a n d s t i l l ’ , K i e r k eg aard (1971), v o l . 2, p. 
179. ’ I can either do this or do that, but which ev er of the 
two I do is equa lly mad, ergo 1 do nothing at a l l , ’ Ibid,
p. 174.
61. This is not to deny the frequent ’secon da ry gain from 
i l l n e s s ’. Freud (1955), v o l . 18, pp. 158-60.
62. Most no tably by Freud (1958), v o l . 12, Canetti (1960), 
pp. 434-62, Sc ha tzman (1973).
63. ’The logic of pure i d e n t i t y ’ , Gabel (1975), p. 155, 
following Minkowski and'Bergson, regards as an unba l a n c e d 
ext remity of the normal tendency to view du ration 
spatially. In psych osi s there are no co un t e r a c t i n g 
tendencies so that thought becomes ’ geometri sm and morbid 
r a t i o n a l i s m ’ , ibid., p. 79, quoting Minkowski. Ja sp er s
(1963), p. 63, puts it succinctly: ’They have to live
forever because time no longer e x i s t s ’ . Hardly  sur pr is ing 
that one patient should report: ’ I felt lost, a b a n d o n e d  to
the infinities of space, whic h in spite of my 
ins ignificance somehow threatened m e ’ , ibid., p. 81.
64. Scnreber (1955), p. 74.
65. As Canetti (1962), pp. 440-1, points out S c h r e b e r ’s 
mastery of space makes him not simply the last human 
survivor, but the centre of the universe. This m e g a l o m a n i a  
is, at the same time, the expe rience  of utter helplessness.
66. And failing retreats into, ’the soft muff led gloom of 
the i n t e r i o r ’ , Kretschme r (1936), p. 161.
67. ’ I had the feeling that I was being pulled up to heaven 
and saw the whole earth under me, a pic ture of incomparable 
splendour and be aut y stretched out under the blue d o m e . ’ 
Jaspers (1963), p. 295. And again: ’my body bears fruit...
it is a w o r l d - b o d y ’ , ibid., p. 296.
68. Minkowski, in May, Angel and E l l e n be rg er eds. (1958) 
pp. 132-3.
69. The ne ur otic and psychot ic are equa lly  ’a b s t r a c t e d ’ , 
logical t r a n s f orma ti ons of each other rather than distinct 
’cond i t i o n s ’ .
70 Gabel (1975). The ne uroti c holds to the truth of his own 
h u m a n n e s s , the psychot ic  to the truth of an obj ec ti ve 
social order. -
71. See be 1o , c h . 11.
72. Dur kheim  a n d » M a u s s (1969), p. 5, assume an o rigin al ly 
un diffe r e n t i a t e d  conditon: ’ It would be impossi ble  to
exaggerate, in fact, the state of i n di stincti on  from which 
the human mind d e v e l o p e d ’ . Thus, ibid., p. 5: ’Animals,
people, and inanimate objects were ori gi nally  concei ve d as 
standing in rel ations of the most perfect identity to each 
o t h e r ’.
73. Relig ion is def ined through the sa cr ed/pro fa ne 
distinction. And: ’ If rel ig io n has given birth to all that
is essential in society, it is be ca use the idea of society 
is the soul of r e l i g i o n ’ , Durkehi m (1964), p. 419.
74. Dur ke hi m ana Mauss (1969), p. 11, explic it ly reject the 
notion that the re lation be tw ee n the two can be reduced to 
a simple causal mechanism, to do so would be to reduce the 
act of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  to some ethereal form of pure 
’t h o u g h t ’ : ’Society was ’not simply a model which
c 1 ass ifieatery thought f o l l o w e d ’ .
75. Ber gson (1935), p. 18, remarks that in soci ety  ’only 
one thing is natural, the n e c essit y of a r u l e ’ .
76. Durkeh im (1964), p. 225: ’R e l igio n ceases to be an
inexplicable h a l l u cinati on  and takes a foothold in 
reality... this power exists, it is s o c i e t y . ’
77. Du rkh eim (1964), p. 38. R o b e r t s o n  Smith (1907), p. 140, 
in his Burnett lectures of 1888 a n t i c i p a t e d  Du r k h e i m  to 
some extent, ’The d is tinctio n b e t we en what is holy and what
is common is one of the most important things in an ci en t
r e l i g i o n ’ . He did not attempt however to formu late a 
general theory of religi on based upo n such a convent ional  
distinction.
78. Durkehim (1964), p. 229.
79. D u r k h e i m ’s ’f u n c t i o n a l i s m ’ tends to obscure this point.
Fai ling to ob serve his own dictum that society must be 
granted a reality sui generis he persists in a t t e mptin g to 
’d e d u c e ’ its cause from itself. For example, ibid., pp. 
370-88.
80. For example in Hertz (i960), and Ne edham ed. (1973).
81. The primit iv e is not ch a r a c t e r i s e d . b y  lack of 
di stinc ti on  but by lack of di ff er e n t i a t i o n  among domains of 
distinction. Every ’a s p e c t ’ of social life is ’e m b e d d e d ’ in 
every other.
82. Hauss (1970), Huber t and Mauss (1964). E x c h a n g e  forms a 
complex system. They  exchange, ’courtesies, enterta inments, 
rituals, mi l i t a r y  assistance, women, children, dances and 
feasts... a system of total p r e s t a t i o n ’ : Mauss, ibid., p.
3.
83. Mauss, ibid. p. 12: ’ In perpetual interc hange  of what 
we may call spiritual matter, co mprising men and things, 
these elemen ts pass and repass be tw een class and 
individual, ranks, sexes and g e n e r a t i o n s ’ .
84. Mauss (1972), pp. 76-9: ’Things affect each other only
becaue they belon g to the same class or are op po se d in the 
same g e n u s ’ , ibid., p. 78. And: ’Mag ic becomes po ss ib le
only because we are dealoing  with cl assified s p e c i e s ’ , 
ibid., p p . 78-9.
85. Its an alogous form in bourgeois society is m o n e y , 
rather than science or religion. It c ons ti tutes in other 
words the mediurn of exchange, and a me c h a n i s m  for 
es tablishi ng e qu ivale nc e among things exchanged.
86. Auge (1982), p. 91: ’one cannot find social ac t i v i t i e s 
that are strict ly speaking outside the s a c r e d ’ .
87. Thoug h D u r h e i m i a n  functiona li sm pervades his earlier 
work on kinship, L ^ v i - St rauss (1969), pp. 478-81.
88. Brilliantly, for example in ’The Story of A s d i w a i ’ , 
Le vi-Straus s (1977), pp. 146-97.
89. Lev i-St rauss  (1963), (1966), pp. 35-74. “In spite of 
L e v i - S t r a u s s ’s eleg ant approach ’s y m b o l i c ’ in ter pr etation s 
of myth and ritual, such as B a c h o f e n ’s (1967) amd J u n g ’s, 
have remained popular. See for exam ple Fir th (1973). From 
either point of view it should also be borne in min d that 
the ’p r i m i t i v e ’ also reflects sel f - c o n s c i o u s l y  upon his 
existence, see par ticu la rly Griaule (1965).
90. Levi-Str au ss  (1966), pp. 75-108, (1968), pp, 67-80.
91. Parti c u l a r l y  in relatio n to Propp (1968), who is ’the 
victim of a subj ective i l l u s i o n ’ , L e v i - Strauss  (1973), p. 
131.
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92. This is p a r t i cular ly  the case with myth, whe re Levi- 
Strauss offers metho dological  advice similar to F r e u d ’s in 
relation to dream interpretation. L ^ v i - Strau ss  (1968), p. 
210-15. See Wi lden (1972), pp. 31-62. And, like dream 
interpretation, ’There is no real end to mythological  
analysis, no hidden unity to be grasped once the bre aking- 
down process has been comp 1e t e d .. . Myths, like rites are
" i n - t e r m i n a b 1e " ’ ,. L i v i - Strauss  (1970), pp. 5-6, c f . Freud
(1964),v o 1.23, pp. 216-54.
93. Levi -S trauss  (1966), pp. 1-34.
94. ’ ... but with models which are built up after it ’ : 
Levi -St ra uss (1968), p. 279.
95. L e vi- St rauss (1968), p. 229.
96. L e vi-St ra uss (1969), pp. 12: ’ I therefore cla im to
show, not how men think in myths, but how myths ope rat e in 
m e n ’s minds wit hou t their being aware of the f a c t ’ . Levi- 
S t r a u s s ’ s debt to Ro us seau is even greater than his debt to 
Durkheim, it is through my tholog y that m a n ’s universal 
nature finally makes itself felt. Thou g h  not in a 
’r a t i o n a l ’ or ’s e l f - c o n s c i o u s ’ form. In an other context see 
Duerr (1985), particularly, pp. 64-6.
97. Lev i-S trau ss  (1966), p. 13.
98. L e vi-St ra uss (1981), p. 639. The analysis of my thology
makes it possible ’to discover cert ain operational modes of 
the human m i n d ’ .
99. Huizing a (1971), p. 25.
100. See p a r t i cu larly in this context Turner (1969), pp. 
80-118, Douglas (1966), pp. 41-53.
101. Onians (1951) pp. 13-17, and for a p s y c h o - a n a l y t i c  
viewpoint Me lan ie Kle in (1980), pp, 35-57, and Wi n n i c o t t  
(1971), pp, 1-30.
102. Bergson (1911), p. 171, writes: ’my present exists in
the consc iousness that I have of my b o d y ’ . Schilde r  
(1935), following Ber gso n argues, that our c o n c e p t i o n  of 
space is initmately related to our body i m a g e : to the
’immediate exp erience  of the human b o d y ’ , ibid., p. 11. An 
experie nce  which is ’more than a p e r c e p t i o n ’ , ibid., p. 11, 
and has to be seen even in the simplest terms as a 
’postural model... in perpetual inner s e 1f - c r ea ti on and 
s e l f - d e s t r u c t i o n ’ , ibid., p. 16. More gener ally we are 
’enshrouded by various body i m a g e s ’ , ibid., p. 237. The 
body is a privileged object in being direct ly  felt, it does 
not however, co ns tit ute the fou ndation of a sy st em  of 
’n a t u r a l ’ signs. See also Douglas (1973), pp. 93-112, 
Needham (1972), pp. 138-51, and more gener ally T u rner
(1984).
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103. For example, Crocker (1985), pp. 2 1 - 3 0 ’ Rei ch el-  
Dolmatoff (1971), Ch ri stine Hu gh -Jones (1979), pp. 235-74, 
Stephen Hugh -J ones (1979), pp. 151-7.
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PART TWO
HAPPI NESS
’The universe, which does not exist through itself, 
cannot exist from out of its own n a t u r e . ’
bsint Ans
’ it is God himself who loves himself in u s ’
Wil liam of ST.Thie
FOUR
HIERARCHY
The bo urgeois w o r l dv iew is not co nst ituted by a simple 
act of rejection- The cosmic body (f un), with its absolute 
freedom of m t e m o r p h o s e s , must certa in ly be renounce d in 
favour of the order of relations we know s e p a rat el y as 
’c o s m o s ’ and ’p s y c h e ’ , but this might be said (in some 
form) of any complex society. The disti nctive chara cte r of 
the bourgeois order must be defined addit i o n a l l y  in 
relation to its own past, in relati on to the so ciety it has 
’o v e r c o m e ’ . This society had in its turn also bee n built 
upon the ren un ciati on  of fun- Its techniques of repression, 
howeve,r were quite di ffe ren t and it is largely in 
comparison to them that the unique rat ional it y of 
capitalism becomes evident.
During the greater part of the period of the 
development of capitalism, the ’middle a g e s ’ was viewed 
unsympatheticaI 1y as a prolonged but u ltimat el y  
insignificant interr uption in the cont inuity of w e ster n
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history. The two great periods of ’a n c i e n t ’ and ’m o d e r n ’ 
culture were separated and joined by an alien intrusion 
belonging properly to neither. And while the ’dark a g e s ’ 
might have been reserved as a term desc ripti ve  of the 
’b a r b a r i s m ’ im mediately  con se quent upon the collapse of the 
Roman Emprire, Eu r o p e a n  c ivil is ation at any time prior to 
the Ren aissan ce  was seen as hardly less steeped in 
ignorance and s u p e r s t i t i o n . 1
There was no th ing of the innocence of fun in the 
irrationalism of such socieities. In place of a primit iv e  
but ’p r o g r e s s i v e ’ system of magic there was a dogm a t i c a l l y  
absurd religion forced upon an unbelie vi ng but uncritical 
populace, itself caught up in the greater a b s u rdity of 
superstition. The two were mutu al ly supportive. The power 
of the church was a brutal fact no one cared to justify.
It did not touch the hearts or the minds of the masses, who 
tolerated its sup re macy just so long as they were left in 
peace to take what comfort they could from flimsy and 
incoherent ’popular b e l i e f s ’ . So that when the church was 
at last moved to ’C h r i s t i a n i s e ’ its nominal congregation, 
its only hope of success lay by way of the Inquisition."
This of course is a ca ricature of e i g h tee nt h and some 
nineteenth century historical writing. It n o n e t heless  
remains the case that a coherent account of ’p r e ­
c a p i t a l i s t ’ society had to wait upon the matur i t y  of 
rational theories of c ap it alism itself. Thus, during the
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seve nte enth century the term ? f e o d a l i t e ’ was known only to 
lawyers.3 And even when it became more widely used to 
designate a pa rticular form of society it carried with it 
the pejorative con no ta tion of an ’ancie n r e g i m e ’ riddled 
with a b u s e s . 4 We can the refore avoid the task of reviewing 
the changing c on ceptio n of ’f e u d a l i s m ’ ; it is a term that 
belongs e x c l us iv ely to the period of ’high capitalism' and 
its aftermath.
The Pri nci pl e of Feudal Social Relations
Otto Hintze, rather ne atl y summing up the prejud ices 
of German historical scholarship, claimed feud al ism to be 
’a system brought about by the lack of rational 
institutional a r r a n g e m e n t s ’ .3 If soc iety was not generated 
and mai ntain ed through an appeal to the power of reason 
vested in each individual, how was it ordered? The answer 
lay in the d e v e lopmen t of two particu lar types of 
’n o n r a t i o n a 1’ social relation: va ssa lage and lordship.
Vas salage was a relation of mutual service and respect 
contracted among individuals of similar social standing.
Its origins have been traced to the pra ctice among warrior 
knights withi n the Fr a n k i s h  kingdoms of uni tin g under a 
freely chosen mil it ary leader. The Gef o 1gschaf t was thus a 
band of retainers linked thr ough bonds of personal loyalty 
and subordi nation to a lead er.6
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In periods of e n d em ic  warfare, the mutual be ne fi t of 
such relations was obvious. It was under the C-aroi ingians, 
however, p a r t i cularl y Pep in II and Charles Martel, that 
such practices became organis ed into a system of 
v a s s a l a g e . 7 Here personal subordin at ion (c o m m e n d a t i o n ) was 
directly linked to the granting of land and goods 
(b e n e f i c e ) thus ensur in g that obiigati ons of milita ry  
service couold be discharged. With the grant of a fief the 
vassal was not only enabled to meet his ob ligations of 
service and pro tect his own interests more readily than 
before, he came under the direct p ro tectio n of ’ i m m u n i t i e s ’ 
granted by his lord in relation to that particu lar 
benef ice.8
Rel ations of va ssala ge were held in high esteem. In 
spite of involving a ’r e c i p r o c i t y ’ of unequal obligations, 
they were regarded as being quite free of c o m p u l s i o n . 9 In 
becoming ’the man of another m a n ’ the vassal, in somewh at  
diminished form, took on the personal qualities of 
greatness emanatin g from his lord. M  will love what thou 
lovest: I will hate what thou h a t e s t ’ , ran an A n g l o - S a x o n  
oath of c o m m e n d a t i o n . 10 Indeed the law came in time to 
deal with disputes betw een  fathers and sons as if the 
fathers, ’were the lords and the sons their men, b o un d to 
them by the rite of h o m a g e . ’11 Similarly, angels were 
sometimes repr esented  as the ’t h e i g n s ’ of God. And the 
common attitude of prayer became that of commendat i o , hands
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closed tight over the chest rather than open and
o u t s t r e t c h e d . 12
The vassal was not so much the ’i n s t r u m e n t ’ of his 
s u p e r i o r ’s will as the ’e x p r e s s i o n ’ of his person. He did 
not therefore require the ’p r o t e c t i o n ’ of legal ’r i g h t s ’ 
held indepen dently from his lord. The lord held ’immediate 
and direct power over the v a s s a l ’ , const rai ned ’solely by 
the notion of what was incompa tible with the di gnity  of a 
free m a n ’ . However, as the v a s s a l ’s dignity was 
inseparable from his l ord’s, no further regulati on  was 
deemed necessary. 13
By the tenth century, in many areas of W e s t e r n  Europe, 
the advantages of vassalage  were much sought after. In 
order to exploit his fief, a vassal fr equently became in 
his turn lord to a lesser v a s s a l . At the same time, his 
lord might seek the security of a more powerful magnate 
than himself. Great men estab 1ished ties of vass alage with 
many dependents, and inversely, the same person could 
become vassal to more than one lor d.14 Over lordship and 
multiple vassalage  greatly comp licate d political society so 
that, ’there began to be built up a vast system of personal 
relationships whose intersecting threads ran from one level 
of the social structure to a n o t h e r . ’13 It should be 
remembered however that vassalage was an institutional 
arrangement ’peculiar to the upper classes who were 
characterised above ail by the pr of ess ion of arms and the
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exercise of c o m m a n d ’ .14
The ideology of vassala ge  was invoked also to justify 
a quite di fferent type of personal dependence: that 
exercised by the fief- holder over those u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y  
bound to the land wi thin his benefice. These sei gneur iaI 
relations were n o n - c o n t r a c t u a 1, mate r i a l l y  e x p l o it at ive and 
unregu lat ed by common ad herence to a code of ’h o n o u r ’ or 
’ di g n i t y ’ .
Seigneurial rights were more ancient than vassalage. 
Manorial lordship in some form was continuous in W e s ter n 
Europe from the late Roman Empire. The villa and 
1ati fundia were transformed, often bec omi ng the proper ty  
of the church before being parcelled  out as benef ices 
through whic h the ecc lesiastical hie rarc hy  could extend  its 
control over the secular elite by creating its own system 
of v a s s a l a g e . 17 T h r o u g h o u t  these changes, however, the 
lower orders remained tfie passive objects of rule; unfree 
and tied to a speci fic community.
The local lord enclosed the commun it y in his own 
system of ’ ju s t i c e ’ . There was in princ iple no limitation 
upon the use of his power, though in practice his freedo m 
became restricted by the gradual acc reti on  of cu stomar y 
practices which came in time to bear the legitimacy of 
’traditional r i g h t s ’ .18
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The feudal ’p y r a m i d ’ was in fact two s u perimpo se d 
structures. At its apex was a ruling group of po litically 
free individuals organised into loose hi er a r c h i e s  through 
voluntary and mutual personal relations. B e n e a t h  them lay 
the mass of the populace, con tained within c o m m uniti es  
u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y  su bordinated to the rule of a feudal 
superior. Bloch points out that the essential diff erence  
be twe en b o n dman and free lay in the separate system of 
justice to which each might appeal: ’On the one hand, there
were the true subjects of the king to whom was extended, at 
all times, the p r o t ec ti on of the courts; on the other, 
there was the mass of the peasantry, largely abando ne d to 
the jurisdiction of the lord of the m a n o r . ’19
Even theoretically, the feudal hier ar chy was never 
conceived as a single, unified and cohere nt order; and in 
practice of course it is often difficult to di scern even 
the most rud ime nt ary principles of vas salage or lordship in 
o p e r a t i o n . 20 The ’c e n t r i f u g a l ’ ten denci es of such a 
’s y s t e m ’ were counteracted, though net always successfully, 
by the two major cent ra lising institutions of feudalism: 
the mon archy and the church.
Kingship during the earlier period of feu da lism was 
simply the political expression of milit ar y s u p e r i o r i t y . 21 
Success depended to a large extent on the k i n g ’s a b i lity to 
establish powers of lordship over demesnes greater than any 
of his subjects, and therefore, the poss i b i l i t y  of
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creating, through rel ations of vassalage, the most 
extensive network of mi li tary s u p p o r t . 22 The k i n g ’s 
position of supremac y created unique problems. If every man 
should be ’the man of another m a n ’ , whose man was the king? 
To what au thority  did the k i n g ’s command appeal? The 
hi erarchi c a 1 pr i nc iple could not extend upward s i m p 1y to 
terminate in the practical control of a mundane individual. 
The king must therefore possess or express extraord inary 
characteri st ics and kingship must itself be m y s t e rious ly  
shrouded in ’rout inise d c h a r i s m a ’ .23 During the twelfth 
century, when feudalism  was well esta blishe d throughou t 
Western E u r o p e , the king was co nceived indeed as a person a 
mi x t a . Like the hi erarchy  of the church, he was touched by 
the divine presence; ’Spirit ’’leaped ” into the terrestrial 
king at the momen t of his c o n s e c r a t i o n . ’24 He became 
’another m a n ’ , in nature  surpassing  all others; a gift 
’attribu ted  to him as an effl ue nce of his co ns e c r a t i o n  and 
f u n c t i o n . ’23 It was s pe ci fically  the ceremony  of 
coronation, most dram a t i c a l l y  in the case of C h a r l e m a g n e  on 
Christmass Day, 800, which thus elevat ed him.
’Liturgical k i n g s h i p ’ in the later feudal period 
became somewhat ove rsha do wed by legalism, without however 
obscuring the fundamental pri nc iple that, ’The power of the 
king is the power of God. This power, namely is G o d ’s by 
nature, and the k i n g ’s by g r a c e . ’26 This is not to say, of 
course, that the king could rule only by the explici t and 
continuing support of the church. Feudalism, in most cases.
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was not a genuinely th eo cratic s t a t e . 27 In being 
consecrated, however, the king was able to justify his 
position as political leader and, more than that, claim an 
inexhaustible source of authority. Both emperor and -pope 
claimed a divine inspiration, both acted as m e d i ators 
between God and man, both realised, within the limits of 
possibility, a perfect nature. It was indeed just beca use 
of this theoretical re qu irement for purity that pe riodic 
reform movem en ts were instigated in both ch urch and 
s tat e.28
The int er depende nc e of church and m o n ar ch y was given 
formal re co gnition by the m i d - e l e v e n t h  centur y in the 
fun cti on alist theor y of the ’three o r d e r s ’ of feudal 
society. ’The City of God, which is believed to be one, is 
divided into three. Some pray, others fight, others again 
work. These three co-e xi sting orders could not suffer 
separation. The services rendered by one permit the world 
of the other t w o . ’29 'These distinctions, o r a t o r e s , 
be 1 1 a t o r e s , and a g r i c o i a t o r e s , was itself, Duby suggests, 
a revival and synthesis of several dif ferent c 1 a s s i f i c a t o r y  
divisions current in the Ca ro l i n g i a n  p e r i o d . 30 As a self- 
conscious ’i d e o l o g y ’ it appears to have ori ginat ed  among 
the more senior Fr en c h  bishops who, together with the 
monarch, advanc ed it as a means of ’c h r i s t i a n i s i n g ’ and 
con trolling the k n i gh tl y class.
The ’h o r i z o n t a l ’ as well as the ’v e r t i c a l ’ links
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wit hin  the ruling group became, in consequence, more 
clearly defined. It was not just at the mystical peak of 
the hi era rch y that a symbiosis of secular and 
ecclesiastical a u t h o r i t y  was established. At every level, 
complex in te rrelati on s based upon an exchange of spiritual 
services (the pr ot e c t i o n  of prayer, the fo rgivene ss of 
sins, the promise of salvation) for material and judicial 
p ro te ction (immunities, gifts of land, feudal obligation), 
were e s t a b l i s h e d . 31 Few were w i l 1ing to risk death withou t 
remission of sin. Yet everyo ne must hold themselves in a 
state of perpetual readiness; death was a commonplace, but 
no net heless al ar mi ng for t h a t . 32 Even the knight, who had 
conquered his secular fear, was seized of a spiritual 
terror that could be calmed only by the int erces si on of a 
religious expert. A cont inuou s process of cl eansin g and 
forgiveness justified the ’p r i v i l e g e s ’ of the clergy. 
Prayers from the lips of the v oca ti onally devout were more 
likely to be ef fe ct ive than the hasty dev otions of those 
brought daily by the secular defence of C h r i s t e n d o m  to the 
u nav oidable  c o m m issio n of sin . 33 U I1imate salvati on  was 
assured by the m a g n i f i c e n c e  of gifts and endo wm ents to 
church or monastery. To die within the holy con fines of 
either made doubly certain. Many thus arranged, well in 
advance, to spend their last days as monks; and not 
sur pri singly (eternity in bliss was being offered in 
exchange), ’no man could hope to take the frock on his 
deathbed unless he had somet hin g substantial to give for 
i t . ’34 The lower orders, who were less exp osed to the
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danger of major sins, to satisfy their super stitious  
craving could, for the gift of labour and produce, gaze 
upon holy relics, and h o p e . 33
These functional relations were often the focus of 
fierce conflicts, more often because the protagon is ts 
believed that a hypothetical reciproci ty had been evaded or 
disturbed than from a convic ti on that the ideal system was 
in itself unjust. Sanctity, courage, patience; social 
virtues were no more ho mogenous than any other human 
characteristic. Man and his attributes were distributed 
fun cti onal ly  over the entire range of social activities, 
and ordered h i e r a r c h i c a l l y  in relation to a transcendental 
n o r m .
The feudal h i e rarchy  cannot be viewed there fore as a 
’continuous v a r i a b l e ’ . Those at its apex did not simply 
possess more of some infinitely divisible ’g o o d ’ than those 
at its base. It was additionally, and more significantly, 
an order esta blishe d among separate ’e s s e n c e s ’ . T h e  serf 
was a diffe rent kind of being than his lord. The universal 
promise of sal vati on  did not extend to all the bond of a 
common human nature. The ’c u l t u r e ’ of feud alism was 
similarly dispersed. There were no common ’ nations. 1' 
languages uniting its scattered elements. Latin, oft en of a 
rudimentary sort, ex pre ssed the freedom and mo b i l i t y  of the 
elite, while dialect and strong regional va ri ation r e ­
enforced the localism of the lower orders. The social
151
world was e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y  varied. The market was a local 
affair. Money, where it was used at all, was equally 
limited geographically, being no more than a local means 
rather than a general medium of- e x c h a n g e . 36 The date, even 
the time of day, were matters of local usage and local 
di s p u t e . 37 S u m p t u a r y  laws regulated the a ppeara nc e of 
different groups in an outw ard show of f e u d a l i s m ’s 
h y 1om orphi c order.
The Chain of Being
The physical world in its entirety, the visible 
cosmos, was also c o n s ti tuted as a feudal hierarchy. It was 
indeed a more complete, un amb iguous and perfect instance of 
such an an order. The gradations of being into which the 
universe was o r g a ni sed was seen as the system of natural 
subordi na tion which had been imperfectly copied in human 
society.
The cosmos, that is to say, was more pe rfectl y and 
completely orde red than was the social world. It was 
composed of a c o n c entri c series of ’cry st al line s p h e r e s ’ , 
the fixed unm ov in g core of which was the earth. Each 
successive sphere, moving outward from the centre, was 
physically closer to perfection, and had impressed wi thin  
it ’b o d i e s ’ graded in the ’ li k e n e s s ’ they bore their 
creator. The moon thus, its surface visibly scarred and
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imperfect, was none theless carried e f f o r tlessly  and 
re cu rr ent ly in a perfectly circular path, part i c i p a t i n g  to 
that extent in a degree of p e r f ec tion denied the earth.
The planets ranged beyond were so many steps towards the 
sublime. The ’s p a c e ’ containing perfect physical objects 
gave way to celestial regions ’c o n t a i n i n g ’ the purer forms 
of angels and the T r i n i t y . 3 ® The entire nested structure 
had mo tio n imparted to it by the ’a c t i o n ’ of the primum 
m o b i 1e , the sphere of Divine Being which was the 
tr anscendin g terminus to the chain of being ranged be ne ath 
it.
The in tercon nected movements of the visible heavens 
were complex and somewhat baffling. Each sphere moved in 
the only co nc e i v a b l e  manner ap pr opriate  to p h y s ic ally 
perfect forms, uniform, circular motion. The t r a n s pa re nt 
substance of each sphere communica te d by direct co nt act its 
motion to the sphere immediately ’b e n e a t h ’ it. By varying 
the number and the relative ’v i s c o s i t y ’ of the jelly-like 
substance of each sphere, qui te s o p h i stica te d physi c a 1 
descript ion s became possible. Authorities, all of whom 
accepted this general scheme, disa greed over the number and 
precise qua li ti es of each sphere. At the incepti on of the 
feudal era, few ventured to revise B e d e ’s modest est im ate 
of seven. His sch ola stic successors, however, by a process 
of cosmic subinfeudation, increased the number of steps in 
the hierarch y to fifty and m o r e . 39
This picture of the physical univ er se was not original 
with feudalism. Similar hierarchical systems had been 
co mmonpla ce since classical times and medieval writers, 
pa rt ic ularly  following John Scotus E r i g e n a ’s t ransla ti on of 
the N e o p 1at oni c writings of Ps eu do-Dionysius , borrowe d  
freely from older s o u r c e s . 40 During the feudal period, 
however, such schemes took on fresh moral and religious 
meaning. As a d es criptio n of the cosmos, the chain of 
being was not so much the r e p r e se ntatio n of a single 
physical struc tur e as a ’p o l y s e m i c ’ symbol wi th in w h i c h  the 
material world found its proper ’p l a c e ’ .41
The earth, the physical centre and therefore most 
distant point from the pr i mum mob i 1e , was m a n ’s te mpo rar y 
abode. Expel le d from Eden by the reckless exercise of his 
freedom, man was co ndemned to exist in the midst of decay 
and corruption. His own physical a n n i h i l a t i o n  consta nt ly 
before him, he inhabited a world which, p hysic al ly 
stationary, knew only the inner mo v e m e n t  of ge ne ratio n and 
death. The material world was itself a reminder of the 
transito rin ess of life, each glance heavenward, equally, an 
irresistible intuition of eternity. This was not just a 
matter of ’reading i n t o ’ its physical structure 
’e x t r a n e o u s ’ moral significance. Sin was phys i c a 1 1y part 
of the universe. The four elements com po sing the sub lu nary  
world, a pro misc uo us flux of earth, water, air and fire, 
were con trasted u n f a v ou rably with the simple, immutable 
essence of the superl unary spheres. Both sepa ra tely and in •
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combination, the earthly elements were subject to 
degeneration, so that all material terrestrial reality 
par ticip at ed in the se nsuousness of continuous 
transformation. •
The cos msos was divi ded hierarchically, not into 
regions of space, but into the localities of p 1 a c e .4 3 And 
each place c onst it uted an indivisible unity of moral and 
physical qualities. There were no general ’ laws of n a t u r e ’ 
unifying and 1 inking together the various places of the 
cosmos, such a no tion was contr ar y to the very idea of 
place. Its co herence sprang, rather, from the single 
unconditional act of b e n e vo le nce from which it was created. 
The cosmos is the over flowi ng  abund ance of G o d ’s love.43 
Its divis ion s expresse d the variety of possible degrees in 
which he could express Himself. All existence  therefore 
shared to some extent in a divine essence, but did so 
unequally, falling n a t u rall y into an unbroken hierarchy, 
within which each being was dependent upon that immediate ly  
superior to it.44
Man was not the least si gnifi cant of G o d ’s creatures. 
Sharing his earthly place were species even less exalted, 
those lacking a rational, or even a sensitive soul; 
creatures and plants co rru pte d by m a n ’s s i n f u l n e s s . 45 The 
sphere of the earth therefore marked a p a r t i cul ar ly 
significant gradation in the chain of being. Wi th in  it, 
everything was tainted and corrupt, all its tr a n s i t o r y
physical forms the tem porar y remission of d i si nt egrati ve  
processes. Beyond it, all material bodies were per fe ct ly 
regular spheres, smooth condensa ti ons of ’q u i n t e s s e n t i a l ’ 
matter, carried in stately pro ces sion upon their regular 
course for ever. Here there was no change or decay, no 
u n d i s cipl in ed metam orphosis, only the timeless recur rence 
of pure m o v e m e n t . 46
Space was ext en de d but limited. It was not void. Its 
internal d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  was a precise s ep aration  of 
qua 1i t i e s . Space and object were def ined as a mutua l l y  
shared essence. The physical and moral ch ar act e r i s t i c s  of 
matter be longed  together, therefore, as the bundle of 
properties ’n a t u r a l ’ to some particular ’p l a c e ’ .
Q ua li tative  divi sions of space were made at every 
ievel and on every scale. ’C h r i st ia n t o p o g r a p h e r s ’ , for 
example, drew maps that procl aimed a more pro found  truth 
than might have been guessed from the accidental 
distribution of land and sea. On the auth or ity of Ezekial, 
Jerusalem was placed ’ in the midst of n a t i o n s ’ , the 
spiritual and theref or e also the geographical centre of the 
worl d . 47
Pilgrimag es were thus spiritual odysseys as much as 
physical journeys; the one implied the other. Mo v e m e n t  
from one place to another was s i multa ne ously a change in 
the moral ’q u a l i t i e s ’ of the t r a v e l l e r . 45 The reli gious
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orders prior to the fou rt eenth  century wi thdrew  from the 
world, p h y s ic ally (by the enc losur e of a wall if nothing 
else) and spiritually, in part at least to satisfy the 
logical req uireme nt s of the theory of place. They needed to 
co nstruct a place un c o n t a m i n a t e d  by human wickedness. A 
place a ppr op ri ate to a holy ’r e l i c ’ which, suffusing its 
aura of holiness thro ughout their community, would act like 
a beacon to pilgrims.
From the c o smi c design of space we move e f f o r t l e s s l y 
to the hum an  s i g n i ficance  of place. At every point such 
transitions were effected. The medieval cosmos, to put it 
concisely, was a feudal hierarchy. It was the ideal 
prototype of its social order. The idea of dependence, of a 
nested structure  of subordin ate forms, of a t h e o r et ic ally 
continuous chain of being within  which every being found 
its natural place, of a s e lf- in flicted  gulf between, on the 
one hand, celestial beings invested with the di gn ity  and 
freedom of their own motion  and, on the other, sublunary 
mortals clingin g w r e t c h e d l y  in their bondage to the 
’customs of the m a n o r ’ , were images shared by ’s o c i e t y ’ and 
’n a t u r e ’ .
It was a struct ur e reproduced in the visible form of 
the cathedral. Abo ve all a holy p 1 a c e , the cathedral 
enclosed as it were on a minute scale, the entire creation. 
’Chartres is medieval thought in visible form, with  no 
essential el eme nt  l a c k i n g ’, Male tells u s . 49 Its
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alignment, the obli ga tory symb olism of its figures in glass 
and stone, the position, grouping and symetry of its parts, 
the arithmetical proportion s realised in its str ucture 
com bin ed to make of it a realistic  ’m o d e l ’ of the universe 
as a who 1e .
At the mi d- point in the chain of being, man, the 
cathedral builder, .was himself the most subtle and acc urate  
replica of the co smic hierarchy. He ’dis co ve rs in himself 
an an alogu e of the u n i v e r s e . ’30 The m a c r o c o s m  is 
reproduced  in the body, the microcosm, which replicat es its 
hierarchical structure. The head thus ’ r e p r e s e n t e d ’ the 
sky, the stomach the seas and the feet the earth. As a 
sensuous being, the human body was a ’m i x e d ’ nature  
composed of the same four elements as eve ry other form of 
degraded corporeality. Man contained w i t h i n  himself, 
additionally, in imitation of the most fundamental of 
cosmic divisions, a ’f i f t h ’ essence; a rational soul which, 
more perf ect than ear thly elements, was the ’s p h e r e ’ of his 
privil ege d freedom.
Man was a point within which all the forces of the 
cosmos were gathered. Spoiling cre at io n he yet retained a 
special sign ifica nc e within it. He occup ied a pr ivileged 
position, a place, from which the entire cosmos becam e 
visible. This is not another vers ion of the cosm ology of 
fun. The immediate expe rienc e of the bod y is not in itself 
a revelation of cosmic design. The cosmos cannot be ’read
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o f f ’ dir ect ly from the somatic e n g r a m . Nor are mac ro cosm  
and mi croco sm t r ans fo rmation s of some more abs tract 
rational ’s t r u c t u r e ’ buried separ ately within each. The 
microcosm is rather a structure  which  informs m a n ’s 
rational soul ana 1og i c a 11y of the macrocosm, which cannot 
be known directly. The body is a ’natural s y m b o l ’ of the 
cosmic hier ar chy which exists as its essential prototype. 
Hence when A1an of Lille claims that ’All created things 
exist for us as a book, a picture, and a m i r r o r ’ , he 
implies that alone among created earthly beings man has the 
potential for knowledge, a capacity fulfilled if we learn 
how to look and rea d. 31 And if man was a mirror of nature, 
nature was itself, ’a mirror in whi ch man can c o n t emplate  
the image of G o d ’ .52 The entire univers e does not lie, as 
it does in the case of the psycho ti c or the infant, wh olly 
within the subject. What does exist within the subject is 
a picture of its own place (the body) whi ch offers a means 
of und er standi ng  the larger structure of which it is both a 
replica and a part.
Just as there is no space which is not si m u l t a n e o u s l y 
a place, with ail the moral and physical qualities 
app ropriate to it, so there was no time which stood apart 
from the drama of creation. All the divisions of time 
possessed real and essential qualities. Augus tine had 
already sep arated - dupl ic ating the divisions of space and 
society - the City of God, whose time with the mo vement  of 
the heavenly bodies was eternal, from the Earthl y City,
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with its linear, d egener at ive and secular time. Yet, since 
the promise of salva tion was heid out to all, ea rt hl y time 
must be superimpo se d upon something more profound; and just 
as specifi c places might become charged with spirituality, 
sa lv atio n promis ed the possi bil ity of sacred time.
A series of analogies linked separate systems of time. 
The most fundamental relation was b e t ween events in the Old 
and New Testaments, a correspo nd ence whi ch was carrie d 
forward to the present as a series of rep et itions or r e ­
ena ctm ents of an original s t ory. 53 The divi sions of time 
followed the invariant order of Creation, r e p r od uced in the 
’ages of m a n ’ and the ’ages of the w o r l d ’ , whose final 
epoch, the millenium, was close at h a n d . 54
Se cular time was equally a di visible  sub st ance whose 
qualities varied with place and social relation. The time 
of the questi ng knight was very di fferent to that of the 
monk or p e a s a n t . 55 Thi's is true of course of our own 
society, but within the feudal hierarc hy  it was not a 
matter of a variable  ’c o n s c i o u s n e s s ’ of time de t a c h e d  from 
its ’o b j e c t i v e ’ order, so much as a di ffe ren t or d e r i n g  of 
the world in a c c o rdanc e with t i m e ’s inherently va riable 
qualities. Time was not in the least ’a b s t r a c t ’ . Its 
specific local cha racter is tics could not be generalised.
It struck no one as odd that ’d a y ’ and ’n i g h t ’ were divided  
into equal numbers of ’h o u r s ’ , so that in c o n s e q u e n c e  the 
duration of the hour varied seasonally. Or that the bells
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announcing the canonical hours were never synchronised, 
even within e a r s h o t . 56
There were no difficulties, therefore, over the 
’ 1 itera 1 ’— re a d ing of Genes i s ♦ T he s i x d a y s  of Creation 
marked the divisions  of G o d ’s time, not a fixed dur at ion on 
some human scale. S ucce ss ion and duration, as with spatial 
order, were always viewed s y m b o 1i c a 11y . The intellect 
sought to penet ra te their secrets by isolating some 
particular instance and conbining it with others through  a 
general process of subordination.
The hierarc hic al structure of nature, as of human 
society, is a symbol ic  order. It is not just that each 
element in the visible chain of being has a place of its 
own within the hierarchical scheme, each has to be 
un derstood as the physical emblem of a more essential 
reality that lies conceale d wi thin it. All empirical order 
is a mere copy of the hidden relations of Creation. Nature  
is best conceived as an order of ’moti vated s i g n s ’ . There 
is nothing ar bitrary  in the relation between signifier and 
signified. It is through a shared essence that a symbol 
comes into being and proclaims its fixed meaning. The 
bestiary as much as the stain glass window con fo rm ed to an 
involuntary i c o n o g r a p h y . 57
This is a cos mo logy opposed to fun. Ever y t h i n g  is 
motionless, fixed and immovable. The cathedral, wit h its
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complex inner- divisions, defines an exact and u n c h an ging  
o r d e r . 58 The re is no possib ili ty of metamorphoses, every 
form is poss essed  of its own inner, unique value. The 
observer wit hin its midst is made aware as a result not. of
individual objects a 1 one but o f an en t i r e s  y-s-t e m o f___________
meaning. Dra wn to some particular object or event the 
intellect, the imagination  and the senses, are imm ediate ly  
connected to another, ana another formed into an as cending  
scale. In being drawn into an object, the human subject as 
it were passe s straig ht  through it and fastens on to the 
immaterial pre se nce it symbolises. The intellect is, then, 
continually led away from the physical world, beyon d and 
above it soars, as the cathedral walls, towards a 
transcend ing  reality.
Any di sc e r n i b l e  bundle of qualities thus ’c o n t a i n s ’ a 
number of d i f f erent  meanings. Jerusalem, for example, is 
in the ’h i s t o r i c a l ’ or ’f a c t u a l ’ sense the town in 
Palestine. In an ’a l l e g o r i c a l ’ sense it is the C h ur ch 
Militant and a potent symbol of the u n i f i ca tion of 
Ch ris tendom a g a in st its external enemies. ’T o p o l o g i c a l l y ’ , 
it refers to the Ch ristia n soul, as the ’p l a c e ’ most 
comple tel y integra ted with the moral and ethical te achin g 
of the church. It also means the Celestial Jerusalem, the 
terminus of human histor y and every connect ed system of 
symbols. It is this final ’a n a g o g i c ’ form that defines, 
additionally, the organised  structure of d e p e nd ency in 
which the various symbolic ’ l e vels’ are h e l d . 59
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Hierarchical relations stand behind and condition the 
'structure of appearances. Both empirical and symbolic 
relations point to wa t a s ^ a - t r a n s c e n d i n g  reality, whose 
ne ce ssar y being is the prec ondit io n of all ex i s t e n c e .
Where the internal relations of fun can be pictured as 
labyrinth of horizontal lines be lon ging to the same ’p l a n e ’ 
of experience, the sym bol ic realm must be conceiv ed as a 
set of vertical lines that lead beyond themselves to an 
ab so lute ly  u n c o n d i t i o n e d  reality.
The Sy mb ol ic  Order
The fundamental reality of feuda lism then was an 
invisible and immaterial reality in relation to which the 
empirical world stood as its symbol. ’The world is a book 
written by the hand of God in which every cre at ure is a 
word charged with m e a n i n g ’ , such t h a t , ’ in reading nature 
(we) read the thoughts of G o d . ’40 This was so much taken 
for granted that, during the medieval period, there was no 
general term for ’s y m b o l ’ or ’s y m b o l i c ’ . The clerical 
d esi gnation  s y m b o 1 urn was o c c a s io na lly used in the sense of 
an article of faith, as in symbolum M i c e a .A 1 And A u g u s t i n e  
had defined the more specialised not ions of s i gnum as 
figur a , imago and a 1 1e gor i a to describe the various 
’c o r r e s p o n d e n c e s ’ be tw een human reason and the inner na ture 
of t h i ng s. 42 The task of the intellect was to recogni se
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the simi litudes obtaining  betw een the world of app ea rances 
and the ’r e a l ’ world that stood within  and beyond it.
The real world being inexhaustible, its physical
symbols could be en dl essly rep 1 icatedj. The a p p a r e n t l y _______
endless multiplication,  for example, of ’holy r e l i c s ’ need 
not shock us. What mat tered was that the piece of wood, or 
the length of twisted metal, ’c o n t a i n e d ’ the esse nce it 
symbolised, not that, physically, it was cut from the 
actual cross or had once, in fact, pierced C h r i s t ’s hand.
We are dea ling here with faith rather than credulity, with 
a parti cular vision  of the cosmos which ’c o n s e c r a t e d ’ such 
remains. It is understandable, similarly, that medieval 
lawyers and schola rs would not simply copy documen ts  but 
would ’m o u l d ’ them to some symbol ic p u r p o s e . 63 Or that 
litigation should be con tested by sym bol ic d e v i c e s . 64
F e u d a l i s m ’s symbolic hierarch y only gradually be came 
fully Christianised. In an important study, Le Goff has 
shown that the central relation of feudalism, vassalage, 
was es tablish ed through a cer em ony which drew many s y m bol ic  
elements from the traditional institut ions of k i n sh ip  found 
among the pre-feudal Germani c t r i b e s . 63 The entire ritual 
comprised three separate, related acts; homage, faith and 
investiture.
Homage was inaugurated in a formal d e c l a rat io n of the 
wish to become a vassal. The subo rdina te  places his joined
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hands betwee n the hands of the superior which close over 
them in a ’polysemic* gesture ex pressive of ’ instruction, 
defense, judgment and p r o t e c t i o n ’ .66 The homage is not, 
however, a unilateral act of submission. It is an act of
reciprocity. In clasping the vassals hands the lord _
already displays a much greater degree of shared dig nity 
than his less ’f e u d a l i s e d ’ Spanish counterpart, who allowed 
his intending vassal only to kiss his left hand. The homage 
is completed indeed by an open ex pr e s s i o n  of equality, the 
exchange of a kiss. A mutual oath is then sworn on the 
bible or some saintly relic and the vassal is p u b li cly 
declared the lor d’s ’man of mouth and h a n d . ’ Le Goff 
emphasi ses  this formu la in relati on to the signifi cance of 
the body (microcosm) in medieval ritual. The investiture 
is compl ete d by the lord conv eying  to his vassal an object 
r ep resenta tive of their new rela tionshi p and its mutual 
obligations. A large number of possible  objects were 
available, most of them connected fairly obv io usly with the 
v a s s a l ’s new privileges" in relation to a fief. Du Cange 
lists no less than ninety-nine, which Le Goff classifies  
acc ording to their domain of r e f e r e n c e . 67 Most common ly 
their mutually  suppor tive c o n n ectio n to the land was 
invoked (a clod of earth, branch of a tree). A l t e r n a t i v e l y 
the investiture might be by a bodily gesture or 
’a p p u r t e n a n c e ’ symbolic of their social positio n (by the 
finger, toe, hand, hair, belt, gloves etc.). More rarely, 
though not unco mm only if an ecclesiastical communi ty  was 
involved, some specific ’s o c i o - p r o f e s s i o n a I ’ symbol
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conveyed new duties and obliga tions (by bells, keys, books; 
or by sword, lance; or in more lowly cases by knife, 
pitchfork and shar pened pike).
These complex exchanges car ef ully regulated the 
estab 1ishment of new relationships. The two part ic ipants 
were quite pre c i s e l y  def ined within the symbolic system, 
and through its ritual inequality is both exp ressed and 
overcome. Exchange, if it is to be genuine, must be 
between equals. But the essence of vass al age (and of the 
feudal relations mod el led upon it) is inequality. Hence 
the neces si ty  of elaborate  symbolic manipulation, including 
the d es ignati on  of a special place (a church  or great hall) 
in which to pe rform the ceremony as a public spectacle.
Such rituals attracted, over a period, a p e n umbr a of 
Ch ristian symbolism. The religious element merged with the 
pagan before e s t a b lis hi ng its i c o n o g r a p h i c a 1 d o m i n a n c e . 68 
This was less a direct ’b o r r o w i n g ’ of ecclesiastical 
authority than a con sequ en ce of invoking symbo lic forms (at 
first their o w n ) which made transp arent an ideal hi er a r c h y  
of essences in relati on to which the church came to have a 
special claim to expertise, and whose own forms then becam e 
the ’n a t u r a l ’ idiom in which to express everyth ing 
’p r o f o u n d ’ . Subtle differ rences however remained. The 
o s c u 1 urn of fid elity was neither the liturgical kiss nor 
the kiss of peace, but just as e ff ec tively  c r y s t a l l i s e d  the 
entire str ucture of f e u d a l i s m . 69 And as c e r t ai nly as the
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more e xplici tl y religious cer emony  of dubbing, it captured 
and ex pressed its ’s p i r i t ’ .70
The sustaining of reciprocal but unequal relations is 
the fundamental political proble m of feudalism. It was 
dealt with in two di ffe rent ways. Firstly, as in the 
ceremony of vassalage, inequal ity  is denied through the 
creation of a purely sym bol ic realm wit hin which genuine 
and sp ont aneous rec ipro ci ty can be practiced. Or secondly 
as in the theory of the three orders, di fferences  in power 
and wealth are ’c o n v e r t e d ’ into q u a l itati ve  and essential 
di ffe rences be tw een  ranks of men. Thus, just as the 
superlunary has dom in io n over the sublu na ry world, or man 
has dominio n over other earthl y species, so a n o b il ity  
ought to exercise its domi ni on over a dep en dent p e a s a n t r y . 
Inequality, that is to say, may be ignored in order that 
exchange can take place, or excha nge is denied in order 
that inequality can be justified and sustained.
The symbol ic order was not an ’ i d e a l ’ we should 
strive to realise; it was al ready fully realised. The 
symbolic order was a weak imitiati on in physical form of 
the order of reality itself. This reality, hinted at in 
imperfect actuality, could be rec onstruc te d more fully 
through the op era tio n of its priv ileged ’m i r r o r ’ the human 
m i n d . 71 The fundamental nature of feudalism is ther efore  
exposed most fully in examples of its ’a b s t r a c t ’ reasoning 
Hence theology, even more than law, is the real ’s c i e n c e ’
of feudalism. In it we can find, free of historical 
complication, an ana lys is of its d i stingu is hing social 
relations.
St. A n s e l m ’s is the first and most profound 
theological e x p l o ra tion of feudalism. His first work, the 
Mono 1o g i o n , w r i tte n in 1076 was not, he claimed, a 
religious book. It. was originally  titled An Ex amp le  of 
Meditating About the Rational Basis of F a i t h , and this 
accurate 1y describ es its intent. An selm insists that in it 
he is putting forward no new doctrine. It consists 
exclusively in rational reflect io n and , ’nothing at all in 
the me ditati on  would be argued on scriptural a u t h o r i t y ’.72 
He wanted rather to de monst rate that by reason alone (sola 
r a t i o n e ) we would be led to the kno wled ge  of God we al ready 
enjoyed by the pri vi lege of revelati on  and authority. The 
nature, far less the existence, of God is not a matter of 
dispute. But by ’dispu ting with h i m s e l f ’ , His fundamental 
truth can be grasped in a different and equa lly legitimate 
way. Reason of course cannot replace faith, it can follow 
in its path. It cannot pierce the my st ery of G o d ’s 
transcending otherness, but in pe rfectin g its own metho d it 
clarifies the image of God a p p r o pria te  to the human 
intel lec t.73
Anselm begins with the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o bs ervatio n that 
’there is something that is the best, the greatest, the 
highest of all existing t h i n g s ’ .74 A sta tement which,
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whether taken for granted or deduced from more pri mitive 
assumptions, makes sense only in the context of a 
hierarchical society. Existence, and not only its 
accidental qualifications, is itself ordered by successive 
sub or di nation  and dependence. Anselm  illustrates his 
c on ten tio n by appe al ing to psychological rather than 
natural ’f a c t s ’’ Everyone, he points out, seeks what they 
beli eve  to be g o o d •or beneficial to themselves. In doing 
so they seek a m u l t i p l i c i t y  of particular things. This 
h e tero ge neity should not obscure the fact, however, that 
each is being sought in relation to its ’g o o d n e s s ’ as the 
common measure of all a tt ra ctive qualities. ’G o o d s ’ are 
c om mensura te because dispers ed in its varied ma ni fe s t a t i o n s 
is something identical in relati on to each. Goods can thus 
be ordered according to the quanti ty of ’ g o o d n e s s ’ each 
contains. Moreover, ’that through which all goods are 
good is itself a great g o o d . ’73 The h e t e r og en eity of the 
good leads inevitably to the notion that in a d d iton to 
specific instances of beings, ’good through something other 
than what they a r e ’ , there must also exist being w h ic h is, 
’good through i t s e l f * . 76
It is ’g r e a t n e s s ’ which defines the s pe ci fically  
christian-feudal c oncep ti on of existence. The 
de mo nst rat ion of supreme and nec ess ar y goodness could be 
found in Plato. Anselm, however, identifies the C h r i s t i a n  
God with being itself, rather than with go o d n e s s . 77 
Relative greatness, therefore, is another term for the
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degree of being which allows some specific thing to exist. 
Every part icular thing exists, like goodness, only by 
’b o r r o w i n g ’ from the essence of a supreme ly ex is ting being: 
’There is a Nature which exists through itself, wh ic h is 
the highest of all existing things, and through whi ch 
exists whatever i s . ’78
’G r e a t n e s s ’ is a noun rather than an adjective. The 
world owes its existenc e to this essence whi ch rep lica te s 
itself, with di minish ing intensity, thr oughout  the cosmos. 
We canno t help comp aring the value of things and finding 
that ’some natures are better than o t h e r s ’ , and we can 
avoid an infinite regress of such com para tives only by 
coming to rest in one ’so pre -emin en t that no other nature 
is superior to i t . ’79 It is the ’f a c t ’ of h i e r a r c h y  which 
prompts Anselm to look behind it to a general ’m e d i u m ’ of 
evaluation, and upwa rds to a being who is the i n ex ha ustibl e 
source of all its di stributed  substance.
The sense in which dep endent being is s u b o r d i n a t e d  to 
greater being is likened by Anselm to a cra ftsman 
fashioning an artifact, and in an even more telling 
analogy, to the social honour gained by a s s o c i a t i o n  with a
superior person. The subordin ate is created through
dependence, it owes its existence, and not just its form, 
to a superior. In the first, instance the u n i ve rs e owes 
its existence to God, who created it ex n i h i I o . This does
not mean, Anselm points out, that He created it from
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no t h i ng ,' as if noth ing were some non-material su bst anc e 
upon which He worked, but rather that he made somet hing 
from a thing which, before he worke d upon it, was nothing. 
He e x p l ic itly -likens the process to the forming of a social 
relation b e tw een two men, in which, ’the first man, who was 
formerly regarded as nothing, is now esteemed as truly 
something b e c au se of the making of the second m a n ’ .80
The same feudal imagery is at the root of A n s e l m ’s 
justly cele brated  ontological a r g u m e n t . 81 The greatness of 
God is here expressed as a being ’than which none greater 
can be t h o u g h t ’, from which Anselm claims to deduce the 
logical and actual necessity. The force of his a r g um en t 
once again rests with its social assumptions. De gr ee s of 
’g r e a t n e s s ’ is an u n d i sp uted ’f a c t ’ of nature wi thin the 
feudal world. In the ontological argument, Anselm  exploits 
the equally ’o b v i o u s ’ assu mp tion that mat e r i a l l y  obs e r v a b l e  
degrees of being exist primarily as symbols of non-material 
essences containe d within them. The created world is the 
plenitude of G o d ’s ’t h o u g h t ’ and, as part of this order, 
man possesses his own image of C r e ati on  in the form of a 
rational intellect. It is given to man, that is to say, to 
exist in more than one way and herein lies his own 
particular ’g r e a t n e s s ’ . To exist in ac tuality  and in the 
mind is ’g r e a t e r ’ than to exist in either alone. And as 
God is ’than which none greater can be t h o u g h t ’ , the 
implication of- his exi stence in act u a l i t y  (as wei 1 as in 
thought) is irresistible.
To argue from ne ces sary concept to ne c e s s a r y  being is no 
the special di sc overy of Anselm. It is the common feature 
of f e u d a 1-chr is tian thought. The empirical world is a 
symbol; human experience, likewise, makes a c c e ssib le  only 
small portion of reality. Each object and event discloses 
a portion of itself to the human gaze which, gifted with 
its own inner image of g o d ’s plenitude, can ’u n d e r s t a n d ’ 
the ne c e s s a r y  co nn ection betw ee n these symbols and their 
essential being in relation to which they are a kind of 
covering. Human und er s t a n d i n g  is however imperfect, 
limited both by m a n ’s place in the scale of being and by 
av oidable human foolishness. In order to u n d e rst an d it is 
essential first to believe. The P r o s i o g i o n  was first 
titled. Faith Seeking Un d e r s t a n d i n g  just to em phasis e thi 
dependence: ’ I bel ieve in order to understand... that I
shall not und er st and unless I b e l i e v e . ’02 Human freedom, 
p a r t i cula rl y pride, obscures the symbol ic relations of 
which the being of man "is part; relations which the 
intellect can recover only when man places himself 
u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y  and he lplessly before creation. Only in 
faith can the intellect pierce the symbol ic veil of 
empirical reality and rest in ultimate, inc or rupti ble and 
universal truth.
More spe cialised theological problems con nect ed  with 
the notion of ’supreme g r e a t n e s s ’ were taken up by Anselm  
in his Cur Deus H o m o , but once again his argume nt is best
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un derstood  as a daring essay in social theory. Unlik e his 
earlier philosophical works it was o cc as ioned by a spe cific 
controversy. The Doctri ne of R e d e m p t i o n  had received a 
vigorous new cha llenge from Judaism. How c o u 1d •R e d e m p t i o n  
be grasped rationally? How could God be saved from the 
indignity of contact with the world of evil? How could we 
accept the idea tht He existed as a man, existed that is as 
something less than Himself?
This was only a more urgent form of the c o n t r a d i c t i o n  
faced by every medieval theologian. Why did God exist in 
imperfect f o rms?03 By definiton, created being is M e s s  
g r e a t ’ ’than which none greater can be t h o u g h t ’ , so how 
could God be respon sible  for ail its limiting 
particula rities?
Anselm had alre ady  tackled the more general point. To 
exist in more than one way is ’g r e a t e r ’ than to exist in 
one way only, even where one of these ways is in itself 
perfect. The more specific prob lem was viewed as a logical 
implication of m a n ’s disobedience. Sin had fru strat ed  the 
purpose of creation, and must therefore  be redeemed.
Anselm views Rede mptio n in the light of vassalage.
Services must be offered if the su bordinate being is to 
enjoy the security and comfort of the s u p e r i o r ’s 
protection. But m a n ’s indebtedness to God is unl i m i t e d  and 
could be redeemed only by an offerof services greater in 
value than the whole of creation. Since only God is
greater than creation, only He can redeem man. The 
payment, to be effective, must n o n e th el ess originate  with 
man. Hence the n e c es si ty of God becomin g a man. The 
Incarnation is, from this point of vie w, the supreme ritual 
of investiture: a token of the means w h e reby man can fulfil 
his obliga tions  towards God.
In clarify ing the central relations of feudalism, 
Anselm makes them absolute. The s y m boli c hierarchy, 
terminating in the n e c e ssity  of Supr eme Being, is an 
a b s t r acti on  drawn out of the experien ce of feudal relations 
themselves. It is the example of personal d e p e nden ce  in 
the social order which furnishes the central image of 
relative ’g r e a t n e s s ’ . The order of man and of nature is 
fixed bec ause both are emanations from a hi erarch y of 
essences of which they are the symbols. The physical world 
is thus a part , a small part, of the cosmos which, by 
sy nec hdoche rather than metaphor, it represents.
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FIVE
RELEASE
The social hierar ch y of feudalism was just one 
imperfect symbol of the real d i s t r ib ut ion of di vin el y 
ordered essences; an enclos ed and comp le ted cosmic 
structure. C r e at ion was a ’d o w n w a r d ’ mo veme nt  in which 
everything which existed po te ntially came ac tual ly  to 
occupy its specific place in the u n i v e r s e . 1 ’M i r r o r i n g ’ 
G o d ’s nature, m a n ’s soul (though not his body, which 
remained rooted in its earthly place) aspired to the 
reverse mov em en t asc en ding the ladder of being to unite 
with its C r e a t o r . 2 It is the very fixity of material 
things whi ch allows human subjectivity, - in o v e r com in g the 
body, which is the resisting medium to its own sym bo li c  
actuality - to rise above itself. Tr a n s c e n d e n c e  is the real 
goal of life cons tra ined by feudal relations.
The fixity of the empirical world is its greatest  
illusion; each frozen essence in fact is just anot her step 
towards an ult imate release. Within the framework of
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fe ud al -chris ti an cate gories such a p o s s i b i l i t y  was 
en ter tained as some thing  more than a distant vision of 
salvation. The mystical fervour of the Pl atonic Tra di tion  
was resisted by many, but even the supreme rationalist, 
Thomas Aquinas, re cognised its inspiring appeal and 
responded to it, ’ In the hie rarchy of being men cannot 
surpass the angels, who by nature are of a higher o r d e r ’ - 
he rea son ably points out - but immedi ately adds, ’Yet man 
can pass beyond them in his knowing, as when he u nders ta nds  
there is a being above them who can make him blessed  and 
when quite possessed will give him compl ete b l i s s ’ .3 It is 
this intellectual ascent which  is m a n ’s true end and only 
source of au th entic happiness. It is the ’p e r f ect io n of 
the soul on the part of the mind whi ch transcend s the 
organs of the b o d y . ’4 In the A n gelic  D o c t o r ’s view, 
however, c or porea li ty cannot simply be ignored as any such 
act of tra ns cendenc e requires bodily perfection, ’so as not 
to encumber the m i n d ’s a s c e n t ’ .5
The ’p r o o f s ’ of G o d ’s exis ten ce favoured by Aquinas, 
therefore, took the form of just such an intellectual 
’a s c e n t ’ towards a point of conceptual dissolution. In the 
five ’ways to G o d ’ rational argu men ts released the m i n d ’s 
inherent tendency to reach beyond what was i m m e d ia tely 
present to it.4 Each proof is a di ffe ren t path whi ch the 
intellect can trace back to its source. The most direct 
route was the inverse of that sequence of ’m o v e m e n t s ’ 
through which obse rv able things came to be as they are.
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However ’f i x e d ’ empirical reality app ears it is in fact the 
outcome of a movement from ’p o t e n c y ’ to ’a c t ’ . And as a 
thing can only make this tran si tion by the agency of 
something already actual, the mind can. fasten upon this 
agency as its its ’c a u s e ’. The agency, as an actuality, 
must have itself made the tran sition from potency. The 
mind is ir res istib ly drawn ’b a c k w a r d s ’ from act to potency 
to agency to ante ceden t act and so on. This seq uence can 
terminate only in an ’unmoved m o v e r ’ ; a being wh ic h exists 
as pure a c t u a l i t y . 7
The greater privilege  afforded the intellect by 
Aquinas compared to earlier schola stic writers is more 
apparent than real. He has not really left the world of 
A n s e l m ’s Mono Io g i o n . The only reason the intellect could 
surpass what was given to the senses lay in the m i n d ’s form 
as a ’m i r r o r ’ of creation. Thoug h exp re ss ing himself 
di ssa ti sf ied with A n s e l m ’s ontological proof, A q u i n a s ’s 
’c o s m o l o g i c a l ’ proofs of G o d ’s ex ist ence share the same 
assumptions. Gi lson puts it clearly: ’Our thought would
never suffice to infer Him, unless the reality wit h  which 
we a r e  linked, co nstituted  in its hiera rc hic and analogical 
structure, a sort of ladder leading us up to God. ’s
The image of a ladder, or a tree, as a ’f i g u r e ’ 
linking the created world, human reason and the h i e r ar ch y 
of essences, was co mmonplac e amo ngst s cholast ic  writers.
It was favoured not only by the orthodox but by such
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diverse figures as Ramon Llull and Bernard S i l v e s t r i s . 9 
Indeed, this ’spi r i t u a l i s a t i o n  of the world went far beyond 
the Churc h and the strictly religious s p h e r e . ’10 Even  
expressed in very general terms, however, the r a t i o n a l i s t ’s 
way to God tended to exclusiveness. A ce rtain kind of 
dialectical facility, and a rigorous training in the 
tr ivium and quadr ivium was its p r e c o n d i t i o n . 11 Yet the 
promise of salv ation was general, possibl y universal, and 
however the final ’r e l e a s e ’ from the co nstrai nt  of 
actuali ty  was conceived its pos sibili ty  could not be made 
de pen dent upon  a ’c o r r e c t ’ arg ument alone. The 
au t h o ri tative Summae of Albert the Great, Aquinas and 
Bonaven tu re were part of, and responses to, the en ormo us  
impact of A r i s t o t e 1ian phi 1osophy during the late twel fth  
and through out the th irteeenth c e n t u r i e s . 12 Wi thi n the 
church however, and outside it, the t e 1 os of human 
happiness was integrated with the immediate exp e r i e n c e  of 
feudal relations in a variety of other ways.
Love
New mon as tic institutions, reform move me nts and 
experiments, begi nning  with Cluny in 909 and c u l m i nati ng  
with the founda tion of the Fra nc is can and Dom i n i c a n  Orders 
in the early thi rteen th  century, were intent above all upon 
the discov ery of happiness. The longing for trans c e n d e n c e  
was the fundamental spiritual value pursued in a prod ig ous
184
variety of practical, organisational and liturgical 
i n n o v a t i o n s . 13 And, as with most radical departures, such 
mo vements appeale d direct ly  to the source of inspiration 
claimed by the corru pte d institutions they s o u g h t -to 
transform. Each fresh wave of mo na stic renewal conceiv ed 
itself as more thoro ughly imbued than the last with the 
original genius of St. B e n e d i c t ’s R u 1e .14 C l u n y ’s 
exceptional freedom from local ju ri sdi ction was secured 
s pecif ic al ly to ensure that its monks might, ’ (serve) God 
without interference, acc ord in g to the rule of St. 
B e n e d i c t ’ .15 A claim to independence emu lated by all its 
successors.
’This little rule for b e g i n n e r s ’ , had in fact been 
framed in a spirit of generosity and compromise. It made 
prov isi on for a shelt ere d way of life in a s e l f - con ta ined 
and s e lf -s uffici en t com mu nity whose members adh er ed to a 
common life pre scribed in a specific order of the day 
varied accordin g to the s e a s o n . 16 Per iods of liturgical 
prayer, spiritual reading and manual work regulated the 
outward forms of the colle ctive life.in such a way that 
each might aspire inwardly to, ’that perfect love of God 
which casts out all f e a r ’ .17 It ap pealed  di rectly  to those 
with serious rather than fanatical spiritual ambitions.
Its del ibe rate avoid ance of rigour, its reliance on the 
wisdom of abbatial guidance, its discretion, all c o n s pir ed  
to allow, if it did not encourage, the growth of physical 
ease and moral indiscipline.
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Cluny, in re -establ is hing the Rule, like many of the 
foundations that were to follow, exag g e r a t e d  its prec is ion  
arid altered the balance  of its ‘practical guidance. It 
sought new standards of m agn if icence and splendour in its 
observance of the daily offices. All the m o n k ’s ac tivitie s 
should be carried out in a spirit of worship, so at Cluny 
everything was sub ordi nated to the dema nds of an exha us ting 
liturgical cycle. In this it followed but soon su rp assed a
general t r e n d . 10 Its e x t r a o rd inary success was made
visible in the richness of its ornamentation, in the 
continuous e n largeme nt s and refi nement  of its buildings, in 
the con spicuous display of its fur ni shings  and decoration. 
The very s umptu ou sness of the setting seemed to demand 
continuous devotion. H u g h ’s great basilica, its pr op o r t i o n  
and elevation contr ol led by a precise harmonics, echoe d to 
a continuous round of chanting and song, and su stained more 
completely than any of its rivals the aura of s a n c t i t y . 19
As a result, the day (and most of the night) became 
clogged with ritual. Anselm indeed del ib e r a t e l y  chose Bee 
in preference to Cluny so that he might be allowed 
sufficient time for study and r e a d i n g . 20 Manual labour, 
not surprisingly, figured even less pr om i n e n t l y  in the 
d a i 1y r o u n d .2 1
The devot ion of the monk remained a service to the 
community; he existed for others. But at Cluny, ear lier
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and more cle arly than elsewhere, the m o n k ’s way of life 
took on a purely personal value. To be utte rly consume d by 
worship, his entire being taken up and ordered a c c o rd in g to 
the relentless liturgical timetab 1e ,•was a certain means of 
overcom ing  the resi st ence of pride or worl dly interests to 
the ac ce ptanc e of G o d ’s love. The pr ivile ge of the 
mon astery was no thing less than a more intimate exper ie nce 
than could p o s sibly be the case for those beyond its 
sanctuary of G o d ’s t ran sc ending reality.
The mo n a s t i c  ideal sanctified obedience. Strict 
su bo rd inatio n under a rule, whatev er its content, was the 
preliminary act of r enun ci ation essential to a proper 
deepening of re lig iou s experience. It was disob e d i e n c e  
therefore that was the prime target of the reform 
movements. Beg i n n i n g  in North Italy and sprea ding rapidly 
throughout Europe more as cetic and more a u t h o r i t a r i a n  
versions of the Rule were pr og re s s i v e l y  embraced, less as 
an instrument of communal o r g a n is at ion than as a proven  
technique of self a n n i h i l a t i o n . 22 Thus, a century after 
its foundation, Cluny itself became an object of ref or ming 
zeal. Its very success became a handic ap  to the r e a l i sa ti on  
of its deeper purpose. Its openness, pa rt i c u l a r l y  its 
willingness to accept new adult members, allowed its rapid 
e x p a n s i o n . 23 New members brought with them grants of land 
encumbered by feudal obiigations, and the habit of 
accepting gifts in advance so that landowners might end 
their days in the m o n as te ry drew Cluny into the same
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world ly ne twork as the unre fo rmed B e n e d i c t i n e s . 24
The fo u n d a t i o n  of Citeaux at the end of the e l e venth  
century p r o vi ded a somewhat diffe rent m o d e l ‘of m o n a s t i c  
reform. Makin g a more decisive break with B e n e d i c t i n e  
tradition the new order of Cis tercian s estab 1ished houses 
in ’w i l d ’ and h i t herto marginal or even u n i n h a b i t e d  places. 
Grants of land were only acc ep ted indeed if they were of an 
unculti va ted and inhospitable n a t u r e . 25 This physical 
isolation was part of the simp licit y and mo de st y esp ou se d 
by their order. The rigour of their discipline, rather 
than the a r d u o u s n e s s  of their adopte d rule, att r a c t e d  many 
and quickly e s t a b li shed their as ce n d a n c y  among the reforme d 
orders. The internal orga nisat io n of each house was not 
simply placed in the hands of an app oint ed  abbot. A 
complex or ganisati onal structure of chapters and 
visitations ens ured the centr alised control of ever y aspect  
of communal life and mai nt ai ned a uni f o r m i t y  of p r a ct ice  
that was u n m a tc he d by any other social organ i s a t i o n  
(ecclesiastical or secular) of the p e r i o d . 26
The success of the Cistercians, as mea sured  by their 
growth in numb ers  at least, was p h e n o m e n a l . 27 And once 
again brought its own difficulties. To support th e m s e l v e s  
in poverty the Cist ercians  had to clear large areas of land 
which, even then, were of little use other than for grazing 
sheep. Large tracts of such ’w o r t h l e s s ’ land were 
developed into g r a n g e s , worked by lay b r e thern (conver s i ) ♦
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They became in other words the most ’p r o g r e s s i v e ’and 
innovative of agricultur ists. It was di fficult to sustain 
a genuinely prim itive vocation in the face of growing 
wealth from the sheep trade. Their reluctance to use their 
riches in consp ic uous liturgical display led them 
inadver ten tly to ’ i n v e s t ’ in further land impro vement that 
su bs eq uently  increased their wealth to e m ba rrassin g 
levels.23
Eco no mic security encouraged a growing emphasis on 
study and learning. Ci st e r c i a n  leaders in the century 
following the f o u n da tion of Citeaux produced the finest 
psychological works of the feudal period. Where the 
dev elo ping s c h o la st ic logic of the schools c o n f ro nted the 
task of integ rat ing A ri stoteli an  n a t u ra lism with reli gious 
orthodoxy, the Cis t e r c i a n  psyc hology sought a more perfec t 
synthesis of C h r i s t i a n  and Platonic traditions. ’R e a s o n ’ 
for St. Bernard, or Will iam of St. Thie rry  could never move 
itself beyond the purely intellectual sphere. Logic- and 
dialectic m i g h t - ’p r o v e ’ G o d ’s exis tence  but in doing so 
would not bring Him any closer. Intellectual u n d e r s t a n d i n g  
is insufficient, 'there is nothing human in its 
o p e r a t i o n ’ .29 The real task is not to de termine an 
abstract agre ement bet ween faith and reason, but to unite 
the human and divine  soul in c a r i t a s .
Love more c e r tainly than .knowledge lifts man up war d in 
the scale of being. Knowledge  is more properly viewed as
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one aspect of the relati on  termed love. Kno w l e d g e  is 
founded upon a ’c o n n a t u r a 1 n e s s ’ of subject and object. In 
knowing something our mind shapes itself to the object it 
apprehends. Now as ’the s o u l ’s sense is love ’ our love of 
God, in ’c o n t e m p l a t i n g ’ its proper object transform s m a n ’s 
inner natur e and lifts him towards perfection. The 
’a f f e c t i o n s ’ conform the soul to the objects of its love.30 
We must the refore learn to love God. Such a love cannot 
originate in the human heart. The asc en ding ladder of 
being stops inf ini tely short of G o d ’s self-s u f f i c i e n t  
nature. M a n ’s human s e l f-i mp rovemen t cannot by itself 
reach Him, and more than unaided reason can fully expose 
the inner n e c e s s i t y  of faith. A u t h e n t i c  car i t a s , whi ch  is 
really the human form of faith, must ori ginate with God; 
’you have given me desire for y o u r s e l f ’ , remarks W i l l i a m  in 
a fo rmula tion r e m i ni scent of A n s e l m ’s Cur Deus H o m o .31 For 
no di sc ernible ’r e a s o n ’ , God in his infinite goodne ss has 
provided man wit h a means by which He might be approached. 
Love, when it is un condi t i o n a l l y  offered to its proper 
object, bridges the abyss of transcendence. The p r ob le m of 
love is to arouse  its passion in such a way as to avoid 
consuming itself upon anything less than God. Since, ’it 
is God himself who loves himself in u s ’ ,32 the human 
subject need only learn to abando n itself to this inner 
Diovement to be saved.
The C i s t e r c i a n ’s stricter asc e t e c i s m  as a pr e l u d e  to 
personal ecstas y was far more de manding than external
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observance. In its initial stage the monk had to learn to 
put away, ’all stirrings after wo rldly honours and delights 
and pleasures, and everything else that can and often does, 
arouse in me the lust of the flesh, or of the eyes, or that 
stirs up in me a wrong a m b i t i o n ’ .33 It is less the 
resisting flesh however, so much as the more subtle and 
dec eptive spiritual obstacle of pride that traps many into 
superficial obedience. It is useless to love God only for 
ourselves. Yet in loving God for Himself, we must also 
love ourselves. Car i tas links the two and tra nsforms  us 
inw ar dl y.34 Its proper de velopme nt requires the const ant 
vig ilance of a, ’vehement and w e ll-ord er ed w i l l ’ .3" It is 
the practice of au t h e n t i c  self-denial, in whi ch the ’s o u l ’ 
is emptied of eve ry secular tendency, that allows the 
spontaneous growth of spiritual love. God expands within 
the soul and lifts the truly devoted ’beyond t h e m s e l v s ’ .
L o v e ’s a s c e nd in g moveme nt is rarely consummated. The 
terrifying exp er ie nce of infinite love is not simple 
enjoyment (which distracts the soul into its own 
particularities), but a willed h el pl essne ss  in the face of 
G o d ’s a g a p e . As ’everyone possesses you just insofar as he 
loves y o u ’ , the path of spiritual love becomes a torment of 
fr ust ration and d i s a p p o i n t m e n t .3 * The least incl intio n to 
a genuinely spiritual life reveals the re c a l c i t r a n c e  of a 
will holding back from the extremity of a genuinely 
unconditional a cc ep tance  of love ’s tran scend in g reality.
Its teI os is known and accepted intellectually. The
knowledge that ’only those who love you truly are truly and 
unique ly and sing ul arly nappy, and that they are p e r fe ct ly 
happy, who love you truly and p e r f e c t l y ’ ,37 did not make 
the unr es er ved acc ep ta nce of G o d ’s ’wou nding  a f f e c t i o n ’ any 
easier. Eve n am ongst the sincerely devoted, pro gr ess in 
spiritual love was pai nf ully  slow and uncertain: ’You do
indeed send me at times as it were mouthfuls of 
c o n s o l a t i o n ’ , admits William, but cannot restrain the 
impertinent reproach, ’but what is that for hunger such as 
m i n e ? ’38
The C i s t e r c i a n  path back to God, in principle  open to 
all sin cerely pr ofessing the faith, in practice b e c a m e  just 
as exclu siv e as the way of reason. Bernard of Clairvaux, 
its most illust rio us exponent, makes clear in his Steps in 
HumiIi ty that rigorous subord in ation to the Rule is only a 
preparation for the arduous spiritual exercise the devoted  
volu nt arily take upon t h e m selves. 39 ’Contem pt of your own 
e x c e l l e n c e ’ , is B e r n a r d ’s paradoxical co mm andmen t and he 
never tires of invoking it against di sguised and perver te d 
forms of p r i d e . 40 Time and again he exposes the 
dialectical subtlety of self-abandonment. In wi l l i n g  the 
destruction of the will those advanced in spiritual love 
could find their pride taking root again in acts of s e l f ­
mortification. As ce tic zeal is as dange rous as s e c u 1ar 
distraction to the pursuit of humility. Learning and good 
works could similar ly trap the unwary and offer a hi ding 
place to the hard pressed e g o . 41
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To gain kn owledge of God was to see him ’face to 
f a c e ’ , a p o s s ibili ty  that demanded an absolut e surrender- in 
the face of his overwh el ming r e a l i t y . 42 Resignation, 
paradoxically, was the only ef fective means of spiritual 
advancement. And resignation, to be sincere, could not 
become a ’r a t i o n a l ’ means of such a d v a n cement  but must 
itself flow s p ontan eo usly from inner faith.
The Cis t e r c i a n  retreat from the wor ld and their 
subseq uen t economi c and a d m i n i stra ti ve inn ovations might 
give the impression  of an order that had in fact succeeded 
in ext ric at ing itself from feudal relations. This however 
would be far from the truth. Their d o c tr in e of car i tas was 
a profound real isa tion and p u r i f i c a t i o n  of f e u d a l i s m ’s 
central principle. Humili ty  as a form of love was, like 
honour, an essence shared betwee n superior and subordinate; 
an essence red istr ib uted rituall y to create a new person 
as ’the man of another 'man’ . The monk in seeking to become 
’a man of G o d ’ plunged into the ab so lu te limit of feudal 
inequality and r e c i p r o c i t y . 43 He had no th ing  to ’o f f e r ’
God but obedience, and as G o d ’s being was infinite, 
ob edience was all that was required. And his only duty, 
consequently, was to accept his L o r d ’s p r o t e c t i o n . 44
It is in this context also that the F r a n cisca n 
pr ofession  of poverty should be viewed. To be entire ly  
dependent on alms was a form of asc eti c trial which
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’t e s t e d ’ the faith of the believer. More than that, it was 
an open avowal of worthlessness. There is no sense here of 
a sentimental identi fi cation  with ’the p o o r ’, or any desire 
for the perf or mance  of ’good w o r k s ’ . It was just because 
feudal society cont ai ned wi thin its hierarc hy  deg raded  and 
worthless elements that the Fran c i s c a n  could adopt poverty 
as a religious v o c a t i o n . 43 Their ex pe riment however, for a 
time unset tling to ecclesiastical authorities, was rapidly 
’r e g u l a r i s e d ’ into a mendica nt  o r d e r .
The w h o l e h e a r t e d  devotion to typical mo n a s t i c  values, 
humility, surrender to the terrifying ordeal of G o d ’s love, 
transfig ure d the monk from being a spiritual function ary 
into a religious virtuoso on his own behalf. It was a 
po ten tially sub versive  ind iv iduali sm  more than 
counteracted, however, by the pecu li arly negative  form in 
which it expre ssed itself. The monk sought an ul tim a t e  
release. An ascent  which, dis pen sing with the m e a sured 
intellectual path of the cosmological argument, mo unted 
beyond the ladder of exist enc e to the direct a p p r e h e n s i o n  
of its first cause.
Valour
The questi ng knight is no less a spiritual figure than 
the monk. Allot te d his fixed place in creation, he 
nonetheless sought, in realising his God-given nature, to
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transcend its imm ediately given boundaries. His aim, just 
as the m o n k ’s, was the happiness that came in the mo ment of 
release from the order to which he had v o l u nt ar ily 
subm i tted himself. His quest was for justice, honour a n d , 
above a 11, death.
The k n i g h t ’s route to eternity remained in spite of a 
vigorous ’C h r i s t i a n i s i n g ’ movem ent throughout the twelft h 
ce ntury somet hing very different to the a s c e t i c i s m  of the 
R u l e . 46 He did not seek the liberation of his soul through 
the di sc iplin ed  ne glect of his body so much as, in 
’t e s t i n g ’ its physical powers he allowed himself to become 
a secular instrument of G o d ’s will. The k n i g h t ’s body  
expresses, as a dire ct and natural symbol, a p e r f e c t i o n  as 
pure in its own way as the m o n k ’s soul. He is not merely 
powerful and active; he is beautiful. Perceval, b r o ug ht  up 
in the ’w i l d ’ be cause  his mother was afraid of losing him 
to some adventure, instantly recognised the physical 
superiori ty of the first knights he happened to see. His 
hyperbole, ’they are more beautiful, 1 think, than God and 
all his a n g e l s , ’ is in a sense quite jus t i f i e d . 47 Their 
physical being, inc orp orating and ex pressing the di vin e 
commandment of justice i_s^ more beautiful than the 
intellectual idea, or the purely inner and soulful 
likeness, of God. Cliges, the most secular of C h r e t i e n  de 
T r o y ’s heroic chara cters is possessed of a physical 
perfection qui te beyond  the range of accidental variation, 
’ In him is nothing that can be m e n d e d ’ .40 In a d d i t i o n  to
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stature, strength, proportion, there is a p o s i tively 
’f e m i n i n e ’ refinement: ’his hair seemed like fine gold, and
his face a fresh -blown r o s e ’ .49 The pr inc iple of 
plenitude, the cosmic fullness of being, has been poured 
into him; ’ In framing him Nature was so lavish that she put 
ev erything  into him at o n c e , and gave whatever she 
c o u l d ’ .50 A fullness that could not be due simply to 
nature, but rather was a token of a purpose that lay beyond 
it.
The true knight was ’f a i r ’ of feature; or, if false 
and corrupted, then ’c o a r s e ’ . The moral d i s t i n c t i o n 
implicit in dif fe re nt p hysiog no mies was more subtle and 
am biguous here than among the holy orders. The monk should 
be emaciated, his whole body turned inward upon itself, 
cast down and worthless; or, if corrupted, fat, sleek and 
c o m p l a c e n t . 31 Among the chivalrou s elite, some slight 
physical blemis h becomes an in co ntrover ti ble symbol of 
moral imperfection.
Physical appearance, in other words, is not an 
isolated or accidental quality. It is part of a tightly 
knit complex of values; Cliges, for example, is d e s cr ibed 
as, ’a brave knight, so handsome, so noble, and so 
l o yal’ .52 A list that might be ex ten ded but could just as 
well be con densed to a single term: a ’t r u e ’ knight cannot 
be anything other than handsome, brave, loyal and noble. 
These are the essentials of knighthood, as hu m i l i t y  is the
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essence of the religious vocation.
That is not to say that all such c h ar acteris ti cs 
spring s po nt aneousl y from the k n i g h t ’s being. He must, 
like the monk, un dergo a rigorous training. His body must 
be dev el oped and tested, its passions trained and 
controlled. He must learn the etique tt e of the court as 
well as the con vent io ns of the battleground. He must 
become as adept in the forma lities of love, as in the 
techniques of combat. Ram on Llull, among his many works, 
produced around 1280 a small book on ch iv alry in whic h the 
range of knightly c h ar ac teristi cs  is prec isely documented. 
The knight is chosen as one among a thousand, ’the most 
suitable, the most courageous, the most strong to sustain 
exertion, the most able to serve m a n ’ .53 Intrinsisc 
qualities which fit him, when they are properly  developed, 
to the specifi c task of mai nt ai ning the secular order. His 
bearing and chara cte r therefore must be commanding, so 
that, ’by love he restore charity and instruction, and by 
fear he restore virtue and j u s t i c e . ’54
It is these special qua lities of character that 
justifies his position of p r i v i l e g e , '’so very high and so 
very noble in the order of chivalry... that it behoove s 
also that the common people labour in the lands in order to 
bring forth fruit and goods whereof the knight and his 
beasts have their livi n g ’ .55 The f u n c t io nalist view of 
society is clearly articulate d by Llull; as the clerics.
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’ incline the people to devotion and a good life, in like 
manner the k n i g h t s , b y  nobility of spirit and force of arms 
maintain the order of c h i v a l r y ’.54
The ’order of c h i v a l r y ’ is as rigorous in its own
fashion as St B e n e d i c t ’s rule. The youth who would be co me  
a knight must learn the arts of war far e and cour tly 
behaviour, how, ’to. carve at table, to serve and dub a 
k n i g h t ’ .57 Hence the nec es sity of L l u l l ’s treati se whi ch 
raises the traini ng for knig hthood to the same level of 
systematic p r e p a r a t i o n  as that offered in the schools or 
monasteries. Personal a s s o ci at ion with and dev ot i o n  to a 
’m a s t e r ’ remains the defi nitive ’p a t h ’ to knighthood, but 
additio na lly it is n e c es sary that, ’the science be w r i t t e n  
and the art be shown and read in such manner as other 
sciences are r e a d ’ .50
The knight is no more sustained by pleasure than is
the monk. He is not ascetic, but his sensuousness,
controlled and directed, is only a means to the
a c comp li shment of a purpose beyond himself. The k n i g h t ’s
’n a t u r a l ’ physical su periority  exp ressed itself t h e r ef ore  
in the virtues of the soul, in justice, wisdom, charity, 
loyalty, truth, humili ty  and hope. 59 Llull in fact
’d e d u c e s ’ these qualities of knig hthoo d as an t h i r t e e n t h
century th eologian might discourse upon the ’n a m e s ’ of God 
They are part of his knightly nature, and his nature is 
part of an inescapable order realised through his actions.
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We are once again w i thin  the orbit of the ontological 
p r o o f .
Llull was lending intellectual weight to an 
ideological mov em ent that was at its strongest in Nort he rn  
and We stern France from the m id -twelft h century. It was 
e nc our age d by ruling princes and kings as a means of 
developing, as a sp ecific style of life, a de fensiv e 
’s o l i d a r i t y ’ among their vassals, thus making  the 
ruling class more resista nt to the subver sive influences of 
the t o w n s . 40 The a s s o c i a t i o n  betw een knig ht hood and the 
clerical orders had alrea dy been made, with comp el ling 
eloquence, in Be rna rd of C i a i r v a u x ’s fierce support of the 
Second Crusade. ’S u r e l y ’, he claimed, ’it is an intrepid 
knight, pr ot ected on every side, who clothes his body with 
the armour of iron and his soul with the armour of 
f a i t h ’ .41 The C i s t e r c i a n  leader could not however restrain 
his asceti c temper and leant his spiritual a u t h o r i t y  also 
to the fo undation  of the Knights of the Temple; a self- 
conscious and unsuccessful attempt to combine no b i l i t y  and 
valour with mo n a s t i c  discipline, which Llull ignored in 
pr eference to C h r e t i e n ’s more appea li ng image of the 
solitary questing knight.
The knight or gan ised but did not live who lly wi thi n a 
community. His essential nature was revealed only when he 
ventured beyond his castle w a 1 Is into the wi Id. He ought, 
immediately prior to the ceremony of dubbing, spend at
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least one night in fasting and prayer during which he was 
not allo wed  to sit or lie down. This imitation of the 
m o n k ’s nocturnal vigil drew at tention to the sacramental 
character of the quest, and begins a physical and moral 
process of ’t e s t i n g ’.42 The following morning he would hear 
a special sermon and celebrate a special mass 
di s t i ng uishing  him from the rest of the faithful. Then  he 
received his arms in an elaborate cer em ony of b e n e d i c t i o n  
modelled on the b i s h o p ’s c on se cratio n of the k i n g ’s sword. 
Llull dwells on all the appurt en ances of knig ht hood whose 
symbolic value are revealed by the cermony. The sword, for 
example, is in the shape of a cross to show that, ’Our Lord 
God va nq uishe d in the cross the death of the human 
l i n ea ge ’ . The spear signifies truth whi ch is, ’a right and 
even t h i n g ’ . The hauberk, being strong and closed on all 
sides, is, ’a castle and fortress ag ainst vices and 
f a u l t s ’ , his spurs are diligence and s w i f t n e s s ’ .43
Thus equipped, the- knight ’sets out without m i s s i o n  or 
office; he seeks adventure, that is, perilous e n c o un ters by 
which he can prove his m e t t l e ’ .44 In the forest he 
confronts nature in the wild, not so much to subdue as to 
test himself against it. But in ’s a v i n g ’ the innocent 
victims of chaos he imposes a tem porary and localised 
order. Divine  justice exudes from his every action, 
protecting him and those he takes into his care. His 
survival depends upon conformity with the p rea rr anged 
harmony of courtly ethics. His only ass ist an ce comes in the
form of an occasional hermit. The knight redeems by direct 
contact, as it were, portions of nature m a n ’s freedom has 
s p o i l e d . 45 He becomes G o d ’s distant sensing device, 
bring ing  into divine co nt e m p l a t i o n  (and thus ordering), 
d is ord ere d parts of the world. Th roug h him God can 
fa mi liar is e himself with sin, with the co nse q u e n c e s  of 
human wickedness, a process which itself, wi thin the sphere 
of the k n i g h t ’s action, redeems the cor rupte d world. The 
k n i g h t ’s courage is not only the physical b r av ery of 
meet ing  and co nquering the fear of his own death, but the 
deeper valour of ’ allowing himself to become the me eting  
point of absolut e good and evil. The knight does not 
follow the path of innocence, of retreat from wickedness.
He must carry the divine creative spirit into the wild, 
risking his own soul in c on tinual ly  renewed adventure.
As an instrument rather than a vessel of G o d ’s love 
the k n i g h t ’s quest is never e n d i n g . 44 It becomes the very 
core of his being; ’tr.ial through a d v e n t u r e ’ , A u e r b a c h  
insists. Vis the real meaning of the k n i g h t ’s ideal 
e x i s t e n c e ’ .47 A series of encounters which has no outward 
political or historical sense of dir ec tion and a c h iev es  no 
particular secular ambition. It is rather an inward drama 
through which the knightly virtues are gradually perfected. 
The k n i g h t ’s individual identity (the particular 
arr angem en t of his virtues), is not only re taine d but, 
through adventure, is enhanced. Unlike the monk who, to be 
ravished by G o d ’s love must become nothing, the knight, in
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acting, retains all his particularity.
This dangerous individuality, so much at odds with the 
ideal order the knight represented, must be mastered. The 
knight, that is to say, must run the risk of love as well 
as face the danger of battle. 46 Ero ti c love can wre ck the 
quest. As part of the wildnes s of unre deemed na tu re the 
knight must confront and conquer its disorde rly challenge; 
’Love is a thing that copies N a t u r e ’ , and is th erefor e apt 
to des troy the social h i e r a r c h y . 49 And just as he must 
embark upon adve ntures  which cannot, even in principle, be 
brou ght  to a concl us ive denouem en t so he must love the 
unattainable. C o ur tl y love plays with erotici sm as the 
joust and tou rn am ent play with  death. And it is no less in 
the game of love that the knight, ’ learned to control his 
violence, to reduce it to o r d e r ’ .70 His p a r t i c u l a r i t y  must 
be di sci plined and confined, his love alights upon his 
lor d’s wife and be comes slavish devotion. It is all the 
more intense for remaini ng unfulfilled. The he lp l e s s n e s s  
of the knight in the face of his ove rwhe lming love charges 
it with mystical p o w e r . 71 Even the greatest knight, as the 
most zealous ascetic, may fail the test. Tris tan and 
Lancelot were both close to perf ec tion yet did not succeed 
in finally ma ste rin g themselves. True valour, as ex c l u s i v e  
and dem anding as genuine humility, offered no easier path 
to the sublime.
The k n i g h t ’s de ath is both the c u l m inati on  of the
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quest and the read ju stment  of the secular world to the 
dist ur bing shock of his individuality. His un ruly passion, 
if it is ero ticised beyond the spiritual af fectus of 
service, loyalty and feudal subordination, must u ltimat el y 
be extinguished. His death preserves his p e r f e e t i o n ;’The 
death he inflicts is to the benefit of Christ; the death he 
receives is to his own b e n e f i t ’ , declares St. Bernard with 
typical vi g o u r . 72 A view echoed in L l u l l ’s co nv i c t i o n  that 
no act can, ’con trib ut e to chivalr y more than d e a t h ’ .73
Cervantes, 'looking back on a t r a d ition  of ro man tic 
literature which had become anachronistic, began by 
pa rod ying its empty mannerisms. But Don Quixote, as a true 
knight (his honour is more to him than real ity  itself), 
triumphs over his c r e a t o r . 74 His passion, wh ich is the 
knightly devo tion to chi va lric order, creates its own world 
in opp osi ti on to any mun dane ex pe rience  that might deny it. 
Yet there is more than a little of the Q u i x o t i c  in his 
noble predecessors, the imitation is comic only b e ca us e the 
world has ceased to believe in t h e .t r a n s cendi ng  value of 
the quest. The knight, as the monk, had conque re d death and 
lived uncaring of his own comfort be cau se  comfort was to 
accept the empirical world as the true reality. To go 
beyond this reality, to realise through a fixed but partial 
symbolic order the essential inner nature of being was his 
quest.
The priv ile ged orders, s it were, con fi rmed the
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ul tim ate values of feuda lism only by going beyond the 
everyda y world's copy of its perfect harmony. The 
fundamental justi fication of the social order was not so 
much that God had willed any particular, mundane 
relations hips (He had not since man, fallen from grace, 
used his freedom on his own behalf), but that, imperfect as 
it was, it could not help but be con st ructed 'in the image 
and likeness' of divine order. Its gradations provided  a 
stairway to the greater reality it sought to express. 
Converted into subj ective 'steps' or proje cted into the 
world as virtuous ' d e e d s ’, the monk and the knight were 
carried beyond the social world. On the one hand, 
’c o n t e m p l a t i o n ’ and on the other ’a c t i o n ’ t r a n s cende d the 
cons traints of time and place to reach the realm of pure 
being; the ’ lov e’ and ’v a l o u r ’ w h ic h was identified as 
happ i n e s s .
Sensuousnes s
What of the much greater number of unfree peasants 
absorbed without prior c o n c e p t u a l i s a t i o n  into the feudal 
hierarchy; the su blu nary species, degraded, u n c i v i l i s e d  and 
incapable of the refinem ent that existed as an as pect  of 
the lord’s benevolenc e?  Can we find amongst them a n y th in g  
approaching a cosmology, a coherent view of their own world 
of exp erience? Ni ne teenth  century his torians  and 
sociologists assumed not. Frazer had no hesi tation  in
including the Eur op e a n  pea sa ntry of his own day, let alone 
of the feudal period, in the same cat eg ory of u nd ev eloped 
culture as the primitive. ’S u p e r s t i t i o n ’ was the dull 
under tow  of hist ory  from which only an educ ated elite had 
ever succeeded in shaking itself free.
In trying to descri be the ’c o m p o r t m e n t ’ of the monk 
and the knight, however, a diff er ent way of ’r e a d i n g ’ the 
symbolic value of experi ence is being invoked. A cos mo lo gy 
does not exist exclusively, even among the educated, as a 
theory or set of theories about the str ucture of the 
universe. Including such ab stract reasoning, it refers 
much more generally  to the o rgan is ing pri nc iples implicit 
in ev eryday life.The Eur op ean peasantry, exis ti ng in a 
cond iti on of inv oluntary s u b m ission within the feudal 
hierarchy, developed an inarti culate cos m o l o g y  profou nd ly 
at odds with either the A r i s tote li an Scholastic, or the 
P la to nic monastic, versions of or tho dox Christ ianit y. 
Mikhail B a k h t i n ’s important work in Rabel ai s has un covered  
this negle cted c o s m o l o g y . 75 No longer im me diately 
comprehensible, Bakhtin succeeds in de m o n s t r a t i n g  that 
R a b e l a i s ’s imagery, his comic playfulness, his use of 
language, makes sense as the cu lm i n a t i o n  of, ’a thousand 
year de ve lopment of popular c u l t u r e . ’74 A d e v e lo pment 
which, as much as Ch ris t i a n i t y  or Hellenism, a d apte d itself 
to the reality of feudalism. The fiction of Rabelai s 
illuminates, as if from the inside, a world of popular 
festive forms: ritual spectacles created from comic verbal
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com po si tion and un co uth forms of speech in which were 
preserved something of the powerful syncretis m of the 
carn i v a l .
Every feudal ceremony: liturgical, civil, legal,
initiations, oaths, eve ryt hing so le mnised by pub lie rite 
and sacrament, had its comic counterpart. Parodie s of 
prayers and psalms, u n c r ow ni ng ceremonies, mock treatises 
(many themselves learned works), made outrag eous fun of 
orthodox and a u t h o rit at ive opinion. All these c o u n t e r ­
festivities, ’built a second world and a second life 
outside o f f i c i a l d o m . ’77 A world ne it her religious nor 
magical which existing on, ’the b o r d erline be twe en  art and 
l if e ’ is a, ’region of liberating ambiguity... w h ic h in 
reality is life itself, but shaped accor di ng to a ce rtain 
pat ter n of p l a y ’ .78 This festive life, the Carnival 
Tradition, which is the p e o p l e ’s ’second l if e’ , is subjec t 
to no regulat io n other than, ’the laws of its own 
f r e e d o m ’ .79 And as inv the case of the c h i l d ’s playworld,
’w h i 1e.Carnival lasts, there is no other life outs ide 
it’.80
Carnival appears, from the outside, to have a ce rtain  
inner logic, a meaning con tained in its ’t u r n a b o u t ’ and 
’i n s i d e - o u t ’ gestural language. It seems to be a world 
constructed by simple inversion, a direct turning upo n  its 
head of the official feudal hierarchy. Ce re monies of 
uncrowning, processions in which the clown takes the place
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of the bi sh op  or king, feasts in whi ch  gluttony and 
indecency replace courtly etiquette, mock sermons in which 
the speaker imitates the sounds of an a s s * 81
Such reversals, however, were only the prelude to a
more radical ne g a t i o n  of officialdom. The est ablishe d 
order was not m e rely  parodied; its very exist ence was
denied. There was a general sus pe ns ion ' of all
hierarchical rank, privileges, norms and prohibitions'.
The Carnival was existence 'hostile to all that was 
immortalised and 'completed'.82
Inversion is the C a r n i v a l ’s own special symbol which 
only later shrinks to express a secular political ideal.
In the feudal period its mea ning is u nr es traine d by any 
practical desire for a more perfect social order, or any 
covert appeal to a subv er sive concept of social j u s t i c e . 83 
The Carnival is complete in itself and need seek nothi ng  
'beyond' its own sensuous fullness. A more profound  
reversal of conventional relations lay in its n e g a t i o n  of 
the process of sy mbolic expressio n as such. Once 
established, Ba kh tin insists, it is a world closed in upon 
itself: an exh au stive reality which cr it icises the more 
profoundly by its indifference to, than its c a r i c a t u r i n g  
of, the official world.
The Carnival, in its inexhaustible aspect, can be 
represented to us who remain outside it (those w i t h i n  have
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no need of represe ntations), as grotesque r e a l i s m . This is 
not intended by Ba khtin to denote a particular ’a e s t h e t i c ’ 
standpoint but rather to evoke the recol l e c t i o n  of a 
’p r i m o r d i a l ’ mode of experience. ’The cosmic, social and 
bodily  elements are given here as an indivisible w h o l e ’ .84 
It is a ’grandiose and e x a g g e r a t e d ’ somatic process; a 
collective, cosmic body existing in a continuou s state of 
flux. It is the ’body of the p e o p l e ’ , fecund and 
degenerate, play ing host to the popular culture of the 
’primary p r o c e s s ’ . The entire world of human exp er ience is 
rendered into b o dily forms. Every somatic functio n is 
exposed and celebrated, every internal organ torn from its 
place of official concealment. Its ’b r i m m ing-ov er  
a b u n d a n c e ’ is cont inual ly  emp ha sised in feasting, 
p o 1y m o r p h o u s 1y , to excess.
Grotesque realism has an immediately  ’d e g r a d i n g ’ 
significance. All that is ’high, spiritual, ideal, 
a b s t r a c t ’ is given fresh ex istence as part of the sensuous 
cycle of death and r e b i r t h . ' ’Laughter degrades and 
m a t e r i a l i s e s ’ , it is a ’p e r v e r s e ’ mo vement of sensuousness, 
in oppo sition to all forms of asc e t e c i s m  and its aetherial 
creatures, mystical love or theological a b s t r a c t i o n .85 
It literally ’brings down to e a r t h ’ all human p reten si ons  
to spiritual transcendence. It realises in its 
unrestra in ed sensuous ness a quite d i f fe rent release from 
the petrified structure of the feudal hierarchy.
These bodi ly d e gr adatio ns  arouse laughter, and it is 
as part of the history of laughter that Ba kh tin views the 
popular culture of feudal society. Wi thin the official 
world, ’that whic h is important and essential cannot  be 
c o m i c a l ’ .86 And it was the develop in g ’s e r i o u s n e s s ’ of 
officialdom, what might be called the feudal ’s t a t e ’ , that 
forced laughter into its own, unofficial sphere. It was 
just bec ause of this enforced sepa ration  and e x c l u siv en ess 
that laughter becam e , ’marked by exceptional radicalism, 
freedom and r e s t l e s s n e s s ’.87 Subsequently, during a brief 
hiatus in the tr an s f o r m a t i o n  of official society, it once 
again became ge ner all y available, and it was in that period 
that Rabelais (and Cervantes, and Shakespeare), were able 
to exploit its pr otean imagery. Their works are filled 
with carnival gaiety that mocks the ’tone of icy pe tr ified 
s e r i o u s n e s s ’ proper to ’s e r i o u s ’ writing.
If the Carnival was not simply an ’i r r a t i o n a l ’ form of 
social protest orig in ating among the lower orders, neither 
was it a cunni ngly devised ’s a f e t y - v a l v e ’ through which, 
from time to time, the accu mulat ed  frustr ations of the 
downtrodden could be h armles sl y r e l e a s e d . 88 They were 
genuinely ’p o p u l a r ’ forms in which th privilege d also 
participated. The more significa nt towns devoted three 
months of each year to such ceremonials, feasts, theatrical 
shows and public spectacles. They involved all the people 
and tempo rarily made them one. The ’feast of f o o l s ’ was 
held at least once (more commonly three or four times!) a
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year in most places. During this festival, ’ grotesque 
degrada ti ons of various church rituals and s y m b o l s ’ were 
sanctioned. A justifica tion of these rites was publish ed  
by 'the Paris School of Theolog y in 1444, defendi ng such 
practices, ’so that foolishness, whic h is our second nature 
and seems to be inherent in man, might freely spend itself 
at least once a y e a r ’ .89 Easter laughter (risus paschal i s ) 
and Christma s laughter similarly drew into their festive 
excess clerics, schoolmasters, lawyers and artisans. The 
theologia n and the philosophe r were equally impat ient to 
celebrate the feast days so that they might be t e m p o r a r i l y  
released from, ’the oppr ession of such gloomy cate g o r i e s  as 
the " e t e r n a l ", ’’a b s o l u t e ” , ’’u n c h a n g e a b l e ” ’ .90
The system of grotesque b o d i 1y images ensu red ’the 
victory of laughter over f e a r ’.91 Every th ing a b s tr act and 
spiritual found itself somati cally duplicated. The soul 
descended to the ’material bodily lower s t r a t u m ’ . The 
carnival body, uni ike"the m o n k ’s (skeletal) or the k n i g h t ’s 
(athletic) body was dominated by the belly, bowel and 
genitals. Neither a vessel nor an instrument, it d i s solved  
into the un bounded  met amo rp hoses of digestion, e l i m i n a t i o n  
and procreation. Th ro ug h its somatic funct ions, the body 
continual ly  over-reac he d its appare nt bou nd ary and devo ur ed 
the earth. It died and was reborn. It remained
perpetua ll y unfinished, incomplete. The carnival face is 
reduced to a huge gaping mouth, ’the wide open b o d i l y  
a b y s s ’ , through which the world passes. It is a common.
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colle cti ve body, ’a point of tran si tion in a life eternally 
r e n e w e d ’ . 92 Th ro ugh it, hi erarchy  is transformed and 
denied. The carnival body, which, ’can fill the entire 
u n i v e r s e ’ , e n g u l f ’s the cosmos in ’s u b l u n a r y ’ sensuousness, 
o ve rwhelmi ng G o d ’s fixed and abstrac t order with m a n ’s own 
generative powers.
The Carnival, then, does not oppose one ideology with 
another, one unofficial picture of the comos to the 
aut horit at iv e tra di tion of theological and philosophical 
reflection. It ’r e d u c e s ’ intellect to substance. In 
B a k h t i n ’s w o n d e r f u l l y  pene trating  ana ly si s Carnival is 
revealed as the c o n t i n u a t i o n  of the ’primary p r o c e s s ’ , the 
per sistence of fun in the midst of the cosmology of 
h a p p i n e s s .
Yet it cannot be the fun of the primary process; not 
quite. The paradisaical innocence of primordial e x p e r i e n c e  
can never be repeated. • Fun cannot be planned; it is simply 
’g i v e n ’ . The Carnival, however ’a b s o r b i n g ’ to its 
participants, could not remain whol ly un co nscious of its 
relation to the official world of fixed and stable 
categories. Indeed, the Carnival can be viewed as a 
species of the comic only because it is the r e c o 1 Iect i on of 
fun rather than the primary process itself. Laughter, as 
Freud clearly demonstrates, is a pa rticular kind of 
n o s t a l g i a . 93 It is not fun, but f u n ’s i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y 
with anything ’s e r i o u s ’ that rouses laughter. Thus, the
Carnival is a huge joke at the exp ense of the official 
medieval worldview* And like any joke it can only partially  
succeed; in arousi ng laughter it lifts a veil upon the 
vanished world, only to let it fall again.
Just as in childhood  play is gra dually subve rted by 
its dep end ence upon the adult world, so the Carnival cannot 
altoget her  forget its relation (albeit it one of negation) 
to orthodox cosmology. A process of r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  
corrupts its liberated forms by assigning  to them a 
purpose. In Switzerland, as early as the f o u r tee nt h  
century, the Carnival had ac quired a much more re stricted 
po l i tico-r el igious s i g n i f i c a n c e . 94 And by the s i x teenth 
century, quite ge ner all y it seems, it had become  a focus 
of, rather than a release from, a whole range of social 
conflicts. At Romans, for example, Mardi Gras had be co me  a 
’s e c u l a r ’ event with ’a twin purpose; pure and simple 
enjoyment, first of all, but s o c i a l , p o 1i t i c a l , municipal 
protest as w e l l ’.93 Mock battles couold and did be come  
genuinely violent. As subversi ve street theatre it gained a 
com ple tely new value, but, more important 1y , in maki ng 
’e n j o y m e n t ’ i ts p u r p o s e , the Carnival ceased to prof es s the 
wholly absor bing ontological givenness that B a k h t i n  claims 
to be its original genius.
The body, tr ansfo rmed into intellect, or love, or 
valour could grasp, beyond its particular and d e f ini te  
order, the tra nscending reality of the cosmi c hierarchy.
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The a s c e teci sm  of discipli ne d thought, humility or valour 
allowed the soul, in its longing for the ul ti mate release, 
to rise above all material symbols and discover h a p p i n e s s . 
The ways to God, however, were un ending quests. Reason  
opened into the abyss of the cosmological argument, love 
str uggled to escape from self-absorption, the chiv alrous 
knight was tested to destruction. The t e 1 os of human 
existence, the reality which gave form to experience, was 
reached only in death. The C a r n i v a l ’s immediate and 
u nd em anding  r e c o l lec ti on of the pl ay world offered a 
di fferent kind of release from the chain of being. It slid 
downwards, liberating the human into pure sensuousness. 
Human reality, however, could no more be wholly 
m ateri al is ed than it could be infi nit ely spiritual ised; it 
moved bet ween the two, stretched into an order that 
remained di st r e s s i n g l y  incomplete and insurmountable.
A passion ate longing for the infinite thus expr es sed 
itself diffe rently among the diffe re nt orders of feudal 
s o c i e t y . 9 h These relations, of course, are for the most 
part imaginary. More often than not the knight was 
barbaric, the monk corrupt and the carnival a tawdry 
display of bad manners. Ideals of loyalty and fr ie ndship 
could scarcely conceal the explo i t a t i o n  and b r u t a l i t y  of 
everyday life.97 It is ideology we are dealing with, not 
history. It is above all bo urg eois ideology that informs, 
by oblique comparison, the subject matter of so many 
discussions of ’f e u d a l i s m ’. The symbo li c hierarchy, is a
’m o d e l ’ of order whi ch  bourgeois culture has discarded.
The more ’ i d e a l l y ’ it is described the more absurd and 
contr a d i c t o r y  it a p p e a r s . In its insistence that the 
empirical world is no more than a ’f i g u r a ’ of reality, and 
in setting for itself goals which, in its own terms, were 
u n a t t a i n a b l e , 98 the present day commentator, by assign in g  
them to the ’p a s t ’ , rids his c on tempor ar y culture of 
u n c o m f ortable  ’b e l i e f s ’ .
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SIX
NATURE
The images of the mirror and the ladder 
ch ara ct er ise the symbolic  reality of happiness and serve to 
di st ingu is h it from the primordial givenness of fun. The 
cosmic body contains all pos sibi li ties wit hin itself; 
cosmos and psyche are one and the same process of 
metamorphosis. The world of happiness, however, is divi ded 
between ma c r o c o s m  and microcosm. And once divided it can 
be end lessly subdiv ided into an order of qualities. The 
world of inner exp erien ce  (psyche) and the order of the 
u n i v e r s e c o s m o s ) a. r e n o longer identical . N e i the r a r e 
they ’e m p i r i c a l ’ categor ies describin g diff er ent ’s e g m e n t s ’ 
of the world as it can be directly experienced. In their 
s i mu 1 taneous de pe ndencs up*on uoc ’ s uncond 1 1 1 ona i anq 
unlimited b en eficen ce  they are the separate ’m i r r o r s ’ of 
divine being. As such they are related analog ically, so 
that m a n ’s uniaue - p r i v i l e g e  is, by virtue of quali ti es
inherent in his soul, to have the potential for kn owled ge 
both of the world and of divine things.
Such a view would seem to allow to nature no more than a 
superficial coherence. The various orders of the empirical 
world are related directly  to the invisible essence which 
informs them rather than to each other. The longing for 
happiness, which is central to the bou rge oi s re c o n s t r u c t i o n  
of feudalism, gave to nature an insubstantial reality. It 
lacked the inner nec e s s i t y  of its own purely physical laws.
Nature existed, for the most part, as an i n t e r mediary  
between divine hiera rc hy (cosmos) and inner release 
(psyche). The quest ions it posed demanded i n te rpreti ve  
rather than e x p l anatory  answers. The revival of the 
quadr i v i urn (geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, music) as 
part of the liberal arts cu rr iculum in thir te enth cent ury 
Paris was defended, therefore, on the grounds of its 
utility as a pre p a r a t i o n  for the rec eption of re vealed 
truth which was the subject of more adva nc ed study, the 
tr i v i urn (rhetoric, dialectic, theology), and not for the 
light it might cast upon the natural w o r l d . 1 W i t h i n  a 
universe of analogies, these ’mathematical a r t s ’ were 
essential intellectual tools, supremely ’u s e f u l ’ in a sense 
quite dif ferent to that espoused by earlier and later 
periods. Since the time of Boethius, the most practical of 
such arts was held, to be m u s i c . 2 It was, like a r i t h m e t i c  
which it resembled in. dealing with d iscont in uous
quantities, a system of pure relations- De at ch ed from the 
const rai nts of corporeality, musical harmonies were 
expressive of the deeper order of creation. And as this 
was an order which pen etra te d (imperfectly) the human form, 
music, like refl ect ive thought and love, had th er a p e u t i c  
and ’e l e v a t i n g ’ powers. E v ery d es cr iption of the mundane, 
physical world was bound up with the moral and a e s t h e t i c  
qualities of its local ’harmonic, o r d e r . 3
The meaning rather than the a c t uality of natu r e  was 
the essential issue. The m a i n tena nc e of an cient learning 
was, with some exceptions, the principal source of 
’o b s e r v a t i o n ’ .4 Compilations, abstracts with occasional 
glosses, and e n c y c l o p a e d i c  collec tions of traditonai 
authorities were the basic mater ials of study, in theolog y 
and phi loso ph y as much as in ’natural h i s t o r y ’ . Isidore of 
S e v i l l e ’s E t y m o l o g i e s , P l i n y ’s Natural H i s t o r y , and 
increasingly the works of Ari sto tl e were reproduced, rather 
than discussed, as intellectual models. But such 
collections aid not in themselves co nstitute ’k n o w l e d g e ’ of 
the natural world. Rather, they formed the ma t e r i a l s  with 
which the mind could sync hronises its own inner harmonies, 
’ lo sing’ itself in conte mp lative ’p a r t i c i p a t i o n ’ in the 
world.
Nature, an ap oretic  entity, was nonet heless formed 
from its own set of secondary, physical relations.
Physical things were bound together by a network of causes
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which, formally a n a lo gous to the essential structure of the 
cosmos, could also be grasped separately and superfici ally  
as a material phenomenon. Be ginning in the twelfth 
century, scholars inf luenced by Ara bic c o mmenta ri es on 
Greek philosophical and scient ific works, as well as those 
specula tin g within  the P l a tonic and P y t h a g o r e a n  tradition, 
ap pro ached nature in a new light.5 This c on st itutes  a 
’R e n a i s s a n c e ’ only in the most general sense of being a 
rebirth of sc ho l a r s h i p  and intellectual self-confide nce; it 
did not a nt ic ipate in its values and precepts the Italian 
Renaissance, far less the S c i e nt ific R e v o l u t i o n . 6 It was a 
dev elopment that lay wholly  within the cos mo lo gy of 
happiness; its d is co veries aroused rather than satisfied  
the longing for the ’r e a l ’ knowledge that wo uld come only 
from surpassing the sensible realm to claim the gifts of 
reason and love.
Historians, resp ondin g to the same d i s s o l u t i o n  of 
certainties we have noted in ’m o d e r n ’ treatments of the 
irrational, were not slow to invert an earlier orthodoxy. 
The medieval world, from being stigmati sed as a co nf usion 
of symbols, steeped in ignorance and prejudice, was 
suddenly red isco vered  as the intellectual source of all 
that was valuable in classical bourgeois t h o u g h t . 7 
Medieval humani sm and natu ra lism were, in consequence, 
thrown into a new prominence. More recent and det ai led 
scholarly at tention has revealed, however, the extent to
which nature remained only a small part of the medieval
cosmos embedded in the larger structure of the feudal
hi erarcny.
Form
Nature may be only part of the cosmos, yet its 
ex istence betrays a material form distin ct from, but 
r epl icative  of the order of, other intellig ible essences. 
Matter, pr op erly speaking, could not exist other than 
formed into the co her ence of nature. It is both a part and 
an emblem of the whole.
The C o s m o g r a p h i a  of Bern ard Si lv estris offers a 
part icula rl y vivid acc ou ont of n a t u r e ’s original 
f or m a t i o n . 0 Inspired by the Timaeus and the works of 
Erigena, the C o s m o g r a p h i a  is ’a landmark of tw elf th  centur y 
h u m a n i s m ’, which presents the process of cr eatio n throug h 
the interaction of a number of ’t h e o p h a n i e s ’ or figures 
represe nti ng elemental cosmic powers.
Silva (also called Hyle), ’still a formless c h a ot ic 
mass', holding ’the first beginning of things in their 
ancient state of c o n f u s i o n ’ ,10 approaches God co mp l a i n i n g  
of the failure of Noys (’the consumm ate and profo un d re ason 
of G o d ’1 1 ), to shape her in ’the image of a nobler f o r m ’ .12 
Silva represents, that is to say, the c h a otic s u b stanc e 
from which all matter will be drawn. It is , ’ intractable,
a formless chaos, a hostile coalescence, the mo tle y 
ap pe aran ce  of being, a mass discordant with i t s e l f ’ .13 It 
contains, ’the original natures of things diffu s e d  through 
her vast w o m b ’.14 As ’p u r e ’ substance, Silva is without 
extension, or location, or coheren ce born of inner 
necessity. As created being, however Silva is possessed  of 
an unqu e n c h a b l e  longing to ’r e t u r n ’ to God; thus, ’yearning 
to emerge from her an c i e n t  confusion, she demands the 
shaping influence of number and bonds of h a r m o n y ’ .13 
Cre ati on is the m a t e r i a l i s a t i o n  of the order potential in 
its limitless turbulence: ’The elements come b e fore  you,
demanding forms, qualities, and functions a p p r o p r i a t e  to 
their causal roles, and seek those stations to w h ic h they 
are almost s po nt aneou sl y borne, drawn by a c o mmon 
s y m p a t h y .’ 1 6
S i l v a ’s demand is timely, coinci ding with the divine 
impulse to order: ’ I will produce a form for S i l v a ’ .17 Not
an ar bitrar y arr angeme nt  but the r ealis at ion of a u n i qu el y 
neces sar y order. Noys ’effected a ba lance of p rope rt ies 
among her ind isc iplined and recalcitrant  materials, joined 
them with means, and so bound them together in arithmet ica l 
p r opo r t i o n . ’10
Hyle, ’once given definiti on by visible images of the 
i d e a l ’ ,19 abandons her ceaseless transformations . Under 
the continu ing guidance of Endelec hia (the cosmic soul 
which exists ’by a sort of emanation), the eleme nt s are
separated and located in fixed rel ati on to each other.
Thus the ’totality of created life unfolds in ordered 
p rogre ss io n from the nu rturing womb of S i l v a ’.20 Nature is 
the product of this second creation; it was ’from the 
intellectual un ivers e the sensible u n i verse  was b o r n ’ , 
fashioned into a ’continuum, a chain in whi ch  noth ing is 
out of order or broken  o f f ’ .21 The cosmos extends itself 
spatially in an unb ro ke n chain of causality. The pleni tude  
of int elligible essences, Noys, fashions itself into a 
h i erarchy, thus bringing into ex istence the physical 
ma n i f e s t a t i o n  of Nature. It is a hi e r a r c h y  of ’r e a l ’ 
powers and influences. The more perfect, qui ntessential, 
matter is placed ’a b o v e ’ deg enerate  forms whose cycles of 
generat ion  and c orru pt ion it controls. E v e r y t h i n g  that can 
exist finds its ap propria te  place in the cosmos, including 
all future and past events: ’For that sequen ce of events
which ages to come and the measure of time will wh ol ly  
unfold has a prior existen ce in the s t a r s ’ .22
The sub stance of Nature, however, retains som et hi ng of 
its original intractability; its ’wild and per ve rse quality 
cannot be perfectl y refined away or t r a n s f o r m e d ’ .23 It is 
oniy the con tinuous  action of E n d e le ch ia that count er acts 
the tendency of created matter to return to a c o n d i t i o n  of 
incoherent sensuousness. The very form of Nature is the 
outcome of opposing tendencies; of the longing for 
’p e r f e c t ’ form on the one hand, and the u n d er to w of 
original substance, on the other. The se tend en cies are the
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two fundamental images that have p r e v io usly bee n isolated 
as fun. If Nature fully satisfied its longing for 
perfectio n it would become identical with Noys and its 
m a t e ri al ity would be ’v o l a t i l i s e d ’ back into the thought of 
God. Equally, if it were to complete ly give way to the tug 
of Hyle, it would lose its material form in the chaos of 
pure sensuousness. Nature, like man (her microcosm), seeks 
release from the feudal order imposed upon her by the act 
of creation. Unable, however, to redisco ver the abs olute 
freedom of reason, or the infinite t r a n s f o r m a t i v e  power of 
the primary process, she fills out the cosmos with a fixed 
structure stret ched taut between the two.
The cre ation of a cosmos turns the primordial 
exp eri ence of fun into an u n a t t ai na ble idea. Happi ne ss is 
the concept or memory of fun; the unre a c h a b l e  tel os of 
nature, and therefore of man. Empirical exi s t e n c e  is an 
imperfect compromise, tending si multa ne ously to both  the 
pure a b s t r action of reason (Noys) and the absolu te  
c on cre ten ess of sensuousness (Silva). If either (and 
therefore both) extre mity were ac tually  a t t a i n a b l e  the 
cosmos would collapse upon itself and resume the u n t r oubled 
playfulness .of the cosmic body.
Silvestris, as if antic ip at ing Freud (or rather 
B a c h e l a r d ) , psych oan alyse s Nature and di sco vers its reality 
is the outcome of a process of ’i n h i b i t i o n ’ upon the 
primary p r o c e s s . 24 Nature is, first of all, a wish. It is
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filled with the desire to transcend  itself; the spo ntaneous 
inner move me nt which is the source also of the m i c r o cosmi c 
order. Noys determines  ’to co mplet e the success and glory 
of my creation  with m a n ’ .23 A being marked by, ’the 
dis tinct iv e attr ib ute of d i g n i t y ’ .26 In man is c o n c e ntrate d 
the opposing tendencies of the cosmos: ’His body will issue
from the depths of chaos and his spirit from the powers 
a b o v e ’ .27 His nature is therefore Nature itself, the unique 
link be tw een sub stance and intellect.
Alan of Lille, whose Plaint of Nature is the direct 
successor to the C o s m o g r a p h i a . expresses the same idea with 
particu lar  clarity: m a n ’s nature was formed, ’acc o r d i n g  to 
the exemplar and iikeness of the struc ture of the univ er se 
so that in him, as in a mirror of the un i v e r s e  itself, 
N a t u r e ’s lineaments might be there to see... so in man 
there is found to be continued ho st ility b e t w e e n 
sensuousness and r e a s o n ’.28
The link betw een megacosmos, as S i i v es tr is terms the 
super lun ary universe, and m icro co smos is more than 
analogical: ’The whole appeara nc e of things in the
subor din ate universe conforms to the heavens... and it is 
shaped to whatever image the motion of the heavens 
i m p a r t s ’ .29 The unity of nature is sustained in a double 
aspect, as intelligible spirit and as matter formed and 
shaped by Noys. The stars are quint essenti al but still 
natural beings, endowed with the capacity d i r e c t l y  to
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apprehend G o d ’s will, which they execute by means of 
n a t u r e ’s own n e c e s s i t y . 30 Physical forces, e xpressi ve  of 
the divine idea of nature, flow inwards from the more 
exalted spheres of creation. As the central focus of 
celestial forces, the sublunary world be comes a much more 
signi fic ant place than was allowed within the traditional 
Ch ristian cosmography.
Nature, however, was not to be un derstoo d e x c l u s i v e l y 
in terms of such forces. The in te lligib il ity of na ture  
remained a form of divine reason op erating through 
secondary causes. The ’h u m a n i s m ’ of the twe lft h and 
thirteenth centuries  was, in this respect, s t r ic tly limited 
in its ambitions. It was less radical, for example, than 
the Arabic science which, in part, served as its 
inspiration. The het erodox astrolo gy  of al-Kindi, for 
example, was founded upon a belief in the direct power of 
the heavens upon the ’radiation of occult infl uences  from 
the s t a r s ’ .31 The binding forces of nature, that is to 
say, were held to be inherent in the su bstance of the 
universe itself. Rut for Silvestris, as much as for An se lm  
of William of St. Thierry, substance was not even material 
before it had received the imprint of divine wisdom. 
N a t u r e ’s n e c e ssi ty  remained for him the order of p e r f e c t l y  
chosen symbols.
An appa r e n t l y  more ’n a t u r a l i s t i c ’ ac count  of the 
origins and structure  of the un iverse was ad vanced  by
Robert Grosseteste, Bishop  of Lincoln. He identified the 
formative power by which ’first m a t t e r ’ was created with 
the physical reality of light:32 ’For light of its very 
nature diffuses itself in every dir ect io n in such a way 
that a point of light will produc e instan taneou sl y a sphere 
of light of any size whatsoever, uniess some opaque object 
stands in the w a y ’ .33 This is just the princ iple of self- 
generation required to account for the physical cosmos.
The infinite exp an sion of 1ux acts upon the abs ol ute 
simplicity of ’first m a t t e r ’ , ’drawing it out along with 
itself into a mass the size of the material u n i v e r s e ’ .34 
In the very act of cr eation nature as it were over steps 
itself, the pure a c t u alit y of the firmament contains 
nothing but ’first m a t t e r ’ and pure form. It is incapable 
of the internal d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of motio n and cannot 
therefore affect our senses. This marks the bo u n d a r y  of 
the physical universe, its outermost, infinitely expanded  
limit.
Not all matter is expanded to the limit of its 
potentiality. Lux internally reflected as Iumen is focused 
back upon the centre of creation. On its return jou rney it 
gathers matter into c o n c en tric spheres of un iform 
’d e n s i t y ’ . The matter with in these spheres still contains 
the potentia lity for movement, but c onstra in ed by the 
ab solutely expanded limit of the fir mament all m o ti on  
within them returns to itself upon an e n d l essly circul ar 
path. Matter confin ed to the central ’s u b l u n a r y ’ region,
’ is more corporeal and m u l t i p l i e d ’ , and, being compressed  
and mixed, one element with another, be neath the lowest 
point of perfection, its movement is rectilinear. Heavy 
objects tend even more to take up a central position, while 
lighter ones seek a se par ate and more elevat ed p o s i t i o n . 36
The hierar ch y of nature, still ordered by q ua li tative 
differences, is here united, formally and physically, 
thr ough the action of light, which is the unique c o n n ect io n 
or influence be tween heaven and earth, and the ex pl a n a t i o n  
of all earthly p h e n o m e n o a  is found in its prese nc e and 
a c t i o n . 37 It is the absolu te  simp licity of light as a 
form-giving power that encoura ges a ’ g e o m e t r i c a l ’ appro ac h 
to nature. Point, line, angle, proportion; the grammar of 
light is reduc ibl e to a few essential relations. The 
generality of such rel ations can be redis co ve red over and 
over again at any point in the natural hie rarc hy  of 
creation. And just as the physical uni ve rse exp an ded from 
a point, so we can rediscover its fullness in the merest 
speck of dust. The smallest particle, ’ is a compl et e and 
inexhaustible tre asury  of all the primary mathema tical  
con stituents from which the whole univers e is 
c o n s t r u c t e d ’ .38
This view of light as a formative princ iple was 
certainly influential in the dev el op ment of a s o p h i s t i c a t e d  
science of optics. But it was not, for Grosseteste, a 
matter of physical theory alone. Lux existed in ways quite
differ ent  to the p h y s i c a l i t y  of light. His views are 
rather the c u 1m i n a t i o n  of a medieval tr ad ition of the 
’metaph ys ics of l i g h t ’ , rather than the b e g i nni ng  of a 
modern science of optics.-39 Physical light is a symbol of 
spiritual light: the formal as well as the e f f i cient cause 
of nature. Act u a l i t y  was drawn out, held together and 
formed into a natural hiera rchy by the integument of a 
d i vi ne 1i g h t .
It was only one of l i ght’s quali ties to act as a 
force, and even in this respect was never the bearer of a 
purely mechanical power. The influences and symp athies 
condu cte d from the centre of the u n i verse to its 
ci rc um ferenc e and back again were laden with purp ose and 
meaning. In id entifyi ng a ’natural m e c h a n i s m ’ for the 
express ion  of the divine will, Grosseteste, rather than 
establishing a domain of independent necessity, sought to 
implicate God more intimately in the op e r a t i o n  of 
creation. It was therefore the identity of formal and 
efficient ca u s a l i t y  in light that placed the science of 
astrology on a sound basis. The relation  be tween the 
heavens and the sublunary world is primarily, but not 
exclusively, analogical. Cert ainly  it is not, as A r abic and 
Jewish writers had assumed, a matter of inherent 
n e c e s s i t y . 40 John of Salisbury, among others, o b j ected  to 
nat ura list ic  astrological hypotheses: ’For they impose on
things a certain  fatal nec essity under the guise of 
humility and reveren ce to God, fearing lest his intent
should per chance alter, if the outcome of things were not 
made n e c e s s a r y ’.41
It was .just because a s t ro logy was not a ’natural 
sci e n c e ’ but par t of the interpre tive schema of the 
medieval w o r l d v i e w  that it became so well developed. It 
thus played a central role in medical theory and practice. 
The mic r o c o s m  of bodil y humours were ’m i x e d ’ in much the 
same way of the earthly elements, and both were subject to 
an internal harmo nics controlled  by the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of the 
heavenly b o d i e s . 42 The bal anc e of humours wi th in  
individuals depended, therefore, on the state of the 
heavens at their birth, and no general d i a g n o s t i c  or 
th er ap eut ic axioms could be app lied w i t hout  careful 
ad a p tation  to the cosmic sit ua tion of the p a t i e n t . 43 
Health depends upon mai nt ai ning the original ha rm ony 
between m i c r o c o s m  and macrocosm. Man falls ill b e c a u s e  in 
exercising his inner freedom he offends a g a in st n a t u r e . 
Nature by itself would never suffer such irr egularities. 
Albertus Magnus, the most learned n a t u r a l i s t  of the 
thirteenth century points out that, ’there is in man a 
double spring of action, namely, nature and the will; and 
nature for its part is ruled by the stars, while the will 
is f r e e ’ .44
Albertus, who was also one of the most r e s p ected and 
a u thor it ative of t h e o l o g i a n s , 43 held that such control 
could only be exercised by the desc ent  of a real power
through the hi erarchy of being. Light and other celestial 
’v i r t u e s ’ impressed upon the sublunary world the patt ern of 
divine things. Nature strove to co nform to this pattern, 
just as man strove to return to God. The m o d e l l i n g  forces 
of the cosmos could be enhanced and ’f o c u s e d ’ by careful 
manipulation. At an ap propriate  time, a p a r t icula r 
planetary  conjunction, a par ticular house in the ascendant, 
an astronom ica l ’s e a l ’ or ’s i g n a t u r e ’ could be traced on 
the smooth surface of a stone, or gem, or piece of metal.
We are assured that, ’Marvels are worked  by such i m a g e s ’4 6 ; 
a force flowing into them is gathered and c o n c e n t r a t e d  by 
the image. This ’natural m a g i c ’ is not un lik e W i l l i a m  of 
St. T h i e r r y ’s theory of love; the image is a part of 
corrupted nature so formed as to be rec ep ti ve to the 
tr ansformin g power of superior celestial virtues. Nature, 
as well as man, could be redeemed if it were made ready to 
accept G o d ’s love. If ordered, its elements  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  
and formed into separate spheres, there would be no 
obstacle to the pene tration  of the most sublime cosmi c 
forces. As it is, the m ater ia lity of nature only 
a c c i de nt ally exists in a rec eptive mode, and divine 
illumin ati on appears as an u n p r e d i c t a b l e  ’m a r v e l ’ of nature 
rather than as its inherent tendency.
The ’formative p o w e r s ’ of the heavens n o n e t h e l e s s  
opeerate con ti nu ously  and to some effect. In The Book  of 
Minerals Albert us describes the ’m i n e r a l i s i n g  p o w e r ’ 
through which stones are f o r m e d . 47 Earth and water, when
con fi ned together in an a p p r opriate  place are con de nsed  
into stone by the ac tion of celestial virtues. It is the > 
earth giving birth to itself, a re lativel y simple process 
be ca us e stones, like metals, are h o m e om er ous substances, 
that is to say perfect ly  simple, uniform, and identical in 
’o c c u l t ’ or inner qualities as in external accidents. And, 
being internally undifferen tiated, stones and metals are 
less demand ing of specific  co nd iti ons of place or astral 
disposition.
Albert us thus admits the p o s s i b i l i t y  of alchemi cal 
transmutation. Tho u g h  an art pra ct ised by pagan 
philosophers, it exists also in a legitimate form: ’For
wh ate ver the elemental and celestial powers p r od uc e in 
natural vessels they also produce in artificial vessels, 
provid ed the artificial are formed just like the 
n a t u r a l ’ .4a The generation  of metals can t h e r ef ore be 
stimulated, albeit with difficulty, in the workshop. The 
practical difficulties, however, are immense. All metals 
are formed from stable mixtures of two fundamental 
substances: sulphur and quicksilver. Each res ulti ng  
’specif ic s u b s t a n c e ’ is a metal with its own pecul iar 
qualities, including ’a f f i n i t i e s ’ with p a r t i c u l a r  celestial 
virtues. Metals act as conductors, so to speak, of 
celestial virtues. Hence their importa nce  as medicines, or 
as ligatures to be worn as prot ec tive devices. In 
a s s o ci at ion with favourable astrological circum stanc es ,
’the elemental and celestial powers of the m a t e r i a l ’ .
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captured in the process of its formation, are released, 
’h e a l i n g ’ affected organs in its v i c i n i t y . 49
A l c h em is t and doctor alike ’p u r i f y ’ the unh e a l t h y  
mixtures of cor ru pted nature. In m a n u f a c t u r i n g  and 
transmuting metals the alc he mist is acti ng as a physici an  
to the natural world, separating  its element s and bringing  
them together in permitted combinations. The alchemi st  
seeks an elixir which is a med ic ine that clean se s the womb 
of nature. Gold, as the purest of metals, is the form in 
which the m e t al li c pri nciple ’o u g h t ’ to exist. T h ere  is 
no th ing illicit in the artificial a r r a n g e m e n t s  of 
sublimation, calcination, and d i s t i l l a t i o n  b e c a u s e  ’nature 
itself performs  the work, and not art, except as the 
instrument, aiding and hastening the p r o c e s s ’ .50
Celestial virtues are contained  also in part ic ular  
plants and animals. The herbal and bestiary, therefore, as 
well as the lapidary, formed the corpus of popular- 
scientific knowledge in medieval s o c i e t y . 51 For many later 
co mmentator s they have been interesting as examp l e s  of 
cr edu lity and observational inaccuracy. From them it 
appears that medieval writers had no real interest in the 
natural world. Their purpose, however, was c 1 a s s i f i c a t o r y  
rather than n atur al istic description. What m a t t e r e d  was 
the isolation of signifi cant or salient ’f e a t u r e s ’ of an 
animal or plant; in other words, their d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  
features, not as members of a species so much as items in a
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symbol ic register. A particular animal is of interest not 
in terms of its ’h o r i z o n t a l ’ relations with other similar 
species, but with refer ence to the ’v e r t i c a l ’ rela tio ns 
with the higher powers that shape it. If the blood of -a 
camel, for example, ’be put into the skin of the beast 
called Stellio, whi ch is like a lizard, having on his back 
spots like stars, and then set on any m a n ’s head, it shall 
seem that he is a giant, and that his head is in h e a v e n ’ .52 
The rel at ion between camel and stellio, or both with man, 
is not int erpreted then as part of a natural ’e c o l o g y ’ but 
as part of a system of cosmic symbolism.
If the created subluna ry world could be d i s a s s e m b l e d
and recombined in terms of essential p r o p or tions only, and 
each nature confined to its un ique ly  a p p r o p r i a t e  place 
within the overall design of the cosmos, then ’m a t t e r ’ , in 
be com ing perf ectly formed, would cease to exist. It is its 
imp erf ections which give to the material wor ld all its 
ch ar ac t e r i s t i c  ’s u b s t a n c e ’ . But nature, as m uc h as man, 
Constantly strives to go beyond itself; to real ise its 
ideal form as order and thus escape the p e r p e t u a 1 inner 
movement of generati on and decay. It strives for a pure 
ideality, to conform itself perf ec tly to the macrocosm, and 
to allow itself to be shaped by divine celestial powers. 
Nature, no longer free to revel in the freedom of first
matter, also longs for happiness. But it is a longing that
cannot be satisfied; nature is fixed in its imperfectio ns, 
stranded in a material realm betw een formless s u b s t a n c e
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(primary process) and insubstantial form (reason).
Flux
Nature, as the unfo rt unate reaim of material existe nc e  
is in a state of perpetual movement. It c o n t i n u a l l y  strives 
to overcom e the vio le nc e inherent in its d i s o rd erly  
appearance, to act ua lise its form ag ainst  the tenden cy of 
matter to revert to the carnival of pure substance. All 
movement is a quest to ac tualise the pa rad is e of 
appro p r i a t e l y  orde red  places.
Subst an ce and place are defined in terms of each 
other. The a c t ua li ty of any object implies a particula r 
spatial relation to the cosmic order as a whole. Space and 
time, in other words, can never be a b s t ra ct ed from the 
material, subl unary  world and treated as ’e m p t y ’ 
extens ion.53 If ev er ythin g were ’ in its right p l a c e ’ there 
would be no motion, no gen eration or corruption, no 
’m a t e r i a l ’ life whatever. All forms of movement, as 
transitions from potency to act, are either ’v i o l e n t ’ and 
disorderly, as when a heavy object is lifted clear of the 
ground, or ’n a t u r a l ’ , as when the same object is rel ea se d 
and falls.34 The latter movement is inherent in the order 
of nature itself. Thus, similarly, fire tends by its 
essence to rise above the air and as sume its ’c o r r e c t ’ 
position directly bene ath the sphere of the moon; or air
release d und erw ater will rise ’n a t u r a l l y ’ to the surface. 
The ’ l i g h t n e s s ’ of air is an inherent qu al it y and as such 
defines a specific place as well as p artic ul ar ’physical 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ’ of a substance. The two are o n l y  
c o n c e p t u a l l y  distinct for us because, no longer living in a 
feudal society, we cannot im mediate ly a p p r e h e n d  the world 
as a figurative order. Force d or ’v i o l e n t ’ motion, on the 
other hand, is not an inherent tendenc y but req uires the 
continuous  a p p l i c a t i o n  of a force external to the moving  
object.
As change of place implies the a l t e r a t i o n  of substance 
and the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  of subst anc e implies ch ang e of 
place, all ’m o v e m e n t ’ is s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  an ’i n t e n s i o n ’ or 
’r e m i s s i o n ’ of sensible qualities. ’M e c h a n i c s ’ , the 
science of physical change, deals with far more than simple 
physical systems or the ’ laws of m o t i o n ’ . C h a ng es  in 
colour, and espe cia lly in temperature, were of te n regarded 
as p a r a di gmatic  of the "physical transit ions to be treated 
by a mechanics of q u a l i t i e s . ss
The special case of ’ l o c a l ’ motion, n o n e t h e l e s s  raised 
some of the most intriguing and d i f f ic ul t problems. The 
dev el op ment of kinematic ideas t hr ou ghout the medieval 
period dem ons trate s a more precise, but no less feudal, 
con ce ptio n of a natural order.
All ’mixed b o d i e s ’ (containing some c o m b i n a t i o n  of the
four sub lu nary elements), could be moved from one place to 
another as a cons eq uence of a motive force exce ed ing the 
resisting or restrain ing force offered by the inherent 
h ea viness of the object and the p 1enum through w h ic h it 
m o v e d . Si This covered such obvious e v e ry da y cases as the 
turning of a waterwheel or windmill. An external force, 
the flow of water or air, was the motive force resp on sible 
for the rotati on of the wheel, which c o n ti nued just so long 
as this motive force was effective. This was no differe nt  
in prin ci pl e for sentient actions, where the moti v e  force 
took the form of an intention or purpose w i t h i n  the soul of 
the acting creature, and its material real ity of fe red its 
resista nce  to the immediate r e a l is ation of this c o n a t u s .s 7
The interestin g and more di ff icult cases involved 
projectiles. A ball could be thrown, or an arrow fired 
from a bow, resulting in an a p p r e c i a b l e  m o t i o n  that was 
a p p a rentl y independent of the initial, external, p ropel li ng 
force. Though creating obvious difficulties, the most 
popular accounts of such cases ut i l i s e d  the p 1enum as an 
in termedia ry motive force. In the most comm on  instance, 
the air displaced by the forward mov em ent of the p r o j ect il e 
re- formed imm ediately behind it (thus pr ev e n t i n g  the 
formation of a vacuum), and by its a g i t a t i o n  co n v e y e d  a 
continu ing  thrust to the moving o b j e c t . 58 Rather 
obscurely, the initial violent force is g r a d ua ll y abs or bed 
by the resisting medium, resulting, as the natural downwa rd 
motion of the heavy body asserts itself, in a typical
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decaying trajectory.
During the ’first feudal a g e ’ that is to say, local 
motion, including violent  p roje ct ile motion, was held to 
depend upon the c o n t in uo us ap pl i c a t i o n  of an external 
force. Local social action, similarly, required the 
continuouis a p p l i c a t i o n  of a superior power. The 
activities of the manor depended ent ir ely upon the 
presence, actual or symbolic, of its feudal s u p e r i o r . 59
During the later medieval period, however, in the new 
’s e c u l a r ’ and urban a t m o s p h e r e  of the schools that were 
developing somewhat apart from the traditional centres of 
f e u d a 1 c u 1t u r e , a rather d i f f er ent ana lysis was proposed. 
These innovations, p a r t i c u l a r l y  those as s o c i a t e d  with 
Merton Coll ege and the Un i v e r s i t y  of Paris during the first 
half of the fourtee nt h century, so impressed Pi err e Duhem 
that he e ffect iv ely dated the s c i e nti fi c r e v o l u t i o n  from 
them.4,0 Important as they were, however, they fit more 
easily the context of an ’a d v a n c e d ’ feudal than an ’e a r l y ’ 
capitalist culture. The greater a t t entio n paid by these 
authors to se condary causes and the mat hematical ana ly sis 
of local motion did not yet take prec edence  over the 
transcendental goal of all knowledge.
The Oxford ’c a l c u l a t o r s ’ , Thomas B r a d w a r d i n e , Wi lli am  
Heytesbury, Richard Sw in eshead  and John Dumbleton, 
developed a new q u a n t itat iv e appro ac h to the an al ys is of
local m o t i o n . 61 This arose, nonetheless, from a traditonal 
s ch ola sti c dist i n c t i o n  between the intensity of a qu al ity 
(for example, temp erature  or speed), and the quan ti ty or 
ma gnitude of the same qu ali ty (correspondingly, heat or 
distance). There seemed an obvious and important 
d istin ct io n betw een the ’h e a t ’ in a given qu a n t i t y  of water 
at a pa rt icu lar tem pe rature and that in a double or treble 
quantit y at the same temperature. Similarly, ’s p e e d ’ could 
be si mp lif ied to a measure of the ’ in st antan eous v e l o c i t y ’ 
of a body at a given moment and should be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  
from the ’m a g n i t u d e ’ of the veloc ity sustain ed over a given 
p e r i o d . 62 The idea of ’s p e e d ’, in its simple st  form, was 
therefore a co mp l e t e l y  abstra ct no ti on and could only be 
defined as a potentiality; as the distance that would be 
traversed in a given dura tion at a given intensity. The 
technical sig ni fi ca nce of the no tion of ’ instantan eo us 
v e l o c i t y ’ was in all owing  a much clearer d e s c r i p t i o n  of 
acc el er ated motion. By geometric methods, simple cases of 
un iform acceleration, that is of a u n i f or ml y changin g 
instantaneous velocity, could be resolved into e q u i v a l e n t  
statements of n o n - a c c e 1erated m o t i o n . 63 Time, space and 
velocity, in all this, remain qu al i t a t i v e l y  d i s t i n c t  and 
possessed of their own inherent qualities. Mat hem atica l 
m an ip ulatio n has no implic ation  here for physical theory. 
There is no sugge st ion of a real i n t e r c n a n g e a b i 1ity of such 
terms.64
After 1530 the Merton analysis was taken up and
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ela bor ated in Paris by, among others, Nicole Gresme. He 
aimed at a q u a l it ative and symbolic ’geometry of q u a l i t i e s ’ 
at the most general level. The intensity and m a g n itude  of 
any quality could be re presente d graphically, and the 
resulting figures used to suggest the dist inctive  
ch ara cter is tics of the phenom en a under s t u d y . 65 Temp ting 
as it might be to suppose, his method in fact did not 
amount to an a n t i q i p a t i o n  of c o-ordi na te geometry  or the 
te chnique of covariance. It was the di mensions of a single 
quality that were ’mapped* in rel at ion to each other. And 
the resulting figures were not read as a b s t r a c t i o n s  from 
physical dimension s but interpre ted s y m b olic al ly as the 
’configurational* essence of the phe n o m e n o n  itself. Thus, 
’not any quality can be imagined by any f i g u r e ’ .66 Colour 
or s o u n d , for example, could be r e p r esen te d f i g u ra ti vely 
and Oresme claims that the a e s th et ic appeal of either 
depends not upon simple arithmetical harmonies  (such as 
pitch) but on the s i m p li ci ty and purity of their overall 
c o n f i g u r a t i o n . 67 •
Some ’a s t r o l o g i c a l ’ and ’m a g i c a l ’ effects, not 
at tri bu ta ble to the defect of the interior sense organs, 
could similarly be ac co unted for on the basis of 
configurational ’s y m p a t h i e s ’ .68 Hence the medicinal 
properties of particular gems and p l a n t s , 69 and the 
’fitting a c c o r d ’ be tw ee n the ’confi g u r a t i o n  of q u a l i t i e s ’ 
in magn eti sed metals whi ch ac co unted for their mutual 
attraction. Such a conf iguration al conform it y which, in a
245
more complex fashion, accou nte d also for the mutual 
a t trac ti veness of human f r i e n d s h i p . 70 Likewise, discord an t 
c o n f i g uration s are held to account for the ph e n o m e n a  of 
repulsion, enmity, or the ’f a c t ’ that ’hot g o a t ’s blood 
fractures the d i a m o n d ’ .71 And, in a more general sense 
Dresme claims that, ’change in this harmony or d i f o rmi ty  
can be one of the causes why heaven ly bodies emit below 
more benign, and at other times less benign, i n f l u e n c e s ’ .72
O r e s m e ’s ’m e t h o d ’ is simply a refinement of the 
analogical model. The ’h a r m o n i e s ’ within the m o c r o c o s m  
shape and form the material mi c r o c o s m  as their image. The 
most significan t of the causes of physical ch ang e in the 
sublunary world is d i s c overe d in the form of things. It 
was in fact s c h o l a s t i c i s m ’s inability to c o n c e p t u a l i s e  
natural relations in ab stract  fashion, rather than its 
excessive ly ’m e t a p h y s i c a l ’ disd ain of o b s e rvatio n or 
experimentation, that acted as a brake upon its 
’s c i e n t i f i c ’ d e v e l o p m e n t . 73 The des c r i p t i o n  of any part of 
the world had to be made in terms of some qu ali ty inherent 
in an object. The world was a plenitu de of such objects. 
The ’d i m e n s i o n s ’ of exist en ce were themselves the qua li ties 
of nature. Space and time could not be treated as the 
separate and ’e m p t y ’ cont ainer s of the physical world; they 
were an ordered part of its content. Nature could not 
therefore appear universal, m a n i f esting at best  a series of 
localised uniform it ies ’a c c i d e n t a l l y ’ generated by the
int er ac tion of such qualities.
The contin ued d i s c us sion of problems of p ro je ctile  
motion, cul mina ti ng in Jean B u r i d a n ’s s o p h i s t i c a t e d  impetus 
theory, is, once again, a d evelopm en t wi thin the general 
feudal picture of the world rather than a ’b r e a k t h r o u g h ’ 
into f u n d a m ent al ly new dynamical c o n c e p t s . 74 B u r id an 
raised a number of. empirical ob je cti ons to the traditonal 
A r i s t o t e l i a n  tre atment of proj e c t i l e  motion. That, for 
example, a lance poin ted at both ends does not fly more 
slowly than one blunted, and offering  greater rei s t a n c e  to 
the ’p u s h ’ of the ambient air, at its trailing end. And on 
a barge, immediatel y after hauling has ceased, e v e ry one 
feels the air res isting rather than ass is ting the 
cont inuin g forward motion. ’T h e r e f o r e ’ , he concludes, ’ it 
seems to me that it ought to be said that the motor in 
moving a moving body impresses in it a certai n impetus 
(impetus) or a certain motive force (vis motiva) of the 
moving b o d y ’ .75 An external force, on contact, is taken up 
and becomes an inherent quality of the moving object. The 
ambient air, or other medium, grad ually  over co mes this 
impetus. There is, additionally, a positiv e c o n n e c t i o n 
between the qua nt ity of matter and the effecti ve  force 
required to impart an impetus to it. Once impressed, 
impetus does not decay except by the ac tion of a o p p osi ng  
force. Heavenl y bodies moving in a ’p u r e ’ me diu m o f f ering  
no resistance, thus, maintain  for ever their pe rfect  
circular orbits with undimini sh ed velocity. And a freely
falling body accelerates, not from some occult ’a t t r a c t i o n ’ 
it feels for its proper place in the uni verse, but from the 
continuous add it ion to its impetus of the co n s t a n t l y  acting 
force of its own weight (g ra vity).76
P ro je ctiles  depend for their mo tion  upon an ’ impressed 
f o r c e ’ ; that is, upon a power ’b o r r o w e d ’ from some exterior 
and superior being.. Mo tion is not itself a co n d i t o n  or 
state of being; it remains a tr ansitio n wi thin a p a r t i a l l y  
ordered hierarchy. Local mo tion as impetus was no more 
independent of the cosmi c hie r a r c h y  than it had bee n in the 
traditional A r i s t o t e l i a n  co nc e p t i o n  of natural and violent 
motion. Its origin and its t e 1 os transce nd the empirical 
domain. Eac h local mo tio n is the outc ome of an impressed 
force which is itself the c o n s equenc e of a ’h i g h e r ’ force 
or an act of intelligence. All mo tion is u l t i m a t e l y 
traceable to God.
In the context of the more highly  de ve loped ’second  
feudal a g e ’ , the pro ject il e is co nc ep t u a l i s e d  as a vassal 
rather than as a serf. Nature is co mposed of rel at ions of 
mutual obliga ti on whi ch con st rain the p ro jectil e to act ’as 
if’ co nt in ual ly direct ed and co nt rolled by an ex traneou s 
power. It is s e lf-prop el led only becaue natur e has been 
suf ficiently well formed, in that domain, to gu arante e a 
’c o r r e c t ’ outcome. It can be trusted beca use it has 
absorbed into its very being not a blindly actin g force but 
the transcendental t e 1 os of the cosmic hierarchy. E u r idan
considers p artic ul ar examples only. He does not propose an 
image of nature as the outcome of un d i r e c t e d  forces 
impressed upon helpless  objects. Each motion can be 
referred upwards, towards a dir ecting 'intelligence, so that 
n a t u r e ’s flux is me rely a further d e v e l o p m e n t  of that ideal 
form which a l r ea dy  exists in the mind of God. It is a 
contin uou s sorting and resorting of recaici trant m a t t e r .
The dramatis per s o n n a e  have changed, from the theo ph anic 
Silva and Hoys, to the a p p a re nt ly more reali st ic ’ g r a v i t y ’ 
and ’i m p e t u s ’, w i t ho ut however a l t ering the fi gu rat ive 
status of nature.
That ’n a t u r e ’ had come into greater p r o m i n e n c e  by the 
fo urt eenth centur y is hardly to be doubted. The implicit 
model of vasallage, rather than of serfdom, is e x p r e s s i v e  
of a genuine social development. The c o n n e c t i o n  b e t wee n 
these diffe-rent aspe cts of social relations can be pursued 
in yet another metaphor. The money economy, whi ch  played 
only a minor part in the organ i s a t i o n  of social life in the 
earlier phase of feudalism, came to play, e s p e c i a l l y  in the 
develo pin g urban areas, an incr easingl y si gn i f i c a n t  r o l e . 77 
This was commented  upo pn by sc holasti c writer s themselves, 
notably by Oresme, in a short treatise De Ho ne t a  w r i t t e n  
about 1355.7 a
Oresme begins by pointing out the rational o r i g i n  of 
money; as ’exchan ge and tra nsport of co mm odities  gave rise 
to many inconveniences, men were subtle en ough to devise
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the use of money to be the instrument for e xc hanging  the 
natural riches which of themselves minister to human 
n e e d s ’ .79 Money, whi ch  cannot be dir ectly  consumed, 
materially, aesthetically, or psychically, is ’artificial 
r i c h e s ’ . It does contain, nonetheless, a wo rth of its own, 
otherwise it would be usel ess in f ac ilitati ng  exchange. The 
fact that money could be ex changed for comm oditie s  
demonstrat ed  the existen ce  wi th in it of some inherently 
valuable quality. Pre ci ous metals are thus ideally suited 
to minting since they co ntain a high value wi th in a 
convenient ly  small weight. Oresme supposes indeed that 
coins orig inated as a means of o v e r co ming the inc onv enien ce  
of weighing out sp ecific  quan ti ties of pre cious metals each 
time a t rans ac tion took place. The p r i n c e ’s head, a symbol 
of truthfulness, replaces the laborious process; stamped 
upon each coin it di f f e r e n t i a t e s  and guarantees its value.
Money, to be effective, must be ’g e n u i n e ’ ; it must 
possess an almost ’p h y s i c a l ’ power. Its inherent value 
must precisely match that of the commod it y for which it is 
exchanged. But as the value of a commodit y depen de d upon 
its intrinsic qualities, each was, by definition, 
incomme nsu rable with another. Money was used t h e r ef ore to 
sustain the fiction of e qui va lence betw een two inh eren tl y 
dissimilar objects. Like the symbols of vas sal ag e money 
presumed and therefore created a r e l a t ion sh ip of 
e q u a 1i t y .a 0
It was inconcei vable on this basis that money could 
become a general ’m e d i u m ’ of exchange. Its use was limited 
and cont rolled by the ’t r a n s c e n d e n t a l ’ needs to which it 
was put. It op era ted only as an int erm ed iary b e t we en the 
arousal of a need and its eventual satisfaction. The 
’r e a l i t y ’ to which money responded did not reside in the 
commodity itself, but in the ’s p i r i t u a l ’ realm w h ic h lay 
beyond it. Money depart ed from and returned to the t e 1 os 
of a guiding intelligence. It could not of itself generate 
a * s y s t e m ’ of exchange beca use  each act of e x c hang e was 
c ir cu mscrib ed  by some specifi c social relat i o n  itself bound 
to its own place wi th in  the feudal hierarchy. As the 
effi cie nt cause of exchange money must, so to speak, draw 
breath and renew itself after each e x p e n d i t u r e  of energy.
It cannot s p o n t a neousl y regene rate itself as the 
’mu 11iplation of s p e c i e s ’ typical of the superior forms of 
being such as light, or loyalty.
Within the social world, that is to say, money was a 
kind of ’ i m p e t u s ’ , and com moditie s were the i mp erfectl y 
formed ’material n a t u r e ’ strung out be t w e e n  the primordial 
chaos of carnival and the r e a l i s a t i o n  of s o c i e t y ’s inner 
rational values. Money was the immediate, e f f i c i e n t  cause 
of the movement of comm oditie s from one place to another.
It imparted to the com mo di ty a direc te d tendency, 
sufficiently powerful to overco me the resisting gravity  
(inherent value) which rooted it to the spot. In doing so 
it ’s p e n d s ’ itself nd becomes exhausted; only to be renewed
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by the in exting ui shable need reg enerat in g itself withi n a 
d i rect ing sou 1.
Money is the impetus of commodities; impetus is the 
money of nature. Th e y  are the means by whi ch things change 
place, and in doing so act ua lise their inner qualities. As 
intermediaries, money ana impetus can be cons trued as both 
cause and effect of the flux of the temporal world. Money 
effects a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  of material things in a c c o rdance 
with the tenden cy of an implicit order. 81 Money, in the 
social sphere, is no more a solvent of the feudal hi er archy 
than is impetus of the traditional c o n c eption of nature. 
Both man and nature, degrad ed  and corrupted but capab le  of 
redemption, are unstable. The su p e r f i c i a l l y  hectic 
activity of both b e tray a con tin ui ng effort to rece ive more 
com pletely the forming spirit whose presence cou n t e r a c t s  
the tempting slide into chaos. Both seek the ult i m a t e  
release into pure, non-material being.
Nature and man are unit ed in their longing for 
happiness. Their common e x i gency  is the want of God; a 
longing to discover the p er ma nence of being, as o p p os ed to 
the transito riness of existence. To perfect t he mselve s 
they need only resign themselves, u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y  and 
absolutely, to the sup re ma cy of a Rule. But both nature 
and man are confin ed withi n the limbo of the material world 
because of their inability or u n wi llingn es s to be obedient. 
Both therefore suffer the dec ep tive flux of exper ience, the
imp erm anen ce  of material forms into which they can never 
pour their true being, the su bo r d i n a t i o n  and d e p e n d e n c y  of 
low status within the h y l o m o r p h i c  order of the cosmos.
O C O
THE M I R R O R  OF GOD
F e u d al is m is an invention of bou rgeois society. It is 
the product of a particu lar kind of historical 
consciousness, a way of des cri bi ng the past w h i c h  cle anses 
bou rgeois soc iety itself of relations it deems 
anachronistic. It cannot be described, however, as 
another form of the ’ i r r a t i o n a l ’. It is not another 
instance of fun. What is attr ibuted  to feudali sm  (and thus 
rejected by capitalism) is a particula r species of reason. 
The categor ies  of medieval culture are c o n s t r u c t e d  with 
meticulous regard to the law of non-c on tradict io n, but  its 
unity and coh eren ce  depends ent ir el y upon an order of 
symbols: an order whi ch reveals itself at every turn as a 
hierarchy of being.
The co smolo gy  of happiness must theref ore be 
rec ons tructed thro ugh a double relation. It is, first of 
ail, an historical phenomenon. This presents us now, as it 
did not for the or ig inators of the no tion of ’f e u d a l i s m ’ , 
with certain ambiguities. The ’c o r e ’ of feudal is m can be 
seen in terms of the slow unf oldi ng  of a reality whose
254
fullness we have ourselves come to occupy (the u r ban  values 
of the second feudal age, the twelfth century renaissance, 
the growth of the state). But it can also be seen as a 
system of rel ations irreco ncilably opposed to those of 
bourgois r a t i on alism  (hierarchy, personal dependence, the 
symbolic i n te rpret at ion of n a t u r e ) . 82 This a m b i g u i t y  is 
itself merely a sign that c o n t e m p o r a r y  scholars no longer 
share the larger world of assu mp tions and values c o mmon to 
the historical sciences during the period of high 
capi t a 1i sm.
The cos m o l o g y  of happiness, secondly, can be ex am in ed 
as an internal relation. Internal that is but not self- 
sufficient. Where the co smo logy of fun (mistakenly) 
believes itself to be an a bs olutel y e x h a us ti ve reality; the 
world of happi ness is sustained by the con tinuo us  
a pp li cation  of the force it exercises upon a primordial, 
unformed reality. In some respects, feu dalis m h a rdly  
mastered the restless and subversiv e spirit of fun. Nature, 
in which man includes himself, is in a per ma nent state of 
flux. The intox ic at ion of the c a r n i v a l > is never far off; 
ce rtainly it is too close to the surface of life to have 
been forgotten. Fun has therefore to be controlled, a 
ne cessity met by transfo rming it into a s e l f - c o n s c i o u s 
goal. This immediately opens an enormous  ’g a p ’ b e t w e e n  the 
world of exp erien ce  and the ’i d e a l i t y ’ of pure b e i n g 0 3 , a 
gap which feudal culture devotes itself to a t t e m p t i n g  to 
cross. Fun made absolute remains aloof. The obj ect of
unq uench ab le longing its presence trans cends and at the 
same time organises the world devoted to its helple ss  
pursuit.
A series of separ ations a c c o mpan y this tra nsformation. 
The empirical world becomes a small segm ent  of.a larger 
cosmos. Every object and event are tokens of the meaning 
that summons their existence. Su bs tance and form, the 
sensible and intelligible, body and soul, are held on the 
point of inner dissolution. These relati on s fall into a 
uni que hierarchical order which both defines exi stence and 
provides the means of salvation  from it. H a p p i n e s s  is the 
summation of this order, the s e l f - t r a n s c e n d i n g  mov em ent 
which is the t e 1 os of all human and natural ’motion. The 
infinite regress of the ’ways to G o d ’ turns ea rthly  
ac tiv ities into a rational tool for the at t a i n m e n t  of an 
ultimate release from striving and c h a n g e . 84 The mind 
seeks to raise itself to the a p p r e h e n s i o n  of its own 
prototype.
The ultimate tendency of happiness is repose, 
tranquility and rest; to dwell in the fixity of its own 
es sen c e . 85 It seeks to overcome ce as eless m e t a m o r p h o s e s 
and in doing so establ ishes the de gr a d e d  world of na tur e as 
its s y m b o 1.
The cosmic body, confined within  the s u b lunar y world 
of imperfect being, therefore, cannot fill the universe.
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The order of the world cannot be immediately sensed or 
felt, but it can be known an al o g i c a l l y  through the 
developm en t of proper self-knowledge. Man, as the image and 
likeness of his creator, is the mirror of the cosmic Order. 
His mind, limited and weak as it is, n oneth el ess  
part ici pa tes di rectly in a hi er archy charged with the 
divine presence.
Occupying a s t r a te gic pos it ion wi thin the great chain 
of being, man is also the focus of universal seco ndary  
causes; a point through wh ich ’h i g h e r ’ forces act upon 
objects in the lower world. He thus comes to know, through 
reflection on his own experience, as well as by the 
revelation of his inner being, the order of things.
Unlike the cosmol og y of fun, whose ir re s p o n s i b i l i t y  in 
this regard cons ti tutes its central social meaning, the 
cosmology of ha ppine ss gru dgingly  recogni ses the nec e s s i t y  
of labour. It is however kept in its ’p l a c e ’ . The 
recurrence of material needs, a bl emish upon hum an nature, 
is dig nified only to the extent that it remains ’e m b e d d e d ’ 
in social relations which derive their a u t h ority  from a 
’h i g h e r ’ sphere. The direct s at isfacti on  of material needs 
can never be the basis of social act iv it ies wi th i n  a 
cosmology of h a p p i n e s s . 86
We view the cosmology  of happiness now from a somewh at  
different position. It was its closeness to the bo urgeoi s
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world that excited the hi s t o r i c i s i n g  imaginatio n of an 
older generation of scholars. Now it seems an oddly remote 
w o r l d . 07 The pr imi tiv e or the lunatic are more disturbi ng 
and more subversive; the repre ssed becomes more dangerous 
than the simply ignored. We find it harder to accep t the 
inner mean ing of s y m b o 1s than we do the a r b i t r a r i n e s s  of 
s i g n s .
in allowing the domain of the symbo lic to fail into 
neglect, the bourge oi s world has a p p a re nt ly succeeded, much 
more comple tely than might have been  expected, in ridding 
itself of its u n d i s c h a r g e d  longings for redemption. Yet we 
would underst and not hing of feu da lism had such longings 
fallen com pl etely into abeyance. In usi ng them to
furnish a psychological po rtrait of an age we have 
’t r a n s c e n d e d ’ , we allow them at least a vic arious 
sat i sfact ion.
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The pr ob le m of the ’t r a n s i t i o n V f r o m  f e u d a l i s m  to 
ca pi talism has excite d conside ra ble scho la rly attention, 
both as part of a general r e a s s essment  of the wr i t i n g s  of 
’c l a s s i c a l ’ sociologists, amd, more recently among economic 
and social historians, as a p e r s pectiv e that br ea ks free of 
confining d i s c i p l i n a r y  b o u n d a r i e s . 1 It has fi gu red much 
less p r o m ine nt ly wi thi n the conventional h i story  of art and 
culture (including the history of science), whos e 
distinctions, fixed by Burckhardt, as sign a po s i t i v e  value 
to this interme diary zone as ’H u m a n i s m ’ and the 
’R e n a i s s a n c e ’ .2
The tr an sf o r m a t i o n  of both cosmos and psyche implied 
in the cate g o r i s a t i o n  of ’c a p i t a l i s m ’ and ’f e u d a l i s m ’ is 
not a s t ra ig htforwa rd  historical issue. Both terms belong 
to the cultural world of capitalism. Hence the ef fo rt  to 
define in a more precise way the boundar y b e t ween  the two.
and to specify the historical process con n e c t i n g  them, was 
bound to become an ulti m a t e l y  s o l i p s i s t i c  e x e r c i s e . 3 The 
real history of such a t r a n s f orma ti on remains unreachable. 
Attempts to write such histories, however, reveal the- 
bourgeois world vi ew at its most vulnerable. T h r o u g h  them 
we can observe the formati on of the bourg eo is w o r l d ’s 
central values and indispensable  metaphors. The symbo li c 
realm of happi ness is thrust back into the inc oh er ence of 
the past, the a n a r ch is m of fun is finally suppressed, and 
reason takes its place at the centre of world history.
The fou nd at ion myth of ca pi talist  society thus 
involves two rather dif fer en t ’t r a n s i t i o n s ’ : the mo veme nt
from hap piness to p 1e a s u r e « which can rea dil y be c o n c ei ve d 
as the ’s u b j e c t i v e ’ aspect of the tr an s i t i o n  from fe udalism  
to capitalism, and the mo vemen t from fun to p l e a s u r e , which 
has a much more diffuse range of historical refe rence as 
the d o m e s ti ca tion of the primar y process. The order of 
symbols, on the one hand, and the m u l t i p l i c i t y  of systems 
of signs, on the other, gave way to the m e c h a n i s t i c  
relations of cause and effect. They gave way, however, from 
within an alre ady constitute d bourgeois  society. The 
cosmologies co nstructed by ’m i r r o r i n g ’ (s y m b o 1s /h a p p i n e s s ), 
and ’s o m a t i c a l l y ’ (signs/fun) are the cre ation s of and 
belong still, if negatively, to the world mapped out by 
bourgeois reason.
it was in a co nc ept ion of reason s e l f - c o n s c i o u s l y
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purged of happiness and fun that, ’mar. became  a spiritual 
i n d i v i d u a l ’ , a being, ’not afraid of s i n g u l a r i t y ’ .4 At the 
origin of the bourgeois  world, ’self - r e a l i s a t i o n  and s e l f ­
enj oyment of the pe rs o n a l i t y  became a g o a l ’.5 It was only 
much later that ple asu re became somewhat detached from 
reason and it was possible to imagine the d e v e l op me nt of 
the latter as a process dependen t upon the repressi on  of 
the former.* In fact it depended on the r e p r ession  of fun 
and through this the e s t a b li sh ment of pleasu re as a 
legitimate value for, and org an is ing prin ciple  of, personal 
and social life. It describes, in other words, a different 
kind of ideal society, one founded upon n o n - h i e r a r c h i c a 1 
re 1 at i o n s .
Utopia
The movemen t from Happiness to Pleas ure is first of 
all the dis cov er y of Utopia; the rep la cemen t of the 
transcending t e 1 os of human action by a secular vis ion of 
perfection.
Utopianism, of course, is end emi c to western s o c i e t y . 7 
A society con ti nu ally stretched be twe en the pr omi se of 
salvation and the degraded spectacle of eve ryday life is 
prodigal of secular, as well as purely religious, forms of 
the ideal. The R en aissanc e stands out n o n e t he less as the 
period of ’c l a s s i c a l ’ utopias and the period during whi ch
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uto pian thought comes closest to realising its systema tic 
ambitions. The c l a s s i c i s m  of the Rena i s s a n c e  was a fairly 
se lf -c ons cious atte mp t to reach back beyon d the fixed 
Sym bolism of the ort hod ox religious w o r ldv ie w and recover a 
more potent image of human p e r f e c t a b i 1i t y . Direct 
borrowing from classical culture was, however, slight and 
c ons tituted  no more than a point of departu re from which 
utopian visions, architectural, literary and artistic, 
could take flight.®
Informing the varied expression s of secuiar longing 
was a rejection of h i e r archy as the n e c essa ry  condit on of 
all e x i s t e n c e . 9 At the outset of the Renaissance, 
anticipa ti ng in a thorough and. c o m p r eh ensive  fash ion its 
fundamental social logic, stands Nicholas Cusanus, whose On 
Learned I g n o r a n c e , aiming to make no original theological 
advance, in fact radically  transformed the medieval 
Pl ato ni c traditon.
Cusanus begins with the absolu te u n k n o w a b i 1ity of God. 
The simple maximum, as he terms Him, cannot be reached by 
any reflective science. All knowledge is founded, he 
claims, upon comparison. Where there is ’c o m p a r a t i v e l y  
little d i s t a n c e ’ separatin g the ’object of e n q u i r y ’ from 
the ’object regarded as c e r t a i n ’ , it is a rela t i v e l y  simple 
matter to make correct judgments leading to valid 
k n o w l e d g e . 11 But God is infinitely remote from living man; 
this is the real mea ning of his divine perfection. No
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hierarchical sequence can ever termin at e in au th entic  
transcendence. However extended and exalted, it must aiwys 
cling to earthly knowledge and material forms. T h u s , ’the 
infinite as infinite is unknown... since it is beyond all 
c o m p a r i s o n ’ .12 Al th ough human knowledg e and human will is 
endle ssl y s e 1f - e x p a n d i n g , it cannot become identical with 
the simple maxi m u m , wh i c'n remains indivisi ble and w i thout 
any distin ction whatever. ’The Good ca nno t be reached by 
any series of inferences that begins with an empi ri cally 
g i v e n ’ , he points out briefly, u n d e r m i n i n g  the entire 
sc holastic tradi tio n of the ’ways to G o d ’ .13 All valid 
knowledge must begin with the r e c o g nit io n of this radical 
ignorance. The entire edifice of hierarchical logic is 
con seq uent ly  subverted. In direct op p o s i t i o n  to the 
scholas tic  princ iple of ’relative g r e a t n e s s ’ Cu sanus calmly 
asserts that, ’from the s e lf-evi de nt fact that there is no 
gradation from infinite to finite, it is clear that the 
simple maximum is not to be found where we meet degrees of 
more and less’ .14 If we begin with the created world we 
must remain enciosed within it. The cos m o l o g y  of Happin es s 
had viewed reality as a hi era rchy of e m m a n atio ns  from a 
transcendental order just to avoid this logical problem.
It was God who, in creating the world, passed into the 
forms of things and thus offere d a m i r a cu lo us ’way u p ’ for 
man. The decisive t r ansfo rm ation eff ec ted by Cusa nus lies 
in his beg inning from the created world, and therefo re 
having to deny the pos si bi lity of ar ri vi ng at God by a 
process of abstraction, confining himself wi thi n its
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1imi ts.
The created univer se itself const itutes a maximum, but 
a ’restric ted  m a x i m u m ’ which, while existing in a form 
which ma xim ise d its own inner potentialities, could not be 
other than limited in an ab so lu te sense. The original 
dep endence of the universe upon God was not called into 
question, what could no longer be sup ported was the view of 
existence as a grada tio n of His ab so lute and ne cessary  
being. The empirical world, formed by God, existed in 
itself, and pers ist ed on the basis of its own inner laws. 
God was removed to an infinitely distan t point, and could 
be found once again only by d i s c overi ng  the m i nimum  which 
lay as i n c o m m e n s u r a b 1y ’b e n e a t h ’ all pos sible c o m p aris on  as 
the maximum lay ’a b o v e ’ it. ’G o d ’s being which is u n i t y ’ , 
he tells us in a typical passage, ’ is not ab st r a c t e d  by the 
mind from things, nor is it un ite d to or immersed in 
things; it is therefore, be yond an yon e to un d e r s t a n d  how 
the plura lit y of thir.g-s is a deve l o p m e n t  of the unity which 
i s G o d ’ .15
This leads Cusanus to many a p p a re nt ly paradoxical 
exp ressions of the nature of creation. The cosmos is 
limitless but bounded, a place in which, ’the centre and 
ci rcu mferenc e are i d e n t i c a l ’ .1* Not only are we con d e m n e d  
to utter ignorance of God, all our relative judgments of 
created being are threatened by our inability to ’f i x ’ the 
end points to the chain of being. All judgments of ’p l a c e ’
are similarly suspect in a universe withio ut centre or 
circumference. Any arb i t r a r i l y  chosen point might, 
equally, serve as its centre. In some sense God 
un d o u bt edly is the centre of creation,' but in a more 
restricted physical sense, ’the earth is not the true 
centre of the w o r l d ’ , and ’the ci rc um f e r e n c e  of the world 
is not the sphere of the fixed s t a r s ’ .17 And what applies 
to the earth is true of all other places: ’in the heavens 
there are no fixed, immovable p l a c e s ’ .18
The entire feudal cosmic  struc tur e is disso lv ed and 
reformed into a mu l t i t u d e  of self-cent re d points. Man, 
roused from his lowly positi on  of centrality, inhabits a 
world as di gnified as any other celestial object; 
possessing its own light and heat and as free to move as 
any other. The categorical d i s t in ct ion be tween su pe r l u n a r y 
and sublunary has bee n shattered, and with it the 
possibility of a q ua litativ e physics of place.
The full implicatio n of this radical break with the 
symbolic-hierarchical co nceptio n of the cosmos was not 
immediately evident. For the most part, ’R e n a i s s a n c e  
C o s m o g r a p h y ’ was a mixt ure  of what now appear to be 
incompatible elements; some belonging  still to the 
scholastic religious tradition, while others, often ill 
articulated and confused, bel onged to a world not yet 
properly formed. What did become clear at once was a new
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philosophical independence. Natural reason was no longer 
harnessed to the task of clar if ying and elabor ating 
revealed truths. As an ins trument for the expl o r a t i o n  of 
nature it reflected the dignity and power of man as a 
pr ivileged being, conscious of his own actions and master 
of his own i n s t i n c t s . 19
M a n ’s knowledge of the world was no ionger 
contemp 1ative. His mind was not a mirro r so much as an 
active and expandi ng p r i n ciple of mastery. The ’ image and 
li k ene ss ’of God was manif es t ac t i v e l y  in his cre ative 
powers, rather than pass iv ely in his form. And as the mind 
could no longer be guided by an aban d o n m e n t  of the will, 
its restless se lf-e x p a n s i o n  found enj oym en t in its own 
existence. Of divine beatitude, that Hap pine ss  promised 
but vainly sought with in the heart of the old society, 
Lorenzo Val la r he torica ll y asks, ’who can call it anythi ng  
better than p l e a s u r e ? ' . IO It is plea sure and not virtue 
that is to be ’sought on ac count of i t s e l f ’ .21 Valla, a 
’Christian  E p i c u r e a n ’, doubted, in the absence of an 
au thoritat ive order of sym bolic valuation, the wisd o m  of 
m e n ’s actions, but he was c o n fi de nt of their motives: ’men
act for the sake of p l e a s u r e ’ ,22 Re ason aspires to 
coincide with the amp li tude of our ex pe rience of the world, 
but cannot go beyond it. R e a s o n  thus becomes a form of 
pleasure, an intelligent a p p r e c i a t i o n  of the world of 
created t h i n g s . 23 Pl ea sure receiv es a fresh value as ’the 
conserving principle of l i f e ’ .24 Hum an aims must be
realisable, and realised, within  the constrain ts of a 
secular world no longer camo uflage d as degraded  matter.
God is not renounced, but the passion that had sought its 
release in the Happi ne ss of seeing h-im ’face to f a c e ’ spent 
itself in the er ection  of secular u t o pi an v i s i o n s . 25
T hr ou ghout the Renai s s a n c e , which acts as a sort of 
cultural buffer be t w e e n  the cold rat io nality of c apitali sm  
and the symboli c order of feudalism, utopian ex citeme nt  
con tinua ll y renewed itself in all the human ’a r t s ’ . 
P e t r a r c h ’s revival of cl assicis m in letters not only 
inaugurates a c olle ct ive search for ’civic v i r t u e s ’ which 
did not reach its zenith until the ei gh teenth  century, but 
also it has as its prel ude the first of those sol itary 
walks which became c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of bourg eois s e l f ­
reflection. The as cent of Iiont Ventoux, a str en uous and 
unusual journey prototypical of the wilful deta c h m e n t  from 
social life of Montaigne, or Rousseau, or Kierkegaard, is a 
new moment of personal "inwardness as well as a new 
evaluation of ’n a t u r e ’ as a beautiful object. The ego, just 
as celestial points in the ’res tri cted m a x i m u m ’ , 
crystallises into an independent unity and d i s c overs itself 
in isolati o n .2 5
The artist, no less than the philosopher, confronts 
the challenge of c o mp rehendi ng  and repres en ting the natural 
world without the aid of symbolic interpretation. If the 
cosmos is no longer an order of fixed, dependent relations.
how is it to be con cei ved? How is it constructed? What 
guarantees its coherence  and per siste nc e?
The ’a r t i s t ’s ’ answer was as clear as the 
’p h i l o s o p h e r ’s ’ , and c o n s i d e r a b l y  in advance of the 
’s c i e n t i s t ’s ’ .26 The theory of harmony, taken from Greek 
sources rather than from Boethius, and deve loped outside of 
any direct religious preoccupation, provided the 
fundamental starting p o i n t . 27
The first and most striking a p p l i c a t i o n  of secular 
harmonics was in architecture. Comp a r e d  p a r t i c u l a r l y  to 
the Gothic c a t h e d r a l ’s crushing r e a l i sation  of divine 
sup eriority over the human f r a m e , the Ren a i s s a n c e  church 
was scaled to the intimate p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y  of the human 
body. Pan of sky highlights the d i f f er en ce succinctly: 
’medieval a r c h i tect ur e preaches C h r i s t i a n  humility; 
classical and Rena i s s a n c e  proc la ims the dignity of m a n ’ .28 
And in painti ng it meant that, ’the painter is no longer to 
work ’’from the ideal image in his s o u l ” ... but from the 
optical image in his e y e ’ .29' The space thus defined was 
continuous and infinite. Exact geometrical p e r s pecti ve  and 
pro por ti onalit y was developed from the notio n of a visual 
image produced by straight lines proje cte d on to a two 
dimensional p i a n e . Classical att empts at per s p e c t i v e  
drawing had con st ru cted the visual field as a virtual 
sphere, centred on the eye and composed of straight lines 
of varying angle but equal, finite length. In B r u n e lles ch i
and A l b e r t i ’s new theory the lines of sight were infinitely 
extend ed and the picture produced  by introd ucing an 
orthogonal plane of p roject io n a r t i f i c a l l y  cutting them 
o f f . 30 The single ’vanishing p o i n t ’ of the p r o j ection 
plane m i r ro red the uni que p o s it io n of both the artis t and 
the su bs equ ent spectator of his work whose individual view 
of the scene it recreates. Even the largest frescoes could 
thus become an intimate com mu n i c a t i o n
Now the artist, ’strives to represent only the things 
that can be s e e n ’ .31 And by adopti ng the visual 
p er sp ective of a single pri vile ge d observer cr eat es upon 
the surface of the canvas an infinitely receding space as 
if framed by ’an open win dow through which I view whatever 
is to be depicted t h e r e ’ .32 Pe rs p e c t i v e  pai nting  is 
therefore much more than a purely technical innovation; it 
’opened not merely a new phase in the pra ctice and theory 
of the visual arts but a new age in which reality came to 
be viewed and und er st ood in mathematical t e r m s ’ .33 The 
Renaiss an ce canvas is filled with objects detached from 
each other, not simply ph ys icall y but me ta physi cally. They 
form a unity only by virtue of the sub jecti ve  
re co ns tructi on  of the spectator whose pos it ion is the focal 
point of all the formal harmoni c relations e x p l oited  by the 
art i s t .
The use of individuated pers p e c t i v e  and pro portional 
drawing implies a sepa ration  of space from place. The
’o b j e c t i v e ’ world is decomposed  into a series of 
su perimpose d visual fields, the space of any one of which 
is identical with any other. Space, that is to say, is 
abs tra cted from any particular o b s e r v a t i o n  and is 
re pre sented as the u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  me di u m  of any possible 
a rr an gement  of objects. An object, indeed, is defined by 
its location in space, by its s e p a ration  from and relation 
to other objects. Space itself lends no th in g to 
r e pr esenta ti on beca use it is the ’c o n t a i n e r ’ and not the 
substance of objects. And all the physical qu alities  of an 
object can be rendered by the con vent io ns of draw ing just 
because they are independent of ’p l a c e ’ . The nature of 
things depends upon the pro porti on s of its own parts, its 
interior harmonic arrangement, and not upon an invariant 
and all enc ompas si ng structural order. The cosmos is 
therefore a str ucture of relations that can be describ ed 
only from the point of view of a single p r i v ileg ed  human 
observer.
The revival of Py th a g o r e a n  c o n c e ptions of order 
provided a secuIar model of such an in dw ell ing o r d e r . 34 It 
was a vision of the cosmos as an a r t i s t i c  work; the product 
of an artificer. The fundamental p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y  of nature 
could be rediscovered in the human body. Vit r u v i a n  
figures, popular thr oug hout the Renaissa nce, have the re fore 
a quite different sign if icance to the medieval 
’m i c r o c o s m i c ’ theory of the body. Now, rather than 
belonging to different orders of being related
a n a i o g i c a 11y , body and cosmos are ha rmonised be cau se they 
are both ’n a t u r a l ’.33 What is at issue here is not a 
piecemeal cr iti cis m of the s c h o la st ic tradition, or its 
religious assumptions, but a s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  di ff ere nt- 
con cep tion of the cosmos, a d i f f erence  which makes itself 
felt in every particular.
It is from this perspective, the h u m a ni stic re jectio n 
of hierarchy and the revival of Pythago rea nism, that 
C o p e r n i c u s ’s ast ronomical innov ations are best understood. 
In the atmo spher e of North  1talIan  humanism, indeed, much 
of De r e v o 1utionib us could appear c o n s e r v a t i v e . 36 The 
universe is held by C o p e rnicus  to be a p hys ic ally finite 
sphere, the most perfect s h a p e ’ .37 And within it, ’the 
motion of the heavenly  bodies is uniform, circular, 
perpetual, or compound of circular m o t i o n s ’ .30 Many of the 
traditional scholast ic c o n c e p t i o n s w e r e  retained, or 
modified only implicitly. His radical P y t h a g o r e a n i s m  was 
moderated, more than was general among artists, by a 
Christian Platonism. In the Na rra ti o Prima for example, in 
which Rheticus first reports his m a s t e r ’s discoveries, a 
conventional ’m e t a p h y s i c s ’ justifies observational 
astronomy. The outermost cosmic sphere, thus, ’was studded 
by God for our sake with a large number of twi nkling stars, 
in order that by com pa ri son with them surely fixed in 
place, we might observe the posit ions and motions' of the 
enclosed spheres and p l a n e t s ’ .39
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The technical advances claimed by the Cop e r n i c a n 
system were twofold. Firstly, a much more accurate 
d et er minati on  of the phenomena of ’t r e p i d a t i o n ’ .40 That is 
to say, the very slight, long term ’third m o v e m e n t ’ of the 
earth in relati on to the b a c kdrop  of ’f i x e d ’ stars, more 
precise kn owledge of which was essential to a rational 
reform of the calendar. Secondly, and more significantly, 
it proposed a c o n s i de ra ble s i m p l i fi cation in the 
geometrical c o n s t r uctio ns  required to ’save the p h e n o m e n a ’ . 
It reduced, in other words, the app ar ent mo tio n of 
celestial bodies to an ordered and in tercon ne cted system of 
r e l a t i o n s . 41 The real fault of Pt o l e m a i c  ast r o n o m y  was not 
its preju dice in favour of uniform  circular motion (a 
Pythago re an prin ci ple shared by Copernicus), but its 
incoherence as a unity: ’ It is as though an ar tist was to
gather h a n d s , feet, head and other members for his image 
from divers models, each part ex ce llently  drawn, but not 
related to a single body, and since they in no way match 
each other, the r e s u l t, would be mons ter rather than m a n ’ .42
When Co pe rnicu s claims, therefore, that ’there is no 
one centre of all the celestial circles or s p h e r e s ’ , he is 
being much less daring, in terms of cosmological 
speculation, than Cusanus. But, more sign ficant 1y , when he 
argues that, ’the centre of the earth is not the ce ntre of 
the universe, but only of gravity and of the lunar 
s p h e r e ’,43 unlike Cusanus, his con c l u s i o n  is not simply  a
philosophical assumption, and is co ns isten t with the most 
complete and precise mathematical analysis of astronomical 
data. There were ar guments which were bound, sooner or 
later, to carry weight amongs t those who could 'comprehend 
them.4 4
The technical d e m o n s t r a t i o n  of the e a r t h ’s mov ement 
was far in advanc e of any other astronomical work of the 
period, but its technical su pe r i o r i t y  alone does not fully 
account for the C o p e r n i c a n  achievement. It is as part of 
general cultural moveme nt  that the meaning of his work 
becomes clear. It is as the most s ophi st icated 
dem ons trat io n of m a n ’s inherent dig nit y that Be 
r e v o l u t i o n i b u s , w i t hout ever being widely read, remain ed a 
vital work and ar oused c o n t r o v e r s y  for well over a ce ntury 
In spite of the odd mixture of p r e sc ient m a t h e m a t i s a t i o n  
and sch ola stic a r c hai sm  4= it marked a dec is ive shift, by 
no means confined to ’a d v a n c e d ’ and ’r a d i c a l ’ cultural 
movements, in the relati on of man to his c o s m o s . 46
Rather than participating, by virtue of being its 
natural symbol, in the plenitude  of creation, man beco mes  
real part of nature, p r o p o rt ioned and h a r m onised acc o r d i n g  
to simple mathematical relations rep licated thro ug hout the 
universe. Man could un d e r s t a n d  the uni ve rse by ob serving  
the order of which he was part, rather than by 
interpreting himself as its symbol. The cosmos took on a
purely objec tive aspect, first and foremost as an object of 
beauty. It was not suf fic ient to ’save the p h e n o m e n a ’ by 
a rb itrary geometri c a 1 man i p u 1 at i o n , the d iagram of the 
world had to express the ’r e a l ’ ha rm onic relations 
sustained at the heart of nature.
C-opern i can i sm, therefore, was not s u r p r isingl y 
embraced by the mo ve ment of hum an is m long befo re it became 
a ’s c i e n t i f i c ’ model of the universe. Cast adrift in 
virtualiy boundless, if not infinite, space, remote from 
God, m a n ’s p e r f e c t a b i 1ity lay in his own hands. The 
longing for happiness, out living its ’n a t u r a l ’ medium of 
religious symbolism, enjoyed a period of i n t en sificat io n in 
innumerable ut opian visions. This entire mo vment was 
supported by institutions that lay ou ts ide  of the 
traditonal feudal hierarchy. North Italy had never been a 
genuinely feudal society, and from the late medieval period 
flourished as a d i s t i n c t i v e l y  urban, secular culture. 
Northern humanism simil arly grew up outs ide traditonal 
scholastic institutions.
This entire moveme nt  spread t h r o ughout  N o r thern  and 
Western Europe with the growth of the book trade; the first 
internationally successful e n t e rp ri se or gan ised along 
capitalist lines.47 The most renown ed writers of the age 
worked, from time to time at least, as p u b l i s h e r ’s c o p y ­
editors. Erasmus, Bude and Rabelias were all employed at 
different times by S e b astia n Gryphu s in L y o n . 48 The spread
2 8 0
of the book was phenomenal. In 1470 there was just one 
press in Spain, at Seville; by 1500 there were thirty, many 
in towns with no previous traditio n of intellectual 
activity. And in Ge rm any towards the end of the' sixteenth 
century, at a time when u n i v e r s i t i e s  had suffer ed a marked 
decline, books were the p r i nci pl e co mmodity  at f a i r s . 49
The printer and boo ks eller was the most ’p r o g r e s s i v e ’ 
figure of the age. The first to establish, through the 
direct a p p l i c a t i o n  of capital to the process of production, 
an ideal world of commodities. Hi ghly sophisti ca ted 
techniques of m a n u f a c t u r e  were allied to a refined div is ion  
of labour supplying a large and growing market for these 
luxury goods. Th rou gh  them ’ i d e a s ’ ap peared on the 
marketplace; freed from all restraint  and authority, they 
anticipated rather than realised the inner freedom they 
were to claim as the core of the bo ur geois worldview.
In Northern  I t a l y , ’scholasticism, and e sp ec ially the 
Aristoteli an  tra di ton of natural philosophy, far from being 
an obstacle to the innovat ion was itself the vehicle for a 
new secular vision of man and nature. Randall goes so far 
as to claim that the ’critical A r i s t o t e 1ianism of P a d u a ’ 
led directly to G a l i l e o ’s r e v o l u t i o n a r y  sc i e n c e . 50 This 
was certainly not the only, or even the ma j or , source of 
G a l i l e o ’s inspiration. The co mm e r c i a l l y  successful Nor th  
Italian cities of Padua, Bo logna and Pavia nurtured a 
humanist version of A r i s t o t e 1ianism that was important in
its own right and serves as an indicator of the growth of a 
secular civic culture.
Influenced p a r t i c u l a r l y  by'Averroes, a number of 
writers tackled the t r a d it on ally difficult p r o blem of a 
’n a t u r a l i s t i c ’ theory of the soul. Medieval auth orities  
held the human soul to be indivisible and immortal; 
separate in function, that is to say, from the b o d i l y  parts 
with which it was ’a s s o c i a t e d ’ . Yet, if the soul were 
genuinely immortal, it could not p ar ticipat e in any way in 
organic life; and if it were ’p e r s o n a l i s e d ’ in particular- 
individual s, it must be corruptible. The so lution pr opose d 
by St. Thomas had been to hold that the soul was quite
separate from the body and participa te d in or ga ni c life by
virtue of a ’m i r a c u l o u s ’ dispensation. The Paduans, 
however, insisted upon a more rigorou sly n a t u r a l i s t i c  
approach. Pom pa nozz i argued that, ’a natural bo dil y 
function can behold rational t r u t h ’ .31 M a n ’s na tu re is 
thus ’a mean betwee n mortal and i m m o r t a l ’ .32 The human 
duality comprised both a fun ction in g organi sm and a power 
of thought and will which, becaus e it-'was not
differentiat ed and specific to a par ticular organ, could in 
some sense be c a 1 led i m m o r t a l . The intei lect is this mean
which is neither ’tot ally free from the body or tot ally
immersed in i t ’ .33 The intellect requires material 
conditions but is not reducible to such conditions; the 
soul grasps the universal.
The loss of the traditional doctrine of immortality 
and, therefore, the wi t h d r a w a 1 of immediate divine 
su pe rv isi on of individual human actions, makes way for a 
genuine moral philosophy. Just as G o d ’s retreat from the 
physical cosmos opened up a space into which human reason 
at once expanded, so a new secular individ ua lism was at 
once invaded by imperative social norms. Both sought 
conformity to ’n a t u r e ’ rather than God; to an inherent 
harmony rather than a t ra ns cending  spirit. Hum an action, 
therefore, ought to be guided by the ’n a t u r a l ’ tendencies  
of human nature.
The idea of the immortality of the soul is tra nsform ed  
into a reflect ive  image of the structur e of nature. In 
Zabarelia can be found a genuinely n a t u r a l i s t i c  psychology, 
in which the soul beco mes identified with wh oll y organic  
functions. The soul is the ’pri ncip le  of the animate 
b o d y ’ .34 It must therefore, like the body, be ext en ded and 
divisible. It becomes -an ’active i n t e l l e c t ’ which 
’i l l u m i n a t e s ’ sense images, disc l o s i n g  their rational 
structure. H a n ’s special nature is his abilit y to 1ook 
inward a n d , by discov ering the ha r m o n i c  pat tern wi thin his 
own mind and temper, find the key to unlock the secrets of 
the universe. In other words, humanity becomes, the 
central object of cur i os i ty and study, out of
methodological nec es sity rather than for reasons mer ely of 
self-glorification.
The ’e m p i r i c i s m ’ of these writ ers was founded upon 
fundamental human ce rt ainties rather than upon the direct 
observational science of nature which, to a limited extent, 
it encouraged. It was a d e - s y m b o l i s i n g  of the medieval 
cosmos ana, along with ’the sober reco gnition  of its finite 
c o n d i t o n s ’ , it retained the ’ lingering odour of 
i m m o r t a l i t y ’ , which Randall asc ribes to all forms of 
h u m a n i s m . 55
The in dividuati on and s e c u l a r i s a t i o n  of Happin es s 
(Pleasure) was the ’ i n w a r d n e s s ’ of the sc ientific 
revolution. Begun but never c o n s umm at ed in N o r t h e r n  Italy 
it preceded the d e v e l op ment of the classical s ci en tific 
worldview. In Te lesio and Patrizzi we can see the fullest 
possible dev el opmen t of A r i s t o t e l i a n  naturalism. Tele sio 
redefined the A r i s t o t e l i a n  potent i a as a natural force and 
the efficient cause of all change. The physics of ’p l a c e ’ 
was thrown over in favouor of an ac co un t of motion  as the 
outcome of purely mechanical ’f o r c e s ’ . The a r t i s t s ’s 
extension of space as a medium, q u a l i t a t i v e l y  identical 
with itself, turned out also to be pre c o n d i t i o n  of a new 
mechanics. Space itself is con ce ived as devoid of all 
qualities and powers, and cannot be the cause of any 
physical change; ’therefore place ( l o c u s ) must be made the 
container for all beings w h a t s o e v e r ’ , and, ’remains 
per petually the s a m e ’ .36
Patrizzi, drawing direct ly upon Cusanus, also
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recognised the sig nifi cance of the formal emp tiness of 
space. S p a c e ’ ’ is the accident of no eart hly t h i n g s ’,57 
and must be concep tu alised as a ’h y p o s t a t i c  extension 
subsisting by itself and inhering in nothing e l s e ’ .58 
Geometry, therefore, as the ana lysis of space, is the most 
fundamental of the sciences.
In this tradit on force replaces form as the 
fundamental organi sing princ iple of matter. Natur e can 
then be seen as a system of mechanical forces ex pressiv e of 
deep harmonic relations which reappear in all its aspects. 
There is no need any longer for an analogical discourse; 
man is not like nature, man i_s_ nature. M a n ’s own dignit y 
therefore implied the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  of fallen nature  as a 
whole; its disc ov ery as an object of beauty.
Arcadia
A second tra nsi tion is possible. While ’p r i m i t i v e ’ 
societies cannot ’ lea p ’ into ca pi t a l i s m  other than by the 
external force of colonisation, a direct intellectual 
transition from Fun to Ple asure is su gg estiv e of a real 
po ss i b i l i t y 3 9 ; an Arc ad ian fantasy, spr inging to life as a 
development within the P l a to ni c Tradition, in contras t to 
the Utopian movements which were for the most part an 
aspect of pr ogr essive Aristotelian ism.
The refoun ding of the Pla t o n i c  Academy by Mar si lio 
Ficino, under the patronage of Cosimo Medici, reached back 
beyond the C h r i s t i a n i s e d  medieval con cepti on  of form as a 
divine emm an at ion to the apocraphyl sources of a more 
recondite wisdom. Works attribu te d to Pythagoras, Orpheus, 
Zoroaster and Hermes Trisme gi stus figure in his writing s 
alongside those of ’o f f i c i a l ’ n e o P l a t o n i s m . 40 Ficin o 
indeed was as devo ted a P y t h g o r e a n  as Alberti, and at times 
seemed to have sought to revive a mystical religio us cult 
in its name. It is a mysticism, however, that co m p l e t e l y  
rejects the as c e t i c  dis ci pl ine of self-annih ilation . 
Pleasure is the core of F i c i n o ’s spirituality. Fir st  and 
foremost, m a n ’s su pe r i o r i t y  and dig nity is e x e m p l i f i e d  in 
the delight of the senses, par t i c u l a r l y  in his instinctiv e 
love of music. As both ’the human s p i r i t ’and the ’material 
m e d i u m ’ for the tran s m i s s i o n  of mus ic is c o n s tit ut ed by 
’a i r ’ , harmon ic sounds can exercise ’a peculiar p o w e r ’ over 
the human s o ul.61 Both are ’a living kind of a i r ’, and it 
is the inner ha rm on ic movem en t of mus ic  (its playfulness) 
that makes it more eff ec ti ve as a spiritual no strum  than 
any painting or building.
Music was of course long rec ognised as a th erapy for 
the soul and played an important part in medical a s t r o l o g y  
throughout the feudal period. F i c i n o ’s theory of ’astral 
m u s i c ’, however, goes much further. Music becomes a means 
of ’e l e v a t i n g ’ the soul of the healthy rather than 
restoring the bodily functions of the ill. Its
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psychological effects are universal. Music'captures' 
p la netary and astral influences. Celestial movements, 
co nfo rming to deep harmon ic patterns, is (as C o p e r n i c u s  and 
Kepler also believed), the ideal 'form' of music. These, 
’celestial figures act by their mo vement irradi ating the 
soul with ha rmo n i c  rays and m o t i o n s ’, pen et ra te eve ryth in g 
and ’con s t a n t l y  effect the spirit secretly, just as music 
does openly, in the most powerful w a y ’ .62 The spiritual 
elevat ion  Fic ino sought in special theurgic p r a c ti ce s is an 
ex pansion of the ego; an ide ntifica ti on of the sub ject iv e  
mi cr ocos m of fun with the m a c r oc osm in such a way that man 
realises his divine nature withou t loss of his temporal 
existence. The soul is led through the enjoymen t of Orphic 
music ’to the deep and silent memory of the h a rmo ny  which 
it pre vio us ly e n j o y e d ’ .63
This susta ined inner relati on to divine h a r mony is 
even more marked in F i c i n o ’s ce le bra ted student, Pico della 
Hirandola, whose Oration proclaims with a new c o n f i d e n c e  
the status of man as a privileged creature. It is his 
separateness from nature that marks m a n ’s decisive 
advantage over any other created being. Han had been 
allowed the privilege of an unli mited  freedom, ’the Creator 
gave him the germs of every sort of life’ .64 Han,
’possesses ail pos sib il ities withi n h i m s e l f ’ ,65 but unlike 
the child unc on sc ious of a world other than his own 
subjectivity, man through the inexhau st ibly s e 1f - e x p a n d i n g  
forms of knowl edge and love, relates this inner inf in it y to
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an outer world of d e t e r mina te  being. Pico does not regard 
this as a tragic s e 1f-a 1ienation but rather as an ideal of 
pleasure; the recogn it ion of the infinite self in the 
world, rather than the ionging for the infinite beyond any 
practical selfhood.
The p r e s e r v a t i o n  of inner freedom, therefore, becomes 
a moral imperative. And it is to prese rv e hum an aut onomy 
that Pico attacks traditonal astrological practices. He is 
not opposed to F i c i n o ’s recondite P y t h a g o r e a n i s m , which is 
an advanc ed psychological technique of self discovery, so 
much as the routine a s c r ipti on  of personal fate to ’occult 
c a u s e s ’ . If man is governed by stellar influences, rather 
than being merely co nd itoned  by natural forces, his inner 
freedom is h o p e lessly  compromised.
F i c i n o ’s p hil os ophy is centred upon a revival of Eros; 
an aspiring upward and insatiable desire that is now, 
however, ’a human pas sion and not a divine g o a l ’ .67 It 
does not ter minate in a moment of ecs ta tic release, but 
maintains a continuous  reciprocal relation with its 
dialectical image. M a n ’s im plicati on in c o r p o r e a l i t y  is not 
a punishment for his original sin but the unique 
configur at ion that allowed the inner plen itude of human 
nature to express itself. Ficino and Pico indeed, by 
reaching back to pre-C h r i s t i a n  spiri t u a 1 sources, a v o i d e d  
the entire n a r r at ive of human history as penance. Na ture 
was to be the secular ideal of beauty; ’not hing in the
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wor ld is mis s h a p e n  or to be d e s p i s e d ’ .68
The individual soul is infinite; how oth er wi se could 
it conceive itse-lf? Its insatiable desire can never be 
satisfied and it remains consc ious of a sense of loss, 
’wistf ul ly  rem in si cent of another world... thin and 
di sem bodied and ever tre mbling on the verge of the 
Chr is ti an m y s t e r y ’ .69 But it holds back, suddenly 
suspicious of religious salvation, and remains bound up in 
an arcadi an no s t a l g i a  for the de pa rted world of fun.
Neither Ficin o nor Pico were Kierkegaard, any more 
than Zaba re lla or Te le si o were Newton; yet an antic i p a t i o n  
of bourgeois p s y c ho logy un derlies their revival of 
P la tonism as the intuition of natural science colours the 
latte r’s pro gr es sive Aristotelianism. What is equall y 
significant is the general splitting of the hierarchical 
and integrated co sm ology  of the feudal period into the 
separate domains of sub'iect and o b j e c t . 70 This division, 
which is of course only a tenden cy in the Renaissance, is 
not a dist inction between, on the one hand, an ordered and 
coherent view of the world as a syste m of interrelated 
forces (objective nature), and a d i s o rdere d chaos of 
sentiments (subjective humanity), on the other. The 
Florentines were just as precise and cohere nt about their 
ps ychology as the Paduans were about their natural science. 
Both subject and object were ordered by immanent h a r monic  
relations which tended in time to be viewed as relations
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sustained by mechanical ’f o r c e s ’ .
Florence and Padua epi tomise these tendencies.
Neither were complete. The movement towards e m p i ri ci sm  
fell short of sys t e m a t i c  observation, and as Luc ie n Febvre 
reminds us, it re ma in ed ex t r a o r d i n a r i l y  dif ficult 
throughout the s i x t eenth  century to be any th ing other than 
C h r i s t i a n . 71 The most radical became unorthodox  Christians, 
and even the F l o r e n t i n e s  shared with the departed  worid of 
Ha ppiness its metaphys ical quest for being. In both cases 
it was less a secular a p p r e h e n s i o n  of exis te nce than a 
growing inward sense of selfhood. And the world be yo nd  the 
self, only in c o n s e q u e n c e  of its capaci ty  to sat isfy its 
desires, became likewise dignified.
More generally, if Cusanus expre ssed with parti cular 
clarity and co he rence the i n t e 11e c t u i a 1 t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  of 
Happiness into Pleasure, anti c i p a t i n g  the central 
structural features of the new cosmology, then Gi ordano 
Bruno spanned the emotional gulf bet we en Fun and Pleasure, 
bringing the phase of the ’t r a n s i t i o n ’ to a close.
Bruno, the most extrava gant indivi duali st of the 
Renaissance, began his adult life, like Rabelai s and 
Luther, as a monk. it is hard to imagine anyone less 
suited to a c l o i ste re d existence. He soon took up a life 
of itinerant and reckless disputation. Trav el ling wi del y 
throughout Europe he cha ll enged  every A r i s t o t e l i a n
ortho dox y in the very places where c o n v e n t i o n a 1 truth was 
most powerful. He quic kly gained the immense and 
scandalous re pu tation that we might suppose he most 
d e s i r e d . 72
He not only eage rly  emb ra ced Copernicanism, and 
intuitively grasped its most  radical implications, he 
ventured far beyond Cusanus in re drawing the cosm ographica i 
map. He followed the Flor e n t i n e  Platonists, back beyond  
Christian and Greek sources of r at ionalis m to the 
’o r i g i n a 1’ wisdom'of the Egyptians, and in particu la r to 
the mythical figure of Hermes T r i s m e g i s t u s .73 Whe re Ficino 
in translating the Corpus  H e r m e t i c u m  had done so in the 
belief that it would prov ide a key to the u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of 
his beloved Plato, Bruno took the H e r m e t i c  wri ti ngs as a 
self-suffi cient view of the world and found in them the 
kind of conceptual language he craved. It was a 
Renaissance of a rather di fferent  sort. It was less the 
humanisatio n of the cosmos through a relo cation  and 
revaluation of man within  its physical structure, than a 
diffuse but powerful spiritual e r u pt ion of man thro ug hout  
the entire universe. It was very similar in fact to the 
ecstatic dispersal of human subj e c t i v i t y  that is so 
ch ara cterist ic of the co sm ology of Fun. Locked w i th in  the 
historical and conventional c on st raints of mere fun, 
however, such a vision remained a mute cosmology. The 
continuous repression of fun thro ug hout the d e v e l o p m e n t  of 
both feudal and cap italist societies  has created a
powerful preju dice agai nst the idea that any primordial, 
'unreflective' e x p e ri en ce could express a s oph is ticated  and 
coherent view of the world. The p s y c hiat ri c and 
an thropological e v i dence noted in an earlier chapter 
challenges such a view; B r u n o ’s writings, and the revival 
of the Herme'tic T r a d i t i o n  to which they were central, is a 
yet more eloquent denial.
For Bruno, even more ma rke dly than for Ficino, the 
cosmos is a living organism. Its coherence resides in the 
single spiri t u a 1 en tity  which  an imates its en d l e s s l y  
diverse appearances. The points of light we di sce rn  in the 
night sky are (as they are for ch ildre n of five), living
creatures endowed wi t h  life and m o v e m e n t . 75 This is not an
obscure ’a n a g o g i c ’ mode of thought. The uni ve rse is alive 
with souls, it is ’a world crowded with souls, with masses 
of souls, of souls whi ch join together - which irradiate 
each o t h e r ’ .76 The peculiar quality of individual 
humanity, the subjec ti ve stru ctu res of desire, will, love, 
power, are re plicated thro ugh out the cosmos. And 
replicated in an endless variety of forms. Bruno pushes 
the new conc eption  of space to an extreme. Infinity, and 
therefore divinity, is a pre dicate of matter as w e l 1 as of 
absolute being. The infinite becomes an ’e m p i r i c a l ’ 
category, so that the actual physical cosmos need not be a
limited ’c o p y ’ of the limitless divine idea, but an endless
extension within which an inconcei vable plurality of worlds 
jostle together. The fact of infinity unifies and
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integrates the cosmos in a new way. It is not a fixed
’t o t a l i t y ’ so much as a ’s t r u c t u r e ’ which can be thought of
as a musical harmony, an endless series of internal chords 
sustaini ng one another. Each being a ’r e s o n a n c e ’ within an 
infinitely ex tendable harmon ic  o r d e r . 77
The human being is the real centre of such resonances, 
a node or co n c e n t r a t i o n  of celestial vibrations. The 
Herme ti c writings provided Bruno with an initial clue.
Nature, as the Padu ans had guessed, was a system of forces
inherent in matter, but these forces should be understo od  
on the basis of a ’p s y c h i c ’ model, as emotional rather than 
mechanical ’t e n s i o n s ’ .
The Asclepius had described the manner in wh ich  cosmic 
powers could be drawn into the statues of the Egy pt i a n  
Gods, filling them with life. These texts were belie ve d to 
be Eg yptian in origin and to have been composed by a 
con te mp orary of Hoses. " In them is expre ssed astrological 
and magical conceptions, and a vision of human k n o w ledge as 
a s e 1f-expanding p artici pa tion of man in the cosmos. 
Knowledge, a practical, rather than a co nt e m p l a t i v e  or 
analytic art, was identical to summoning and co nt r o l l i n g  
the cosmic forces of which man was the natural focus.
In fact the Asc lepius and other Herme ti c texts were 
written no earlier than the second century A.D., but for
the Rena is sance Hermes was not. only a real person but for 
many the fount of wi sdom from which both Greek philosoph y 
and Chr isti an ity had been corrupted. As Frances Yates 
notes, ’this huge historical error was to have amazing 
r e s u l t s ’ .78 The F lore nt ines were at times wary of Hermetic  
heterodoxy, but B r u n o , u n p e r t u r b e d , claimed it as original 
religion as well as original philosophy.
Ficino, extolling at least the phil o s o p h i c  supe ri ority 
of Hermes, claims the Pimander to be a clearer guide to 
creation that the T i m a e u s , The E g y p t i a n  genesis parall eled  
the Ch ris tian myth with uncanny accuracy; but the Fall is 
not a conseq uence of willful di sob e d i e n c e  so much as of 
narciss is tic curiosity. Seeing himself reflected in nature, 
original man, a star-demon, himself drew aside the heaven ly 
sphere and desce nded to earth, stepping as it were into his 
own shadow. In doing so he fell under the power of other 
stars and remained confined by natural forces. Hermes 
passes on to his son Tat' the secrets of re ge n e r a t i o n  so 
that he becomes the first in the a p o s t o l i c  s ucc es sion of 
Magi, cosmic ’o p e r a t o r s ’, able to recon st it ute them sel ves 
as divine beings through the m a n i p u l a t i o n  of the celestial 
forces they gather withi n themselves.
The figure of the magus was rehabilitated, though not 
without risk. F i c i n o ’s Orphic music seems modest comp ared 
to the cosmic powers sought by Corn elius Agri ppa  who had 
’cohabited with the elements, vanq ui shed nature, mo un ted
higher than the heavens, elev ati ng himself above the angels 
to the arc het yp e itself, with whom he then be comes co- 
operator and can do ail t h i n g s ’ .80 This immediacy, typical 
of the cosmology  of fun, is charged however with a powerful 
egoism foreign to primordial experience. The liberty of 
signs, the infinitude of metamorphoses, in bec om ing 
s y s t m a t i c a 11y e lab or ated into a theory of the universe, 
loses its innocence; and in its a r c ad ian form tends either 
to fantasy (Fludd) or the cult of the pe rs o n a l i t y  (Bruno).
The magus was a reformer as well as a wise man. He 
sought a type of kn owledge which, abstruse  and recondite, 
was non et heless  primarily practical and u n p h i 1o s o p n i c a 1.
He aimed at the r eg en eration  of life in a c c o r d a n c e  with a 
purer inner harmony. He held out the hope theref or e of an 
earthly salvation. Secular individua lism was taken up and 
magnified into a new cosmic design. From the t h e o r e ticall y 
unlimited powers at m a n ’s command, a new soci ety could be 
created, an order realising the har mo nic code to whic h the 
comsos clings for its coherence.
Much has been made of the practical, u t i l i t a r i a n  
aspect of the Hermeti c search for original w i s d o m . 81 The 
ideological tone of Hermeticism, however, stress ed the 
’p a r t i c i p a t i o n ’ in, rather than control of, nature. Human 
aims could be realised through magical tech nique s but, in 
the process, these aims were themselves transformed. The 
Hermetic quest is a rediscove ry of the natural ’h a r m o n y ’ of
which man is a part. It will u ltimat el y overcome the 
nece ssi ty of employing any particula r ’t e c h n i q u e ’ to wrest 
from nature its ine xhau stible store of energy. The 
He rm etic is t does not piace bet wee n himself and natur e a 
mechanical contr i vance as a means. This again betray s a 
’mode of t h o u g h t ’ typical of the cosmolo gy  of Fun. The 
magus strives, through symbolic /magical participation, for 
psychic master y of the u n i v e r s e . 82
Bruno aimed to const ru ct a wholly internalised  map of 
the cosmos, in the form of a mn e m o n i c  c o d e , that w o u 1d 
allow him to p artici pa te in the who le of creation. The 
archetypal images and 'natural signs' allu ded t o b y  
Albertus Magnus seem a crude and stumbling science in 
comparison. Bruno grasped the core of the magical 
tradition. As the subjectiv i ty of the cosmos, human memory 
can be ordered and subdi vided acco rd ing to its own harmo ni c  
code. The comos is a kind of psychic  sy s t e m . 83 By 
engraving upon his own me mory  the astrological ’s e a l s ’ 
preformed to the pattern of stellar forces, Bruno could 
call down into himself unlimite d cosmic p o w e r . 84 He could 
himself become the divine being who stepped for the first 
time into nature from his he avenl y abode.
The distinction, so important for us, be tw ee n signs 
and symbols is diss ol ved by Bruno. His e p i s temolo gy  
appears at times to be founded on a notion of i m m a n e n c e , at 
other times to be a version of trans cendentalism.
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Cate gor i es merge and reform in his thought. His 
fas cin ation for moder n writers lies less in his ma rtyrdom  
than in his uncanny facility in the c o n s t r u c t i o n  of images: 
the medi ators between the world of natur e and human 
s u b j e c t i v i t y 8 5 ; c o nstruc ti ons which inter penet ra te in ways 
the sc ientific tradition  was soon to discard.
He did not simply reject orthodoxy. His threat to 
aut ho rity  was the more pro found  insiste nce on the unlimi ted 
freedom to create personal cosmic images. His purs uit of 
inner freedom was dir ectly iinked to the o r g a n i s a t i o n  of 
nature ’u n m e d i a t e d ’ by official religious, philosophical, 
artistic, or political institutions. The pursuit of 
personal ple asure (and pleasure is now firmly a 
q u a l i f ic ation  of the ego), and the d e v e lo pm ent of knowl edge 
of the world became identical. The dis tance  b e t w e e n  the 
sensible and the intelligible, w h ich  was only iust being 
established in a new way, was com ple te ly abandoned. The 
longing pr ed ica ted upon "the absolut e di st i n c t i o n  betw een 
matter and spirit was finally quenched. No wonder Bruno 
seemed passionate! He proposed a cosmology, centred on the 
individuated ego, but retaining ail the tr a n s f o r m a t i v e  
charm of play.
B r u n o ’s ’f r e n z y ’ is u n c a t ego ri sab 1e as a cultural 
event. His is the first ’absolut e e g o ’ of the bou rgeoi s 
age, as he is its first schizophrenic; the p a r a d i g m a t i c
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heroic martyr to the mad ness at the core of classical 
rati o n a 1 i t y .
Her me ti cism did not die immediatel y upon C a s a u b o n ’s . 
definitive dating of its ’sacred t e x t s ’ . Robert Fiudd 
produced a typ ic ally e xt ra vagant  p r o g r amm at ic cosmo logy 
three years after the Eg ypt i a n  myth had been e x p l o d e d . 86 
And, as an ’u n d e r g r o u n d ’ intellectual and spiritual 
movement, it per sis te d a good deal longer, exerti ng an 
obscure and gradually d im inishin g influence on the 
developing ’o f f i c i a l ’ sci en tific w o r l d v i e w . 87
Cusanus and Bruno exemplify the co mp lexity of 
Renaissance cosmography. Their thought moves in opposite 
directions. Cusanus cuts off all possib le  access to the 
t r a n s c e n d e n t a 1 and thus leaves man master of the created 
universe. Bruno projects man into the infinite and allows 
nothing to be placed beyon d his reach. In the former, the 
secular spirit is confine d with in a finite un iverse and 
realises its longing for the ab solute by a p p r e hendi ng  
n a t u r e ’s con cealed harmony. The world becomes an object of 
beauty, an object which p re su pposes  an individ uated  as we 1 1 
as a seculari sed ’o b s e r v e r ’. The latter takes individual 
subject ivi ty as a new abs ol ut e and identifies it with the 
empirical universe. Instead of desc ribing  the ego as a 
detached point from which to observe creation, it is 
creation itself. These mo vements are geo g r a p h i c a l l y  and 
po lit ically specialised. The first belongs to Ve ni ce  and
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Padua, the second to Florence. One is ass oci at ed with a 
ca pit alist tr an sf o r m a t i o n  of trade, and the other with 
m a n u f a c t u r e . 8 B
B ur ckh ard t insists that the Italian Rena i s s a n c e  was a 
culture ex pr essive  of the indiv idualism not only of the 
artist or scientist, but also of the Prince. The 
i n d i v i d u a 1 p a t r onag e of s ch ol arship  and the arts was part 
of a d i s i n t e g r a t i v e  process of co mp e t i t i o n  among ruling 
families who scarcely  bot he re d to claim legitimacy for 
their p o w e r . 89 Their brutal realism was in fact one of the 
most cons picuous aspect s of the new secularism. Neither 
capital ism  as a civilisation, nor an integrated and 
systema tic  w o r l dview  ex pressive of its fundamental 
principle, could thus develop. That step required the 
additional step of ce nt ra l i s a t i o n  of aut h o r i t y  and 
political o r g a n i s a t i o n  soon to become familiar as the 
nation s t a t e . 90
The ’t r a n s i t i o n ’ was d isco ve red when the nec e s s i t y  of 
protecting the ’o r i g i n s ’ of classical r ational it y became 
important; and that was only when suspicions of rat i o n a l i s m  
developing within bou rgeoi s society could be identified. 
The Renaiss ance played an important role as a ’b u f f e r ’ 
between the ’c o l d ’ logic of science and its ca lc u l a t i v e  
rationality on the one hand, and the symbolic hie r a r c h y  of 
feudalism on the other. The fundamental aesthetic  
categories of the Re na i s s a n c e  embody the political se ren it y
that the Prince failed to discover in the every day social 
world. In either form, as pa trician detachment, or as 
frenzied participation, it couid never become a d e m o cr atic 
v'ison of the world. As utopia' or arcadia, pleas ur e was a 
oneness with cr ea tion which was limited to the en jo yment of 
a few. It was in that sense a pol iti ca lly expensive  
cosmology, one whose intoxicating freedom had first to be 
stren uou sly comb at ted before, much later, it could be 
allowed to re-emerge.
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EIGHT
MECHANISM
How can the classical bou rg eo is ’s c i e n t i f i c ’ wor l d v i e w  
be grasped as a social relation? Efforts to establish  a 
sociological account  of the scientif ic re vo lut ion of the 
se ven teenth ce nt ury have met with only limited success. 
M e r t o n ’s influential m o n og ra ph provok ed an ex ten siv e 
literature devoted to e lucid at ing the social and cultural 
’c o n t e x t ’ of such a re vo lution  but did little to encou ra ge  
a sociological analysis  of the tr ansf o r m a t i o n  in the 
c o n c e p t u a l i s a t i o n  of natural p r o c e s s e s . 1 D i f ferent  
sociological traditions  have offered other acc ou nts of the 
historiographical b ac kg round but have si mil arly taken the 
theoretical tra nsit io n as ’g i v e n ’ .2 It is d i f f icult  not to 
sympathise with K o y r e ’s bewilderment, ’ I do not see what 
the scient ia activa has ever had to do with the d e v e l o p m e n t  
of the calculus, nor the rise of the b ourgeoi si e with that 
of the Copernican, or the Kepierian, a s t r o n o m y ’ .3
308
At the same time, it has become incre as ingly obvious 
than the rise of science does not simply exp lai n itself. 
Hist ori ans of science have become sensitive to the 
’e x t r a s c l e n t i f i c ’ influences that shaped the central ideas 
of any of the major figures of the sc ie ntifi c revolution. 
These influences are most often viewed as the 
’p h i l o s o p h i c a l ’ or ’a e s t h e t i c ’ pre di sp o s i t i o n s  of 
particu lar  p er so nalit ie s and as such require, apparently, 
no further explication. The most illu minatin g historical 
studies have been those which have att emp te d to trace such 
personal intellectual ’p r e j u d i c e s ’ to a var iety of 
ne glected intellectual t r a d i t i o n s . 4 Science, however 
r e v o l ut ionary  its implications, is thus und e r s t o o d  as part 
of a con tinuo us  hi sto ry of ’ i d e a s ’.
Science, once granted the priv ilege of its own inner 
’r a t i o n a l i t y ’, can never be wholly reabsor bed into the 
totality of social lif'e. Yet if this priv ilege  is denied 
it, no amoun t o f '’c o n t e x t u a l ’ inv est igati on  can mak e it 
’e m e r g e ’ as a d istinc ti ve cultural phenomenon. This 
met hodological diffi cu lty is just one aspect of the general 
i n t r a c t a b i 1ity of historical un d e r s t a n d i n g  which  has been 
alluded to at various points. It is a d i f f i c u l t y  whi ch  will 
be avoided (but not solved) by viewing science w i t h i n  the 
context of the four related co sm ologies out lined here. In a 
general sense the content of the classical s c i e n t i f i c  
wor ld view  can be grasped in relation to the fundamental
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structure of c a p i talism  in the same way that the medieval 
wo rld view can be u n d e rs tood in relation to feudalism. It 
should be borne in mind, however, that this is by no means 
the complete picture. Science, as well as su pe rceding the 
symbolic int erpret at ion of nature, esta blishe d itself by 
repressing in its own way the prodigal disorder of fun.
The language of hie ra rchy and release provided a 
common context within which feudalism as a ’social 
structure' and as a 'cosmology' could be described. In 
fairly obvious ways the medieval wor l d v i e w  e nc ourag es  a 
'sociological' reading of its own content. The notion that 
nothing stands on its own, that all app ea ra nces are 
connected s y m b o lical ly  with an ordered hi era rchy of 
essences disc ou rages  the tendency (central to the classical 
sci entific traditon) to 'explain' isolated phe no mena in 
terms of specif ic chains of cause and effect. This is just 
the ap proach  which, initially, can be used to grasp the 
nature of the s c i e nt ific cosmology. An 'interpretive' 
rather than a 'scientific' un d e r s t a n d i n g  of its specifi c 
form is a p r e r e qu isite  of any possib le 'explanation' of its 
emergence withi n w e s ter n society.
Fun is a society without exchange, without labour and 
without money, while happiness is a spe cif ic order of such 
necessities, an order defined within  the limits of personal 
relations. The 'society' of fun is an hermetical self- 
sufficient body, that of hap piness a hie ra rchy of
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dependence. Cap i t a l i s m  (and its scienti fi c worldview: 
pleasure) is pr imaril y a system of relations among 
c o m m o d i t i e s . And it is iust in a proper u nd er standin g of 
co mmodity relations that we can see the fundamental 
features of classical science.
For the sake of c l ar it y the general ch aract e r i s t i c s  of 
the sci ent ific r evo lu tion can be summari sed  in advance. 
Koyr4 describes the tr a n s i t i o n  from the medieval to the 
classical sci ent ific view of the universe as 'the 
dest ru ction of the cosmos' and its re placement  by the 
’geometrisa ti on of s p a c e . ’5 There is, that is to say, a 
'substitution of the homo ge nous and abstra ct - however now 
considered as real - d i m e ns ion space of the Euc l i d e a n  
geometry for the concret e and d i f f e renti at ed place- 
cont inu um of pr e-G a l i l e a n  physics and a s t r o n o m y . ' 4 Rather 
than a 'q ual ita tively and onto 1o g i c a 11y di f f e r e n t i a t e d  
whole', there is an 'open, indefinite, and even infinite 
universe, united not by its immanent structure but only by 
the identity of its fundamental' contents and l a w s . ’7 It is 
furthermore 'only in this abstract-real (Archimedan) world, 
where abs tra ct bodies move in an abs tr act s p a c e , that the 
laws of being and of mo ti on  of the new - the classical - 
sciences are valid and t r u e ’ .8 The new science seeks to 
formulate laws of nature which are ever ywhere the same, to 
absorb qua li ta tive d i s t i nc ti ons into an a b s o lu te ly general 
theory of matter in motion, and give expr es sion to the 
emergent totality of the univers e as a system of forces.
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This c o n c ep tion of a universal order is fundamental 
also to an u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of capita li sm as a system of 
commodity relations. Marx describes the capit al ist mode of 
production  first of all as an ’ immense c o l l ec tion of
c o m m o d i t i e s ’ each one of which is an ’external o b j e c t ’
whose ’use value is wholly independent of its exc ha nge  
v a l u e ’ .10 All the sensuous qualities which d i s t i n g u i s h  one 
object from anot her and in relati on to which the human
subject sat is fies a m u l t i p l i c i t y  of needs, is su ppresse d in
favour of a pu rely q u a n t itati ve  measure of value; ’As use- 
values, c o m m od it ies differ above all in quality, while as 
e x c n a n g e - v a 1ues they can only differ in q u a n t i t y ’ .11 
Co mmoditi es are marked, therefore, to a peculiar degree, by 
abstraction. ’Not an atom of matter enters into the 
obj ec ti vity of co mm odities as v a l u e s ’ argues Marx, 
conceptualising, rather as Gal ileo had the dynamic 
relations among bodies, exchange relations as both abstra ct  
and r e a l . 12
If c omm od ities are pure quantity then they vary only 
in the relativ e prop ortion  of their ’co mmon s u b s t a n c e ’ . In 
terms of their e x c h a n g e - v a 1u e s , 'all co mmodities are me re ly  
definite qua ntiti es  of congealed labour t i m e ’ .13 Thus, 
although human labour is infinitely varied in terms of its 
intrinisic qualities, for the world of commodities, it is 
’reduced to human labour pure and s i m p l e ’.14 Labour power 
ceases to be d is tingu is hed by particular human attributes.
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every commodi ty con ta ins ’the same kind of labour, human 
labour in the a b s t r a c t ’ .13 Thus, as soon as an object 
emerges as a co m m o d i t y  ’ it changes into a thing which 
transcends s e n s u o u s n e s s ’ .14 Labour power, in itself being 
transformed into a commodity, creates only ’a l i e n a t e d ’ 
objects which, lacking sp ec i f i c a i l y  ’h u m a n ’ 
a t t r i b u t e s ,appear poss es sed of the ne c e s s i t y  of nature 
itself. Or rather, nature, from the persp ec tive of the 
bour geo is world, is endowed with the necessity, 
uni versa li ty  and a b s t r a c t n e s s  of the c o m m o d i t y . 17
Of the c om moditi es  filling the bou rgeois world labour 
power has a special s ig ni ficance  as the source and meas ure 
of all others. Labour power cannot be used, however, in 
actual exchange, as a ’general e q u i v a l e n t ’ of any 
commodity. As a real process, exchange  requires an 
’o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n ’ of the process of labour, that is as 
money. Labour power and money belong together as the 
essential commo dities o'f the cap it alist world, the 
commodities in the abs ence of which none others could 
exist. They form, so to speak, the framework for the whole 
process of circulation.
Equivalence, however, is not identity. The 
universality of labour power and money, the fact that it i 
everywhere the same and provides the essential frame work 
for exchange, should not obs cure their separate ten de ncies 
They refer to two quite separate dim en si ons of the social
world, and from them are created the two fundamental axes 
of the classical s ci entific  worldview. Money we might say 
is the ’s p a c e ’ of the cap it al ist social world. In place of 
the limited ’p e r s o n a l ’ space of exchan ge in feudual society 
money as a co m m o d i t y  generalises the c ir culati on  of all 
commodities. Mon ey *i n f i n i t i s e s ’ space. It allows all 
existing co mm o d i t i e s  to enter into relations of exchange.
It is indiffere nt to the physical limitations of space. In 
the place of the qu a l i t a t i v e l y  diff er e n t i a t e d  human ’space' 
it cons tructs an ideal, empty, ex t e n s i o n  through which can 
pass every po ss ib le commodity. Money therefore, ’ is the 
absolu tel y a l i e na bl e commodity, because it is all other 
commo dit ies div ested of their s h a p e ’.1? Labour power, on 
the other hand, has a special relatio n to time. It 
si milarly divests human time of all its ’i r r a t i o n a l ’ 
qualities and substitute s for it an abs o l u t e l y  u n i fo rm 
duration, an infinite exte nsion  con tain in g all pos si ble 
interactions.
In terms of the classical scie ntific  worldview, the 
connect ion  b e twe en  space and money is of par ticul ar 
importance and has been alluded to by a number of 
w r i t e r s . 20 It would be misleading, however, to suggest that 
money in some way ’ led t o ’ the s c i e nt ific revolution. We 
have alr eady seen that money in feudal societies, .just 
because it was part of a system of personal relations, 
could be seen as emb od yi ng fundamental aspects of its 
cosmology. It is only when money becomes a general
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c om modity that we can see in it the formal aspects of the 
* g e o m e t risat io n of s p a c e ’ . Marx* viewing the d evel op ment of 
society as the mov ement of a totality* points out therefore 
that ’money does not create the an t i t h e s e  and 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n s ’ of c a p i ta list soci ety  but rather it is 
’these c o ntradic ti ons and antith es es whi ch create the 
seemingly transcendental power of m o n e y ’.21 It is only 
therefore with in capita li st soci ety that ’money is the 
imperishable c o m m o d i t y ’ .22
The natural world* the unive rs e c o n c e p t u a l i s e d  by the 
scientific  revolution* is best un d e r s t o o d  s o c i o l o g i c a l l y  as 
a univrse ’filled with c o m m o d i t i e s ’ . Individuated ’o b j e c t s ’ 
are di st ributed wi thin  the infinite ex te nsion of space and 
time and ordered by simple u nd erlying  and universal laws 
of nature. It is a world ’ l i b e r a t e d ’ from the ar b i t r a r y  or 
the subjective; red ucible in the final analysis to matter 
in motion. Neither ’m a t t e r ’ nor ’m o t i o n ’ , however, can be 
taken as conceptual ’g i v e n s ’, and to unde rs tand the social 
logic of the classical wor ld view its f u n d a m e n t a 1 scie n t i f i c 
terms must be more fully reconstructed.
Matter
It is alt ogether  odd to discover in the greatest of 
modern Pythagoreans, Johannes Kepler, the spokesman  of a 
new materialism. At first sight Kepler appears to belong
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comp letel y to the world of the Renaissance. There is in him 
a conv iction as powerful as we find in Ficino, or Alberti, 
or Bruno; a conv ictio n that the cosmos is an immanent order 
of harmonic  relations. So strong was that con v i c t i o n  indeed 
that Kepler, a more gifted m a t h e m a t i c i a n  than any of his 
immediate predecessors, b e g a n  his ’s c i e n t i f i c ’ career by 
’e x p l a i n i n g ’ 'the C o p e r n i c a n  system e xclusiv el y in terms of 
such relations.
K e p l e r ’s intellectual am b i t i o n  was not hing less than 
to reveal ’the constructiona l laws which, in the mind of 
the Creator, directed the c r e a t i o n  of the u n i v e r s e ’ .27 The 
problem of plan etary  motion, for the first time treated 
system at ically  by Copernicus, left in K e p l e r ’s mind a 
number of u n s ol ved problems. The most conspicuous of these 
were the number and spatial d i s t r i b u t i o n  of the planets.
Why should there be just six, “and why should their orbits 
about the sun fall in pr ecisel y the paths that they did? 
Clearly Kepler ’cons id ered it per fectl y reas onable to seek 
the arc hi tecton ic  principle s which determin ed the st ructur e 
and com po si tion of the C o s m o s ’ .24 His initial solution, 
given in his Hys te rium C o s m o g r a p h i c u m  which was pu blished  
with his teacher M a e s t l i n ’s help in 1596, was to prod uce 
the most beguiling of all c o s m o g r a p h i c a 1 maps. Kep ier was 
quite convinced that ’the alm i g h t y  and infinitely m e r c i f u l  
God, when he created our moving world and d e t e rm in ed the 
order of the celestial bodies, took as the basis for his 
co ns tructio n the five regular bodies which have en joyed
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such great dist i n c t i o n  from the time of Pythagora s and 
Plato down to our own d a y ’.23 It was in fact a three 
dimensional ’m o d e l ’ of the solar system. There were six and 
only six planets beca use there were, and -could only be, 
five regular solids. The relative distances  of the orbits 
of the planets could be represen ted as lying within the 
spheres c o n s e c u t i v e l y  inscribed within, and ci rcumscri bed 
about, a uniqu e arra ngemen t of these s o l i d s . 2t
The s i g n ifi ca nce of this work, however, was somewhat 
dif ferent to those inspired by Alberti or Ficino. As the 
world is ’the corporeal image of G o d ’2 7 , Kepler was not 
content with the revelat ion of a formal harmony. His 
’m o d e l ’ had to repli cate the real physical relations 
existing among the planets. It was the first ge nuinely 
systema tic  c o s m ology of the scie ntific epoch. To 
demonstr ate the true system of the world, Kepler was forced 
to pass ’from a s t r o n o m y  to physics or c o s m o g r a p h y ’ .28 
Kepler in fact rejected the n u m e r o 1ogical tradition, at 
least in its more florid R en ai ssance examples. In an 
important polemic directed against  Robert Fludd, Kepler- 
defended the use of math ematic s c o n s traine d by rea li stic 
physics. M a t h e ma tics ought to be purel y instrumental and 
logical, it could not itself ’c o n t a i n ’ reality so that the 
truth of the world could not be grasped directly through 
mere arithmetical m a n i p u 1 a t i o n .25 For Kepler, m a t h e m a t i c s  
was a rational means to clarify and present a physical 
concept i o n . 3 0
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in at tempting to outline a physics of the cosmos, 
Kepler also rejected the A r i s t o t e l i a n  t r a d it ion which 
subsumed physical prop erties under an on tol o g y  of p l a c e . 31 
His search for an a r c h i t e c t o n i c  co smi c principle  united 
he av en  and earth w i thin  the same u n i f o r m  space. It was the 
space within which terrestrial mec ha nics was v a l i d . 32 In 
ex tending the p hy si cality of the earth throu ghout the 
visible universe, Kepler was heir to the a r c adia n fantasy. 
Celestial bodies were no different, qualitatively, to the 
earth, and there fore could be u nd er stood in terms of the 
laws regulating fami 1iar m a t t e r . K e p l e r ’s physical realism 
was responsible for the co m p l e t i o n  of the first phase of 
the Co pe r n i c a n  Revolution. It was inc on ceivab le  to him that 
the ’motive f o r c e ’ orderi ng the complex i n t e r plane ta ry 
relations should emmanate from a geometrical point. In the 
original Cope r n i c a n  scheme, the centre of the e a r t h ’s 
orbit, rather than the physical body of the sun, occupied 
the centre of the universe. Kepler objecte d that ’a 
mathematical point, whether it be the centre of the world 
or not, cannot move and attract a heavy o b j e c t ’ .33
It was the physical m a g n i ficenc e of the sun which, 
bathing the heavens in light and heat, held the celestial 
bodies in their proper paths. The physical cen t r a l i t y  of 
the sun, however, was not fully exp li ca ted in the first 
version of K e p l e r ’s cosmology. In fact his initial exe rci se 
in physical harmonics was only a iimited success. Impressed
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by the adv ances in observational a s t r on om y made by Tycho 
Brahe, Kepler could not ignore the imperfect ’f i t 7 betwee n 
his three dimensional model and the observ ed paths of the 
planets, es p e c i a l l y  that of M a r s . 34 He became briefly, and 
somewhat uneasily, T y c h o ’s assistant, ap p r o p r i a t i n g  for his 
own use an enormo us mass of observational data on the 
letters death.
Mars became the ’test c a s e ’ for his new celestial 
physics and the centr ep iece of his Astrono mi a N o v a . 
Referring ail plan etary motions to the actual po sit i o n  of 
the sun, n e c e s s i t a t e d  at first t h e xre i n t r o d u c t i o n  of all 
the unw el come geometrical compi ictions the e l i m i n a t i o n  of 
which had been the driving force be hind the C o p e r n i c a n
Revolution. To un de r s t a n d  the mo tion of the planets as
instances of local motion, however, (as the result of the
app li ca tion of a continuous force which had its origins in
the body of the sun) left him no option. The new point of 
view had the ad va nt age at least of a pi ausible intuitive 
expla nat ion for the appare nt variati on  in the speed of the 
planets. The variation, in fact, was quite real and 
depended simply upon the varying p r o x imity  to the s u n . 33 
The historic  a s s u m p t i o n  of uniform motio n was abandoned, 
and with it the n e c e ssi ty  of ’a r t i f i c i a l ’ mathematic al 
constructions.
Kepler conce ive d of the force prop ellin g the plan ets 
as hav i ng a p'nys i ca 1 a s p e c t , rather than being e x c l u s i v e l y
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material in nature. He couid still talk of a ’s o u l ’ or 
’s p i r i t ’ an imating its body and being the cause of its 
light as well as the source of its physical power. More 
generally he likened its force to the power of a m a g n e t . 3i 
Yet K e p l e r ’s revolut io nary as tr onomy was allied to 
conventional physics. The s u n ’s power is a co nt i n u o u s l y  
acting r a p t u s , a solar wind which ’p u s h e s ’ the planets 
around in their orbits. It Is not an ’a t t r a c t i v e ’ force. 
Kepler pi ctured the sun as the central hub of a large 
rotating wheel. The trailing spokes, spi ra ll ing outwards, 
swept the planets around its centre. To acco unt for the 
variations in the speed of pi an etary  motion, Kepler had 
then to introduce both a resi sting inertia inherent in each 
body and particular ’ l o c a l ’ motive forces belo ng ing to each 
p l a n e t . 37 The com pl icatio ns  m ultipli ed  to the point where 
it appeared  likely that the new ast r o n o m y  would be 
still born.
Having ab and one d uniform  mo tion in one respect, Kepler 
finally saw that the simple solution to both the 
c o s m o g r a p h i c a 1 and the mathematical problems lay in 
abandoning it in a more r a d i c a 1 sense. The do ctrine that 
celestial motion was of n e c e ssity circular had been central 
to C op er nican as well as Pt o l e m a i c  astronomy. But if 
astronomy was to be an ext en sion of terrestrial physics 
this need no longer be the case. Upon the earth elliptical 
and par abolic motion was commonplace; if this were the case 
also for celestial motion, then the orbits of the planets
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could be simply und er st ood as elli pses within  which the sun 
formed one focus. The si mp lic ity of a uniform and universal 
force replaced the sim pli ci ty and u n i v e r s a l i t y  of form.
The world system was the con sequ en ce of a force acting 
everywh ere  in the same way. The speed of the planets 
depended simply upon the quant 1ty of force acting upon 
them. All celestial bodies could be c o n s id ered as 
qua li ta tively  identical, varying only in terms of their 
inherent power to resist the force of the s u n ’s r a p t u s .
K e p l e r ’s no ti on  of inertia was therefore  of a 
resisting power. The ontological d i s t i n c t i o n  between rest 
and motio n was still fundamental to his physics. Matter 
’p r e f e r e d ’ rest, and its inertia was related to its 
g r a v i t y . A M  bodies, by virtue of their m a t e r i a l i t y  alone, 
possessed a power of ’mutual a f f e c t i o n ’ : ’ If two stones
were removed to some place in the u n i v e r s e , in pr opinqui ty 
to each- other, but outs ide the sphere of force of a third 
cognate body, the two stones, like ma gne t i c  bodies, would 
come together at some intermed iat e place, each ap pr oaching  
the other through a distanc e proporti o n a 1 to the mass 
(mo 1e s ) of the o t h e r ’ .38 This is not yet a theory of 
universal gravitation. The nature of the force retains a 
spiritual qua lity and, more significantly, is not itself 
responsible for the mov eme nt of the p l a n e t s .which depends 
upon the unique force of the c e n t r al ised sun.
K e p l e r ’s great ’s c i e n t i f i c ’ success, his three laws of
plane tar y motion, were bu rie d amidst the many false starts 
and blind alleys of his major w o r k s . 38 They were for him no 
more than indicators of the validit y of his und er lying 
cosmic vision. Buoyed up by his success 'in resolving the 
long standing enigma of the orbit of liars, Kepler returned 
to the ’d e e p e r ’ pr obl em  of the ha rmo ni c struc ture of the 
solar system. His fresh insight into elliptical orbits, and 
the more accura te obs ervatio nal material, pro mpt ed a fresh 
approach. The ha rmonic  stru cture of the cosmos could be 
captured most c om pl etely in musical notation. A ’n o t e ’ 
determined by its angular veloci ty  could be assign ed  to 
each p i a n e t . Then, by compar ing its lowest value (when its 
velocity was least, at aphelion) with its highest value (at 
perihelion), a musical ’ i n t e r v a l ’ d escrib in g the 
eccentr icity of the orbit could be computed. Kepler found 
indeed that the ratios of such intervals were almos t 
entirely c o n s o n a n t . 40 The H a r m on ic e Hundi comp leted  the 
task begun in the My s t e r i u m  C o s m o g r a p h i c u m  and was qui ckly 
forgotten. In spite of his own dee pest instincts, Kepler 
had turned astr onomy  into a physical science.
Motion
Gali ie o ’s mods of unive r s a l i s i n g  nature moved in the 
opposite dire ction to K e p 1e r ’s . Rather than project 
terrestrial phenomena  into the heavens, he united them by 
absorbing the celestial into the eart hly and gave a
sci ent ific twist to the utopi an  vision.
Ga lileo began his professional career as a fairly 
orthodox A r i s t o t e l i a n . 41 But he was al re ady a c o n v i n c e d 1 
Cop er ni can when, in 1609, he heard of a D u t c h m a n ’s success 
in fabricating a t e l e s c o p e . 42 Galil eo immediately 
constructed one for himself, improving it several times 
before turning it upon the heavens. The immediate results 
of his observations, p u b li sh ed in his Siderius N u n c i u s , was 
to d r amat ic ally conf irm the physical assum pt ions of 
K e p l e r ’s astronomy. The general and a p p a re nt ly inesc apable 
conclusion to which G a l ileo was drawn was that celestial 
bodies were no more ’p e r f e c t ’ and inc orrup tible than the 
earth. He could thus cl ea rl y d i s t i n g u i s h  the shadows cast 
by the light from the rising sun falling across the m o o n ’s 
irregular s u r f a c e . 43 Not only were there ’p r ot ru beranc es  
and g a p s ’ on what should have been a perfectl y smooth 
surface, but they were s uf ficient ly  large to be able to 
estimate their d i m e n s i o n s . 44 Even more damaging to the 
traditional cosmography, was the d i s c overy of J u p i t e r ’s 
four ’m o o n s ’ . The great a e s thetic  appeal of the pre- 
Copernican system was its u n i f i c a t i o n  about a single 
centre. To discover not only that the sun and earth were 
centres of rotation, but other planets as well, seemed to 
introduce u n a c c e p t a b l e  asymetries. Many of course denied 
the ’e v i d e n c e ’ , but the y.found  it dif fi cult to pe rsist in 
their objections and even more diffi cult to resist the 
implication of the specta cular increase in the number  of
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visible stars. The m i lk y way, resolved into coutless 
separate points of light, ch allenged the old theological 
as sumption  that God had placed them there as a cosmic 
ornament that man might enj oy and c o n t e m p l a t e . 45 Would God 
have been so prodigal as to fill the un iverse with 
uno bse rvab le  objects? The arg ument  became strained.
Three years later, his Letters on Sunspots  
dem ons trat ed  in a series of careful o b serv at ions that 
blemishes also oc cu rr ed regula rly on the s u n ’s s u r f a c e . 46 
But in the 1onger term the observation s through whi ch 
Galileo became  c e l e br at ed were not his most important 
co ntr ib ut ion to the f o r ma ti on of the new worldview.
It was in m e c hanic s rather than ast ro nomy that 
G a l i l e o ’s daring showed  itself to its fullest effect. His 
arguments served to make the C o p e rn ic an cosmos p h y s ic ally 
plausible. In ma king the rotation  of the earth a physical, 
as well as optical, nec e s s i t y  Galileo destro ye d the ’common 
s e n s e ’ as sumptio ns which had sus tained sc ho lastic  science.
In the f ou rt eenth cent ury Qresme and B u r i d a n  had 
considered the diurnal rotation of the earth as an 
interesting logical possibility. But while the opt i c a 1 
evidence could be in terpret ed eq au lly  on the a s s u m p t i o n  of 
a stationary or a rotating earth, they did not for a moment 
suppose such a ro ta ti on  to be an a c t u a l i t y . 47 Copernicus, 
on the other hand, had certainly taken the e a r t h ’s rotati on
to be a real phenomenon, and Galileo reco gnise d t h i s . 4E Yet 
Co pernicus  had made no at tem pt to provide p h v s i c a 1 
argu ments to support his belief and it was this d eficie nc y 
that Gali leo set out to make good, p a r t i cu larly in the 
b r i l li an tly argued ’Day T h r e e ’ of his ma st e r p i e c e  Dialo gu e 
on the Two Great World S y s t e m s .
The physical obje ctions  to accep ti ng the e a r t h ’s 
rotation were of two fundamental kinds. The first raises 
the qu estio n of the si mul tan eous ro tat ion of e ver yt hing 
upon the e a r t h ’s surface, and the second points to 
di ff icul ti es a s s o ciate d with the no tion of ’c e n t r i f u g a l ’ 
force. These were both arg uments which had w e i ghed heavily  
with Qresme.
If the earth revolves, moving from west to east, and 
completes one r evolu ti on every twenty-fou r hours then why 
does a perpetual wind not blow from east to west? How do 
birds succeed in flying equally well in any dir e c t i o n ?  Why 
does a heavy object dro pped from a tower, or the mast of a 
sailing ship fall parallel to the tower or mast rather than 
’b e h i n d ’ it? And, a more recent example discussed  by Tycho 
Brahe, if two similar cannons are fired, one due west, the 
other due east, why should the shot be carried a c o m p a r a b l e  
distance in each c a s e ? 49 Kepler had ans we re d these 
objections by suppo sing the earth is possessed, like the 
sun, of its own dy namic force, its r a p t u s , which holds 
everyth ing  close to its surface ’as if by c h a i n s ’30
G a l i l e o ’s sol ution  was more radical. There is no need 
of a crude ’m e c h a n i c a l ’ e xplan at ion of motion in these 
cases. With out  recourse  to any special ’s c i e n t i f i c ’ 
de mons t r a t i o n  or special ist knowledge, Ga li leo shows that 
our every da y un d e r s t a n d i n g  of motion, when fully analysed, 
is perfec tl y com pa tible with such phenomenon. Traditional 
’p h y s i c s ’ had no t.d eal t with rotation at all and Galileo 
points out that it does not fit into the A r i s t o t e l i a n  
categories of ’n a t u r a l ’ or ’v i o l e n t ’ motion. It is movement 
without change of place and there fore could not be 
u nd ers too d as if it were a special case of re ctilinea r 
motion. Instead, Galile o offers an accoun t based upon a 
simple ’thought e x p e r i m e n t ’ .51 A perf ectly spherical hard 
ball will ’n a t u r a l l y ’ roil down a smooth inclined surface, 
it will, furthermore, accelerate as it does s o.52 And, if 
already in motion, it will gradually slow down if the plane 
is inclined, even very slightly, upward. Suppose, rather 
than any actual inclined plane, an abs o l u t e l y  horizontal, 
frictionless surface. Clearly upon such a surface, 
discounting any extraneou s forces, a bail would co nt inue in 
its state of motion  indefinitely; ’ if such a space were 
i n t e r m i n a t e , the mo tio n upon it would likewise have no 
termination, that is, would be p e r p e t u a l ’.53 Equally, a 
ball at rest would remain at rest. In contrast to Kepler, 
Galileo does not assume that matter has a p r e f e r e n c e  for 
the state of rest. Indeed, by defining motion as a 
continuous state rather than a c o n dition of chan ge Gali le o
assumes an absolut e indif fe re nce of matter to the 
distincti on  between m o v emen t and rest. Matter will 
naturally preserve its state of motion, including rest, 
unless acted upon by an external force.
This a n t i cip at es but does not a c c u ra te ly present the 
classical law of in e r t i a . 54 R ectil in ear motion is not 
preserved. To see.this we have to u n d e rs ta nd the meaning of 
an ’a b s o lut el y horizontal p l a n e ’. One possible definit io n  
would be a tangent to the e a r t h ’s surface at any par ticular 
point. Now, as movemen t in any di r e c t i o n  upon such a plane 
would in fact be away from the e a r t h ’s centre, mo ti on upon 
i t w o u 1d n a t u r a M y  be d i m i n i s h e d . The only motion which 
could conceiv ably be c o n s er ve d would lie along a plane upon 
which every point was e q u i dis ta nt from an unmov in g centre; 
that is, upon the surface or ’p a r a l l e l ’ to the e a r t h ’s 
surface. It is in fact c i r cuIar motion  which is conserved, 
and it is for this reason that the traditional obje ct ions  
to the e a r t h ’s rotation fail. No force need be ap pl ied  to a 
projectile, or an ything not p er ma nently  anchored to the 
surface of the earth to ensure that it will ’p a r t i c i p a t e ’ 
in the e a r t h ’s motion. As the truly ’natural ’ m o t i o n  of 
rotation, all share equally and ef fo r t l e s s l y  in its 
p e r p e t u a t i o n . 55 What Gal ile o does come very close to 
comprehending is the purely ’s e c u l a r ’ s i g n i fica nc e of 
circularity. However important empirically, c i r c u l a r i t y  
should not be viewed as an inh erently priv ileged form; it 
is simply the c on se quence  of two forces int ere actin g upon
each other: the ten de nc y of motion to conserv e itself, and
the tendency of matter to cohere about its own c e n t r e . 56
Nor did Galileo  formulate the classical co ncepti on  of 
gravity. The tende nc y of matter to cohere about its own 
centre was not gen er al ised into a new co smic principle. 
Indeed, he did not use it in a sys tema ti c way to c ounter ac t 
the other major a r g um en t against the e a r t h ’s rotation.
Small objects placed  on the rim of a spinning -top are 
thrown off at a tangent by its rapid rotation. Ro tation 
seems in some way to ’c o u n t e r a c t ’ gravity. Why are we not 
similarly shrugged off the surface of the rapidly spinning 
earth? 57 The answer requires the same leap in scale as the 
Coperni ca n insistence that the ’ fixed s t a r s ’ lie at an 
inconceivably vast dis ta nc e from the earth (and therefo re  
show no parallax). The e a r t h ’s rotation does indeed make us 
’ l i g h t e r ’ than we would if it were stationary, but such is 
the immensity of the e a r t h ’s ’g r a v i t y ’ that its speed of 
rotation cannot fling us into space.
Resi st ing B r u n o ’s radical inf initisation of space, 
Galileo could not grasp the full sign if icnce  of his own 
mechanics. It was only by encl osing  the un ive rs e that, 
ultimately, its order was guaranteed. And in spite of his 
mechanical acco unt of circular motion, it retained in his 
work the aura of p e r f e c t i o n . 53 It is however an ea rthly 
perfection, a feature of the empirical world itself.
h e r p etua i r e c u r r s n ua, t h e c o n s e r v at io n u f q uantl t y i n 
s. specif ic i gea 1 x orrn, qsscr 1 b 6 s an important! a s p 6 ct of the
it s w s i j c 1 s t y s. s cle ariy a s it 1 a l a the f cuncat ions or a n e w
mecnani cs . T h >. al I o i c  of G a l i l e o ’s physics becomes
apparent when it is co ntrasted with the impetus theory to 
which, at the outset of his career, he was c o m m i t t e d . 59 In 
the feudal scheme, there is no ’c o n s e r v a t i o n ’ pri nciple and 
the entire process of ’e x c h a n g e ’ (change of place) occurs 
only under the continu ous ap pl i c a t i o n  of an external force. 
With Galileo, nature becomes genuinely self-moving. Once 
set in motion, the entire dyn amic system of the world 
continues wi thout the necessity of any additional ’motive 
f o r c e ’ . This, of course, is lust the cha racter of exchange  
in a cap it alist  s o c i e t y . 60 To reach hi's fundamental 
insight, Galileo had to abstract from the worid of real 
experien ce ’i d e a l ’ co nd ition s of perfectly  hard surfaces 
and frietioni ess planes, in the social world, as we have 
seen, the co mmodity  form is a similarly ’ i d e a l ’ reality 
within which all particular qualities are swa llo we d up into 
pur e quant i t y . Money, in effecting this a b s t r a c t i o n  for u s , 
has a special a f f in ity with thought, it behaves with a 
certain philosophi caI cunning to reveal the n e c e s s i t y  (and 
conceal the origin) of our more immediate social ’worid 
s y s t e m ’ .
Force
K e o ! e r a n d I so introduced into the ana o r
ocial logic.nature, incomplete i y and imperfectly, a nei 
Secular realism (matter/labour) and a prin cip le of 
co ns er vation  (motion/money) became the i n d i s p e n s i h 1e 
’p r e c o n d i t i o n s ’ of a sci entif ic cosmology, Newton, 
develo pin g the view of nature as a system of interacting 
forces, produced such a c o s m o l o g y . 63
Unce again, t ne 
a v o i d s q . Mewton as a 
’s c i e n c e ’ was clearly
pureiy historical p r o d i e m can d e 
per sonai it y remains n i e c e n » His 
only part of an intellectual 
endeavour as o a f r 1 i n g to our notion or ’r e a s o n ’ as the wor 
of Bruno or Kepler. The ’h o w ’ of the Ne w t o n i a n  R e v o lu ti on 
however is, for the moment, less si gn ificant than the 
’w h a t ’ .62 The shock of discover ing that he was not a cool- 
headed ratio nal ist should! not distract us from the centra! 
signific anc e of the genuine rationality of his sys temat ic  
science. 1n arguing that this rational ity is itself the 
expres sio n of something ’extra-scienti f i c ’ , need not lead 
us into biographical recons tr uction or an endless search 
for the specific ’s o u r c e s ’ of his various arguments. It is
i-1 wnat was ’ m  his m m  a ’ so muc I—. -r- V*. . f ■£ii ct ro l * i cr i irm7 into wax
s h a p e c ’finished p r o d u c t ’ that is of immed
interest
N e w t o n ’s ’mathematical w a y ’ introduced quantita ti ve 
analysis into the sci entif ic  d e s c riptio n of the ’system of 
the w o r l d ’ . The reasoning involved did not aim at 
reproducing the force of geometric de mo ns t r a t i o n  aione, but 
sought to esta bl ish the limits of variat io n of actual 
physical p he nomeno n in such a way that the empirical worid 
couid be dedu ced from its fundamental t h e o r e m s . 63 This 
involved an initial simplification, in which physical 
intuition p 1ayed a par t as v 1t a 1 as that of mathemat i c a 1 
acuity. The c o m p lexi ty  of the material world was at first 
reduced to a ’one-boay-systern’ in order to clarify the 
ele men tary forces implied in our most pr imi tiv e c o n c ep tion 
of matter. Such a body is d is ti nguishe d by ’extension, 
hardness, impenetrability, mo bilit y and forces of i n e r t i a ’ , 
but not of n e c e ssity by gr av i t y . 64 Gr avity is a universal 
but not essential ch a r a c t e r i s t i c  of matter as such. It can 
be detected only r el ation al ly and has no me ani ng in 
reference to a uni verse containi ng on 1y a single b o d y .
His a tt ri bution  of inertia to an isolated body is a 
corollary of his notion of ’absolute s p a c e ’ which, ’in its 
own nature, without relation to anyth in g external, remains 
always similar and i m m o b i l e ’.65 it is possible, in other 
w o r d s , to c o ticeptua1i se an isolated body as i n mo t i o n . 1 n
relation to such a body in absolute space (rather than an 
ioeal ball o n a perf ec tly s m o o t n i n cl i n e o p lane), u s. 1 i i e q- s 
pri nci p 1e o f inertia c o u 1d be seen as a special case o t a 
more general law which applied un iversa ll y to rec ti li near
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m o t i o n . B y as sum i n g t h s. t t. h e re 1 at i o n a m o n g b od i e s w a s 
governed bv a simpie inverse square law of gravi tv Newton 
was able to demo ns trate the mathematical n e c e s s 1ty of 
K e p l e r ’s laws of pla neta ry  motion.'66
in spite of the dazzling  success of the 
ma thema t i s a t i o n  of the general dynamics of the solar 
system, N e w t o n ’s F r i n cipi a fell short of what many had 
already come to expect from a ’s c i e ntific  e x p l a n a t i o n ’. Few 
of his c o nt empora ri es felt able to cha ll enge his 
mathematical reasoning and were c o n s e q u e n t l y  less critical 
of his scientif ic account of nature than they mi ght have 
b e e n . 67 Even so his as ce ti c denial of causal exp lanatio n 
could hardly go unremarked. Even more ri go rousl y than 
Galileo, tit; eschewed  ’ hyp othBses ’ , ° 0 and r s t u s g q  to oe 
drawn as to the ’c a u s e ’ of gravity. ’What 1 call att ra ction 
may be performed by impulse, or some other means un known to 
m e ’ , he suggests. And a t t r actio n is sim il ar ly just ’any 
Force by which Bodies tfend towards one another, whatever be 
the C a u s e . ’69 For many this was hardly sufficient. What 
’m e c h a n i s m ’ was respons ible for the effects Ne wto n had so 
bril lia ntly ana lysed? In allowing for the p o s s ib il ity of 
action at a d i s t a n c e ’ , was ne not all ow ing d i s r e putable  
’occult p o w e r s ’ an u n n e ce ssary role in an ot herwise 
exemplary science? A modern scholar goes so far as to 
describe N e w t o n ’s m as te rpiece  as ’ less a ba t t l e - c r y  for the 
new science than a co nf ession of f a i l u r e . ’70
Yet ’ g r a v i t y ’ was no more or less occult than any of 
the familiar ’primary q u a l i t i e s ’ , the und erlying  meehani sm 
of any of which was unk n o w a b l e  and acc epted without 
d if fic ult y as the ’g i v e n s ’ of n a t u r e . 71 N e w t o n ’s instincts 
on the matter were, later, fully justified. The 
’r a t i o n a l i t y ’ of science, as of human action  generally, 
depend 7101 only- upo n a context of unt es tabie  assu mptio ns  
but upon the ’ irrationality* of v a l u e s . 72
The immediate impact of Newton ia n science, however, 
did not depend only upon his general so lution to the 
problem of motion. In a d d ition  to uniting heaven and earth 
in a coh ere nt ly ordere d system governed by a simple, 
quan tif iable law, he extended this order ’d o w n w a r d s ’ as a 
general theory of the structure of matter. The pr imary 
qualities which d i s t i n g u i s h e d  the isolated single body in 
space could he used to desig nate the nature of any 
el eme ntary par ticle of matter whatever. The ’s t u f f ’ from 
which nature was composed, that is to say, was ideally 1ik<
itself: simple and ’confo rmable to i t s e l f ’. Prim ary
matter was eve ry where  the same and the bodies c onstruc te d 
from t hem differed one f rom ano t he r by v i r tue of t he 
quan t i t i y and i n t er na 1 or gan i sa. t i on of the matter t ney 
contained. N e w t o n ’s corpus cul ar phi los op hy was ex pre ssed 
w 1 1.h particular c i ar i f.y and f reeoum in the yuer 1 es a.n p e 7;u
i i  L i i C  j  L i b  L 1 y famous y. u e r y 31 , h e w r
’ it seems probable to me, that God in the b e g i nn ing formed 
matter in solid, m a s s y , h a r d , impenetrable, moveab 1 e
par t i d e s  4 of such size and figure, and with such other 
properties, and in such prop or tion to space, as most 
conduced to the end for which he formed t h e m . ’ 73 Hatter was 
ideally reduc ible to ’ inertialiy e q u i v a l e n t ’ particles, 
each, whatever its ’f i g u r e ’ , the po ssessor of pr ecisel y the 
same degree of ’m a t e r i a l i t y ’ as any o t h e r , 74
The d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  and coh es ion of bodies depended  
upon in terpa rt iculate  forces of the kind (inertia and 
gravity) that ord ered the motion of ceiestiai bodies.
Newton was much less successful i n spec i f yi ng quant i f lab 1e 
laws in rel at ion to such forces. The Q pt i c k s was 
experimental where the Pr inci pia had been  mathem at  i c a 1 and 
inspired a s c i e ntif ic  tradition in many ways at odds with 
the philosophical intentions of its founder. The 
’mechanical p h i l o s o p h y ’ borrowed the a u t hority of Newton  
but tended to a cruder form of ’corp uscul ar  i s m ’ . 75
N e w t o n ’s ’third law ’ seemed to provide a simple mechanical 
p r i n c i p l e  t h r o u g h  w h i c h  'to e x p l a i n  a l m o s t  all e v e n t s .  If
ouantitv of force was c o n s e r v e d , impact on 1y irecting
and never d e s t royi ng  motion, then a physics of con tact 
might, be presum ed to explain the cont i n u i t y  and cohe r e n t c e  
of n a t u r e . 7h The perpetual interaction of p a r t i c k
c o n >_■ e i v e d a a a ■ m s. r k e t • where f o r u e s w ers e x c 11 a. n g e d a n d 
every outcome was goverened by a simple law of e q u i v alence
The idea of me chanism is not to be con fus ed with that 
of a ’m a c h i n e ’ . Mechanism, as a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of the
classical scien ti fic worldview, should be understood as the 
view that the empirical world is the ’r e s u l t a n t ’ of a 
number of continuously' interacting ’f o r c e s ’ .77 It is by no 
m e a n s  l i m i t e d  to the t h e o r y  of the ’ t r a n s m i  ss i o n ’ of s uch 
forces through physical contact. The ’m a c h i n e ’, especially 
so phistica ted clockwork, had a p r i v il eged position during 
the s e v e nt eeth and eightee nth ce nturies  as an illustration 
of the providential design of nature, rather than as itself 
an a r c h i t e c t o n i c  ’m o d e l ’ of the c o s m o s . 78 The machine is 
not therefore, in itself, a co nstruct  from which genuine 
kno wledge of the worid can be derived. ’F o r c e s ’ remain 
unknown; they' cons tit ute the irred ucible relationships 
among part icl es of matter.
As well as the ’p a s s i v e ’ force of inertia Newton also 
sought to el uci date the o p e r at io n of the ’a c t i v e ’ forces of 
gravitation, chemical ’attract i o n ’and f e r m e n t a t i o n . 79 The 
most important technique of inve st igating  small scale 
i nterpar t i culate forces he con sider ed  to be the o b s e rvati on  
of the in terac tion between light ana m a t t e r . 80
The cosmos of ca pi talis m is .a m e c h a n i s m  not beca use it 
i n s t r u c t e d  upon the analogy of a ’m a c h i n e ’ (no matter 
how soph i st i c a t e d ) as an i ns trument of m a n u f a c t u r e , but 
be cause its order is the outcome of the continuous 
interaction among indwelling forces. Mature can be 
c on ce p t u a l i s e d  as an autonom ous system of ’exchange-
oocOuu
r e 1 a t i o n s 1 
s i m p 1 y b e
The c 
upon the ’ 
r e l a t i o n s  
e x c h a n g e  i 
’ v a 1ue ’ , i 
c o s m o s  as
' whose fundamental ordering princip les  must 
accepted as ’g i v e n ’ ,
cosmology of happiness is focu sed'up on  use-value; 
' i r r a t i o n a l i t y ’ of the human subject. Feudal 
are always ’p e r s o a n ! ' relations. The triumph of 
•e1 a t i o n s . their s e p a ra ti on from any human 
.3 expre ssed therefore in a new? vision of the 
a realm of un iv e r s a l i t y  and necessity.
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N I HE
EGOISM
The corr e s p o n d e n c e  betw een the ma c r o c o s m  and mic r o c o s m  
was transformed, during the Renaissance, into a new 
metaphor of ’i n s i d e ’ and ’o u t s i d e ’ . The cosmos became a 
unified but u n b oun de d structure or de re d through universal 
laws of nature. The ’ i n t i m a t e ’ re ality of human ex pe reince 
could no longer be c o n c e p t u a 1ised as a met ap hor or symbol 
fo a i 1-inclusive order. The human world must conform  to the 
same laws as the rest of nature. Yet the dign ity  of man, 
which had been one of the central ideas of the Renaissance, 
seemed to imply a ’p r i v i l e g e d ’ status for the ’h u m a n ’ .
This difficulty, the paradox of Ren a i s s a n c e  humanism, 
lies at the intellectual heart of bo urgeoi s psychology. No 
auuiisf nad the o i a i m to dignity oeen es t a d 1 i s neo , t nr ousn 
the a ssi mi la tion of man to nature (in arcadia n or utopi an 
forms), than it was lost. Man did not inhabit a c e n t rali se d 
and degraded world; he assumed the dignity of celestial 
motion. But, in consequence, his soul was no longer the
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mirror of the world. The uniq ue adva ntage  of his position 
as an ’o b s e r v e r ’ of the cosmos was lost. True, the cosmos 
was no longer held to be the means to proclaim an ultimate 
truth; but even as a mechanism, it appeare d baffling. Its 
regularities couid be for ma li sed through the quan ti tative  
language of mathematics, but the cause of its order 
remained mysterious. Was ’h u m a n ’ nature si milarly 
un kno wable? Was it not eq ua ll y contra ry to presume that man 
was a my st ery  to himself?
These purely intellectual c o ns iderati on s were, 
additionally, ways of de scribin g the new social reality of 
commodity exchange. The commodit y embodie d a dual reality. 
As exchange value it ex pr essed the u n i v e r s a l i t y  of 
neces sar y relations. It cre ated a world of ’n a t u r e ’ with!n 
which man could live, a world which appeared to have sprung 
up mag ically around him and now sustained itself by the 
power of its own indwelling forces. As use-value, however, 
the commodity was u l t i m a t e l y  relinquis hed to the 
’i r r a t i o n a l i t y ’ of the human subject.
The di vis ion between m icrocosm and macr ocosm gave w a y , 
then, to the d i s t i nctio n betwe en object and subject. ’Human 
n a t u r e ’ was, just as much as the physical cosmos, 
inexhaustible. As ’s u b j e c t i v i t y ’, the human was an interior 
cosmos. But what was its specific ’m e c h a n i s m ’? A series of 
attempts were made to ’save the p h e n o m e n o n ’ ; to ’e x p l a i n ’
:a1i ty in terms of universal laws and, at the same; Y\ f- £3
time. clearly distinguish between the peculiar quality of
human exp eri ence and all that lay beyond it.
Ca rtesi an  dualis m is the first step towards the self- 
co nsciousn ess of the bou rgeois ego. The radical dist in ction 
between matter and mind, itself hint ing at the momentous 
split between the view of the ’ob ject w o r l d ’ exc lus iv ely in 
terms either of exchange or of use, cleared the way for the 
direct ’a p p l i c a t i o n ’ of physical conc epts to human 
activities. This, of course, was not D e s c a r t e s ’ intention, 
but as so of ten d e m o n strate d in the history of ideas, 
innovators are powerless to exercise  control over the 
effects of their ideas. Once the ’q u a l i t a t i v e ’ character of 
human experienc e had been con fin ed to a particu lar 
category, it could be fully explor ed by the methods 
developed within quite different fields of study.
These methods were to be N e w t o n ’s, rather than 
D e s c a r t e s ’ , and the disciples of N e w t o n i a n  ' corpus cu lar isfrr 
rather than those of their master. While, es p e c i a l l y  in 
France, contro ve rsy sur rou nded the ul tima te  signif ic ance of 
Newt oni an !sm for a p hilo so phy of nature, his ’m e t h o d s ’ were 
freely bo r r o w e d  and u n c o n t r o v e r s i a  1 1y adop ted as the 
foundation for a new ’science of m a n ’ . Just as the cosmos 
had to be described in a form co mm e n s u r a t e  with the new 
social reality of co mm odity exchange, so the human 
’q u a l i t i e s ’ hidden wi thin such a reality could appear 
philosop hi cally only as elements with in a ’t h e o r y ’ of the
m a r k e t .
Soci ety  was compos ed of commodities; individuated 
obiec-ts defined by the universal at tr ibute of exchange- 
value (labour). The comsos was composed of individuated 
objects, bodies, that dif fer ed only qu a n t i t a t i v e ! y  (by 
mass) and thereby e s t a bl ished invariant relations with 
other bodies. The ’.internal’ rea lity of human nature, in 
spite of its ’u l t i m a t e ’ i r r a t i on ality as ’pure 
s u b j e c t i v i t y ’ , could be grasped as a similar ’ internal 
m a r k e t ’ upo n which some universal quan tities were 
e x c h a n g e d . Firstly, therefore, human nature became a 
universal defining  criteria, the ’species b e i n g ’ of man. 
This had not been the case, of course, in feudal society. 
There only particu lar human beings existed, specif ic 
qualities held fleetin gly within  a living subject. The 
bourgeois revolution, op pos ing all feudal re striction upon 
internal ’f r e e d o m ’ of the market,' created the ind ivid uated 
’e g o ’ as a new historical actor.
The human was internal and subjective, but after that 
it was infinite, ne ce ssary and universal. It was not a 
di fferentia ted part of the cosmos, but a comsos in its own 
right, a cosmos viewed from a differe nt  vantage point. The 
social world, which was the ’m o d e l ’ for both cosmologies, 
the order of nature and of the psyche, was se l f - g e n e r a t i n g 
and s e 1f - j u s t i f y i n g . All that was required for its pe rfe ct 
order was that the individuated subjec ts that compose d it
should be free to act ’r a t i o n a l l y ’ .1 This rati on ality  was 
in turn guaranteed by the u n i v e r s a l i t y  of ’h u m a n ’ 
a t t r i b u t e s . 2 The difficulty, as outlined in the first 
chapter, was pr imarily to account for the failure to 
realise in practice this universal nature. Society was 
imperfect, and human beings cor ru pted to the extent to 
which ’r e a s o n ’ remain ed ’ 1o c k e d - u p ’ wi thin the cons traints  
of a symbolic order the bourgeo is  world had already 
outgrown.
The intellectual proble m confr on ted by the bourgeois  
psy cho logi st  was then to ’e x p l a i n ’ the peculiar att rib ut es 
of human nature In such a way that ’reason' could be 
deduced from it as a genu ine ly universal phenomenon. This 
was at tem pte d in a number of diffe re nt ways, with each 
succeeding ’s c h o o l ’ be li eving itself to be o v e r t h r o w i n g  tht 
very foundations of its predecessors. But from the 
pe rsp ective of a greater distance, we can see the common 
assumptions which guided all these efforts. In broad 
outline, three di fferent but related app roa ches can be 
distinguished; c h ara ct er ising  three rather different types 
of internal market. They can be d e s i gn at ed as sensation, 
sympathy' and desire.
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Sensation
’S e n s a t i o n a l i s m ’ was the first and perhaps the most, 
successful ve rs ion  of bou rgeois psychology. Its initial 
appeal rested on its claim to offer a s ys tematic  and 
co mpr ehen si ve  acco unt of s ub jectivi ty  adequat e to the new 
’s c i e n t i f i c ’ worldview. Hobbes of course, even before 
Newton, had pr opo se d a radical m a t e r i a l i s t i c  psychology. 3 
it was, just for this reason, rejected. ’M e c h a n i s m ’ , not 
’m a t e r i a l i s m ’ , was the key to the new intellectual 
or der .Even natu re could not be grasped as a purely 
’m a t e r i a l ’ phenomenon, and a properly s c i e ntific  a p p roach 
began with the r e c o gnitio n of the 1 i m i t s of our c om mo nsense 
notions of ’physical c a u s a l i t y ’ . The world contai ned 
nothing but matter in motion, but that was not to say that 
every phe no mena was red ucible to the effects of ’c o n t a c t ’ 
and collision among its elemental particles. One of the 
leading ’c o r p u s c u l a r ’ philosophers, Robert Boyle, Insisted 
upon the importa nce of ’emer g e n t ’ and f uncti o n a 1 re 1 at i ons 
for any r easona bl y s atisfa ct or y account of even simple 
physical phenomena. The ’t e x t u r e ’ of matter, its internal 
organisation, gave rise to many of the ’sensible q u a l i t i e s ’ 
through which we recogni sed it.4
Se nsa tion al is t psychology, in its more so ph i s t i c a t e d 
variants at least, was fully alive to these distinctions. 
Even where it app eared to be an attempt to ' r e d u c e ’
p s y c h g 1 o g y  t o  p h y s  i c s ,  0 r  p h y s  
p  r e s e r v  e t h e  ’ d i  g n i  t y ’ o f  i t s  
p a r t i c u l a r  a n d  u n i q u e  q u a l i t y  
f r a m e  o f  r e f e r e n c e .
1 o 1 o sjy, i f  was c a r e f u l  t o  
s u b j e c t  m a t t e r  b y  m a k i n g  t h e  
o f  s u b  1 a c t i v i t y  i t s .  u l t i m a t e
D a v i d  H a r t l e y ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e  m o s t  a m b i t i o u s  o f  s u c h  
p s y c h o l o g i s t s  b e g i n s  h i s  t r e a t i s e .  O b s e r v a t i o n s  o n  M a n  w i t h  
a s c i e n t i f i c  d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  i n t e n t .  I n s p i r e d  d i r e c t l y  b y  
Q u e r y  3 1  o f  t h e  O p t i  c k s , h e  d e v o t e s  h i s  i n i t i a l  d i s c u s s i o n  
t o  a n  a n a l y s i s  o f  s e n s a t i o n ,  d e f i n e d  a s  ’ t h o s e  i n t e r n a l  
f e e l i n g s  o f  t h e  m i n d ,  w h i c h  a r i s e  f r o m  t h e  i m p r e s s i o n s  m a d e  
b y  e x t e r n a  i o b  j e c t s  u p o n  t h e  s e v e r a !  p a r t s  o f  o u r  b o d i e s ’ . 3 
H e  d e f i n e s  s e n s a t i o n s ,  i n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e i r  
p r e s u m e d  c a u s e s  r a t h e r  t h a n  p h e n o m e n a  1o g i c a 1 1y , a n d  b y  t h i s  
p r o c e d u r e  h o p e s  t o  a v o i d  t h e  a r b i t r a r i n e s s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  
v a r i a t i o n  a n d  i n t e r n a l  ’ j u d g m e n t ’ . I t  a p p e a r s ,  i n d e e d ,  t h a t  
h e  i s  i n t e r e s t e d  e x c l u s i v e l y  i n  t h e  p h y s i c a l  d e t a i l s  w h i c h  
a l l o w  s u c h  c a u s e s  t o  b e  o p e r a t i v e .  ’ We a r e  t o  c o n c e i v e ,  
t h a t  w h e n  e x t e r n a l  o b j e c t s  a r e  i m p r e s s e d  o n  t h e  s e n s o r y  
n e r y e s , t h e y  e x c i  t e  v  i b  r a t  i o n s  i n  t h e  a e  t  h e  r  r e s i d i n g  i  n  
t h e  p o r e s  o f  t h e  n e r v e s  ( m e d u l l a r y )  b y  m e a n s  o f  t h e  m u t u a l  
a c t i o n s  i n t e r c e d i n g  b e t w e e n  t h e  o b j e c t s ,  n e r v e s ,  a n d  
a e t h e r ' H
H a r t l e y ’ s  m a j o r  i n t e r e s t ,  h o w e v e r ,  s o o n  e m e r g e s :  i t  i s
’ i d e a s ’ r a t h e r  t h a n  ’ s e n s a t i o n s ’ w h i c h  f o r m  t h e  r e a l  
s u b 1ect mafter of his book. The simplest idea is an 
’ i n t e r n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ’ o f  a  s e n s a t i o n .  H a r t l e y  i n s i s t s
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u p o n  s e n s a t i o n  a s  t h e  u l t i m a t e  ’ s o u r c e ’ ( i . e .  c a u s e )  o f  a l l  
s u b j e c t i v e  p h e n o m e n a ,  a n d  e x p l i c i t l y  r e j e c t s  L o c k e ’ s 
d i v i s i o n  o f  t h e  e x p e r i e n t i a l  s o u r c e s  o f  h u m a n  k n o w l e d g e  
i  n  t o  s e n s a t l o  n  a n d  ’ r  e  f  1 e c  t  i  o n  ‘ . 7 T h e r e  a r e  n o  •' s u p e r a d d e d ’ 
i n t e r n a l  h u m a n  ’ f a c u l t i e s  w h i c h  a r e  n o t  t h e m s e l v e s  
t r a c e a b l e  t o  t h e  i n v a r i a n t  o p e r a t i o n  o f  e x t e r n a l  s e n s o r y  
c a u s e s .
S i m p l e  i d e a s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h r o u g h  a  p r o c e s s  o f  
’ c o a l e s c i n g  o f  v i b r a t i o n s ’ w h i c h  a r e  t h e i r  c a u s e s ,  g i v e  
r i s e  t o  m o r e  c o m p l e x  p e r c e p t i o n s .  H a r t l e y  i s  s o o n  u n a b l e  t o  
s u s t a i n  t h e  c u m b e r s o m e  l a n g u a g e .  F o l l o w i n g  L o c k e  m o r e  
c  l o s e  1y  t h a n  h e  m i  g h t  h a v e  w i s h e d ,  h e  u s e s  t h e  p u r  e 1y  
s u b j e c t i v e  t e r m  ’ a s s o c i a t i o n ’ t o  d e s i g n a t e  t h e  
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  e n d  r e s u l t  o f  s u c h  a  m e c h a n i c a l  p r o c e s s .  
’ S i m p l e  i d e a s  w i l l  r u n  i n t o  c o m p l e x  o n e s ,  b y  m e a n s  o f  
a s s o c i a t i o n ’ , h e  c l a i m s ,  r e f e r i n g  b o t h  t o  t h e  c a u s e  a n d  
e f f e c t  o f  t h e  m a n n e r  i n  w h i c h  t h e  m i n d  b e c o m e s  f i l l e d  w i t h  
i t s  s p e c i f  i c  e o n t e n t , 3 ' T h e  g e n e r a l  p r o c e s s  o f  a s s o c i a t i n g  
i d e a s  b e c o m e s  m o r e  c o m p l e x  a n d  m o r e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  h u m a n  
s u b j e c t i v i t y  t h r o u g h  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  o f  t w o  p a r t i c u l a r  
t y p e s  o f  ’ v i b r a t i o n s ’ . A n e w  ’ l e v e l ’ o f  a s s o c i a t i o n  i s  
developed through language. The range of possib le 
a s s o c i a t i o n  i s  e n o r m o u s l y  i n c r e a s e d  b y  t h e  u s e  o f  w o r d s , 
w h i  c h  c o n n e c t  p r e s e n t  s e n s a t i o n s  t o  t h e  v i r t u a l l y  i n f i n i t e  
reservoir of past and projected future experience. It is 
t h e  a s s o c i a t i v e  p o w e r  o f  w o r d s  w h i c h ,  i n  f a c t ,  c r e a t e s  t h e  
’ a r t s  o f  l o g i c  a n d  r a t i o n a l  g r a m m a r . ’ 3
£ e c o n d  1 y , s.s ’ s e n s !  h  1 e p  i s s s u r  t *s s . nd  p a . i  n a  5 a . r  e ' t h e  
m o s t  v i g o r o u s  o f  o u r  s e n s a t i o n s ' 1 0 , t h e y  a r e  a l s o  t h e  m o s t  
e f f e c t i v e  i n -  f o r m i n g  a s s o c i a t i v e  l i n k s  i n  t h e  h u m a n  m i n d .  
H a r t l e y  i n d e e d  p r o p o s e s  a  ' q u a n t i t a t i v e '  v i e w  o f  p l e a s u r e  
a n d  p a i n .  P l e a s u r e  i s  c o n c e i v e d  a s  a n  ’ o p t i m u m ’ l e v e l  o f  
v i b r a t i o n  o f  t h e  n e r v e  f i b r e s ,  s u c h  ' t h a t  p a i n  s h o u l d  b e  
n o t h i n g  m o r e  t h a n  p l e a s u r e  i t s e l f ,  c a r r i e d  b e y o n d  a  d u e  
lim it’ .11
T h e  doctrine of association is used mo r e 
’ m e c h a n i c a l l y ’ b y  H a r t l e y  t h a n  b y  L o c k e .  H a v i n g  
’ e s t a b l i s h e d ’ i t s  c e n t r a l i t y  a s  ’ f o r c e ’  o r d e r i n g  t h e  
i n t e r n a l  e x p e r i e n t i a l  c o s m o s .  H a r t l e y  a t t e m p t s  t o  d e r i v e  
f r o m  i t  a  1 1 t h e  s p e c i f i c  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  h u m a n  n a t u r e .
A s  a s s o c i a t i o n  i s  f o u n d e d  u p o n  a  ’ n a t u r a l ’ p r o c e s s  o f  c a u s e  
a n d  e f f e c t ,  t h e  c o n n e c t  i  o n s  i n  t h e  m i n d ,  w h i  e h  a r e  d e r i v e d  
f r o m  t h e m ,  u l t i m a t e l y  f o r m  t h e m s e l v e s  i n t o  a  ’ r a t i o n a l ’ 
p i c t u r e  o f  t h e  w o r l d .  T h e  h . u ma n  s u b j e c t  r e t a i n s  s o m e t h i n g  
o f  t h e  ’ o c c u l t ’ q u a l i t y  o f  t h e  ’ m i r r o r  o f  t h e  w o r l d ’ , 12 
S e n s o r y  v i b r a t i o n s  f i n a l l y  s o r t  t h e m s e l v e s  o u t  i n t o  a 
s t r u c t u r e  w h i c h  c o r r e s p o n d s  t o ,  t h o u g h  i s  * q u a  1 i  t a t  i  v e 1 e y ’ 
d i s t i n c t  f r o m ,  t h e  w o r l d  c f  n a t u r e  w h i c h  i s  t h e i r  s o u r c e . 12
i f  ’ r e a s o n ’ i s  a  c o r r e s p o n d e n c e  b e t w e e n  i n t e r n a l  
Pe  r c  e p r  i  o n  a  n  d t h e  o  r  d s  r  o f  n  a  t u  r e , m o r  a  1 i t  y  e q u a l  i y  o w e  s 
i t s  s t r u c t u r e  a n d  v a l i d i t y  t o  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  a s s o c i a t i o n .
Those valuations and judgments formed at the earliest stage
a n d  c o n t i n u a l l y  r e - e n f o r c e d  b y  t h e  a g r e e m e n t  o f  o t h e r s  
’ a p p e a r  l i k e  i n s t i n c t s ’ . 14 H e  d o e s  n o t  h e s i t a t e  t o  c l a i m  
t h a t  ’ t h e  m o r a l  s e n s e  i s  t n e r e f o r e  g s n e r a . t e d  n e c e s s a r i  1 y  
a n d  m e c h a n i c a l l y ’ 13 A n d  a s  t h e  r a t i o n a l  m i n d  i s  n o t h i n g  
m o r e  t h a n  t h e  ’ i n t e r n a l ’ p e r c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  i n h e r e n t  o r d e r  
o f  e m p i r i c a l  r e a l i t y ,  a l l  h u m a n  a c t i v i t y  i s  c o n s e q u e n t l y  
a s s i m i l a t e d  t o  n a t u r e :  ’ B y  t h e  m e c h a n i s m  o f  h u m a n  a c t i o n  I
m e a n ,  t h a t  e a c h  a c t i o n  r e s u l t s  f r o m  t h e  p r e v i o u s  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  o f  b o d y  a n d  m i n d ,  i n  t h e  s a m e  m a n n e r ,  a n d  
w i t h  t h e  s a m e  c e r t a i n t y ,  a s  o t h e r  e f f e c t s  d o  f r o m  t h e i r  
m e c h a n i c a l  c a u s e s ’ , 1 *
T h i s  m a k e s  H a r t l e y ’ s c o n v e n t i o n a l  ’ m o r a l i s i n g ’ a i l  t h e  
l e s s  c o n v i n c i n g . I n  s e e k i n g  t h e  a b s o l u t e l y  u n i v e r s a l  a n d  
n e c e s s a r y  f o u n d a t i n  o f  h u m a n  p s y c h o l o g y ,  h e  h a d  i n  f a c t  
o b l i t e r a t e d  t h e  v e r y  q u a l i t y  o f  i n n e r  f r e e d o m  t h r o u g h  w h i c h  
s u b j e c t i v i t y  m a k e s  i t s e l f  f e i t . 17 ’ A s s o c i a t i o n ’ m i g h t  b e  
t h e  o r g a n i s i n g  p r i n c i p l e  o f  t h e  i n n e r  l i f e ,  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  
f r o m  w h i c h  a l l  i t s  o p e r a t i o n s  c o u l d  b e  d e d u c e d ,  b u t  w h e r e  
’ i n t i m a t e ’ k n o w l e d g e  o f  n a t u r e  c o u l d ,  r e l u c t a n t l y ,  b e  
f o r e s w o r n ,  i t  w a s  m u c h  m o r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  d e n y  t o  t h e  h u m a n  
s u b j e c t  ’ a u t h e n t i c ’ k n o w l e d g e  o f  i t s  o w n  ’ q u a l i t y ’ .
H a r t  1e y ’ s w o r k  p r  o v e d  p o p u  i a r , a s  h a d  L o c k e ’ s ; e s t a b l i s h i n g  
a  t r a d i t i o n  o f  r e d u c t i o n i s t  p s y c h o l o g y  w h i c h  r e m a i n s  
u n b r o k e n .  A l t h o u g h  t h e  m o s i  g e n e r a l l y  a c c e p t e d  t r a d i t i o n  o f  
b o u r g e o i s  p s y c h o l o g y ,  i t  i s  n e i t h e r  t h e  m o s t  r i g o r o u s  n o r  
t h e  m o s t  p e r s u a s i v e  v e r s i o n  o f  s e n s a t i o n a l i s m ,  n o r  i s  
s e n s a t i o n a l i s m  t h e  m o s t  c o m p e l l i n g  s c h o o l  o f  t h o u g h t  w i t h i n
t h a t  t r a d i t i o n .  1 n  p r  o v  i  d  i  n g  a. ’ m o d e l ’ o f  ’ s.c i  e n t  i  f  i  c  ’ 
p s y c h o l o g y ,  h o w e v e r ,  i t s  u n f u l f i l l e d  p r e m i s e  c o n t i n u e s  t o  
e x e r c i s e  a n  e v i d e n t  f a s c i n a t i o n .
L a  Me  1 1 r  i  e , s e e k i n g  a  v i e w  o f  h u m a n  n a t u r e  c o n s i s t e n t  
w i t h  b o t h  L o c k e  a n d  D e s c a r t e s ,  p r o d u c e d  a p s y c h o l o g y  t h a t  
w a s  m o r e  c o h e r e n t  a n d  m o r e  s c a n d a l o u s  t h a n  t h a t  e n v i s a g e d  
b y  H a r t l e y . 18 M u c h  . m o r e  c l e a r l y  t h a n  t h e  E n g l i s h  
e m p i r i c i s t s ,  h e  r e c o g n i s e d  t h a t  ’ t h e  i n n e r  c o n n e c t i o n  
b e t w e e n  p h y s i c a l  c a u s e  a n d  p s y c h i c  e f f e c t  r e m a i n s  
u n k n o w a b l e ’ . 19 H i s  a i m ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  w a s  n o t  s o  m u c h  t o  
p r o d u c e  a  m a t e r i a l i s t  m e t a p h y s i c s  o r  a  c o m p l e t e  
d e m o n s t r a t i v e  s c i e n e e  o f  m a n , a s  t o  d e m o n s t r a t e  t h e  
i n h e r e n t  c o n s i s t e n c y  o f  a  p a r t c i u l a r  v i e w  o f  t h e  h u m a n  
m e c h a n i s m .
L a  M e t t r i e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  r e j e c t s  t h e  C a r t e s i a n  ’ b e a s t -  
m a c h i n e ’ a s  a n  i n a d e q u a t e  m o d e l  o f  t h e  h u m a n  o r g a n i s m .  N o r  
d o e s  h e  a d m i t  t o  a  s i m p l e  ’ c o n t i n u i t y ’ b e t w e e n  s e n s a t i o n  
a n d  s o m e  p u t a t i v e  ’ l a w  o f  a s s o c i a t i o n ’ t o  a c c o u n t  f o r  
human reaso n . The specific and universal feature of man 
d o e s  n o t  ’ d e p e n d ’ u p o n  h i s  o r g a n i s m ,  i t  i j a  h i s  o r g a n i s m .  
’ M a n ’ s p r e e m i n e n t  a d v a n t a g e  i s  h i s  o r g a n i s m ’ , h e  d e c l a r e s ,  
f i n d i n g  t h e  s p e c i a l  p r i v i l e g e  o f  t h e  h u m a n  i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  
o f  h i s  b o d y : 26 ’ T h e  h u m a n  b o d y  i s  a  m a c h i n e ’ h e  c l a i m s ,  b u t  
a  m a c h i n e  o f  a  s p e c i a l  s o r t ,  o n e  ’ w h i c h  ’ w i n d s  i t s  o w n  
s p r i n g . ’ 21 T h e  C a r t e s i a n  d u a l i s m  w a s  d i s s o l v e d  i n  h i s  
n o t i o n  o f  t h e  o r g a n i c  m a c h i n e  a s  ’ a g e n u i n e l y  s e l f -
s u s t a i n i n g  s y s t e m ’ * 22  U n l i k e  a n y  m a n - m a d e  m a c h i n e ,  m a n  
h i m s e l f  i s  s e l f - m o v i n g  a n d  p u r p o s i v e .  G e n u i n e  m a t e r i a l i s m  
c o u l d  n o t  a f f o r d  t h e  s i m p l i c i t y  o f  a  t h e o r y  o f  m o t i o n .  T h e  
c o m p l e x i t y  o f  i n t e r n a l  r e l a t i o n s  d e f i n e d  t h e  h u m a n  o r g a n i s m  
i n  a  p a r t i c u l a r  a n d  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f a s h i o n .  ’ B u t  s i n c e  a l l  
t h e  f a c u l t i e s  o f  t h e  s o u l  d e p e n d  t o  s u c h  a  d e g r e e  o n  t h e  
p r o p e r  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  b r a i n  a n d  o f  t h e  w h o l e  b o d y ,  
t h a t  a p p a r e n t l y  t h e y  a r e  b u t  t h i s  o r g a n i s a t i o n  i t s e l f ,  t h e  
s o u l  i s  c l e a r l y  a n  e n l i g h t e n e d  m a c h i n e . ’ 23
’ S e n s a t i o n ’ c e a s e s  t o  b e  a  d i r e c t  ’ m e c h a n i s t i c ’ 
p r i n c i p l e  o f  h u m a n  p e r c e p t i o n ,  a n d  e x p r e s s e s  a n  i n n e r -  
s t r u c t u r e  a d a p t e d  t o  t h e  f o r m i n g  o f  i m a g e s  o f  a n  e x t e r n a l  
r e a l i t y .  T h o u g h t ,  h e  c l a i m s  ’ i s  s o  l i t t l e  i n c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  
o r g a n i s e d  m a t t e r ,  t h a t  i t  s e e m s  t o  b e  o n e  o f  i t s  
p r o p e r t i e s ’ . 24 L a  M e t t r i e  s o u g h t  t o  ’ V i t a l i s e  t h e  
C a r t e s  i a n  ” d e a d  m a c h a n i  s m ”  a p p r o a c h  t o  b  i  o  1 o g y  ’ , 2 5 
f o r c e f u l l y  e x p r e s s i n g  t h e  h u m a n  c h a r a c t e r ,  a s  w e l l  a s  
m a t e r i a l  f o r m ,  o f  h i s  m a n - m a c h i n e .  ’ T o  b e  a  m a c h i n e ’ i s  
n o t ,  a s  i n  Hs . r  1 1 e y  o r  f  o r  t h s . t  m a t t e r  i n  B a r  o n  d ’ H o  1 P a c h  , 
t o  b e  ’ n o t h i n g  m o r e  t h a n  a  p a s s i v e  i n s t r u m e n t  i n  t h e  h a n d s  
o f  n e c e s s i t y ’ , 2 *■ b u t  i s  r a t h e r  ’ t o  f e e l ,  t o  t h i n k , t o  k n o w  
h o w  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  g o o d  f r o m  b a d .  a s  w e l l  a s  b l u e  f r o m  
y e l l o w ’ . 27 i n  m a n  n e c e s s i t y ,  s o  t o  s p e a k ,  e s c a p e s  f r o m
i f p p  ! f .
L a  M e t t r i e ’ s p s y c h o l o g y  i s  a  v e r i t a b l e  a e s t h e t i c s  o f  
m e c h a n i s m .  T h e  w h o l e  t e n d e n c y  o f  F r e n c h  m a t e r i a l i m s  i n
f a c t ,  f a r  m o r e  t h a n  i t s  B r i t i s h  c o u n t e r p a r t , w a s  t o w a r d s  a  
s y s t e m a t i c  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  ’ p e r s o n a l i t y ’ . T h i s  i s  t h e  c a s e  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  i t s  m o s t  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  e i g h t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ,  C o n d i l l a c ,  w h o s e . e x p  1 i c i t • i n d e b t e d n e s s  t o  
L o c k e  a n d  N e w t o n  s h o u l d  n o t  c o n c e a l  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  h i s  
s e n s a t i o n s a 1 i s m  w a s  v e r y  d i f f e r e e n t  t o  t h e i r s .
T h e  u l t i m a t e  p o i n t  o f  r e f e r e n c e  f o r  C o n d i l l a c ’ s 
’ s y s t e m ’ w a s  t h e  s e n s e  o f  s e l f  w h i c h ,  a s  i n e x p l i c a b l y  a s  
t h e  r e a l i t y  o f  t h e  e x t e r i o r  w o r l d ,  p r e s e n t e d  i t s e l f  t o  u s  
a s  a n  a c c o m p l i s h e d  f a c t , 2 B B u t  u n l i k e  L o c k e ,  o r  D e s c a r t e s ,  
i t s  i m m e d i a c y  c a n n o t  b e  t a k e n  a t  l a c e - v a l u e .  T h e  f a c t  t h a t  
t h e  e x t e r n a l  w o r l d  a p p e a r s  t o  u s  a s  ’ o u t s i d e ’ o u r s e l v e s  
d o e s  n o t  m e a n  t h a t  w e  m u s t  s i m p l y  a c c e p t  t h e  c o n t i n u o u s  
p r e s e n c e  w i t h i n  u s  o f  a n  o b s e r v i n g  s e l f ,  a n y  m o r e  t h a n  i t  
u n a m b i g u o u s l y  ’ p r o v e s ’ t h e  r e a l i t y  o f  s u c h  a n  e x t e r n a l  
r e a l i t y  i t s e l f .  I t  t o o  m u s t  b e  c o n s t r u c t e d  o u t  o f  
s e n s a t i o n s .  P s y c h o l o g y  t h e r e f o r e  b e c o m e s  a  f u n d a m e n t a l  p a r t  
o f  t h e  s t u d y  o f  r e a l i t y ?  a  s t u d y  w h i c h  s h o u l d  a s p i r e  t o  t h e  
s y s t e m a t i c  r a t i o n a l i t y  o f  N e w t o n ’ s d e d u c t i v e  s y s t e m .  . 
C o n d i l l a c  t h e r e f o r e  a i m s  ’ t o  r e d u c e  t o  a  s i n g l e  p r i n c i p l e  
e v e r y t h i n g  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  h u m a n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g ’ . 29 H i s  
a t t a c k  u p o n  m e t a p h y s i c a l  s y s t e m  b u i I d i n g  d i d  n o t  d i m i n i s h  
t h e  c o n f i d e n c e  w i t h  w h i c h  h e  p r o p o s e d  t h e  ’ t r u e ’ 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  ’ s y s t e m  o f  t h e  w o r l d ’ . T h e  m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  
s u b j e c t i v e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  o f  m a t t e r  w e r e  i n t e r e l a t e d  i n  
c o n f o r m i t y  w i t h  a  s i m p l e  u n d e r l y i n g  l a w  s u c h  t h a t  ’ m a n  
h i m s e l f  i s  a  s y s t e m ’ . 30 A n d  i n  r e n o u n c i n g  t h e  a r b i t r a r y
a s s u m p t i o n s  o f  t h e  p h i l c s o p h e r ,  w e  f r e e  o u r s e l v e s  t o  
d i s c o v e r  t h o s e  s y s t e m s  ’ w h i c h  t h e  a u t h o r  o f  n a t u r e  h a s  
m a d e ’ . 31
I n  o r d e r  t o  d e m o n s t r a t e  t h e  i n t e r a c t i v e  r e a l i t y  o f  t h e  
s e n s o r y  w o r l d ,  C o n d i l l a c  c o n d u c t e d  a  ’ t h o u g h t  e x p e r i m e n t ’ . 
He  i m a g i n e d ,  n o t  a  m a n - m a c h i n e ,  h u t  a  ' s t a t u e - m a n '  i n t o  
w h i c h  h e  i n t r o d u c e d  i n  t u r n  t h e  v a r i o u s  s e n s e s  o f  t h e  
e x t e r n a l  w o r l d .  T h i s  c a n  b e  s e e n  a s  a  s y s t e m a t i s a t i o n  o f  
t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  p e r c e p t u a l  w o r l d  o f  t h e  b l i n d ,  o r  t h e  
n e w l y  s i g h t e d ,  w h i c h  h a d  a r o u s e d  c o n s i d e r a b l e  i n t e r e s t  
s i n c e  t h e  w o r k  o f  L o c k e .  3 2  P a r t i c u l a r l y  d e v e l o p i n g  
B e r k e l e y ' s  i n s i g h t  i n t o  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  s i g h t  a n d  
m o v e m e n t ,  C o n d i l l a c  t r i e d  t o  d e v e l o p  a  s e n s a t i o n i s t  
p s y c h o l o g y  t h t  w a s  a t  l e a s t  p h e n o m e n a  1o g i c a 1 1 y  a d e q u a t e  t o  
t h e  r i c h n e s s  o f  h u m a n  p e r c e p t i o n s .
S e n s a t i o n a l i s m ,  i n  s p i t e  o p f  C o n d i l l a c ’ s r i g o u r ,  
p r o v e s  i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  ' t h e  d e s c r i p t i o v e  t a s k .  Mo a c c o u n t  o f  
t h e  i n t e r i o r  w o r l d  o f  s u b j e c t i v i t y  c a n  r e a l l y  b e g i n  u n t i l  
t h e  s e n s o r y  s y s t e m ,  a r t i c u l a t e d  a n d  m u t u a l l y  i n t e r r e l a t e d ,  
i s  a w a k e n e d  t o  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  p l e a s u r e  a n d  p a i n ,  a n d  i n  
s o  d o i n g  c r e a t e  f r o m  w i t h i n  i t s  o w n  i n t e r a c t i o n s  a  
p e r s o n a  1 i  t y  d e p e n d e n t  u p o n  b u t  n o t  r e d u c i b l e  t o  s u c h  
e x p e r i e n c e s . 33 C o n d i l l a c ’ s  s e n s a t i o n a l i s m  a l m o s t  
i m p e r c e p t i b l y  l e a d s  t o  t h e  a s s e r t i o n  o f  t h e  ’ s e l f ’ a s  t h e  
c o n s c i o u s ,  m o r a l  a n d  r a t i o n a l  p r i n c i p l e  o f  t h e  ’ h u m a n  
s y s t e m ' .  L o c k e a n  e m p i r i c i s m  s h a d e s  i n t o  a  n e w  s o l i p s i s t i c
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m e t a p h y s i c s :  ’ w h e t h e r  we  a s c e n d ,  t o  s p e a k  m e t a p h o r i c a l l y ,
i n t o  t h e  h e a v e n s ,  o r  w h e t h e r  we  g o  d o w n  i n t o  t h e  a b y s s ,  we  
n e v e r  l e a v e  o u r s e l v e s :  a n d  w e  n e v e r  p e r c v e i v e  a n y t h i n g  b u t
o u r  o w n  t h o u g h t ’ . 34
T h e  e m e r g e n c e  o f  t h e  ’ s e l f ’ a s  t h e  ’ a c t i v e  p r i n c i p l e ’ 
o f  a  m a t e r i a l i s t  p s y c h o l o g y  w a s  i n e v i t a b l e  o n c e  t h e  
c 1 a s s i f i c a l o r y  d i v i s i o n  b e t w e e n  m a t t e r  - a n d  s p i r i t  ( e x c h a n g e  
a n d  u s e )  h a d  b e e n  e s t a b l i s h e d .  I t  w a s  e x p r e s s e d  l e s s  
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  b u t  m o r e  b r i l l i a n t l y  b y  D i d e r o t  f o r  w h o m  
’ i  n d  i  v  i  d u a 1 i  t y  i s  t h e  s u b j e c t i v i s a t i o n  o f  r e a l i t y ’
r a t h e r  t h a n  s i m p l y  a  ’ f e e l i n g  p o i n t  o f  n a t u r e ’ 3 5 , a n d  l e s s  
b r i l l i a n t l y  b u t  e v e n  m o r e  c o m p r e h e n s i v e l y  b y  d ’ H o l b a c h .  T h e  
l a t t e r  i n d e e e d  g o e s  s o  f a r  a s  t o  p r o p o s e  t h e  ’ s e l f ’ a s  t h e  
g r a v i t a t i o n a l  p r i n c i p l e  o f  t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  w o r l d . 34
R a t h e r  t h a n  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  ’ e x p l a i n ’ s u b j e c t i v i t y  a s  a  
p a r t i c u l a r  e f f e c t  o f  m a t t e r  i n  m o t i o n  -  a s  w e  f i n d ,  f o r  
e x a m p l e ,  i n  H o b b e s ,  a n d '  t h e r e b y  a s s i m i l a t i n g  m a n  t o  a  
u n i v e r s a l  c a t e g o r y  o f  n a t u r e  -  s e n s a t i o n a l i s m  p r o g r e s s i v e l y  
a c c e p t e d  t h e  s e p a r a t e n e s s  o f  h u m a n  n a t u r e  a s  a  ’ s p i r i t u a l ’ 
p h e n o m e n o n .  A s  s u c h  i t  h a d  t o  b e  d e s c r i b e d  a n d  u n d e r s t o o d  
i n  t e r m s  o f  i t s  o w n  i n t e r n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  T h e  h u m a n  
s u b j e c t  t h e n  b e c a m e  a n  i n t e r i o r  c o m s o s ,  a  p s y c h e ,  
q u a l i t a t i v e l y  d i s t i n c t  f r o m  b u t  o r d e r e d  h o m o l o g o u s l y  t o  t h e  
’ s y s t e m  o f  n a t u r e ’ .
Sent imenta
I f  t h e  p e r c e p t u a l  w o r l d  o f  t h e  h u m a n  s u b j e c t  c o u i d  n o t  
b e  r e d u c e d  t o  a  s i m p l e  ’ s t r e a m ’ o f  s e n s a t i o n , . t h e n  n e i t h e r  
c o u l d  i t s  m o r a l  a n d  a e s t h e t i c  d i m e n s i o n s  b e  e x p l a i n e d  
s o l e l y  u p o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  u t i l i t y .  Y e t  i u s t  a s  
s e n s a t i o n a l i s m  a t  f i r s t  s e e m s  t o  b e  t h e  ’ n a t u r a l ’ 
p s y c h o l o g y  o f  t h e  b o u r g e o i s  a g e ,  s o  u t i l i t a r i a n i s m  s e e m s  t o  
e x p r e s s  i t s  i  mm e d  i  a t e  e  t  h i c a  i a s s u m p t i o n s .
S e n s a t i o n a l i s m  i n  p s y c h o l o g y  a n d  u t i l i t a r i a n i s m  i n  
e t h i c s  w e r e  i n  p r a c t i c e  l i n k e d ,  h i s t o r i c a l l y  a n d  
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y ,  t h r o u g h  t h e  p o w e r f u l  a n d  s o m e w h a t  d i f f u s e  
i d e o l o g i c a l  m o v e m e n t  t h a t  d e v e l o p e d  a r o u n d  t h e  n e w  
s c i e n t i f i c  w o r l d v i e w .  I f  t h e  m a t e r i a l  w o r l d  c o u l d  b e  
i n t e l l e c t u a l l y  r e c o n s t r u c t e d  w i t h  r e f e r e n c e  o n l y  t o  t h e  
e s s e n t i a l  q u a l i t i e s  o f  m a t t e r  a n d  m o t i o n ,  a s  D e s c a r t e s  a n d  
H o b b e s  s u p p o s e d ,  t h e n  t h e  i n n e r  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  w o r l d  c o u l d  
b e  f u l l y  e x p l i c a t e d  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  e g o  a l o n e .  T h e  ’ s e l f ’ 
w a s ,  f r o m  o n e  p o i n t  o f  v i e w ,  t h e  e n d  r e s u l t  o f  a  c o m p l e x  
i n t e r a c t i v e  s e n s o r y  p r o c e s s :  b u t  f r o m  a n o t h e r  p o i n t  o f  v i e w  
i t  c o n s t i t u t e d  t h e  e l e m e n t a r y  p a r t i c l e  o f  s o c i a l  l i f e .  T h e  
e s s e n t i a l  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  s e l f ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  m u s t  ’ c o n t a i n ’ 
a l l  t h a t  w a s  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  l o g i c a l  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  
s o c i e t y  a s  a n  o r d e r e d  w h o l e .  S i n c e  t h e  f u n d a m e n t a l  p r o p e r t y  
o f  t h e  s e l f  w a s  a n  e g o ,  t h a t  i s ,  n o t h i n g  o t h e r  t h a n  a n
u n a v o i d a b l e  t e n d e n c y  t o  a c t  i n  c o n f o r m i t y  w i t h  i t s e l f ,  a l l  
h u m a n  a c t i v i t y  c o u l d  b e  g r a s p e d  a s  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  
f u n d a m e n t s .  1 p r  1 n c i  p i e . 37
H o b b e s  p r o p o s e d  a  c o n s i s t e n t  p s y c h o l o g y  o f  t h e  e g o  a s  
p a r t  o f  h i s  g e n e r a l  m a t e r i a l i s t i c  p h i l o s o p h y .  A s  c l e a r l y  a s  
D ’ H o  1 b a c h ♦ t h e  e g o  e m e r g e s  i n  h i s  w o r k  a s  t h e  ’ a c t i v e  
p r i n c i p l e ’ o f  t h e  p s y c h i c  w o r l d ,  t h e  i n v a r i a b l e  r e l a t i o n  
t h r o u g h  w h i c h  t h e  p s y c h e  b e c a m e  c o n s t r u c t e d . 38 T h o u g h  
s y s t e m a t i c  a n d  c o m p e l l i n g ,  H o b b e s i a n  p s y c h o l o g y  d i d  n o t  
b e c o m e  c e n t r a l  t o  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  E n g l i s h  u t i  i i t r i a n i s m .  
H i s  u n c o m p r o m i s i n g  s e c u l a r i s m  w a s  t o o  e a s y  t o  r e j e c t  a n d  i t  
i s  o n i y  i n  r e t r o s p e c t  t n s t  w e  c a n  s p p r e c i a t £  m e  a d e q u a c y  
o f  h i s  v i s i o n  o f  t h e  m a r k e t  a s  a  s u b j e c t i v e  r e a l i t y .  39
I t  w a s  B e r n a r d  M a n d e v i l i e ’ s F a b l e  o f  t h e  B e e s  t h a t  
e s t a b l i s h e d  a  s u c c e s s f u l  t r a d i t i o n  o f  ’ e g o  p s y c h o l o g y ’ i n  
b o u r g e o i s  s o c i a l  t h o u g h t .  I t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  r e a l i s e ,  
h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  j u s t  a s  C o n d i l l a c  o r  L a  M e t t r i e  w e r e  i n t e n t  
u p o n  l a y i n g  b a r e  t h e  s e n s o r y  f  o u n d a t i  o n  o f  t h e  p e r c e p t u a l  
w o r l d ,  s o  M a n d e v i i l e ’ s c o n c e r n  w a s  t h e  e g o i s t i c  r o o t  o f  
mo r a  I a c t ! o n . H e  d i d  n o t  a r  g u e , t  h e r  e f  o r e , t h a t  t e r m s  s u c h  
a s  w i c k e d n e s s  o r  v i c e  w e r e  w i t h o u t  m e a n i n g ,  o n l y  t h a t  
a c t i o n s  s h o u i d  b e  u n d e r s t o o d  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  p r i v a t e  
m o t i v e s  p r o m p t i n g  t h e m  a n d  j u d g e d ,  i n  p a r t  a t  l e a s t ,  f r o m  
t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  f l o w i n g  f r o m  t h e m .  T h e  u s e f u l n e s s  o f  v i c e  
t o  t h e  c o m m u n i t y ,  w h i c h  h e  w a s  a t  p a i n s  t o  d e m o n s t r a t e ,  d i d  
n o t  a b o l i s h  i t s  e t h i c a l  w i c k e d n e s s . 40 N o r  w a s  h i s  a i m  t o
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e x c u s e  t h e  m a n y  v i c e s  w h i c h  w e r e  m a n i f e s t l y  u s e l e s s .  I t  i s  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  r e a d  h i s  w o r k  n o w  w i t h o u t  s e p a r a t i n g  h i s  
’ f u n c t i o n a l i s m ’ ( t h e  u s e f u l n e s s  o f  v i c e )  f r o m  h i s  
u t  i 1 i  t a r  i a n  i s m  p r o p e r  ( t h e  s e 1 f - r e g a r d  i n g  r o  o t  o f  a i l  mo r  a 
1 u  d g m e n  t > . 4 1
H a n d e v i i l e  d e m o n s t r a t e d  a t  g r e a t e r  l e n g t h  a n d  w i t h  
m o r e  v i g o u r ,  i f  n o t  a l w a y s  w i t h  g r e a t e r  s u b t l e t y  t h a n  
a n y o n e  e i s e ,  t h e  s e l f - d e c e p t i o n  o f  ’ c o n v e n t i o n a l ’  m o r a l i t y  
’ T h e  n e a r e r  w e  s e a r c h  i n t o  h u m a n  n a t u r e ,  t h e  m o r e  w e  s h a l l  
b e  c o n v i n c e d ,  t h a t  t h e  m o r a l  v i r t u e s  a r e  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
o f f s p r i n g  w h i c h  f l a t t e r y  b e g o t  u p o n  p r i d e ’ . 47 N o  m a n  i s  
’ p r o o f  a g a i n s t  t h e  w i t c h c r a f t  o f  f l a t t e r y ’ 43 a n d  i t  i s  t h e  
l o v e  o f  s e l f ,  p r i d e ,  w h i c h  i s  t h e  m o s t  p o w e r f u l  o f  h u m a n  
m o t i v e s .  T h e  n e e d  t o  m a i n t a i n  a  g o o d  o p i n i o n  o f  o u r s e l v e s  
i s  a l s o  t h e  m o s t  c i v i l i s i n g  o f  f o r c e s ;  ’ a  d e x t r o u s  
m a n a g e m e n t  o f  o u r  s e l v e s ’ 44 d e p e n d s  n o t  s i m p l y  u p o n  t h e  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  a p p e t i t e s  w h o s e  s o u r c e  l i e s  w i t h i n  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l ,  b u t  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  o u r  a c t i o n s  b e  a p p r o v e d  b y  
o t h e r s .  T o  t h i s  e n d ,  w e  d i s g u i s e  o u r  r e a l  f e e l i n g s  a n d  
c o n t r o l  o u r  s p o n t a n e o u s  i n c l i n a t i o n s :  ’ a  m a n  n e e d  n o t
c o n q u e r  h i s  p a s s i o n s ,  i t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t h a t  h e  c o n c e a l s  
t h e m ’ .43
H a n d e v i i l e  t h e r e f o r e  i n t e r p r e t e d  a 1 1 ’ a l t r u i s t i c ’ 
a c t i o n s  a s  m o t i v a t e d  b y  p r i d e  a n d  s e l f i s h n e s s :  b y  l o v e  o f
p r a i s e  a n d  f e a r  o f  b l a m e .  A c o m p a s s i o n a t e  a c t  w a s  s i m p l y  
i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e  o t h e r  t h a n  a s  a  r e l i e f  o f  t h e  c o n s c i e n c e .
a n d  c o n s c i e n c e  w a s  o n l y  a  m e c h a n i s m  t o  p r e s e r v e  o u r  p r i d e  
u n d e r  t h e  s c r u t i n y  o f  p u b l i c  o p i n i o n .
E e n t h a m ’ s l a t e r  a x i o m a t i s a t i o n  o f  u t i l i t a r i a n i s m  a d d s  
l i t t l e  t h a t  i s  b a s i c a i  i y  n e w ,  e i t h e r  p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  o r  
l o g i c a l l y ,  t o  M a n d e v i l i e ’ s  p r o v o c a t i v e  t e x t ,  i f  ’ t h e  
p r i n c i p l e  o f  u t i i i t v  n e i t h e r  r e q u i r e s  n o r  a d m i t s  o f  a n y  
o t h e r  r e g u l a t o r  t h a n  i t s e l f ’ , t h e n  e v e r y t h i n g  f o l l o w s  a s  a  
m a t t e r  o f  d e f i n i t i o n . 4 * a n d  t h e  t h e o r y  b e c o m e s  a s  
t a u t o l o g i c a l  a s  t h e  a c t i o n  i t  ’ e x p l a i n s ’ . T h e  i n t e r n a l  
w o r l d  o f  t h e  s u b j e c t  i s  o r g a n i s e d  a s  a  ’ s y s t e m ’ o f  e x c h a n g e  
g o v e r n e d  b y  t h e  i n h e r e n t  t e n d e n c y  t o  ’ c o n s e r v e ’ p l e a s u r e .
O b j e c t i o n s  t o  u t i l i t a r i a n i s m ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  w o r k  
o f  S h a f t e s b u r y ,  a n d  t h e  i m p o r t a n t  S c o t t i s h  w r i t e r s  o n  
’ m o r a l  p h i l o s o p h y ’ c e n t r e d  u p o n  t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  
’ p l e a s u r e ’ w i t h  t h e  ’ s e l f ’ . H u m a n  n a t u r e  f r o m  t h i s  
p e r s p e c t i v e  a l s o  a p p e a r e d  t o  b e  w h o l l y  s e l f - r e g a r d i n g ,  b u t  
a g e n e r o u s  d e f i n i t i o n  Of t h e  s e l f  m a d e  t h e  p o i n t  i n  a  l e s s  
c y n i c a l  f  a  s  h i o  n .
S h a f t e s b u r y  i n d e e d ,  m o r e  t h a n  H o b b e s  o r  L o c k e ,  
d e s e r v e s  c r e d i t  a s  ’ t h e  f i r s t  m o r a l i s t  w h o  d i s t i n c t l y  t a k e s  
psycho Iog i ca 1 exper i enee as the basis of e t h i c s ’ .47 
A s s u m i n g  p h i l o s o p h y  t o  b e  ’ t h e  s t u d y  o f  h a p p i n e s s ’ , h e  
r e c o g n i s e s  s e l f - k n o w l e d g e  a n d  s e l f - m a s t e r y  a s  t h e  c e n t r a l  
p r a c t i c a l  a n d  i n t e l l e c t u a l  p r o b l e m s  o f  t h e  a g e . 4B H e  
c r i t i c i s e s  H o b b e s  o n  t h e  g r o u n d s  o f  t h e  l i m i t i n g  c o n c e p t i o n
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o f  m a n  f o r c e d  u p o n  h i m  b y  h i s  d o g m a t i c  m a t e r i a l i s m .  H o b b e s ,  
i  r. f a i l i n g  t o  a c k n o w l e d g e  a n y t h i n g  ’ w h i c h  n a t u r a l l y  d r e w  u s  
t o  t h e  l o v e  o f  w h a t  w a s  w i t h o u t  o r  b e y o n d  o u r s e l v e s ’ , 
p a i n t e d  a n  u n r e a l i s t i c  p r o t r a i t  o f  h u m a n  ' s e l f i s h n e s s . 4 ’  B u t  
’ m o r a l ’ a c t i o n  c o n s i s t e d  l u s t  i n  t h i s  r e a c h i n g  b e y o n d  t h e  
i m m e d i a c y  o f  t h e  s e n s u o u s  s e l f ;  i f  i t  d i d  n o t .  i t  i s  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  s e e  h o w  t h e  l a n g u a g e  o f  m o r a l i t y  c o u l d  h a v e  
d e v e l o p e d .  T h e  u t i l i t a r i a n s  t h u s ,  ’ ’n a v e  m a d e  v i r t u e  s o  
n e c e s s a r y  a  t h i n g ,  a n d  h a v e  t a l k e d  s o  m u c h  o f  i t s  r e w a r d ,  
t h a t  o n e  c a n  h a r d l y  t e l l  w h t  t h e r e  i s  i n  i t ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  
w h i c h  c a n  b e  w o r t h  r e w a r d i n g ’ . 30 W h y  m a k e  a n  a p p e a l  t o  
e t h i c a l  p r i n c i p l e s  i f  a  n a r r o w l y  c o n c e i v e d  n a t u r a l  
p r o p e n s i t y  t o  u t i l i t y  w e r e  i n  f a c t  e x h a u s t i v e  o f  t h e  s t o r e  
o f  h u m a n  m o t i v e s  a n d  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  r e g u l a t e  s o c i a l  
b e a h v i o u r ?  T h e r e  w o u l d  b e  n o  n e e d  t o  d e c e i v e  a n d  f l a t t e r  i f  
a  11 e t h i c a l  a c t i o n  w e r e  a  d i s g u i s e .  I t  i s  o n l y  t h e  
a u t h e n t i c i t y  o f  o u r  m o r a i  s e n s e  w h i c h  m a k e s  h y p o c r i s y  
p  o s s i  b  1 e .
T h e  ’ s e l f ’ , t h a t  i s  t o  s a y ,  i s  n o  m e r e  r e f l e x  o f  a  
p l e a s u r e  p r i n c i p l e ;  o r ,  t o  b e  m o r e  p r e c i s e ,  p l e a s u r e  i s  n o t  
m e r e  s e n s u o u s n e s s .  A n  e t h i c a l  a n d  a e s t h e t i c  s e n s i b i l i t y ,  a s  
m u c h  a s  n a t u r a l  a p p e t i t e ,  m a k e s  d e m a n d s  u p o n  t h e  h u m a n  
s u b j e c t  t h e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  w h i c h  d r a w s  h i m  i n t o  a  s e r i e s  
o f p s ychic  e xc ha n ge s . T h e  s e l f  i s  a n  1n t e r n a  1 c o m s o s a n d  
n o t  a n  ’ a t o m ’ o f  s o c i e t y .  I t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  c o n t i n u a l l y  
p o s s e s s e d  o f  a n  i n n e r  d y n a m i c ,  m o v e m e n t s  t h r o u g h  w h i c h  i t  
s e e k s  t o  ’ c o m p l e t e ’ i t s e l f  a s  a  s y s t e m ,  a n d  ’ t h u s  i s
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e v e r y o n e  c o n v i n c e d  o f  t h e  r e a l i t y  o f  a  b e t t e r  s e l f ” . ' 1 T h e  
s p e c i a l  t a s k  o f  p h i l o s o p h y  i s  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  s u c h  a n  i n w a r d  
d e v e l o p m e n t ,  ’ t o  t e a c h  u s  o u r s e l v e s ,  k e e p  u s  t h e  s e l f - s a m e  
p e r s o n s ,  a n d  s o  r e g u l a t e  o u r  g o v e r n i n g  f a n c i e s ,  p a s s i o n s  
a n d  h u m o u r s ,  a s  t o  m a k e  u s  c o m p r e h e n s i b l e  t o  o u r s e l v e s ,  a n d  
k n o w a b i e  b y  o t h e r  f e a t u r e s  t h a n  t h o s e  o f  b a r e  
c o u n t e n a n c e . ’ 3 2
F r a n c e s  H u t c h e s o n  i n s i s t e d  j u s t  a s  v i g o r o u s l y  u p o n  t h e  
v a r i e t y  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a l  s e n s e s .  B e a u t y ,  a s  w e l l  a s  v i r t u e ,  
i s  a n  i r r e d u c i b l e  a s p e c t  o f  s e l f h o o d  a n d  o n e  w i t h o u t  w h i c h  
o u r  i n t e l l e c t u a l  c a p a c i t y  f o r  r e a s o n  w o u l d  h a r d l y  b e  
r o u s e d .  T h e  n e w  s c i e n t i f i c  w o r l d v i e w  i s  i t s e l f  t h e  f i n e s t  
e x p r e s s i o n  o f  t h e  o r d e r e d  e x p r e s s i o n  o f  t h i s  i n t e r n a l  
s e n s e . 33 T h e  d i s c o v e r y  o f  s u c h  a r d u o u s  a n d  i m p r a c t i c a l  
t r u t h s  o f  r e a s o n ,  w o u l d  n e v e r  r e s u l t  ’ w e r e  w e  n o t  c o n s c i o u s  
t h a t  m a n k i n d  a r e  p l e a s e d  w i t h  t h e m  i m m e d i a t e l y  b y  t h i s  
i n t e r n a l  s e n s e  o f  t h e i r  b e a u t y ’ . 3 * S c i e n c e  c a n n o t  b e  
’ e x p l a i n e d ’ , t h a t  i s  t d  s a y ,  b y  r e f e r e n c e  t o  i t s  p r a c t i c a l  
a d v a n t a g e ,  a n y  m o r e  t h a n  e t h i c a l  c o n d u c t  c a n  b e  g r a s p e d  a s  
e n l i g h t e n e d  s e n s u o u s n e s s .
H u t c h e s o n ’ s m o r a l  t h e o r y  i s  m o r e  f u l l y  d e v e l o p e d  t h a n  
t h a t  o f  S h a f t e s b u r y .  A c c e p t i n g  t h e  r e a l i t y  o f  a n  i n t e r n a l  
m o r a l  s e n s e ,  h e  g o e s  o n  t o  s h o w  t h e  s o c i a l  m e c h a n i s m  
d e v e l o p e d  f r o m  i t .  V i r t u e  c a n  b e  c o n c e p t u a l i s e d  a s  a  ’ g o o d ’ 
p o s s e s s e d  b y  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  t o  t h e  d e g r e e  t o  w h i c h  h e  
r e c e i v e s  t h e  ’ a p p r o b a t i o n ’ o f  o t h e r s .  B u t  u n l i k e  o t h e r
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g o o d s , i t s  a c c u m u l a t i o n ,  e x i s t i n g  i n  t h e  a d m i r a t i o n  o f  
o t h e r s ,  g e n e r a t e s  e m u l a t i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n  e n v y .
H u t c h e s o n ’ s w r i t i n g ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  h i s  c r i t i c a l  a t t a c k  
o n  M a n d e v i l l e 55 w a s  w i d e l y  a d m i r e d  a n d  i n f l u e n c e d  b o t h  H u m e  
a n d  S m i t h .  A n d  i t  i s  i n  S m i t h ’ s T h e o r y  o f  M o r a l  S e n t i m e n t s  
t h a t  b o u r g e o i s  p s y c h o l o g y  c o u l d  b e  s a i d  t o  h a v e  c o m e  o f  
age.
S m i t h  a d m i t s  t h a t  ’ e v e r y  m a n  i s  n o  d o u b t ,  b y  n a t u r e ,  
f i r s t  a n d  p r i n c i p a l l y  r e c o m m e n d e d  t o  h i s  o w n  c a r e ’ a n d  
t h a t  a  ’ r e g a r d  t o  o u r  o w n  p r i v a t e  h a p p i n e s s  a n d  i n t e r e s t ’ 57  
i s  a  n e c e s s a r y  e l e m e n t  i n  v i r t u e .  Y e t  u t i l i t y  c a n n o t  w h o l l y  
a c c o u n t  f o r  a n y  o f  o u r  a c t i o n s :  ’ H o w  s e l f i s h  s o e v e r  m a n  m a y
b e  s u p p o s e d , t h e r e  a r e  e v i d e n t l y  s o m e  p r i n c i p l e s  i n  h i s  
n a t u r e ,  w h i c h  i n t e r e s t  h i m  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  o f  o t h e r s ,  a n d  
r e n d e r  t h e i r  h a p p i n e s s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  h i m ,  t h o u g h  h e  d e r i v e s  
n o t h i n g  f r o m  i t  e x c e p t  t h e  p l e a s u r e  o f  s e e i n g  i t ’ . 5S T h e  
c o r e  o f  m o r a l  l i f e  i s  s y m p a t h y ; t h a t  i s ,  a  s p o n t a n e o u s  
’ f e l l o w - f e e l i n g ’ i n  t h e  s p e c t a c l e  o f  l i f e .  ’ W h a t e v e r  i s  t h e  
P a s s i o n  w h i c h  a r i s e s  f  r o m  a n y  o h  i s e t  i n  t h e  p e r  s o n  
p r i n c i p a l l y  c o n c e r n e d ,  a n  a n a l a g o u s  e m o t i o n  s p r i n g s  u p .  a t  
t h e  t h o u g h t  o f  h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  i n  t h e  b r e a s t  o f  e v e r y  
a t t e n t i v e  s p e c t a t o r ’ . 57 T h i s  c l e a r l y  i s  a  p r i n c i p l e  w h i c h  
c o u l d  p l a y  l i t t l e  p a r t  i n  t h e  m o r a l  l i f e  o f  f e u d a l i s m  a n d  
c o n t a i n s  a n  i m p l i c i t  a s s u m p t i o n  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  f r e e d o m  u p o n  
a  m a r k e t .  S y m p a t h y  i s  f o u n d e d  u p o n  t h e  f o r m a l  e q u a l i t y  a n d  
t h e  q u a l i t a t i v e  i n d i f f e r e n c e  o f  t h e  p e r s o n a l i t y .  T h e
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i n d i v i d u a l  ’ i m a g i n e s ’ t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  w h i c h  h e  p e r c e i v e s  
a n o t h e r  a n d  e x p e r i e n c e s ,  a s  a  r e s u l t  t h e  s e n t i m e n t s  
a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  s u c h  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  I t  i s  n o t  a  d i r e c t  
i m i t a t i o n  o f  a n o t h e r ’ s p a s s i o n s ;  t h e  s i g h t  o f  a  l u n a t i c ,  
f o r  e x a m p l e ,  m a y  a r o u s e  i n t e n s e  s o r r o w  i n  t h e  o b s e r v e r ,  
i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  t h e  m a n i f e s t  f e e l i n g  o f  t h e  m a d m a n . 60
A p a r t  t h e r e f o r e  f r o m  s e n s u o u s  s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  ’ n o t h i n g  
p l e a s e s  u s  m o r e  t h a n  t o  o b s e r v e  i n  o t h e r  m e n  a  f e l l o w -  
f e e l i n g  w i t h  a l l  t h e  e m o t i o n s  o f  o u r  o w n  b r e a s t ’ . 61 T h e  
f o r m a t i o n  o f  t h e  s e l f  i n  i t s  b r o a d e s t  s e n s e  i s  a n  
i n t e r s u b  1 e c t i v e  p r o c e s s  a n d  i s  i t s e l f  a  s o u r c e  o f  p l e a s u r e  
i n g e p e n o e n t  o f  t h e  e m o t i o n a l  ’ c o n t e n t ’ o f  t h e  f e e l  i n g t i  i t  
s e t s  i n  m o t i o n .  T h e  m u t u a l i t y  o f  s y m p a t h y  i s  t h u s  t h e  
g r o u n d  u p o n  w h i c h  w e  u r g e  o u r  s o r r o w s  u p o n  o t h e r s  s i n c e ,  i n  
a r o u s i n g  t h e i r  - f e l l o w - f e e l i n g ,  w e  r e d u c e  o u r  s u f f e r i n g  b y  
t h e  a d d i t i o n  o f  a  f r e s h  s o u r c e  o f  p l e a s u r e . 62 F u r t h e r m o r e ,  
a s  a n o t h e r  c a n n o t  f u l l y  e x p e r i e n c e  t h e  i n t e n s i t y  o f  o u r  o w n  
e m o t i o n s ,  w e  w i l l ,  i n  e n l i s t i n g  t h e  c o n s o l t i o n s  o f  f e l l o w -  
f e e l i n g ,  m o d e r a t e  t h e  v i o l e n c e  o f  o u r  o w n  p a s s i o n s . 63  
S y m p a t h y ,  t h e  m u t u a l  i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e  o f  s e l v e s ,  p r o v i d e s  
Sm i  t  h w i  t  h  a  r e g u l a t o  r y  mo t  i  v e  mo r  e  p o w e r  f  u 1 t h a n  a n y  
i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c  c a l c u l u s  o f  u t i l i t y .  I f  p l e a s u r e  d e p e n d s  
upon the feIings of others, then the ’c i v i l i s e d ’ restraint 
o f  c o n d u c t  t h r o u g h  m o r a l  c o d e s  b e c o m e s  i m m e d i a t e l y  
c o m p r e h e n s i b l e .  T h e r e  i s  a n  i n h e r e n t  ’ e c o n o m y ’ o f  p l e a s u r e  
w h i c h  t e n d s  t o w a r d s  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n  o f  s e l f h o o d  a s  p e r s o n a l  
i  d e n  t  i  f  i  c a 1 1o n  w i  t  h s u  c h  c o d e s .  T h e  ’ p e r s o n ’ i s  t h u s
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c o n c e i v e d  a s  t h e  m o r a l  c o n s i s t e n c y  r u n n i n g  t h r o u g h  
i  n n u m e r a b 1e f o r  ms o f  s u b  1 e c t  i v  i  t y , g u i d i n g  t  h e  ’ e h o  i c e s ’ 
e n a c t e d  i n  i n d i v i d u a l  b e h a v i o u r .
S m i t h  m a k e s  s y m p a t h y  t h e  o r g a n i s i n g  p r i n c i p l e  o f  h i s  
p s y c h o l o g y ,  d e d u c i n g  f r o m  i t  t h e  n a t u r a l i s t i c  d e t a i l  o f  
p e r s o n a l  l i f e  t h a t  i s  c o n s p i c u o u s l y  a b s e n t  f r o m  t h e  
s e n s a t i o n a l i s t  t r a d i t i o n . 6 * T h e  p s y c h e  b e c o m e s  a n  i n t e r n a l  
m a r k e t  i n  s e n t i m e n t s .  S e l f h o o d  i s  a  t e n d e n c y  t o  p l e a s u r e ,  
t o  t h e  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  a p p r o b a t i o n  a n d  v i r t u e ,  a l l  o f  w h i c h  
d e p e n d s  u p o n  t h e  e x c h a n g e  o f  s e n t i m e n t s .  S e n t i m e n t s ,  we  
m i g h t  s a y ,  a r e  t h e  c o m m o d i t i e s  o f  t h e  p s y c h i c  w o r l d ,  w h o s e  
c i  r  c u 1 a t  i o n  i  s g o v e r  n e d  b y  a n  i  n t e r n a i  1 a w  o f  g r a v i t y  t h a t  
w e  e x p e r i e n c e  a s  p e r s o n a l  i d e n t i t y : 65 t h e  i n t e r n a l  ’ m a s s ’ , 
o r  s e r i o u s n e s s  o f  t h e  p e r s o n a l i t y .
T h i s  p s y c h o l o g y  i s  n o t  s i m p l y  ’ f i t t e d ’ t o  a  g e n e r a l  
i d e o l o g i c a l  v i e w  o f  m o d e r n  s o c i e t y  a s  t h e  l i b e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  
u n i v e r s a l  s u b j e c t  f r o m  ' t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  o f  f e u d a l  
p a r t i c u l a r i s m :  i t  ’ a c c o u n t s ’ f o r  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  s o c i a l
f e a t u r e s  o f  c a p i t a l i s m .  S y m p a t h y  i s  a n  a s y m e t r i c  p r i n c i p l e ,  
s i n c e  ’ m a n k i n d  a r e  d i s p o s e d  t o  s y m p a t h i s e  m o r e  e n t i r e l y  
w i t h  o u r  j o y  t h a n  w i t h  o u r  s o r r o w ’ , a n d  b e c a u s e  o f  t h i s  ’ w e  
m a k e  p a r a d e  o f  o u r  r i c h e s ,  a n d  c o n c e a i  o u r  p o v e r t y ’ . 66 T h e  
S c o t t i s h  S c h o o l ,  w i t h  t h e i r  o r i g i n a l  h i s t o r i c a l  
p e r s p e c t i v e ,  h a d  s h o w n  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  n o t h i n g  ’ n a t u r a l ’ i n  
m a n ’ s d e s i r e  f o r  r i c h e s  a n d  S m i t h  c o n c u r r e d :  ’ w h a t  i s  t h e
e n d  o f  a v a r i c e  a n d  a m b i t i o n ,  o f  t h e  p u r s u i t  o f  w e a l t h ,  o f
■ib /
p o w e r , a n d  p r e e m i n e n c e ? ’ h e  a s k s . 67 O u r  l o v e  o f  c o m m o d i  t  i  e s  
i s  s t i m u l a t e d  b y  s o m e t h i n g  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  m a t e r i a l  b e n e f i t s  
t h e y  m i g h t  b e s t o w :  ’ t o  b e  o b s e r v e d ,  t o  b e  a t t e n d e d  t o ,  t o
b e  t a k e n  n o t i c e  o f  w i t h  s y m p a t h y ,  c o m p l a c e n c y ,  a n d  
a p p r o b a t i o n ,  a r e  a  i I t h e  a d v a n t a g e s  we  c a n  p r o p o s e  t o  
derive from i t ’.68 It is to d isting ui sh himself that the 
r i c h  m a n  d i s p l a y s  h i s  w e a l t h :  h e  ’ g l o r i e s  i n  h i s  r i c h e s ,
b e c a u s e  h e  f e e l s  t h a t  t h e y  n a t u r a l l y  d r a w  u p o n  h i m  t h e  
a t t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  w o r l d ’ . 67 T h e  i n d i v i d u a l  s e e k s  t o  c o m p l e t e  
h i s  p e r s o n a l i t y  b y  b e c o m i n g  ’ d i s t i n g u i s h e d ’ f r o m  a l l  
o t h e r s .  T h i s  i s  a  p r o c e s s  m o r e  e a s i l y  a n d  g e n e r a l l y  
a c c o m p l i s h e d  i n d i r e c t l y ,  n o t ,  t h a t  i s  t o  s a y ,  b y  a r o u s i n g  
t h e  s e n t i m e n t s  o f  o t h e r s  t o  t h e  p e r s o n a l i t y  i t s e l f  s o  m u c h  
a s  t o  i t s  h a l o  o f  c o m m o d i t i e s . 70 A n d  a s  o u r  a p p e t i t e  f o r  
d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  i n  p r i n c i p l e  u n l i m i t e d ,  t h e r e  i s  n o  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  d e m a n d  f o r  c o m m o d i t i e s .
D e s  i  r e
T h e  v a . r  i  o u s  t  r a d  i  t  i  o n s  o f  b o u  r  g e o  i  s p s y c h o  i o g y . 
s e n s a t i o n a l i s t  m a t e r i a l i s m ,  u t i l i t a r i a n i s m ,  t h e  t h e o r y  o f  
m o r a l  s e n t i m e n t s ,  a i l  h a d  a s  t h e i r  c o m m o n  f o c u s  t h e  
e m e r g e n c e  o f  t h e  ’ s e l f ’ a s  a  c e n t r a l  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  a n d  
p r a c t i c a l  i s s u e .  T h e  s e l f ,  h o w e v e r ,  w h a t e v e r  t h e  m a n n e r  o f  
t h e  a p p r o a c h ,  r e l a t e d  t h e  b l a n d i s h m e n t s  o f  r e a s o n .  
S h a t e s b u r y  i n d e e d  h a d  t a k e n  t h i s  i n s p i r e d  c o y n e s s  t o  b e  i t  
h a l l m a r k . 71 P e r s o n a l  i d e n t i t y  l a y  not m e r e l y  b e y o n d  t h e
r e a c h  o f  a c c u r a t e  c o n c e p t u a l i s a t i o n ,  b u t  a l s o  a g g r a v a t i n g 1y  
e v a d e d  i t s  o w n  e x i s t e n c e .  M o r e  o f t e n  t h a n  n o t  i t  r e f u s e d ,  
a s  i t  w e  r  e , t o  c  r  y s t a l  ! i s e  w i t  h i n  t h e  f l u x  o f  s u  b  1 e c t  i v i  t  y . 
We c o u l d  h a r d l y  d o u b t  i t s  r e a l i t y ,  s i n c e  o u r  e x p e r i e n c e  w a s  
a p p a r e n t l y  f o u n d e d  u p o n  i t s  c o n t i n u o u s  p r e s e n c e 7 2 , a n d  y e t  
i t  w a s  n e v e r  p r e s e n t  t o  u s  i n  i t s  c o m p l e t e n e s s .
T h e  r o m a n t i c  u r g e  t o  g r a s p  t h e  s e l f  i n  i t s  e n t i r e t y  
e x p o s e d  t h e  i m p o s s i b l e  d e p t h  o f  u n i v e r s a l  s u b j e c t i v i t y .  A s  
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  w a s  a n  i n n e r  c o s m o s ,  e a c h  w a s  a s  u n b o u n d e d  
a s  t h e  u n i v e r s e  G f  o b j e c t i v e  a n d  ’ a b s o l u t e ’ s p a c e  a n d  t i m e .  
T h e  s e l f ,  a s  o n e  p o s s i b l e  a r r a n g e m e n t  o f  s u b j e c t i v i t y ’ s 
i n f i n i t e  v a r i e t y ,  c o u l d  b e  u n d e r s t o o d  ( a s  t h e  u n i v e r s e  w a s  
u n d e r s t o o d )  a s  t h e  c o n t i n u o u s  o p e r a t i o n  o f  a  s p e c i f i c  
m e c h a n i s m  r a t h e r  t h a n  a s  a  p a r t i c u l a r  a r r a n g e m e n t  o f  
e l e m e n t s  o r  p a r t s .  A s s o c i a t i o n i s m ,  u t i l i t y  a n d  m o r a l  
s e n s i b i l i t y  w e r e  t h e r e f o r e  a t t e m p t s  t o  o u t l i n e  t h e  M a w s  o f  
t h e  p s y c h e ’ r a t h e r  t h a n  t o  p r o v i d e  a  ’ p h e n o m e n o l o g y ’ o f  t h e  
s u b j e c t .
T h e  p e r p e t u a l  i n c o m p l e t e n e s s  o f  t h e  s e l f ,  w h i c h  i s  t h e
hi dden mot ive of bourgeois  p s y c h o 1o g y , * o  ^  +  r l  c ,  o  •-i S Ufcs L Lit!1--s c r i b e d  a s
desire. If pleasure is the pursuit of the ego, desire is 
t h e  e n d l e s s  q u e s t  f o r  t h e  s e l f  i n  i t s  ’ f i n i s h e d ’ f o r m .  T h e  
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  i n f i n i t e  i n  w h i c h  t h e  s u b j e c t i v i t y  o f  
h a p p i n e s s  r e s t e d  i s  t r a n s f o r m e d  i n t o  t h e  p e r p e t u a l  t o r m e n t  
o f  t h e  s e l f ’ s s e a r c h  f o r  c o n c r e t e  ’ a u t h e n t i c i t y ’ . T h e  
d i s c o v e r y  o f  o u r  o w n  p e r s o n a l i t y ,  i t s  e m e r g e n c e  a s  a  w h o l l y
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determinate and n e c e s s a r y  structure, becomes the 
’r e l i g i o u s ’ duty of the bour geois i n d i v i d u a l . 73 This is s. 
discovery of ’ i n w a r d n e s s ’ and inev itably so as the ’double 
f r e e d o m ’ of c a p i ta lism extends to each individual an 
identical legal and political identity. The act of 
di stingu ishing one person from another, in a c o n dition  of 
ideal ’e q u a l i t y ’, must ther efo re be the work of an interior 
personality. The endless vari ety of such per sona lities  is 
the corol lary of the comple te inner freedom of 
subjectivity. In reaching beyond itself, hopelessly, to 
complete itself, the incipient ’s e l f ’ p r o g r es si vely 
discounts ali the per sonal it ies which it is n o t . 74
The self as a re lation of desire, a segment of the 
infinite interior freedom of the subject, is an a s s u m p t i o n  
of bou rgeois p sychol og y u n e x am in ed by the majority  of its 
conventional practitioners. It is hinted at in H u m e ’s 
scepticism and ag onis ed  over by Rousseau. Perhaps only in 
Hegel does it become the f ou ndation  for a sy stematic 
re construct ion of reality.
In a famous passage in the P h e n o m e n o 1ogy Hegel 
analyses the growth of s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s  as a d i a le ctic of 
desire.
Simple und i f f e r e n t i a t e d  consciousness, the ’ I’, which is 
’absolute m e d i a t i o n ’75 consc ious of itself on 1y as the 
immediacy of the given world, as the ’dizziness of a 
perpetually s e 1f-enge nd ered d i s o r d e r ’ ,76 postulat es itself
as a coherent structure by desire. The more it desires the 
more concrete and s p e ci fic it becomes. Desire is the 
specific mode of ex is tence of the self.
In desiring c om moditie s the self seeks to confirm  
itself as dis tinct  from any other self, but what it seeks 
in any object is the spiritual reality which lies at its 
core. The original di s o r d e r e d  state of s u b j e ctivit y 
’alienates' itself into such material forms in order that, 
in re cog nising and re in co r p o r a t i n g  itself within its own 
personality, it can define  its uniqueness. In seeking 
commodities, that is to say, it seeks itself. It seeks 
itself with even greater ur ge ncy in the ’p u r e s t ’ of its
alienated forms, as another person. To become
’ I’ must engage itself in a r elatio ns hip of mutual 
r e c o g niti on .77 It des ires the desire of another, and 
becomes itself only by tra nsce nding  all other, animal, 
n e eds. 76
In spite of the groundless freedom of subjectivity, 
the personal it y ’e m e r g e s ’ by a n i mm a n e nt and a b so i u t e 1y 
necessary process of unfolding. H e g e l ’s ph e n o m e n o l o g y  is a 
philosophical d e s c r i p t i o n  of this process. The self, in it 
co m p 1e t e d , ratio n a 1 f o rm (w hi c h i n b e c om i ng p h i 1oso phi c a i 1 
possible becomes also, for Hegel, a practical reality) is 
after all a kind of duplica te  of the ’world s y s t e m ’ . It is 
-first of all, a system: in H e g e l ’s terminology, pure
mediation. The self is ’all of a p i e c e ’ , its various
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d if fe re n t i a t i o n s  so many aspects of a to tal ity recovera ble 
from any starting point. It is therefo re ’r a t i o n a l ’ . Its 
devel opm ent through a series of dialectical steps or 
’n e g a t i o n s ’ , its p r o g r ess iv e ’o t h e r n e s s ’ is an inevitable, 
se lf- moving sequence of forms. It is a system u n d e rsto od  in 
terms of a simple u n d e rl ying principle, desire, rather than 
a fixed empi r icaI ar range ment of par t s . Desire, we m i ght 
say, is the gravity of the self: it is what lends weight to
the p e r s o nali ty  and fills it with content.
This is not to suggest of course that there is no 
differenc e b e t ween a Hegeli an  and a u t i l i t a r i a n  ap p r o a c h  to 
the nature of indivi duated sub 1ect ivi t y . Such a content i on 
would be absurd. Yet they are linked as two of the 
logically and existentiaI 1y possi ble versions of bourge oi s  
selfhood. Neither are co mpre h e n s i b l e  wi thin the c o s molo gy  
of fun or happiness. What all the trad ition s of bourge oi s  
ps yc hology seek above all is c o n f i r m a t i o n  of con sc ious  
s e l f h o o d . 79 And the route to conscious selfhood is through 
completion of the ’p s y c h i c ’ system. This system can be 
viewed in a number of different ways; as the complex 
inters 1 at ions of ’ i r r i t a b l e ’ matter, the netw ork of 
utilitar ian calculations, the reflexive judgments of 
'a p p r o b a t i o n ’ , . or the dialectics of ’o t h e r n e s s ’. Each 
tends, in its o w n w a y , t o p r o g r- e s s i v e 1 y h i g h e r 1 e v els o f 
internal orga n i s a t i o n  that culm in ate in se lf -consc io usness.
THE SYSTEM OF THE WORLD
The substantial unity of psyche and cosmos, whether- a 
the undivided immediacy of fun or as the sy mbolic  identity 
of happiness, was shattered  by the new realit y of 
capitalism. Two separate realms of being disen t a n g l i n g  
themselves from the co nfusions of the p r e m o d e r n  world vi ew 
confro nte d each other in suspicious  silence. Nature  at las 
exercised its claim to an independent existence, and in so 
doing exhausted  the world of its material content. The 
human subject, no longer d istrac te d by its im plicati on  in 
purely natural cate go ries (its embodiment), co unted this a 
a release rather than a loss.
Both cosmos and psyche, that is to, say were subject 
to an infinitising movement. The boun d e d n e s s  and fixity of 
the symbolic universe, its mi nute ly  regul ated hie r a r c h y  of 
parts, was o verw he lmed by a new universality. The order o 
the world could no longer be conceived as a ’ logic of 
p l a c e ’ . Rather nature had to be seen as an i nconcei va bly 
com plicated me ch anism whose cohe re nce derived from its own 
indwelling lawfulness. Matter e v e r yw here was the same.
Nature anywhere, to exist as nature, had to conform to a 
few simple formal rules. These rules could be expressed  
with perfect clar ity in a ma thematical form. The subject 
similarly, to exist as subject, had ever ywh ere to be the 
same. It was not just some vague ’ l e f t - o v e r ’ from the 
realm of nature. Subjectivity, d i s c ov er ing its proper 
domain of ’ i n w a r d n e s s ’ , d iscov er ed its own infinity. And, 
in order to guarantee its c o h e ren ce  a similar lawfulness 
must regulate its interior interactions, and provide it 
with its own, non-material, mechanism.
It is misleading, therefore, to view the classical 
bourgeois picture of the world as split be tw een on the one 
hand a ’r a t i o n a l ’ , objec ti ve and universal nature, and on 
the other an ’i r r a t i o n a l ’, subj ectiv e and particu lar  
psyche. Cosmos and psyche it is true be come qu a l i t a t i v e l y  
distinct. All att em pts ’s c i e n t i f i c a l l y ’ to reduce one to 
the other, or ’m e t a p h y s i c a l l y ’ to force them to merge, 
failed. Yet this di ff erence  cannot be repres ented as the 
di sti nction bet ween the rational and the nonrational world.
The ’m e c h a n i s m ’ of na ture could not be immediat ely 
appre hen ded but, in princi pl e at least, could be ea sil y 
understood. Matter, guided by ineluctbl e necessity, 
interacted in a co mp licat ed  fash ion to produce effects of 
which we became con scious as the phenomenal world. The 
psyche was not itself a division wi thin this world of 
exterior n a t u r e . But its ov/n inexh au stible inner- va ri ety
was ordered by a ’mechanism* proper to itself. Ue 
experience this m e ch an  ism dir ectly  as the pursuit of 
pleasure. P l e asu re  is the spontaneou s tendency, and 
inherent orga n i s i n g  pri nc iple of the psyche. Its effects 
become visible, to ou rse lve s and to others, as the 
i nd i v i d u a 1 and par t i c u 1ar chara cter istics of per s o n a 1 
identity. ’R e a s o n ’ and ’p a s s i o n ’ wi thin  the individual are 
opposed in just the same way as the c o m p l exities  of real 
events may obsc ure or even ’c o n t r a d i c t ’ the direct 
consequence s of a simple ’ law of n a t u r e ’ . The m e c h a n i s m  of 
pleasure, however, cannot any more than the law of gravity, 
be revoked.
The purs uit  of pleasure has no th in g to do with 
sensuous gratification. It is a m e c h a n i s m  of individua tio n; 
the principle by which the self emerges from the flux of 
consciousness. And the laws of na ture are not th em selve s 
’m a t e r i a l ’, but the principle in terms of which we ’make 
s e n s e ’ of matter. Neither di re ctly appreh en ds the pure 
’s u b s t a n c e ’ of either nature or consciousness. The 
organising princi pl es of m e c ha nism and egoism are therefo re  
’r a t i o n a l ’ abstractions.
The ’t h e o r e t i c a l ’ sciences of the bourgeois  era, 
unc omf ortably  con sc ious of a gulf be tween object and 
subject inadvi sedly sought to span the abyss with a yet 
more abstra ct system of philosophical categories. But 
there was no need. The social relations of capitalism, the
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forma tio n of the c o m mo dity world, had done the job for 
them. The c o m m o d i t y  was itself an abstraction, an object 
drained of qualities. It was its u n i v e r s a l i t y  and neces sity  
that the sc ientis t and the psy ch ol ogist had red isco vered in 
the rational m e c h an is ms of nature and subjectivity.
The c o m m o d i t y  world furnished the sciences with a new 
social logic; one of individuated ’o b j e c t s ’ , d i f fe ri ng only 
by quant i tat i v-e criteria, and in ter acting upon a universal 
’m a r k e t ’ of pure dim ensionality, a c c ording  to strict rules 
of causality. Consequently, the phi loso ph er who sought to 
reunite the .disparate realms of object and subject, 
succeeded only in hypos t a t i s i n g  the commodity. And since 
the c o m m o d i t y  ’thinks for i t s e l f ’, there was a real sense 
in which p h i l o s o p h y  had be come redundant.
Yet, however much the bourg eoi s sciences made sense 
only within the con text of a new universal social logic, 
the initial steps beyond its ’system of the w o r l d ’ took the 
form of di sm a n t l i n g  the c o m m o d i t y ’s met aphysical a 1ter e g o .
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PART FOUR
EXCITEM EN T
’How should exp lan ation s he 
first t urn eve ry thing into a n
r r i e a n c n  N i  e r z s c n s
a z 
i ma
a l l  p o s s i b l when
u u : i  ma:
TEN
TOWARDS A C R I T I Q U E  OF BOU R G E O I S  PSYCHOLOGY-
The classical bour ge ois w o r ld vi ew can be u nd er stood as 
a process of individuation, as the pursuit of pleasure. The 
pursuit of pleasur e is the pursuit of the self; and the 
self, like the cosmos, is a system of relations tending 
towards a uniqu e equilibrium. This has long since ceased 
to be a pla usible view of either psyche or cosmos. The 
pre-eminence of the c 1 as s i c a 1 bourgeois w o r 1dvlew 
(mechanism and.egoism) can claim an historical validity  
indeed for little more than a hundred and fifty y e a r s . 1 The 
cultural history of cap ita li sm since the m i d - n i n e t e e n t h  
csntury has been one of oisintegration. It is a process 
which, still continuing, does not allow us to adopt a 
position ’b e y o n d ’ its own a p p a r e n t l y  aim less course. There 
is no vantage point from which to obse rve its b ewilde ri ng 
succession of ’s t y l e s ’. No way to avoid being caught- up  
in (or caug ht-ou t by) its next convulsion.
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We are p ar ad oxical ly  the refore still firmly routed in 
the very wor ld view we have come to despise. Or, which is 
the same thing, it is still firmly rooted in us. No longer 
con vinced of the po ss i b i l i t y  of a complete and consistent 
’system of the w o r l d ’ we none thele ss  have to behave as if 
we did. All our cri ticisms turn into s e 1f- ac cusations and 
dissolve. The bo urg eoi s wor ld view is as it were carried 
forward into the heart of the ’m o d e r n ’ world, the world 
which s h o u 1d have replaced it, and f inding it h e a r 1 1 ess 
took root again. . Strangely, the bo urgeois  wo r l d v i e w  has 
come to cont ain its own future. Pe rhaps we should not be 
surprised it contains after all both its past (happiness) 
and its opposite (fun).2
More oddly still (modern c r i t icism cannot have too 
much of this sort of thing), its future is cont ai ned in its 
own p a s t ! We f i n d , in Monta i gne or C e r v a n t e s , for example, 
at the dawn of the bourgeois world, all the elements  of 
corroded s ubje ct ivity we have come to love in its 
afterlife.2
The problem of ’ i d e n t i t y ’ which is central to 
Montaigne is not, thus, a biographical struggle  towards the 
’r e a l i s a t i o n ’ of the unique value of an individual. The 
’s e l f ’ emerges only to dissolve, existin g s e p a ra tely and 
incoherently in the moments il lumin ated by an un r e l i a b l e  
memory. Human personal ity has emer ged  as the pri vileg ed  
’s u b j e c t ’ of world history, but is still free of all
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h i s tor ica i d e t e r m i n a n t s . The author exists then in a void; 
s e 1f-d etermin in g and s e 1f - d e c e i v i n g .4 There is no standard 
of val i d a t i o n  aga inst which the self can test itself. Any 
apparent norm is in the final analysis self-generating.
It was not in fact in this rad ic al ly so li p s i s t i c  form 
that the bourge oi s ego emerged on to the world stage. It 
was rather as an unc om p 1icated union of reason and desire 
(as pleasure) that the ego made its appearance. It is 
almost as if Montaigne, a nticipa ti ng three hundred years of 
brutal self-abuse, had leapt to the farther side of the 
bourgeois world to des cri be the inner d e c o m p o s i t i o n  of what 
hardly yet existed. Of course it was just bec aus e the order 
of cap it al ism was not yet visible, while the col la pse of 
feudalism was only too apparent, that M o n t a i g n e ’s 
psyc hol ogy bears such a striking re se mblance to the most 
advanced of ’m o d e r n ’ w r i t e r s . 5
It is simi larly  tempting to read Giord an o B r u n o ’s La 
cena de le ceneri as an ’a n t i c i p a t i o n ’ of the th eory of 
r e l a ti vi ty;6 as if, immediately prior to the long tour of 
classical science, a p r e m a tu re ly ’m o d e r n ’ c o s m o l o g y  had
been stillborn. Indeed, from the per spectiv e of the 
present, there is much that is familiar in the Renaissance, 
more,it often seems, than can be found in the e x h a u s t i n g  
’p r o g r e s s ’ of reason during the eigh t e e n t h  and muc h of the 
ni net eenth centuries. But we should not be misled. Theirs 
is a contest be tw een fun and happiness; a r e d i s c o v e r y  of
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the ine xhaustible t r a n s fo rm ative power of subject iv ity  
released at last from the eti quet te  of a spiritual quest. 
The real struggle, however, was be tw een happiness and 
pleasure, which could have but one result. ’M o d e r n i t y ’ is 
neither of these: nor is it a c ompetit io n between pleasure 
and ’somet hing e l s e ’ . It does not ch all enge reality, it is 
not antagonistic. It is nothing but decayed pleasure and 
quite harmless. A ce rtain a im lessnes s and love of paradox 
is hardly suff icien t to join us once agai n to the premodern 
world. We only notice these sim ila ritie s to convince 
ourselves of our own intellectual freedom.
We cannot th ere fore date the advent of ’m o d e r n ’ 
cosmology from what appears, in retrospect, to be its 
initial spokesmen: any more than we might claim Democr i tus 
as the real founder of classical atomism.
Nor should we begin with the spectacula r changes in 
the physical sciences, as if they were propelled by some 
internal dynamo of their own. Both h is to ricall y and 
conceptually, it is safer to look for the origins of 
modern culture in the ’h u m a n ’ sciences. Tr a n s f o r m a t i o n s  of 
culture are always complex and many sided. At this point 
we can simply continue with the story. In the hist ory of 
human subjectivity, what has been the fate of the purs uit 
of pleasure?
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Despai r
In the writings of S^ren Kie r k e g a a r d  can be found the 
first c o m p r ehen si ve and critical ’d e p t h ’ psyc holog y of the 
bourgeois e r a . 7 It is a critical p s y c holog y in a rather 
special sense. The general as su mptions  of his writings, as 
of his life, are just those i n s t i t u tional is ed with the 
d eve lopment  -of capitalism. An ’ i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c ’ psyc hol ogy 
is therefore as central to Ki er k e g a a r d  as it was to Adam 
Smith. He takes ,quite serio usly the o b l i g a t i o n  to become 
that ’single i n d i v i d u a l ’ which is his un iq ue p o s s i b i l i t y . 8 
So wh ol e h e a r t e d  is his commitmen t to the ideals of the age 
that his suffering  for them exposes their cruelty. Of 
course he misjudges  his age, importing into it the ab sol ute 
demands of an older t r a d i t i o n . 9 For all his love of 
paradox, he fails to see one of the most fundamental of 
modern contrad ictio ns: the absolut e demand to be 
hypocritical. K i e r k e g a a r d ’s ’e r r o r ’ was to take life 
seriously, to seek the re al i s a t i o n  of a value in himself. 
Modern values, however, are to be talked about rather than 
realised. For ail that, indeed because of it, K i e r k e g a a r d 
is an unr iva ll ed  guide to the pitfal ls of personal 
existence. Taking the urge to i n d i v iduat io n to an 
extremety he displays for us the formal i mpossi bi lity of 
the ’s e l f ’ and incidentally  exposes the (less harrowing) 
difficu lti es faced by the mu ndane ’e g o ’ .
Uhat is at issue, for K ier ke gaard a life and death
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issue, is not whether from some other point of view the 
self- evi dent ’r a t i o n a l i t y ’ of bou rg eois culture might 
appear grotesque or absurd, but rather, given this 
fundamental reality, what does it mean for an individual, 
personal existence?
K i e r k e g a a r d ’s a s t o nish in g insight into the 
incompleteness and co nt radi c t o r i n e s s  of the bourgeois 
psyche has two obvious and equally important s o u r c e s . 10 
One is the p hilosop hy  of Hegel, p a r t i c u l a r l y  the 
Phenomena 1ogy to which, in common with many other radical 
intellectuals, he re sponded during the 1 8 4 0 ’s . 11 The second 
is his own personal experience. The two are per fectly  
merged. His ’c a t e g o r i e s ’ cannot be unde r s t o o d  as abstra ct  
philosophical terms, they un ne r v i n g l y  take on the qualities 
of personal existence. And equally his personal life 
existed as a philosophical g e s t u r e . 12 He tir ele ss ly 
attacks both the ’a b s t r a c t n e s s ’ of the ’s y s t e m ’ and the 
dialectical insuff iciency of c o n t e m p o r a r y  life.13
Hegel is, for Kierkegaard, the a p o t he osis of 
enlightenment. He renders nature, hi st ory and the human 
subject into aspects of an immanent, u n f olding  Reason. The 
’e g o ’ is the personal inwardness of this process, 
continually expandi ng as the mo ve ment of human kno wl edge 
towards the absolute. While Mar;-: c o u nt er ed H e g e l ’s 
metaphysical co mpr e h e n s i o n  with its ’r e a l i t y ’ as the social 
world, Kie rk egaar d opposed both, as dif ferent ve rsi ons of a
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totalising rationality* with the u n s y s t e m a t i c  fragments of 
personal existence.'*4 For him ’p a r a d o x ’ is not a sign of 
logical misbehaviour* or of contextual confusion* it is the 
point at which life asserts itself agai nst that part of 
itself (i n t e 11e c t u a 1 reason) which claims to speak for the 
entir ety  of human experience.
A co nv incing reply to the P h e n o m e n a  1ogy cannot 
therefore be conceived  simply as an al te r n a t i v e  ’s y s t e m ’. 
H e g e l ’s system is (as Marx also argued) the definitive 
statement of bo ur geois rationality, it can only take the 
form of a personal document* an au to bi ographi ca l essay* in 
which met aphysical tendencies are rigo r o u s l y  supp res sed in 
favour of the hard, ir reconci lable diff er ences of life 
itself. The rea lity Hegel captur es in his thought is the 
truth of reason. But that is only part of life; ’ If Hegel 
had written his whole logic and had w r i tt en in the preface 
that it was only a thought e x p e r i m e n t ’ * claims Kierkegaard* 
’he u n d o ubte dl y would have been the greatest thinker who 
has ever li ve d’ .12 He is not incorrect* he is incomplete* 
which is worse: ’As it is he is c o m i c ’ .'14
E i ther/Or was conce ived as a polemical a u t o b i o g r a p h y  
against Hege l i a n i s m  and the ’m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of the a g e ’ . 
This strange book, however, cannot be u n d e rstood  without 
reference to its purely personal content. It contains the 
’s t o r y ’ of K i e r k e g a a r d ’s unhappy love for Regine Olsen.
This ’p r i v a t e ’ matter provides p e r f e c t l y  sound subject
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matter for a ph i 1o s ophi c a 1 work ; it is indeed pa s s 1 on a lone 
wh i ch can r e vea 1 the on 1 v i nter esting ph i 1 osoph i ca. 1 top i c , 
the s e l f . 17
The prospe ct of ma rr ia ge p r e c i pitat ed  a crisis in 
K i e r k e g a a r d ’s life. Having  hastily contrac ted  an egagement 
he found himself in an imp ossible situation. The genuinely 
decisive na ture o f .the sit uation a g g r ava te d his pec uliar ly 
melancho lic anxiety: ’ If you marry you will regret it: if
you do not marry, you will also regret i t ’ .10 But more 
than this, it caught him in an irr eco nc ilable co ntr a d i c t i o n  
between his intense and secretive life with his father, and 
his conc ep tion of mar ri ag e as an open relationship.* ■ He 
could not marry, but to extric at e himself from the 
situation, or rather to extric at e Re gine from the 
situation, justified a m e l o d r a m a t i c  subtrefuge. That she 
might not harbour any lingerinmg hopes in him he affected a 
dissolute publi c life. By app ea ring to be an unscr up ulous 
libertine he also satisfied his own guilt and left Regine 
unattached and wi th out blame so that, in the small and 
intensely pious a tm os phere of bour geois Cop e n h a g e n  society, 
her future prosp ects of marriage  might not be d a m a g e d . 20 
The sit uation became scandalous. It had been what 
Kierkegaard had intended, yet he could not help trying to 
’e x p l a i n ’ himself, to Regine and to the world. When 
E i t h e r /0 r was publish ed he had a copy sent to Regine. His 
use of a pseud onym fooled no one and the cause celebre 
again became a topic of gossip as his book was has til y read
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for any new insights into the circum stances  it might offer. 
As the first volume ended with a narr ative entitled ’The 
Diary of a S e d u c e r ’ and seemed to be a thinly veiled 
account of the entir e ’a f f a i r ’ , there was every hope that 
public curiosit y would be satisfied.
His book, however, was far from straightforward. 
Whatever the si gni f i c a n c e  of the ’D i a r y ’ , what was to be 
made of its other e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y  diverse contents'? It 
seemed to have no- central focus, it even claimed to have 
been w r i tte n by two diffe re nt people. Either was ap p a r e n t l y  
the work of a ’young m a n ’ of e x t r a ordina ry  literary and 
critical gifts, while Or was ostens ib ly the c o m p os ition of 
an older friend of the author of E i t h e r . The jJr_, in the 
form of long letters a d d r ess ed  to the ’young m a n ’ thus 
forms a critical p e r s o n a 1 c om me ntary upon the E i t h e r . Th i s 
complex ’ indirect c o m m u n i c a t i o n ’ was not intended only as a 
’c o n f e s s i o n ’ or as a covert ’e x p l a n a t i o n ’ for R e g i n e ’s 
sake, but more gene rally as a de sc ription of the ’r e a l ’ 
psychology of the bo urgeoi s age.
P hi lo sophy must grasp life directly, and the real 
content of modern  life lay in lust those di scon c e r t i n g  and 
’c o n t r a d i c t o r y ’ mo vem ent s the m e t a p h y s i c i a n  could not 
allow. Each individual is a cha otic history of internal 
states and dis po si ti ons that can be formed into a unity 
only through the deceptions of memory. In truth the
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individual, at least the bou rg eois individual, cannot 
become united with himself because he altoget her lacks the 
guidance of a transcendental  norm. He is left to define 
himself aiid is u n d e rmine d by the endless se lf -doub t of 
ex i s t e n c e . 21 The co h e r e n c e  of the individual is only an 
i d e o 1o g i c a 1 as sumpt ion, and is destroyed in the moment we 
try to live ’s e r i o u s l y ’ . This is not an ’ i n t e l l e c t u a l ’ 
problem. Re ason as the nece ss ary order of immanence, 
unfolding in our ex pe r i e n c e  by a process of inner 
development, is pow er less to help us. K i e r ke gaard can 
describe his predicament, but he cannot by some pro cess of 
rational refl ection ’d e c i d e ’ how to act. Human a c t ivity  is 
not a que stion of ’r a t i o n a l ’ decision, but of ’c h o i c e ’ , 
which is quite another m a t t e r . 21 K i e r kegaar d realised 
therefore that his failure to marry could not be u nd erstood  
as a decision. The ac co unt of the circumst an ces whi ch  he 
offered to the world, and to himself, were at first self- 
flattering. The in surmo un table con trad i ct i 071 of remaining 
’f a i t h f u l ’ to his father a7id to his ow7i melancholy, while 
at the same time binding himseif a b s o l u t e l y  to Regine, was
nothing more than a p a r t i c u l a r l y  testi7ig example of the 
oppositions that went to make up everyda y experience. He
had lacked not hing in i7ite 1 1 ectua 1 skill and
discrimination. Like the ’young m a n ’ of the Ei t h e r ,
Kierkegaard was well aware of his own talent for 
reflection, what he had lacked was the courage essential to 
’cho i c e ’ .2 2
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Bereft of any ’n a t u r a l ’ unity, the individual is not 
without a sense of direction, and K i e r k e g a a r d ’s psychol og y 
is in large me asure an el ab o r a t i o n  of the ’s t a g e s ’ through 
which the self might pass. It com prises an existential map 
of u n p r e c e d e n t e d  (and almost unsurpassed) p r e cisio n and 
detail. His ’a e s t h e t i c ’ works in particu lar  offer 
e x trao rd inary insight into the nature of the ’m o d e r n ’ 
experience of the self.'23 .Eit her/Or is a d e s c r i p t i o n  of 
the first two ’s p h e r e s ’ of existence, the a e s t h e t i c  and the 
ethi c a 1.
The peculiar book is after all not chaotic; it turns 
out in fact to be a p e r f ec tl y coherent, but d e l i b era te ly 
unsystematic, ac co unt  of these ’s p h e r e s ’ of ex istenc e as 
’p o s s i b l e ’ modes of selfhood. From this perspective, we 
can see that the Ei ther contains as a loosely co nn ecting  
theme the nature of ’a e s t h e t i c ’ enjoyment. This becomes 
more apparent in the light of the ret rospec ti ve c o m m entar y 
written by Judge W i l l i a m  who lives under the ra dically 
different dete rm inants  of ethical values.
The ’a e s t h e t i c ’ sphere is ’ i m m e d i a t e ’ existence. The 
’young m a n ’ aspires to nothing beyond the e n j o y m e n t  of the 
world presented to him. He seeks pleasure  as the only 
meaning of his e x i s t e n c e . 24 He is not without cultivation. 
He hopes to find pleasure  in the finest artistic 
achievements. ’ I m m e d i a c y ’ does not mean sensuousness. But 
his superb educ at ion is to no avail. He finds only
boredom. The more pleasure becomes the sole object of 
conscious endeavour the more cert ai nly it eludes the grasp 
of the longing subject. Part of the diffic ul ty is the 
sheer number and var iety of possib le sources of pleasure.
No sooner is one envisaged as the ult im ate and final 
sati sf action than its attracti ons pale, to be superseded by 
some yet more b e g u ili ng  o b j e c t i v e . 23 P l e asu re  is a 
relation of desire, a movement towards the com p l e t i o n  of 
the self. But the self is infinitely extendable, so the 
object world co nt i n u a l l y  takes on new attractions. It is a 
movement  which cannot be completed. We cannot find, in 
pleasure, the c e s s atio n of desire. But this is what the 
’young m a n ’ desires above all. His f a n tas ti c projects and 
fits of e7ithusiasm always end in b o r edom and self dis gust 
because they fail to prov ide a real sensuous object in 
which he can ’take h o l d ’ of himself. The pursui t of 
pleasure is always the desire for the self. But the ’s e l f ’ 
can7iot become actual i n ’ immediacy' , and remai7is 
a c c i d enta ll y di spe rsed thr oughout  the world of experience.
Mome7itary pleasure is a r b it ra ry and chaotic, it cati 
provide neither the ’f o u n d a t i o n ’ nor the ’ i m a g e ’ of 
selfhood. To the degree to which the ’young m a n ’ identifies 
himself with these hec tic adv en tu res he also become 
’v o l a t i l i s e d ’ and chaotic. 17i a radical rejec ti on of 
Hegelian phi lo so phy and all other tradit ions from whi ch 
bourgeois ps yc holog y had sprung, K i e r k e g a a r d  begins his 
desc ri ption of the ’ i n d i v i d u a l ’ as an acci d e n t a 1
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rel at ion. 2 * The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  inner feeling of existence 
under the sway of ae s t h e t i c  ’c a t e g o r i e s ’ is thus neither 
pleasure nor f r u s tration  (which requires the clarity of a 
fixed objective), but boredom. The ’young m a n ’ consequent ly  
’hovers above e x i s t e n c e ’2 7 , po ssessing only the mel anc holy 
which Kier kegaar d himself had known so well since his 
chi 1d h oo d. 2 8
The ’young m a n ’ is in ’d e s p a i r ’ , that is to say he is 
failing to be himself. Indeed, in a purely  ae st hetic 
existence, despair takes the extreme form of the failure to 
be any self, let alone the ’single i n d i v i d u a l ’ each person 
might become. But in suffering m e l a n c h o l i a  he begins to 
despair ’s e r i o u s l y ’ , for m e l a n c h o l y  is al ready a moveme nt  
of the s e l f .29 It shades into ironic det ach me nt from the 
world and it is this deeper form of despair which brings 
him to the edge of a e s t h e t i c  e x i s t e n c e . 30 In it the 
intuition of another form of exi s t e n c e , ent i re 1y diffe ren t 
from the ar bit r a r i n e s s  of the immediate senses, comes to 
life. In me l a n c h o l y  and irony the ’young m a n ’ possesses 
despair, which is the starting point of ’r e a l ’ 
philosophical existence, not intellectual doubt but a doubt 
of exi s t e n c e . 31
There is no necessary, essential or immanent move me nt 
which leads from bo re dom to m e l a n c h o l y  to irony; far less 
any inherent force of s e 1f - d e v e 1opment driving him to make 
the ’r e p e t i t i o n ’ beyond all these ’q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ’ of
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immediacy into an ’e t h i c a l ’ life. The fundamental error of 
Hegelian p s y c holog y is revealed as the absu rd ly opti mistic 
belief in the continuou s de ve l o p m e n t  of reason. Real 
existence is made up not only of c o ntrad ic tions (the 
impossibility of grasping pleasure, for example), but also 
of brutal disc on t i n u i t i e s  and disjunctions. It is indeed 
only from the farther side of such a ’g a p ’ in existence 
that its having a farther side can be known.
The ethical begins, then, not with a rational 
d e m o n s tration  of its superiority, or by blind necessity, 
but by a self-m o t i v a t e d  ’ lea p ’ . It is only in making a 
decisive ’c h o i c e ’ that the individual can exist in a 
different way. But once such a ’ le a p ’ has been effected, 
miraculously, the individual finds that he has not left or 
destroyed the aesthetic, but has taken it with him - and 
now in a form in wh ic h pleas ur e finally does become a 
realisable goal.32 The dec is ive choice ’c r y s t a l l i s e s ’ the 
self into ethical categories. The real meaning of 
existence is revealed as the pursuit and e xpress io n of some 
’v a l u e ’ . Ethical exist ence is ther efore polarise d be tween 
judgments of ’g o o d ’ and ’e v i l ’ . However, just as the 
ultimate pleasure sought wi thi n the a e s the ti c turned out to 
be the ind ivid uality  which it could never contain, so all 
the choices within  the ethical, in being choice made by the 
self, are really choices for the self. The decisi ve choice 
is not in favour of one good rather than another, or one 
good iii pr eference  to evil, but b e t ween life conceiv ed as
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falling within such choices and one (unaware of the 
’higher' possibility) that ab andons it to the chaos of 
imm ed iacy .3 3
Judge W i l l i a m ’s example of the ethical life is his own 
individuality, and in particular  the dec is ive choice of 
marriage. His rather touching and naive account of 
•bourgeois marriage  as the par amoun t ethical life-choice has 
a par ticular relevance, of course, in the context of 
K i e r k e g a a r d ’s own failed engagement. It would be 
misleading, however, to regard the ’young m a n ’ as 
Kierkega ar d or to ’e x p l a i n ’ the l a t t e r ’s failure to marry 
by an inability to break free of irrespons ible  
aestheticism. K i e r k e g a a r d ’s own d iffi cu lties lay deeper, 
and the choice of marria ge  is only one of a number of 
possible examples of the ethical.
The ethical organ ises the inner life into a coherent 
and continuou s unity. Eut wi thi n it divisions and 
contradicti ons reappear. Just as ae s t h e t i c  e x i s te nce fails 
to grasp the pleasure which is its only goal, so the 
ethical life cannot in fact realise the good as free 
expres sio n of the self. Our limited knowledge, both of the 
world and the com ple xi ty of our own nature, the enormo us 
scope for self-d e c e p t i o n  and mi sun derst anding, all 
implicate us in evil. As soon as we attach ourselves 
et hically to the world, we cannot evade r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  for 
the consequences of our choice. 34 The typical inner
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feeling of the ethical exis tence is once again one of 
failure, this time of guilt. Guilt, however, is a 'higher' 
qu a l i f i c a t i o n  of the individual than boredom; it has a 
precise quality of individuation, and a longer time 
perspective. It mai nt ai ns and builds a unique vi sion of 
the self.
To u n d ergo a second ’r e p e t i t i o n ’ into the higher 
ex istence of religion, stretched b e t wee n the po la rities of 
faith and sin, requires an e x t r a o r d i n a r y  effort. Be yond  
the highes t ’p o t e n t i a t i o n ’ of the ethical (the comic), lies 
a dreadful gulf that few can summon the spiritual resou rces 
to challenge. It was from the edge of this pa rticul ar  
p r e c i p i c e 32 that K i e r k e g a a r d  wrote his ps eud o n y m o u s  works. 
Gripped by a powerful intuition of the religious ’s o l u t i o n ’ 
to the problems of personal existence, he yet could not for 
a long time summon the energy to ’ le a p ’ into f a i t h . 34.
There is in K i e r k e g a a r d ’s p s y c ho lo gy here an e x t r a o r d i n a r y  
affinity with the great mystical writers of the tw el fth and 
thirteenth centuries. There is iust as ob viousl y however a 
fundamental difference. The entire tendency of the 
k'ierkegaardian ’s t e p s ’ or ’s t a g e s ’ in life is towards the 
absolute inner certainty  of faith as an expe ri ence of the 
s e l f . The eventual a t t a inmen t of religious c ategor ie s  
grasps the profound paradox of personal e x i s t e n c e , 37 and 
holds it in an ab s o l u t e l y  inward and secretive  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
with God. It is the very opp osi te of the a n n i h i l a t i o n  of 
all pe rsonal ly  disti n g u i s h i n g  features sought by St.
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Bernard or Wil liam of St. Thierry. It is the ultimate 
con firma ti on  of the self as a ’single i n d i v i d u a l ’ , rather 
than the ult ima te release from the self as that stubborn 
pride that blocked genuine spiritual growth.
Even K i e r k e g a a r d ’s religious writings are therefore 
works of mode rn  psychology. The rel igious terminos to the 
process of s e l f - d e v e l o p m e n t  is in fact deceptive. It is an 
unat ta in able goal. No one, other than Christ, could in 
fact become a Chr.i s t i a n . 3 a The reality of selfhood in the 
modern world, the duty and prom ise at. the heart of 
bourgeois society, is in fact boredom, guilt and spiritual 
terror. The ’p e r s o n ’ never emerges from the trials of 
existence; he is incomplete, c o n t r a d i c t o r y  and un known to 
himself. In the face of this psychological reality, the 
church has the bad taste to offer ch ildis h piety. It 
ministers to the superficial cohere nc e of the bour geois  
ego, which had ironically been the starting point also of 
K i e r k e g a a r d ’s su bv ersiv e orthodoxy. To overco me m a n ’s 
struggle with himself, Kier k e g a a r d  had to resort to a 
solution as ’a b s t r a c t ’ as had Hegel. Christ, as the only 
living example of fully de veloped existential unity, is a 
’t h e o r e t i c a l ’ rather than an ’e x i s t e n t i a l ’ possibility.
Modern life as the e x p e ri ence of ind ividua li ty is an 
i deo i o g i c a 1 impasse. And bourg eo is psycho logy is expo sed 
as a ’fa 1s e - c o n s c i o u s n e s s ’ of a p e c u li ar ly ten acious kind. 
It is the failure to achieve the b e a t i f i c a t i o n  of the
’single i n d i v i d u a l ’ which turns K i e r k e g a a r d ’s life (as well 
as his writing) into a critical instrument, dissecti ng the 
hypo crisy of bourgeois ’ i d e a l i s m ’ and ’p i e t y ’ . In this he 
is far more successful than Max Stirner, whose ’absolute 
e g o ’ remains a grand i ose ext ensio n rather than a cr i t i c a 1 
negation of the bourgeois p s y c h e . 39 Despair, which is the 
’sickness unto d e a t h ’ , is the incurable dis ease of modern 
subjectivity, the ine scapable mark of its cor rosi ve  self- 
consciousness.
*
Though cast in traditional, even reactionary, terms as
the search for rational individuality, K i e r k e g a a r d ’s
ps ychology in fact dra matises the d e c o m p o s i t i o n  of the
modern self. In striving for unity it is dr iv en  deeper
into despair, farther away from itself. The
’c o n t r a d i c t i o n s ’ of modern life do not stop with the
division between sub ject and object; s u b j e c t i v i t y  is itself
fragmented, each ’s p h e r e ’ th reate ning the self with its own
*
impossible vision of the world. The s y n t h e s i s i n g  power of 
reason has somehow evap orate d from e v e r y t h i n g  human; poured 
out of the self and into the world of ’r e a l ’ , objective 
relations, into the com modity form, and into the scientific 
conception of nature. The human subject, thus ’ l i b e r a t e d ’ 
from its constraint, finds itself in a world of unl imitied 
inner freedom.
A00
Dread
It is from the point of view of the dec omp osed subject 
that we can grasp the sig nifi cance of dread as a 
specifically mod ern phenomenon. Ki er k e g a a r d  devoted his 
most obscure work to an essay on the s u b j e c t . 40 It is a 
notable ’a n t i c i p a t i o n 1 of many of F r e u d ’s key ideas on 
anxiety, the term sometimes used indeed to translate 
K i e r k e g a a r d ’s t i t l e . 41 In K i e r k e g a a r d ’s text, however, 
the terror of an inordinate and u n r e a s o n i n g  passion is more 
transparently present. Dread is to be s i mu ltaneou sl y 
attracted and repelled by the world; immob ilised by fright, 
confined by an inexpli cable loss of f r e e d o m . 42 it is fear, 
but of a peculiarly ’o b j e c t l e s s ’ sort. It is fear of 
nothing. A fear of the next empty m o m e n t . Dread possesses 
the self and makes the simplest acti on  an impossible risk.
It is in this very o b jectle ss ness of dread that its 
terror lies. Here an intense feeling is experienced, as it 
were, in a vacuum; in the absolute purity of emptied space. 
The pursuit of pleasure, or virtue, or faith, is 
conceivable as the search for selfhood. It is to discover 
ourselves in the object world that we act with an 
underlying c o n s i st en cy of motive. When this process of 
’s e l f - d i s c o v e r y ’ becomes un de rmined by the intuition of the 
’n o t h i n g n e s s ’ that lies at its end, then we become filled 
with dread. And where we might n o r ma ll y invest the world 
with the attr ac tivenes s of our own self-love, project ing 
our ’w a n t s ’ into objects to render them delightful, the
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de co mposed self -pr eoc cupie d with its own inner 
f r agme nt ation - can project only u n r e c o gnisabl e images of 
itself. In dread, the ’man without q u a l i t i e s ’ recognises 
himself, clothi ng the world of a p p e aranc e in his authentic- 
self hood; that is, in nothing.
K i e r k e g a a r d ’s lingering ideological sen timent (he 
considers the rejection of selfhood as the core of life to 
be a patho lo gy of the personality), does not pr event him 
pr opo sing a genuine ly critical p s y c h o l o g y . 43 It is a 
ps y c hology  which is repe at edly r e d i sc overed in the 
following hundred years. He does not so much inaugurate a 
tradition which, dev elo pi ng from his fundamental insights, 
elabor ate s and refines his ’c a t e g o r i e s ’ , as propose a point 
of view which is s ub se quently  rediscovered, independently, 
in a number of differen t c o n t e x t s . 44 A fuller e x a m i nation  
of dread, not only as objectless fear but as obj ect less 
passion in general, can be found, for example, in the major 
novels of Dostoevsky.
The ex t r a o r d i n a r y  realism of D o s t o e v s k y ’s char acters 
can be readily grasped in K i e r k e g a a r d i a n  terms. There is 
nothing artificial or ideological about their coherence. 
Whatever their a u t h o r ’s original intentions each of his 
major characters, as if strung along the Stages in L i f e ’s 
W a y , might be viewed in the light of one of K i e r k e g a a r d ’s 
existential Images. The aesthetic, the ethical and the 
religious ’s p h e r e s ’ of ex istence are ail ’r e p r e s e n t e d ’ by
a bsolu te ly  conv incing p e r s o n a l i t i e s . 43 Each one presses 
his or her own claims on reality with the shaping power of 
a real human presence. It is ch ara c t e r i s t i c  of 
D o s t o e v s k y ’s cycle of mature novels that the con tr adictions 
among and pa radoxes with in these ch ar act ers are not 
’r e s o l v e d ’ by an authoritative, ’t r a n s c e n d e n t a l ’ , act of 
synthesis on the part of the author. The complete  
independe nce  of each character ove rcomes the residual 
ideological senti ment in K i e r k e g a a r d . 44 Each existential 
’p o s i t i o n ’ is accor de d an equiva lent status, a possible 
mode of individuation. There is no inherent order linking 
such possibilities, no ’d e v e l o p m e n t ’ , whe ther from inner 
necessity or by the irr atio nality  of the ’ l e a p ’ , leading 
from one to another, and no pri vileged final state which 
realises all the inner potentia li ties of the individual. 
Raskolnikov is converted at the close of Crime and 
Funishmen t only to reappear, more terr ifying than ever, as 
Stavrogin and Ivan K a r a m a z o v . 47 The ar gument s among the 
various p rota go nists are ne ve r - e n d i n g  and inconclusive. 
Reason is powerl ess to reconcile their differences. Eq ua lly  
however they cannot un de rgo  ’r e p e t i t i o n s ’ into 
progress iv ely ’h i g h e r ’ categories that carry the hope of 
overcoming the in co nsistencies  of all particularities.
It is only as readers that we are al low ed  the 
privilege of the ’ l e a p ’ from one enclosed vison of reality 
to another. Where his characters ’d e v e l o p ’ it is towards a 
’d e e p e r ’ subjective rea li sation of their own reality. Any
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mo vem en t from one deci sive p ossibi li ty of life to another 
is unsystematic, a r b i tra ry  and freq uentl y r e v e r s e d . 40
In the prelude to his major novel cycle, Notes from 
Under g r o u n d , Dos t o e v s k y  introduces one of his central 
characters. He is ’a sick m a n ’ , suffering the sickness unto 
de a t h . 49 He is in despair, the despair of ’w e a k n e s s ’ ; he 
is incapable of acting and confines his existence to 
abstraction, he is only an idea of .himself.50 He lives 
a e s t h e t i c a l l y  but', like the ’young m a n ’ of E i t h e r , is 
disgusted by his own trivial and m e a n i ngless  existence. He 
is incapacitated by an overly dev el op ed s e 1f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s . 
His disease is an inability to forget himself, even for a 
moment. This is a deli berate  inversion by D o s t o e v s k y  of the 
orthodoxy, sanc tif ied by the secular myt h o l o g y  of the 
E n l i g h t e n m e n t . 51 There the human is identified with self- 
consciousness, which is the unique atttrib ut e of m a n ’s 
species being, and in the P h e n o m e n o 1ogy the human 
’d e v e l o p s ’ ge nericall y only to the extent to which this 
power of re fl e x i v i t y  can take prece dence over m a n ’s 
instinctual life. The growth of ’ inwardness', whi ch is an 
aspect of the dial ectic  of desire, is held to be the 
special virtue of the human. But in the ’U n d e r g r o u n d ’ 
self- awa reness becomes an affliction. The co sm o p o l i t a n 
’European ’ has become tr an sp are nt to himself and cannot 
cease ques tio ning his own motives. He bec omes frozen  by 
self- con scious doubt over the wisdom of any action. He is 
possessed of self-loathing, that is to say the loathing of
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not being himself. He envies those who in te llectually  and 
spi ri tu ally he despises but whose blissful lack of 
ref ine ment allows them the e xh il aratio n of continu ous 
activity.3"
There is more here than the ’m e l a n c h o l y ’ te mperament 
of the artist and intellectual. ’U n d e r ground H a n ’ is a 
general type of mo dern humanity presented in its most 
’ i n t e l l e c t u a l ’ form. But less sophisti ca ted ve rsions are 
continua ll y met with in the p r o l i f erat io n of n e u rotic 
symptoms, wher e dread, rather than e xpre ss ing itself in 
general terms, ’f i x e s ’ itself in some objecti ve form. The 
intolerable ’o b j e c t l e s s n e s s ’ of the passions is t empor ar ily 
denied by di sc o v e r i n g  some a ppropr ia te ’o b j e c t ’for the 
sensations of guilt, boredom, self- lo athing and so o n . 33 
Do stoevsky  presents however the purest case. A case in 
which the hi ghest d e v e l opment of E u r op ea n Culture, a 
culture which began in a frenzy of spiritual liberation and 
confident self-assertion, is exposed as c a n c erousiy  
solipsistic.
Only the ’man of a c t i o n ’ , the thoughtless and 
insensitive fool, can tolerate the modern world as it is. 
’Underg rou nd H a n ’ , in being ’s t u c k ’ in immediacy, is in 
fact w i t h dr aw ing from the world as it is, the worl d of 
i d e o 1og i c a 1 de lu sion and hypocritical values. A more 
dramatic attemp t to avoid both the anodyne c o m p l a c e n c y  of 
conventional culture and the corro siv e s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s
405
of aest h e t i c i s m  is exe mpl if ied in U ndergr ou nd M a n ’s ' 
immediate successor* Raskolnikov.
Crime and Pu ni s h m e n t  in fact marks a decisive movement 
beyond the c on vention s of bourgeo is p s y c h o l o g y . 34 In order 
to ’r e a l i s e ’ his potential u ni quenes s Rask ol nikov essays a 
fearful leap. Mow* however, given the inherent 
incompa tib ility  but existential equ iva le nce of any of 
life’s ’s p h e r e s ’ * the leap into faith can just as easily  be 
the leap into s e 1f - justifying violence. By killing an old 
woman mon ey-len de r R a s k olnikov  aspires to become a ’single 
i n d i v i d u a l ’ . The novel e x h a u s t i v e l y  exposes and rejects 
all possible ’r a t i o n a l ’ motives for his crime. No 
utilitar ia n or moral calculus can comp rehen d the mean ing of 
such an a c t . 33 It is not an ’a c t i o n ’ at all, but a form of 
inner reflection. Only ac ci d e n t a l y  related to the external 
world his crime aims at an interior transformation. It Is 
a technique of ’r e p e t i t i o n ’ which will p re ci pitate the 
personality in a more highly dete rmined  form.
Only a p r o f oundly  immoral act can satisfy 
R a s k o l n i k o v ’s thirst for authentication. He must define 
himself. No external norm can vali date or limit an 
absolutely freely chosen interior selfhood. If actions 
flowing spont a n e o u s l y  from his p e r s o nalit y were to conform 
to the conventional moral expec ta ti ons of his family and 
friends* they would serve only to irritate his relent less  
s e 1f - d o u b t .3 h The d espicab le  murder, a ’t e i e o 1ogicaI
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suspens ion  of the e t h i c a l ’ is a true test of uniqueness* a 
’p u r e ’ act e xp ressiv e of himself alone. Yet he chooses his 
victim with a cer tain amoun t of care and cannot wholly 
shake off a conventional r e s p o n sibi li ty for his m o t i v e s . 57 
He has caught himseif in a dreadful contradiction. To 
remain inactive is to co ndemn himself to the lingering 
sickness of ’Un de r g r o u n d  M a n ’ . But to become the 
authentic, R a s k o l n i k o v  demands no thi ng less than an act of 
arbitrary criminality. Yet an ar bitrar y act, just bec ause 
it is void of genuine expression, is power less to bring his 
hidden self into existence. He cannot act in the world, 
nor can he wi th dr aw from it. He has intensified rather 
than resolved ’Un de r g r o u n d  H a n ’s ’ subversive despair. And 
here there is no saving ’ l e a p ’ into a higher existence. 
R a s k o l n i k o v ’s ’c o n v e r s i o n ’ is the a f t e r th ought of the novel 
and not its d e n o u e m e n t . 56
The su pe rfi cia 1ity of his conv ersion  follows on the 
failure of his second ’t e c h n i q u e ’ of self-realisation, 
namely confession. By ’u nb urdeni ng  h i m s e l f ’ to Sonia* he 
hopes still to salvage something of his original intention. 
The guilt he feels is not remorse over his crime, but pure 
self-loathing, which c o m m u n i c a t e d  to Sonia is the tenuous 
form in which he can appear to h i m s e l f . 59 If he can 
despise himself he must after all be a particular, 
despicable individual, someone worth despising. Sonia, a 
genuinely tragic heroine, shoulders the guilt he ought to 
feel. She has the feelings he lacks, and being un able to
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unde rstan d his brutal act, none theless forgives him.
Worse, she loves him. Instead of hating him and thus 
co nfirming his pervert ed form of self-expression, she 
’s p o i l s ’ his confession, by loving him.4 0 Nor. can he 
confess to Porfiry, who knows he is guilty but treats him 
as the charmi ng p e r s o n a l i t y  as the heart of a 
p s y c h o logical ly  ’f a s c i n a t i n g ’ c a s e . 41
Raskoln ik ov is trapped in his own subjectivty, in the 
paradox of a e s t h e t i c i s m  deepened to s c h i z op hrenic 
detachment. The theme of con fes si on is used by D o s t o e v s k y 
to show the reader, and more importantly to demo n s t r a t e  to 
Raskolnikov, another ’v e r s i o n ’ of himself. By recei ving 
Svidrigay 1o v ’s con f e s s i o n  Ra skolniko v can view himself in 
another light. His fascinated horror of S v i d r i g a y l o v  is an 
exact desc r i p t i o n  of dread. He cannot shake off the 
obsessive curiosity, the awful attraction, of 
Svidrigay 1o v ’s amoral sensuousness. He reco gnise s in him 
his own d o u b l e . * 2 Dread is the fear of nothing, the 
nothing which is the core of selfhood; in S v i d r i g a y l o v  it 
is the terror of pure self-determination. R a s k o l n i k o v ’s 
revulsion has noth ing  to do with conventional moralislng.
Sv i dr igay Iov as an ’obj ect i f i cat i o n ’ of his own self- 
loathing shows him the ultimate tendencies of bo u r g e o i s  
inwardness. An active, sensuous immediacy, rather than a 
reflective abst ract ae sth e t i c i s m  is just as incap able of 
escaping the circle of self-doubt and dread. S e n s u o u s n e s s  
remains frozen in narcissism, or its close relative,
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incest; and int ensifying in the only ’d i r e c t i o n ’ open to 
it, cu lm ina tes in its one ’positive.’ act of self- 
expression; s u i c i d e . 4 3
Do s t o e v s k y  is a neg ati ve Kierkegaard, His existential 
pre cision is not con di ti oned by an implicit or exp licit  
order. His novels are loosely org anised around 
conventional ’s t o r i e s ’ c o mpre he nsible in terms of- 
* everyday ’ noti ons of morality. The i n te ns ificat io n of 
normal exist en ce .which we find in his characters tends 
however to invert and pervert the orignai ’m e a n i n g ’ of the 
narrative. The ’n o r m a l ’ psycho logy of bourg eois egoism as 
the rational pursuit of pleasure (the self) is overthrown. 
Without a t r a n s cendi ng  norm each character is ’r e s p o n s i b l e ’ 
for creating himself, a process which ends in self 
destru cti on or madn ess as the ultimat e forms of 
’a u t h e n t i c a t i o n ’ ; the proof that he is, as he suspected, 
worthless. The ’ l o g i c ’ of personal autonomy is turned 
against the self. The re alisa tion of a unique 
in div iduality is in fact a self -d efeat ing illusion.
Ba khtin has sugge sted that D o s t o e v s k y ’s d i s regard  for 
the formal niceti es of the classical novel, his original 
forms and themes, his psychological ’d e p t h ’ , are ail 
aspects of his revival of Menipp ea n satire, the original 
literary form of C a r n i v a l . N o n e t h e l e s s ,  however indebted 
he may to purely literary prototypes, his novels appear
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st ri kingly modern. He has broken through the veil of 
bourgeois c on ventio ns  in another direction. They do not 
recall p r e - c a p i t a l i s t  ideals of order and disorder, 
hierarchy and release. His characters are caught nicely in 
the act of w i t h d r a w i n g  from the ’object r e l a t i o n s ’ which 
define the ’n o r m a l ’ individual. This withdrawal, catching 
them out with its slippery logic, p r ec ip itates  a bizarre 
and u n p r e d i c t a b l e  world of experience.
This is not. Fun, but Excitement. The t r a n s f or mation s 
of mood and feeling form the foregro und  to the grey and 
dismal exi st en ce of boredom. A welter of events and unruly 
passions are c o n c e ntrat ed  into his b o o k s , yet they stand 
out, even there, as unusual and never claim the 
in clusiveness or ’n a t u r a l n e s s ’ of fun. They exist 
prim ari ly to be read, to be ’c o n s u m e d ’ by a ’n o r m a l ’ reader- 
delight ing  in the shock, surprise and m e l o d r a m a t i c  teasing 
of his pa rt ia lly hidden wishes. A good deal of the time 
D o s t o e v s k y ’s characters, like his readers, are ’hang ing 
a r o u n d ’ waiting for some thi ng to h a p p e n . 45 The hectic 
narrative overla ys a bac kd rop of a decadent ruling class 
consumed by its own inactivity. The provincial b o r edom 
depicted pa rti c u l a r l y  by Chekhov is implici tly contrasted, 
not with classical bourg eois self-assertion, but wit h the 
further de c o m p o s i t i o n  of such composure, with its 
’b r e a k t h r o u g h ’ into irrational cravings for new, unt es ted 
forms of experience.
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Def iance
Despair is to be other than the self. Dread is the 
fear of being nothing, of not being able to become a self* 
Dread is there fore a generalised form of despair, an 
inability to a c t u a l i s e  any image of the self. It is the 
purest form of what Kierk eg aard termed the ’despair of 
w e a k n e s s ’ , a somewh at mi sleading term in the light of 
D o s t o e v s k y ’s unc onv en tional characters* ’W e a k n e s s ’ 
embraces not only those who have t ho ughtles sl y emb raced  
bourgeois complacency, but also those engaged in the most 
intense inner spiritual struggle over themselves* Yet 
despair may be ’p o t e n t i a t e d ’ in another way, tran s f o r m i n g  
comfortable hyp o c r i s y  into ’d e f i a n c e ’ . Wi th in each 
’s p h e r e ’ of exi st en ce there is the p o s s i bilit y of 
identification with the ’w r o n g ’ choice. There are a series 
of negative characters, d e li be rately  in pursuit of 
unpleasure, or evil or sin. There is a powerful d e mo nic 
element in such personalities, a perverse wi lling not to be 
the self; a strange power of se l f - p o s s e s s i o n  di rected 
against it se lf .66
Such individuals, Ras koln ik ov hovers on the verge of 
becoming such a one, are ’s h u t - u p ’ wit hin t h e m s e l v e s . 47 
Myshkin, for example, and in a more sinister form 
Stavrogin, remai n unapp r o a c h a b l e  in the p e r f ection  of their 
inner individuality. But while My shkin and Alyosha
All
Kara mazov ap p r o a c h  the ideal ’p o s i t i v e ’ character, the
Ki e r k e g a a r d i a n  rel igious t y p e / ®  with whom D o s t oev sk y never 
felt totally at ease, S vidri ga ylov and St avrogin provide 
the more powerful image of un iqueness, as def'i a n c e . Their 
existence is an insult hurled against the western 
philosophical tr a d i t i o n  and the values it claims to 
support- In the place of philosophical ce rta inty con ceived 
as knowledge, he claims the aut he ntic si ngula rity of 
personal truth.
Philosophy, however, was not slow to fight back. 
Nietzsche, towards the end of the n i n e t e e n t h  century, 
attacked the phi losophica l orth odoxy of the classical 
scientific w o r l d v i e w  head on. He proposes a fresh 
philosophical a p p r o a c h  which does not, once it has laid 
claim to mode rn  reality, lead away from it into 
’a b s t r a c t i o n ’ . Nor is it just another voice c omp la ining of 
the obstacles s p e c ula ti ve m etap hy sics has placed in the 
path of real s e 1f-know 1 e d g e . His is not, as in K i e r k e g a a r d  
or Marx, a critiq ue of phi los ophical language, but a 
philosophical cr it iq ue of mod ern life. His writing s are
not conceived as exe rci se s in a critical reason which
Y>
places itself be yon d existen ce  to comment upon the 
shortcomings of the present.
Nietzsche ge neralis es K i e r k e g a a r d ’s Attack upon 
Chri stendom to m o d e r n  bo urg eois culture in general / ’ The 
core of this culture is not the s ci en tific knowl edge of the
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world to which it lays claims but the speci fic way of life 
espoused in its values. The search for ’o b j e c t i v i t y ’ in 
philosop hy is one such value and one whic h reveais the 
general inversion and turning away of bo urg eois culture 
from a ' n a t u r a l ’ d i s p o s i t i o n  towards life. Ni et zsche is 
p ri marily a moralist, not because the disco ur se over values 
can be more ’r a t i o n a l ’ than the dis course over 
e p i s t e m o 1o g y , but in rec og ni tion of its more fundamental 
sense of r e a l i t y . 70 Know le dge of the world, that is to 
say, is intimatei-y linked to a part icular way of life which 
it expresses. Mo der n science admits as much in its
acc ept ance of the provisional na ture of its results, and
the co n v e n t i o n a l i t y  of its t h e o r i e s . 71 It has abandoned the 
search for ’t r u t h ’ in favour of the e r a d i ca ti on of ’e r r o r ’ ; 
an appa re ntly slight transi tion whic h turns out to be 
momentous. Any view of the world is just that, a 
’p e r s p e c t i v e ’ whose claim to validity  is supported 
ultimately by the ’will to p o w e r ’ which it expresses, and
with which it is o n e . 72
The di scourse over values has itself become corrupted, 
and in just the same way as the d i s c ussi on  of knowledge.
The search for the good has been replaced by the avoid ance  
of evil. This is N i e t z s c h e ’s general statement of the 
character of modern a s c e t e c i s m . 73 He traces the 
ch ara cter is ti c ’tr ans v a l u a t i o n  of all v a l u e s ’ to the 
formation of early C h r i s t i a n  morality. The pow erlessn ess 
of early Ch r i s t i a n  groups to realise their vision of life
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in the face of a powerful and oppressive foreign ruler led 
to an ’ i n t e r i o r i s a t i o n ’ of their values. They came to 
identify their own wea kne ss with these values. Humility, 
passivity, fo rgive ness becam e the perverse aims of a 
profound 1y self - d e n y i n g  form of e x i s t e n c e . 7 * The 
subject ive  world is or ganised  by r e s s e n t i m e n t , by a host of 
repressed feelings that express themselves as their 
opposites.
Modern bou rg eois moralit y in N i e t z s c h e ’s view is 
modelled on the C h r i s t i a n  prototype of t r a n s v a l u a t i o n . 7 =
The symptoms of r e s s e n t i m e n t , anxiety, guilt and self- 
loathing, ev er y w h e r e  abound. Overtaken by these 
pathological forms of subjectivity, the mo dern  individual 
seeks relief from them in the very proce sse s that oc casion  
their formation; by subj ugati on  to an external ’a u t h o r i t y ’ , 
by ’c o n f e s s i o n ’ , the ne ur otic s u b s ti tu tion of real wants; by 
acceptable but u n s a t i s f y i n g  playthings.
The formal co he rence of P hi lo sophy and Ch ri s t i a n i t y  
make them both prime targets for Nietzsche. The 
distinction is not, as for Kierkegaard, b e t ween the cruel 
abst ra ction of the former and the existential vitality  of 
the latter: but be tween the world of expe rience rendered as 
a systematic tot ality  and the world as open possibility.
The moralist cannot any longer espouse a posit ive value.
The world is a l r ea dy  rotten and corrupted, there is nothing 
in it but repetition, the ’eternal rec urrence  of the ever
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s a m e ’ . Against the perpetual grimace of demon s t r a t i v e  
reason, the inner world of the human subject opens to 
reveal an un di m i n i s h e d  plenitude. The subjectiv e becomes 
the exc lusiv e realm of the a e st hetical ly  and moraily 
valuable; not as a dig ni fy ing principle of individuality, 
but as the home of f r e e d o m . 71
N i e t z s c h e ’s demonic passion is co mp re h e n s i b l e  in the 
context of K i e r k e g a a r d ’s psychology. He is the defiant 
character, turned inwards, rel entle ss ly stri pping existence 
of every conventional positi ve value. He takes the absolute 
freedom of the inner self to be its only principle.
✓
Indeed, the no tion of the ’s e l f ’ is revealed as illusory. 
S ubjec ti vi ty cannot be formed and c o n s tr ai ned by any such 
individuated ’s t r u c t u r e ’ .77 Personal identity cannot rise 
above the incomplete and c o n t r a d i c t o r y  fra gments of 
immediate experience. It is the fundamental ’e r r o r ’ of the 
Western phi losophical tradition to aspire to identity, 
completion, integration, wh ole nes s and sy st ematic  unity
t
where none can exist. Pers ona  1 'integration, as muc h  as a 
system ati c metaphysics, is a denial of reaiity, a rej e c t i o n  
of life.
The no bi lity of life, which is the heart of genuine 
philosophy, cannot limit itself to somet hing (logic, value, 
pleasure) less than itself. N i e t z s c h e ’s p r e d i l e c t i o n  for 
the co smology of fun is evident. That it is life in its
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u n d i m i n i s h e d  fullness need not be doubted. But here again 
we are faced with something new. Fun has alre ady been 
su pp ress ed  and cannot be r e c o v e r e d . 7 ® It cannot be 
d e l i be ra tely sought or made the object of rational action. 
At best we can hold ourselves in a state of readiness to 
catch its unpr e d i c t a b l e  vibrations. Excitement, an 
in ternally deco mposed  state within whic h the ’s e l f ’ cannot 
locate itself, is the enjoy ment of mod e r n i t y  and the modern 
form of enjoyment. It is inheren tly u n p r e d i c t a b l e  and 
related to the .’object w o r l d ’ in an a r b i t r a r y  fashion. It
is the choice of defiance, a love of noth ing rather than a 
fear of nothing; a demonic a ttachme nt  to everyt hi ng 
incomp 1ete and uinfinished. In an exci ted  state, the 
psyche no longer ’knows i t s e l f ’ and manages to throw off 
every p re tension  to seriousness.
The world of pleasure, the bourgeois world, is 
composed of a system of rel ations (commodities) 
di f fer en tiating  and linking the ’s e l f ’ and the ’w o r l d ’ .
The distance be twee n the two is felt as desire. The 
psychology of excitement  resolves these rel at ionship s into 
projective f antas ies. Objects exist for it o n 1 y as aspects 
of its abiding narcissism. Any external stimulus might 
trigger off the entirely  free, internal and irrational 
process which is the sanct uar y of human freedom.
Ex ci tement is a kind of no s t a l g i a  over fun, as pleasur e is 
ultimately the forgetting of happiness. The nope of 
excitement is a voracious consumer of novelties. As
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enjoym ent  is no longer predicta bl y rlated to the nature of 
the object world, and is something ent ir ely inward, 
e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n  becomes continuous. So met hin g which 
triggers a keen enj oyment on one occasion  may be impotent 
at the next.
The N e w t o n i a n  mechan is m finally d i s i n te gr ates towards 
the close of the nin e t e e n t h  century. The system of forces 
it defined and used to describe the ’system of the w o r l d ’ 
ceased to have an u namb ig uous and c o n s is te nt meaning. This 
is not just a matter  of a ’re 1a t i v i s i n g ’ te nde ncy in the 
theoretical languages used to des cr ibed nature and society. 
These tendencies, admittedly, are important. Eut a more 
general issue em erges and becomes paramount, first with i n  a 
loose ’t r a d i t i o n ’ of bourgeois thought which might be 
c a l 1ed ’phi 1osophical p s y c h o l o g y ’ . As aga in st all 
’t o t a l i s i n g ’ modes of thought Kierkegaard, Do s t o e v s k y  and 
Nietzsche, most powerfully, but not in isolation, proclaim 
the priori ty of a paradoxical, co nt r a d i c t o r y  and fra gment ed  
reality.-79 The c o n s c io us ness of the bou rg eois wor ld did 
not founder as a c o n s equence  of attacks moun ted  upon it 
from without so much as crumb 1e from withi n i n the res pons e 
of its most devote d philosoph er s to the life it had 
promised them.
Notes to Chapter Ten
1* From say N e w t o n ’s Pr incipla (1686), to the Inv ention of 
n o n - E u c 1idean geomtry and the deve lo pment of critical 
p sy cho log y in the 1 8 4 0 ’s.
2. The use of ’c o n t a i n ’ here is not intended to conv ey any 
sense either of He ge l i a n  immanence or of conscious 
purposiveness.
3. ’We are all c o n v e n t i o n ’ : Montaigne (1958), p. 190. 
boldly  declares. For a bril liant e x p o s i t i o n  of his 
’m o d e r n i s m ’ , see St aro binski (1985).
4. C h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  he lacks m e m o r y : ’ I find sca rc ely a
trace of it in m y s e l f ’ , he boasts, Mo ntaigne  (1958), p. 28. 
See more gen erally Sta robinski (1985), pp. 9-14.
5. Or that C e r v a n t e s ’ novel can appear as an ’exempla ry  
s t o r y ’ in the work of Fou ca ult (1970), pp. 46-50, and 
Schuts (1976), v o 1.2. pp. 135-58
6. As su gg ested  by Pate rs on (1970), p. 41.
7. Cole (1971), provides a system atic co m p a r i s o n  with  
Freud. See also Lowith.
8. Ki erk ega ar d in general add resses his works to the 
’single i n d i v i d u a l ’ , for example, (1941), p. 109, and
w r i t e s .  J o u r n a l s  a n d  P a p e r s  ( 1 9 7 0 ) ,  v o l . 2 ,  p .  4 1 1 ,  t h a t :
—  "   {   *
’He can be in ki nship only with ”the single i n d i v i d u a l ” , 
and only ” the single i n d i v i d u a l ” can be in kins hip with 
G o d ’ . As the high est ’p o t e n t i a t i o n ’ of the self the ’single 
i n d i v i d u a l ’ is a pa rt icula r personality, and c o m p l e t e l y  
unlike its ’H e g e 1i a n i s e d ’ abstraction. Max S t i r n e r ’s 
'unique o n e ’ or absolut e ego which is wholly  i n d e t erminat e 
and ’f r e e ’ . See Stirner (1971), pp. 257-61: Lo with for 
comparison.
9. Not that he did not make many b r i l li an t comme nts on the 
con tem pora ry  world and his relation to it. In saying 
(1978), p. 97, ’The present age is e s s e n tially  a sen sible  
age, devoid of p a s s i o n ’ , he is surely correct, but adds 
’and the refore it has nu lli fied the pri nc iople of 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n ’’ (emphasis in original), he misses the
’p a s s i o n a 1 e s s ’ c o n t r a d i c t i o n  of hypocrisy.
10. The biographic al mater ial is not simply a useful 
’b a c k g r o u n d ’ to u n d e r st an ding his writings. See 
Kierke gaa rd (1962), Lowrie (1962): Thomp s o n  (1974).
11. See, generally, Thulstrup  (1980), p a r t i c u l a r l y  pp. 320-
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82; Taylor (1980), p p . •105-40; Ma la n t s c h u k  (1971), pp. 9- 
101.
12. Lukacs (1974), pp. 28-41.
13. For example, a J o u r n a 1 entry, (1970), v o l . 2, p. 225, 
'The System "goes forward by n e c e s s i t y , " so it is said. And 
look, it never for a moment is able to advance as much as 
half an inch ahead of existence, which goes forward in 
freedom'. But the 'present age', (1978), p. 88, 'is 
esse nt ia lly a sensible, re flecting age devoid of passion, 
flaring upin superficial, shor t-lived  enth us iasm and 
pru de nt ially relaxing in indolence.'
14. Hence the 'disjointed' structure of Ei ther as a 
de s c riptio n of 'immediacy'. On the differen ces be tw een  
Kierke g a a r d ' s  and Marx's rejecti on of Hegel, see Lowith 
(1964).
15. K ie rk eg aard (1959), v o l . 2, p. 217.
16. Ibid., p. 217.
17. Philosophical refl ec tion empties the self of all 
content; by ref lecti on  'i can ci r c u m n a v i g a t e  myself, but 1 
cannot erect myself above myself, I cannot find the 
A r c h i mede an  p o i n t ’ , which lies in exis tence  itself:
Repet i t ion p. 90. It is felt by the intellect as paradox 
'for the paradox is the source of the t h i n k e r ’s passion' : 
Phi losophical F r a g m e n t s , p. 46. It is therefore to 
'repetition' rather than to Socra tic 'recollection' that 
the pas siona te thinker must turn. 'Re colle ct ion is the 
pagan iife-view, rpetitio n is the mo dern life-view; 
re pet ition is the interest of metaphysics, and at the same 
time the interest upon which me ta physics  f o u n d e r s ’ :
Repet it i o n , p. 53.
18. Kier ke gaard  (1959), vol.l, p. 37. For details of his 
relation with Regine, Lowrie (1962), pp. 191-231 Tho m p s o n
(1973), pp. 101-16.
19. In turn repr esent in g a conflict b e t ween  his own 
w it hdrawn m e l a n c h o l y  and an urge to speak 'directly'. A 
'quiet despair'. Journals vol.l, pp. 345-6, and a 
'passionate coldness' L e t t e r s , p. 133-8. In short, lack of 
'faith': Lowrie (1962), p. 226.
20. In fact she marr ied  Fritz Scnlegel six years later, in 
1847.
21. The ' a e s t h e t i c ' ■self 'loses itself in the 
m u l t i f a r i o u s ’ : ibid., (1959), v o l . 2, p. 171; Judge W i l liam
comments of the 'young m a n ’ , 'you are c on st antly only in 
the moment, and therefore your life dissolves': ibid.,p.
183.
22. "His soul had been 'anae st hetis ed by despair', ibid..
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D e a t h  a n d  T h e  C o n c e p t  o f  A n x i e t y .
24. And a ttribu te s his failure to attain it to his own 
’m e l a n c h o l y ’ , ’the most faithful mistress I have k n o w n ’ : 
ibid., (195S), vol.l. p. 20.
25. ’Pleasu re is in itself a m u l t i p l i c i t y ’ : ibid., v o l . 2,
p. 183. And in an ot her sense is the bored om of i mmed i a c y , 
’the nothingn es s which pervades r e a l i t y ’ : ibid., vol.l. p.
26. Accidental that is t o 'say from an ’ i n w a r d ’ viewpoint, 
’The a e s t heti c choice is either e n t ir el y immediate and to 
that extent no choice, or it loses itself in the 
m u l t i f a r i o u s ’ : ibid., v o l . 2, p. 171.
27. He has become ’a b s t r a c t e d ’ and literally philosophical 
’you are united with the philosophers. What unites you is 
that life comes to a s t o p ’ , the H e g elia n method becomes a 
reaiity, ’You m e diate co nt ra diction s in a higher madness, 
philoso phy  me di a t e s  them in a higher u n i t y ’ : ibid., v o l . 2,
p* 175-6.
28. Ki er kega ar d (1962)
29. Ki er kegaard (1959)
oCO Ki erkegaa rd (1965 >
31. K i er ke gaard (1959)
despair is a doubt of
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’Doubt is a despair of thought.
31.
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the what of C h r i s t i a n i t y  but by the how of the Christian. 
This how can only co rrespon d to one thing, the a b s olut e 
p a r a d o x ’ : K i e r k e g a a r d  (1941), p. 540.
38. Kie rkega ar d (1941), p. 457.
39. For a s y m p a t h e t i c  assess ment see Carroll (1974).
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41. Kierke ga ard (I960) the arch aic term ' d r e a d ’ is still 
much richer in associations.
42. ’Dread is a sympat he tic an tipathy  and an anti pathet i c 
s y m p a t h y . . .This dread belon gs to the child so essentia lly 
that it cannot do without it; even though it alarms him, it 
captivates him n e v e r t h e l e s s  by its sweet feeling of 
a p p r e h e n s i o n ’ : K i e r k e g a a r d  (1957), p. 38.
43. Co 1e (1971).
44. CarroI 1 (1974).
45. ’Un dergro un d M a n ’ is a somewhat cynical versio n of the 
’young m a n ’ of the Ei t h e r . and Ras k o l n i k o v  might be 
considered as his ’d e m o n i c ’ brother. Prince My sh ki n has the 
comical incogni to of the a u t he ntic Christian.
46. Bakh tin (1973), pp. 4-7, in particular has drawn 
attention to the ’as to n i s h i n g  inner independence of 
D o s t o e v s k y ’s h e r o e s ’ , and to the, ’plu ral it y of independen t 
and unmer ge d voices and co ns ci o u n e s s e s  and the genuine 
polyphony of full -v alued  v o i c e s ’, char a c t e r i s t i c  of his
noveIs.
47. liochul sky (1967), p. 463.
48. Thus, ’ in D o s t o e v s k y ’s world even agreement  (s o g 1 a s 1e ) 
retains its d i a l o g ! c a 1 character, i.e.it never leads to a 
merging of voices and truths in a single i m p e r s o n a 1 truth, 
as is the case in the monoiogical w o r l d ’ : Bakhtin (1973), 
p. 78.
49. In The Sickness Unto Death Kierke ga ard might have been 
describing the p a r a d o x i c a l l y  self-c onsci ou s ’U n d e rgr ou nd 
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an impotent s e l f - c o n s u m p t i o n  which  is not able to do what 
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consumption, in whi ch again, however, the despa i r e r is not 
able to do what he wills, namely, to consume h i m s e l f ’ : 
ibid., p. 151. Moc h u l s k y  (1967), p. 244, also draws 
attention to the par allels be tween ’U nd ergroun d M a n ’s ’ 
striking insights and those of K i e r ke ga ard and N i e tzsc he
50. But rather than com plete the ’a b s t r a c t ’ d e v e lopm en t of 
the K i e r k e g a a r d i a n  ’young m a n ’ this is accompa ni ed by a 
characteri st ic ’f a l l ’ from the ethical to the aesthetical, 
to cynical pleasure. Mo c h u l s k y  (1967), p. 249.
51. As had been ex pre ssed parti c u l a r l y  by C h e r n y s h e v s k y  in 
his novel What is to be D o n e , "and symbolised by the Crystal
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(1967), p p . , 253-4.
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w e r e ’ *. Dosto ev sky (1972), pp., 63-9.
53. K ierk eg aard (1957), pp. 103-5, speaks e lo qu ently of the
’sop histry of r e m o r s e ’ ; cf. F r e u d ’s (1971), vol. 20, later
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54. Moc hu ls ky (1967), pp., -272-3.
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modern one, a case c h a r a c r t e r i s t i c  of our time... here we 
are faced with a d e t e r m i n a t i o n  to take the first s t e p ’ ; 
Dost oe vsky (1966), p. 467.
56. A theme deepene d in the figure of Ivan Karamazov, in
whom ’all is p e r m i t t e d ’ turns into ’metaphysical
r e b e l l i o n ’ . See Camus (1971), pp. 50-6.
57. A second ’u n p l a n n e d ’ murder is introduced to ensure 
conventional moral culpability.
58. Mo chulsky  (1967), p., 312. In the ’E p i l o g u e ’
Raskolnikov states quite clealry, ’My conscience  is c l e a r ’ , 
Dostoevsky (1966), p. 552.
59. Ibid., pp. 432-3, ’ I just did it; I did it for myself 
a lone...the devil had dragged me there, and it was only 
afterwards that he expl'ainedto me that 1 had no right to go 
there beca use I was the same kind of louse as the r e s t ’ .
60. This does not, of course, resurrect some ’n o r m a l ’ 
feeling in Raskolniko v; she follows him to Sib eria where 
she is tormented, ’by his rude and contempt uo us att itude 
towards h e r ’ , ibid., p. 551.
61. Ibid., pp. 468-74.
62. D osotev sk y had p revio us ly deait with the the idea of 
the ’d o u b l e ’ , a theme he had taken from Gogol, Dost oe vsky  
(1972).
63. M o c h u 1s ky (1967), p p . 307-11.
6 4 .  B a k h t i n  ( 1 9 7 3 ) ,  p p .  8 7 - 1 1 3 .  I n t e r e s t i n g l y  J o h n  C o w p e r  
P o w y s  ( 1 9 7 4 ) ,  a l s o  p o i n t s ,  t h r o u g h  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  p 1 a y , t o  
c a r n i v a l  i m a g e r y  i n  D o s t o e v s k y .
6 5 .  T i m e  a n d  s p a c e  i n  h i s  n o v e l s  a r e  b r o k e n  i n t o
incommen sur ab 1 e fragments. B a k h t i n  (1973). p. 124.
66. ’The individual is in the evil and is in dread of the 
good. The bonda ge of sin is an unfree relation to the evil, 
but the demoniacal is an unfre e rel ation to the g o o d ’, 
Kierkega ard (1957) p. 106; see also Kier ke gaard (1968), pp. 
200-7.
67. Kierkegaard, (1967), pp. 110-14
68. His less exa lte d ’p o s i t i v e ’ characters, Razu mi khin for 
examp 1e , or Sonia, are also less strikin g then their 
c o r r e s ponding ly  minor ’d e v i l s ’.
69. K ier ke gaard (1944); Nie t z s c h e  (1969), (1973).
70. He rejects, of course, any unconditiona l moral c o d e , 
his morality, like K i e r k e g a a r d ’s religiosity, begins with a 
’t e 1e o 1o g i c a 1 s us pensio n of the e t h i c a l ’ , with the ’stern 
e a r n e s t n e s s ’ of ’s e 1f - o v e r c o m i n g ’ : Jaspers (1965), pp. 154- 
6 .
71. The really striking fact in this, Nietzsche points out, 
is the extent to whi ch science has n onet he less vindicated 
itself. ’ Indeed, we are so convinced  of the unc ert ai nty and 
fantasiesof our judgments and of the eternal changeof all 
human laws and concepts that we are really amazed how we 1 I 
the results of sc ie nce  stand u p ’ ; N i e tzsch e (1974), p. ill.
72. In a typical passage we read; ’We operate only with 
things that do not exist; lines, planes, bodies, atoms, 
divisble time spans, divi sible spaces. How should 
exp lan ations be at all possible when we first turn 
everything into an i m a g e , our image! It will do to.consi der 
science as an attempt to humanise things as fai thfully  as 
possible; as we des cr ibe things and their o n e - a f t e r - 
another, we learn how to descri be ou rselves more and more 
precisely... in truth we are confronted by a conti nuu m out 
of which we isolate a couple of pieces... The suddenness 
with which many effects stand out misleads us; actually, it 
is suudden only for us. In this moment of sud denness there 
is an infinite number of pro cesses that elude u s ’ :
Nietzsche (1974), pp. 172-3.
73. Nietzs che (1967), pp. 24-56.
74. Ibid., pp. 97-163.
75. A view denied hy Sche Ier (1972), w ho nonethe i ess t o ok 
over the cat ego ry of r e s s e n t i m e n t .
76. Of course we need not suppose a spiritual liberation 
will destroy the world. ’What at first was app ear ance 
becomes in t h e ‘end, almost invariably, the essence and is 
effective as such. How foolish it would be to suppose that 
one only needs to point out this origi n and this misty 
shroud of de lu sion in order to destroy the world that
counts for real, so-calle d " r e a l i t y " ’ : Nietzsche (1974), p. 
122.
77. The ’s e l f ’ betrays an outmoded metaphysical prejudice 
in favour of a un ifi ed and ’d e e p ’ reality. But, ’would it 
not be rather probable  that, conversely, precisely the most 
superficial and external aspect of existe nce - what is most 
apparent, its skin and s e n s u a 1isation - wouid be grasped 
first - and might even be the only thing that allowed 
itself to be g r a s p e d ’ ; ibid., p. 335.
78. ’Forgetti ng  is no mere vis inertlae as the superficial 
imagine; it is rather an active and in the strictest sense 
positive faculty of. r e p r e s s i o n ’ : Nietzs ch e (1967), p. 57.
79. For a some what di fferent  reconstr uc tion see Carroll
(1974)
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ELEVEN
NATURE'S STR AN GE NESS
The cr iti qu e of bou rgeoi s 'psychology is by no means an 
exercise in 'negative t h i n k i n g ’. It provides a d e s c r i p t i o n  
of the real world: the mo dern w o r 1d . Ki e r k e g a a r d ,
Do stoevsky  and N i e t zsc he  lay bare the reality of d e c o mp osed 
subjectivity. They reconst ruct the world from its point of 
view, or rather from its varied and incompatible points of 
view. The exper i ence of mo der n life cannot be conveyed, 
they ciaim, by any system of rational concepts. 
Incompleteness and contr a d i c t i o n  (rather than ignorance and 
error) are its fundamental conditions, however much it 
succeeds in rend ering the ’o b j e c t i v e ’ n e c essit y of nature 
as a rational order. The standard of personal truth could 
never be subsumed wi th in  a h y p o t h e t i c o - d e d u c t i v e  ’system of 
the w o r l d ’ .
The implication, which Nietzsche fully realised, was
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in fact to deny to nature as well as to personal
’ i d e n t i t y ’ the rational form of a logical s y s t e m . 1 The
conseque nt attack on b o u r ge ois metaphysical pr ete nsions  
must be taken up with in science itself. This line of 
thought is in one sense a cu ri ously negat iv e c on firmati on  
of the ontological argument which stands opp os sed to the 
metaphysical tradition, as it were from the other side.
Both An sel m and Ni etz sch e deny the p o s s i b i l i t y  of a
reasoning ’f a c u l t y ’ separa te from the reality upon which it 
reflects. Indeed^, our thoughts do not lead us h opele ss ly 
astray merely because they can never achieve the 
• o b j e c t i v i t y ’ s up po sedly inherent in a wh olly ’d e t a c h e d ’ 
v i e w . 2 Our c on spicuou s failure to ’s o l v e ’ the puzzle of 
self-ident it y offers a genuine insight into the real nature 
of the self as paradox. We must trust this intuiti on and 
resist all sha llow forms of rational abstraction. But if we 
are not in fact cons ti tuted as isolated ’e g o s ’ , how can we 
hope to un derstan d ’n a t u r e ’ as if it were composed of 
nothing but the relations among isolated particl es? Just as 
our own experience, if taken seriously, will under mi ne any 
rational psychological theory, so will it prevent the 
completion of the classical sc ientific worldview. The 
frozen ps ychotic stare of rational m e c h an ics gives way, 
then, and with dramati c suddenness, to a new a p p r e c i a t i o n  
of n a t u r e ’s strangeness.
Although central to our un ders t a n d i n g  of it. 
N i e t z s c h e ’s philosophical insight can hardly be held
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res ponsible for the t r a n s f or ma tion in s cien ti fic thought. 
Scientists, in formul ating their own problems, however, 
were subject to the same conditions, and had to use as 
their intellectual resources the same modes of experience, 
as those he .described. The relativism, di sc-ont inui ty and 
inc ompleteness which was held to c h a r ac te rise the 
exp eri ence of m o d er nity also came to depict the basic 
properties of nature. We can thus find ’m o d e r n i t y ’ 
described, pr ecisel y but i n c o m m e n s u r a b 1y , in the diffe rent 
languages of physdcs and philosophy, as well as in the more 
common idioms of painting, literature and m u s i c . 3
Invisible Mech anism s
The crisis of rational science lies just as deeply  
hidden in the n i n e t e e n t h  century as does critical 
psychology.' ’A n t i c i p a t i o n s ’ of the new relational and 
morphological concepts of nature have in fact been detected 
as a contin uo usly present u n d e v elo pe d alte r n a t i v e  to 
Newto nia n mechanics, as in the writings  of L e i b n i s a or 
E o s c o v i c h 5 or Goethe'4’. In the present context, however, the 
first stirrings of the movement - which s ubse qu ently 
dev eloped into a disti n c t i v e l y  mo dern as opposed to 
classical scie nt ific wor ld view - might c o n v e n i e n t l y  be 
dated from Sadi C a r n o t ’s Refl ec tions on the Motive Power of
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F i r e ,•which appeare d in 1824, but was not well known until 
much later in the century through the.work of Rudolf 
C l a u s i u s , 7 and from the invention during the 1 8 3 0 ’s of non- 
Euclidean geometry whose full sign if icance  was likewise not 
immediately a p p a r e n t . 0 It is worth noting, nonetheless, 
that the sc ie ntific ideas which would come in time to 
render p o s i ti vi sm absurd were c on te mporar y with the 
pu bl ica tio n of C o m t e ’s major works.
The aim of the classical scie nt ific wo rldview  was to 
complete N e w t o n ’s P r i n c i p i a , subsuming all natural 
phenomenon  and their regulator y forces within a system of 
rational mechanics. Two rather dif fe rent views of the 
underlying me c h a n i s m  of nature were dev eloped as part of 
this endeavour. One focused upon the ' i n h e r e n t ’ pro pe rties 
of matter and att em pted to deduce from them the 
character is tics of the phenomenal world. The other, 
regarding matter as f u n d a mental ly  ’p a s s i v e ’ , sought to 
isolate and des cribe the variety of ’f o r c e s ’ held'to be 
responsible for the coh es ion of and interaction among 
bo d i e s . 9 Either approach, through progress ive a b s t r a c t i o n  
and mathematisation, tends towards the statement of a law 
from which can be derived (given spe cific initial 
conditons) expr essio ns  d e s c r ip ti ve of the real world. Such 
laws are typi ca lly exp re ssed in the form of equations.
From such systems of equat ions might be calculated, for 
example, the posi tion of Mars or some other planet in 
relation to the Earth at some particu lar time. Such
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procedures, central to classical mechanics, are always 
r e v e r s i b l e . This formal feature has important physical 
implications: it means that the fundamental theories of
classical science are isotropic with respect to t i m e . 10 
The cissica! laws do not explain why the entire m e c h ani sm  
of the u n i vers e might not be put into ’r e v e r s e ’ , and the 
sequence of pla ne tary motions, eclipses and conjun ct ions 
run ’b a c k w a r d s ’ . Classical mecha nic s is in fact ind ifferent 
to time; it does not disti ng uish ’b e f o r e ’ and ’a f t e r ’ , but 
establishes the Ideal re gul ariti es of a pu rely conceptual 
world. Its fundamental laws are therefo re c o n s e r v a t i o n  
laws and its cosmos is governed by principles of identity 
and exchange. Ever y physical process can be co n c e p t u a l i s e d  
as an exc ha nge of equivalents, nothing is ever ’g a i n e d ’ or 
’ lost’ . Me c h a n i s m  can be viewed as an ideal market  upon 
which pure, alienat ed objects p er petuall y circulate.
Classical science succeeded by ignoring rather than 
explaining n a t u r e . Mey er son ex pre sse s this idea 
forcefully: ’we only attain l a w s ’ , he points out, ’by
violating nature... by isolating more or less a r t i f i c i a l l y  
a phen om enon from the w h o l e . ’11 N e w t o n ’s e x t r a o r d i n a r y  
success in de rivin g laws of mo tion from a general princi pl e 
and using them to account for the observed motions of the 
pianets was fortuitous. Few aspects of nature, in reality, 
app roa ched that degree of c o n f orm it y to ’t i m e l e s s ’ 
repetition. C a r n o t ’s memoir, one of the first di r e c t l y 
inspired by the techno 1ogy of the industrial revolution.
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introduced an en ti rely new elemen t into scientific 
thinking. Rather than esta blish an identity, C a r n o t ’s 
’p r i n c i p l e ’ expresses n a t u r e ’s inherent pro pensity to 
c h a n g e . 12 In defini ng the idea of the efficien cy of an 
engine, Carno t points out that, ’wherever  there exists a 
differ enc e of temperature, motive power can be p r o d u c e d ’ ,13 
but that, in the transfer of heat from one body to another 
which this involves a certain amount of energy was 
n ec es sarily  d i s s ip ated through frictional and other forces. 
As all natural pro cesses involve such energy transfers, 
nature as a whole must exhibit a similar ’c o o l i n g ’ effect. 
Meyerson, again, is to the point: ’ In opp osit io n to the
illusion of identity to which  mechanical theories, the 
principles of conservation, and even the form of laws in 
general give rise, C a r n o t ’s princ ip le stipulates that the 
whole univer se is mo difying  itself in a constant 
d i rect i o n ’ .14
Hade a n a l y t i c a l l y  precise and q u antita ti vely 
measurable as entropy by Clausius, this new theoretical 
vi ewpoint p 1ayed a central r o 1e in the de velopemn t of 
physical ideas during the latter part of the n i n e t e e n t h  
century. Where physics had p r e v iou sl y been concern ed  with 
ridding its c on ceptio n of natur e of all ’s u b j e c t i v e ’ and 
intuitive ideas, its most adv an ce d branches now beg an to 
develop in response to an iner adicabl e aspect of our 
immediate experie nce of the world. The exact r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between the second law of t h erm od yn amics  and our own inner
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certa int y of du ra tion has remained a matter of d i s p u t e * i= 
The am bi ti on to express physi caI i aws in a t i me -s ensiti ve  
form, however, has become commonp lace. The idea, of e n t r o p y 
seemed to provide a new pri nciple of cosmic reasoning. if 
the entire u n i ve rse were considered to be an isolated 
system, rather like a sealed container filled with gas, 
then all physical events detec table within it must tend 
towards a state of ’e q u i l i b r i u m ’ and end, ultimately, in a 
con di ti on of compl et e d i s o r d e r . W e  can grasp this 
intuitively, since we know that machines ’wear o u t ’ , their 
parts rust and be come useless, that all living things 
perish and disintegrate, that the processes of na ture are 
rarely in fact reversible.
Carnot, and more s i g n i fi ca ntly his belate d followers, 
were co nce rne d prima ri ly with the laws governing the 
diffusion of heat in fluids, both liquids and gases. In 
spite of the inherent no ve lty of the enterprise, this did 
not appear to pose any real threat to the integrity of the 
physical sciences or the validty of their fou nd ation in 
rational mechanics. Such investigations indeed began as a 
confident e x t e nsion  of the classical laws, as no thi ng  more 
than an ’a p p l i c a t i o n ’ of basic principles long since 
established within  the Newtonian tradition. Heat was a 
f orm of energy and must therefore be associa te d with the 
motion of particles. If liquid were heated, or a gas 
compressed, the a c t ivity  of its mo lec ules would be 
increased. If a hot liquid were poured into a contain er
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partially filled with cooler liquid, the more active 
particles would quickl y lose heat through collision s with 
their colder, more sluggish companions, resulting in a 
uniform temperature. This kinetic theory, pre servi ng  an 
underlying ’m e c h a n i s m ’ for heat trans mi ss ion and diffusion, 
proved only par ti ally successful. Quite apart from the 
difficu lty  of- reducing a mass of experimental data to a 
satisfy!-ngly simple 1 a w , the large-scale mechanics of 
elastic coll is ions had never been sa tisf ac torily 
u n d e r s t o o d . 17 More important still was the rea li st ic 
com ple xity with which any theory had to deal. There could 
be no que st ion here of isolating a single particle and 
co nsi dering its properties. The level of d e s c r i p t i o n  had 
to refer to the fluid as a whole and therefore to the 
be haviour of mil li ons of interacting particles. New 
statistical methods were de velop ed  to deal with the general 
problem of description, but the pres umed ’u n d e r l y i n g ’ 
el ementary processes  remai ned obscure.
The kinetic theory of gases attrac ted some of the most 
able phy sicists of the second half of the n i n e te en th 
centuery, among them Wi ll ia m Thomp s o n  (Lord Kelvin), James 
Clerk Maxwell and Ludwig Eoltzmann. The mathematical 
problem proved to be o v e r w h e l m i n g l y  complex unless the 
action of each individual pa rti cle was assumed to be 
independent of every other. If given a physical 
inte rpr etation  this meant that a str ictly  mechanical view 
had to be a b a n d o n e d . 18 The ob se r v a t i o n  of the so -called
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’brown ia n m o t i o n ’ , the random movement (presumably as a 
con sequence of elemen ta ry molecular agitation) of fine 
particles of pollen sus pended in a fluid, even offered 
unlikely empirical support for such a drastic s t e p . 19 But 
this made the Second Law all the more mysterious. If 
element ary  par t i d e s  were not governed by a strict 
mechanism, how could the properties  of fluids, on a molar 
scale, be so clearl y defined? Why should heat a 1 ways be 
trans fer red from warmer to colder regions? Why were there 
no instances of f'luids at a un iform  temp erature 
sp ont an eo usly dividing into regions of differe ing 
temperature? Such problems were to recur, in a more acute 
form, at the beg in ni g of the twen tie th century, but even 
without new ? d i s c o v e r i e s ’ , the deve lopme nt  of classical 
mechanics had, by the 1 8 9 0 ’s, run its course.
Dif fic ulti es  over the kinetic theory of gases were not 
an isolated problem. Increasingly, the M o o s e  e n d s ’ of 
Ne wtonian science became in terconnected in their 
r e c a 1citrance to classical solutions. From the m i d ­
ninete ent h century, they centre on the ’n e w e r ’ sciences 
dealing with electrical and m a g n e t i c  phenomena. W e l l -k no wn 
e le ct ros tatic and magn et ic effects had never sat easily 
within the Newto ni an picture of the world. R e p ulsi ve  as 
well as a t t r activ e forces were involved, and their 
operation was not easily  re ducible to a universal law. And 
later, with F a r a d a y ’s brilli an t experimental d e m o n s tr ations  
of induction, a mechanical acco unt seemed all the more
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cl i s tan t . 2 u Hence it we. s to the ’ rion-corpuscu 1 ar ' theory of 
light that physicists turned in search of instructive 
analogies. In spite of N e w t o n ’s own profe ssed pre fer ence 
for a un ifo rmly ’c o r p u s c u l a r ’ view of nature, some of his 
own contemporaries, no tably Huygens, and in the suceeding 
century, after the a p p a r e n t l y  decisive arguments of Young 
and Fresnel, almost everyone, con ceived of light as some 
form of vib ra tion with in a luminiferous e t h e r . 21
The ’w a v e ’ theory of light was part of, rather than an 
anoma 1y within, the c 1 ass i c a 1 picture of mechn ism. Light 
was held to be a p h y s ic ally real elastic d e f o rmatio n of 
the ’subtle f l u i d ’ which c on stitute d the e t h e r . 2'2 As the 
medium of p r o p a g a t i o n  supporting natural forces, the ether 
was clearly not a ’m a t e r i a l ’ substance in the usuai (even 
usually scientific) sense of the term. Pervading space, it 
apparently offered no res ist ance to the passage of 
planetary bodies through it. But just as clearly, by virtue 
of propa gat ing light, gravitational and possibly other 
forces, it was not simply another name for ex tens i on or 
continuity. It was possessed, that is to say, of 
’m e c h a n i c a l ’ as well as purely geometrical p r o p e r t i e s . 23
h a I- a. d a y , however, in visu alisi ng  electrical and 
magnetic effects in terms of ’ lines of f o r c e ’ , bro ke with 
the implicit me chanis m of the ether theory. There was no 
hint here of a ’p h y s i c a l ’ p h e n om enon underlyi ng and unit ing 
heuristic images offered as interpretatio ns of his
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r e s u i t s . 24 And if Faraday could for a time be ignored by 
m a t h e m a t i c a l l y  s o p h i sti ca ted physicists, James Clerk 
Maxwell could not. Deeply impressed by F a r a d a y ’s 
demonstrations. Maxwell set out to extend and complet e his 
work by estab l i s h i n g  a general and precise framework for 
the ana lysis of all el e c t r o m a g n e t i c  phenomena. In 
est ab li shing a m a t h e m a t i c a l l y  faultless ’field t h e o r y ’ . 
Maxwell quite self- c ons ci ously took the physical sciences 
beyond the confines of classical m e c h a n i c s . 23 M a x w e l l ’s 
physical intuition, which Einstein  so much admired, was 
entirely liberated from mechanical prejudices. Others 
often found his work diffi c u 11 because of this and pref ered  
to treat his physics as no more than a mathematical 
convenience. But this was never his intention. He always 
insisted upon the ne cessity  of ana 1ogy in sci en tific  
th i n king,2 * and treated mechanism  as just one among several 
of its possib le  f o r m s . 27 The aim was always to connect  
the un known and unfamiliar with the known and familiar, to 
present the unity of natur e in a series of connect ed 
images. Maxwell indeed, gifted with e x t r a o rdinary  powers of 
synthesis, felt the more pressing methodological d i f f i c u l t y  
to be the e s t a b li shment  of difference, rather than the 
forging of identities. ’ If all that we know is rel at ion ’ 
he confesses, ’and if all the relations of one pair of 
things c o r r es po nd to those of another pair, it will be 
difficult to dis ti nguish  the one pair from the other, 
although not presenting  a single point of r e s e m b l a n c e ’ .2e
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E l e c t r i c i t y  can be connected with magnetism* and both 
can be con sid er ed as ana logous to light. They can be 
rep resented as varying states of fields of force whose 
local co nditions remain quali t a t i v e l y  unlike the large- 
scale physical interactions known to classical m e c h a n i c s . 29 
M a x w e l l ’s e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  theory, the foundation of the 
modern physical sciences, brought to an end the prog ressiv e 
m e c h a n i s a t i o n  of the world picture which had been at the 
heart of the bourgeois ’mode of t h o u g h t ’ .
Eccentr ic  Obse rv ations
Clerk Maxwell, expressing a view common to many 
physicists during the latter part of the ni neteen th  
century, remarks that ’all our knowledge, both of time and 
space, is e s s e n t i a l l y  r e l a t i v e ’ .30 Ernst Mach and Henri 
Poincare indeed went so far as to apply this ’p r i n c i p l e ’ of 
relativity to classical m e c h a n i c s . 21 The former, in a 
br illiant ana ly sis of N e w t o n ’s original ’d e m o n s t r a t i o n ’ of 
absolute space, argued that, far from e s ta bl ishing an 
invariant fra mework for physical description, such 
experiments showed rather the unr es tricte d in teractio n of 
all matter in the u n i v e r s e . 32 We could not imagine a 
physically real location from which we could ob se rve the 
’a c t u a l ’ motions of matter in the cosmos. Every 
obser vat ion had to be made from some particular place, and 
was subject to the ’d i s t o r t i n g ’ effects of its own motion.
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It was an illusion to suppose there were any physical 
experiments we might perform that would free us from the 
effects of our own particular perspective* The 
interpreta ti on of classical mechanics as the true ’system 
of the w o r l d ’ was th ere fore an u nw ar ranted  generalisation. 
Classical mechanics, rather like Euclidean  geometry, 
ex erc ised an o verwh el ming attr ac tion on our ’common s e n s e ’ 
but, in the final analysis, could be regarded as nothing' 
more than a co n v e n t i o n  that might be e x p r es sible equally 
well in quite a di fferent form.33
A ’r e l a t i o n a l ’ and ’c o n v e n t i o n a l ’ view of scientif ic 
knowledge s t i mu iated a wide- ran g i ng m e t h o d o l o g i c a 1 debate 
that most sci entists were happy to igno re.34 Such 
reflections seemed to offer no novel physi c a 1 ideas. Even 
in the con text of ingenious new experimental
investigations, it prompted at best an ad hoc c r i t icism  of 
classical id eas.33
Scie nt ific interest centred on the dev el opment  of 
M a x w e l l ’s theory and in particular on the search for a 
definit ive  d e m o n s t r a t i o n  of the reality of an ether as the 
q u a s i - p h y s i c a 1 seat of fields of force. The most 
celebrated and refined of such exper iments was cond ucted by 
Michel son and Horley in 1887. They developed  an ingenious 
apparatus to compare the velocity of light along two 
orthogonal p a t h s . 3i In ’t h e o r y ’ , its speed meas ur ed along 
the di rec tio n of the earth's motion should be greater than
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that found for the transverse path. No dif fer ence was in 
fact observed, and all efforts to detect the ’d r i f t ’ of the 
earth through the ether failed.
These deve lo pments form the immediate context of 
E i n s t e i n ’s Special Th eor y of R e l a tivity which appeared in 
Ann ale n der Physik in 1905. They do not furnish us, 
however, with E i n s t e i n ’s real point of dep arture which was
- to him - the evident c o n t r adic ti on bet wee n Newtoni an 
science and M a x w e l l ’s e l e c t r o d y n a m i c s . 37 He begins his 
his to ric paper thus: ’ It is known that M a x w e l l ’s
el ec tr odynam ic s - as us ua ll y un dersto od  at the present time
- when  applied to moving bodies, leads to asymetrie s which 
do not appear to be inherent in the p h e n o m e n a , ’33 and only 
later mentions the failure to detect the movemen t of the 
earth through a ’ 1u mi niferou s e t h e r ’ . The Princ iple of 
Re la t i v i t y  which he introduces to resolve these 
di ffi cu lt ies is, unlike those of Poin ca re or Mach, a 
physical postulate. The aba n d o n m e n t  of ab solute space, and 
a pr iv ile ged point of observation, wi thin it from which to 
construct  a ’system of the w o r l d ’ , n e c e s s i t a t e d  a much more 
thorough revision in our basic physical concepts than had 
been r e a 1i s e d .
U 11 i mate Iy, it requi red a s c i e nt if ic theory of much 
greater co mplexity than any en vis age d wi th in  the Ne w t o n a i n  
traditon. Genera li ty rather than si m p l i c i t y  must becom e the 
standard of formal elegance. Ei nst ei n makes this clear in
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his 1916 paper on the General Theor y of' Relativity: ’The
general laws of nature  are to be e x p r e s s e d ’ , he insists,
’by equations which hold good for all systems of c o ­
ordinates, that is, are co -variant with respect to any 
su bstitutio n w h a t e v e r ’ .3 '5 The realisation, that is to say, 
of the n ec es sarily ’s u b j e c t i v e ’ and ’r e l a t i o n a l ’ viewpoint 
from which we obs erve the world does not mean that science 
is restric ted to empty forma li sm and the a r ti fi ciality  of a 
purely conventional viewpoint. Proper ly  understood, it 
provides us rather with the starting point for a new and 
more secure sc ientific realism. Its method inverts the, 
largely implicit, as s u m p t i o n  of classical science that 
’r e a l i t y ’ is more com plex than the theory through which we 
understand it, Now ’r e a l i t y ’ is a b s o l u t e l y . s i m p l e  but 
remains unkn owable in its simplicity.
E i n s t e i n ’s science begins, then, with a postulate  of 
constancy rather than a r ela ti vistic hypothesis. Physical 
observations might be made from any point within an 
indefinitely large range of possibl e systems of c o ­
ordinates. There is no absolute space, and there are no 
stationary points, and any observational pla tfo rm must be 
considered in mo tion relative to any a rb it rarily chosen 
point in the universe. Even so, ass um in g u ni f u r m relative 
motion of two such ’inertial f r a m e s ’, we can say that the 
laws of mec hanics (however expressed) must hold good for 
that observer and, what is really implied in such a 
statment, the veloc it y of light, ’is always pro pagat ed  in
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empty space with a definite ve locity  c which is independent 
of the sate of mo tion of the emitting b o d y ' . 40 The 
uni fo rm ity of nature, as we have seen, is the fundamental 
postulate of the scient if ic re voluti on  and Einstein's 
Special Theory can be und ers to od as a thorough analysis of 
the mea ning of this conviction. Just as Kierk egaar d or 
D os to evsky exposed the depths of bou rg eo is self deception 
by embracing rather than rejecting the fundamental reality 
of the ego, Einste in  does not base his science on a 
radically new princ iple but on a careful c onsid er ation of 
all the implications of the exist ing pri nciple to which he 
remains fully c o m m i t t e d . 41
Given these two fundamental postulates, the phenomenal 
world must be 'deformed' in relatio n to them. If we know 
that the velocit y of light must remain constant  for any 
observer, then observers moving rel ative to each other must 
disagree about such a p p a rent ly  'universal' things as the 
me as urem en t of length or time. Ad as any m e a s urement  must 
depend upon the sending and re cei vin g of light signals, 
this bec omes a general theoretical, rather than a 
technical, problem, Suppose an observ er A situated at the 
centre of an u n rea li sticali y rapid train (travelling at an 
ap precia ble fraction of the speed of light) switches on a 
lamp just as he passes a c o m p an io n B on a platfo rm 
stationary with respect to the mo ving train. A observes  
(that is, his instruments record for him) that light 
impulses from the lamp reach either end of the carriag e
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simultaneously, B however records that light impulses 
reach the rear of the carriage  befo re reaching the front. 
This is a simple cons eq uence of their relative motion. In 
the brief moment it takes for the light to reach the rear 
of the carriage, the carriag e itself has moved forward so 
that, from B ’s point of view, the light still has some 
distance to cover to reach the new posit io n of the front of 
the c a r r i a g e . 42 Simultaneity, that is, does not reside in 
nature, and in compari ng events in differen t reference 
frames, is a meaningles s concept. There is no 'absolute' 
time any more than there is an ab so lute s p a c e . 4 ’ '
The con st an cy of the velocity of light force even more 
bi zarre conclusions. imagine A and B conduct a more 
refined experime nt and each measures the velocity of the 
light impulses emitted from A's lamp. Befor e the 
exp er imen t takes place, A and B have satisfied themselve s 
as to the dimes nsions of the carriage  while at rest 
relative to each other and have s y n c h ro nised their clocks. 
Appa rat us is set up on the platf or m to exac tly replicate 
the posit io n of mirrors and clocks w i thin the s t a t i o n a r y  
car r i a g e . Again as the train speeds by B , A switches on 
his lamp. For A there is no difficulty, it does not matter 
in which dir ec ti on  he takes mea su r e m e n t s  as he is part of 
the inertial system con taining ail the relevant apparatus. 
For B it appears, at first sight, that if he measur es the 
ve loc ity in the direc tio n in which the train is moving, he 
must arrive at a higher value than if he were to m e a sur e it
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in the direction  against the mo tion of the train. But in 
fact he cannot ’compound v e l o c i t i e s ’ in this way. The 
velocity of light is not augme nted or diminished by any 
relative mot io n in its source. Intuitively we can 
understand  this must be the case. If we could, by moving 
very rapidly, ’o v e r t a k e ’ light signals as we can sound 
waves or a ball thrown ahead of us, we couid see events 
which had taken p 1 ace before we began  to move. We could 
move ob serv a t i o n a l l y  into the past. The incoherence of 
such a poss ib ility is far more di s t u r b i n g  to our sense of 
reason than are the n o n- in tuitiv s c o n s e qu en ces of the 
const anc y of the velocity  of light.
Suppose B measures on his watch the time it takes for 
the light to reach the forward end of the carriage.
Bec ause of the forward mo tio n of the carriage, the light 
travels farther, relative to his ’s t a t i o n a r y ’ position, 
than it does for A , H o w e v e r , since v e l ocity  is given by 
dista nce  traversed divided by time elapsed and the velocity 
must be the same for both observers, A ’s clock must run 
’s l o w ’ in relation to B ’s. S i m i larly  if A and B agree on 
the elapsed time then they must dis ag ree about the length 
of the carriage. It is important to note that these 
relativ iti es are not ’s u b j e c t i v e ’ p h e n omena but physical 
con seq uenc es  of relative motion. Clock s remain 
sy nch ro ni sed and mea suring rods remain of equal length only 
so long as they are confined to the same inertial frame of 
r e f e r e n c e .
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Measure me nts of space and time could no longer be 
considered as ind ependent and absolute magnitudes* 
Minkowski, introducing his own formalis at ion and extensio n 
of E i n s t e i n ’s theory in 1908, remarks that, ’H e n c ef orth 
space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed to fade 
away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two 
will preser ve an independent r e a l i t y ’.44 This marks a 
decisive shift in the Ga lil ea n viewpoint. The physical 
univ er se  cannot be u n d e rst oo d from the point of view of an 
isolated, obse rving  ego. All physical o bserv at ions become 
c omp arisons  among separate observers, and physical laws 
become the rules by whi ch their dif fe ring ’r e s u i t s ’ can be 
rationalised. In E i n s t e i n ’s physics we are not asked to 
’imagine o u r s e l v e s ’ in a particu lar  location or situation, 
we are asked rather to ’ imagine someone e l s e ’ in a 
particular set of circumstances. It is the o t h e r ’s 
observations, when compared to our own, or to a third 
p a r t y ’s, that provide the theorist with his basic- 
m a t e r i a l . 45 His is the viewpoint of the d ec omposed  subject. 
The obser ving ego must be distrib uted into a var iety of 
locations and times if it is to overcome its te nd ency to 
project into nature the illusion of its own rational order. 
And reason is powerless to recom bin e these d i s p ar at e images 
into a unified and coherent picture of the world. The 
generality Ei ns te in sought in his theoretical work is an 
exp res sion of powerful phys i c a 1 intuitions which, in 
satisfying formal crite ria of consistency, proved d i f ficul t
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to visualise. In e x t r a o rd inaril y lucid n o n - t e c h n i c a 1 
presentations, however, the same difficul ties arise. If by
rational we mean the comp le tion of a single Ne wtonian  
deductive ’m o d e l ’ of the cosmos, then the ’absolute  
s i m p l i c i t y ’ of nature  cannot be rendered into the form of a 
rational i n t e l l e c t . 4 * Nature mus t appear strange.
These d i ffic ul ties become much more acute when the 
in ter -relati on betw een space-tim e as an u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  
continuum, and matter are considered. Minkowski, realising 
that the classical 1anguage of point-mass, velocity, force 
and so on had finally been overthrown, suggested a new 
geometric approach. Any ’substantial p o i n t ’ in the universe 
can be assigne d a sp ace-time co -o rdinate and its 
’everlastin g career' repres ented  by a w o r 1 a - 1i n e . 47 Then, 
’physical laws might find their most perfect exp r e s s i o n  as 
reciprocal relations bet ween these world l i n e s ’ .48 It was 
only at this point that the enormous p h y s 1c a 1 imp lications 
of devel opments in n o n - E u c 1idean geometry became clear.
The ne w geometric d e s c r i p t i o n of space-t ime  would be a. n 
unimaginabl e four-dimensional and n o n - E u c 1idean man i f o 1d .4 9 
Only then would the ’s i m p l e ’ physical ph en omena of 
accelerated motion, gravitational ’f o r c e ’ and field effects 
be fully comprehensible.
As early as 1870, William Clifford  had su ggested that 
many of the phe nomena we associat e with ’p o n d e r a b l e ’ matter 
m 1 ght be better un de rst ood as properties of s p a c e . Might
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not 'physical v a r i a t i o n s ’ , in fact, be 'effects whi ch are 
really due to changes in the curvat ur e of our s p a c e ? ’ .56 
it was not until 1916, however, with the pu bli cat ions of 
E i n s t e i n ’s General Theory, that such spe cula tions were made 
rigorous. The ex t e n s i o n  of the Special The ory led not 
only to a deeper unde r s tand ing of moti o n , but also to a new 
c on cep tio n of matter. The technical prob lem was 
de ce p t i v e l y  simple. The Special T h eory had found ways to . 
express the invariance of the laws of natur e across 
reference frames ,in un if or m mo tion  relati ve to one another. 
But what about re fer ence frames a c c e 1erating with respect 
to one another c
In a n o n - t e c h n i c a 1 presentation, E i n stei n introduces 
the problem by asking us to imagine someone inside a closed 
lift from which he can make no o b s e r va tions of outside  
space. The lift, tra ns ported to a distant region of space, 
is in ’free f a l l ’ . For the observer enclosed within this 
’inertial s y s t e m ’ , the laws of me chanic s hold good and are 
directly obse rvable in their classic form. Everything, 
including himself, is ’w e i g h t l e s s ’ and objects remain where 
they are in rel ation to the bo un dar ies of the lift, unless 
the observer interferes with them in some way, for ex ampl e 
by pushing them, in which case they will persist in their 
motion until colliding with anot her  object or the walls of 
the container. The ’m a s s ’ of any object can be d e t e r m i n e d  
by its resi sta nce to motion. A ’ l a r g e ’ object req uir es  
more of a push to achieve a specific  velocity than a
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Now suppose the lift is acted upon by an external 
’ i n v i s i b l e ’ force* A rope is attac he d to its ’t o p ’ and a 
distant energy source used to a cceler at e it through space. 
For the interior observer things are now quite different*. 
He feels a downward  pressure forcing all ’h e a v y ’ obj ects to 
the base of the lift. He becomes conscious of his own 
’w e i g h t ’ . And now he can determ in e the relative masse s of 
the objects around them by a weighing device, such as a 
spring balance, whi ch measures the ’f o r c e ’ acting upon it. 
The larger the object the greater the force. He mi gh t well 
’e x p l a i n ’ such fundamental physical features of his world, 
Ein ste in suggests, by sup posing the base of his lift were 
endowed with some quality such as gravity which, ’actin g at 
a d i s t a n c e ’ , a c c e l erat ed  objects towards it.
The internal observer assumes the lift is at ’r e s t ’ in 
relation to some absolute frame of reference. An external 
observer, however, does not make this mistake and 
at tributes the ’g r a v i t a t i o n a l ’ effects wi thin the lift to 
its a c c e l e r a t i o n  relative to the space su rro unding it.
Again, this is not a purely formal relativism. It per si sts 
only because of the app are nt ly fortuitous eq ui v a l e n c e  of 
inertial and gravitational m a s s . ”  This equivalence, 
however, allows Ei ns tein to treat ’g r a v i t a t i o n a l ’ forces as 
acc ele rati ng  r e f e r e n c e - f r a m e s , and suggests, furthermore, 
that light and other forms of e l e c t r o - m a g n e t i c  ra d i a t i o n
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mus t be ’b e n t ’ by gr av i ta t i ona. 1 fields. From t he 
pe rspect ive of an a c c e l e r a t i n g  reference-frame, this is 
easy to grasp. Sup pose a small hole is bored in the lift 
and light from an ’o u t s i d e ’ source introduced into the 
lift. The illuminated point on the wall opposite the hole 
will not be dir ec t l y  in line with the outside source but 
di splaced due to the mov em ent of the lift during the 
interval of its travel across the interior-. For the 
’i n t e r i o r ’ observer, this effect will also be a t t r ibute d to 
the ’g r a v i t y ’ he.has discov ered governs ail other 
d i s p l a c e m e n t s . 23
Since tnsr0 is no kinematic difference d etween
gravitational field and an a ccele ra ting r e f e r e n c e - f r a m e , 
Einstein, in gene ra lising  the classical laws to ex pr e s s i o n s  
invariant under any t r a n s f ormat io n (including 
a c c e l e r a t i o n } , a r rives at a new con ce pt ion o f gravi tatio n a 1 
’f o r c e ’ . Instead of invoking a ’f o r c e ’ , either acting at a 
point or d is tr ibuted  throughout a field, to ac count  for 
acceleration, E i n s t e i n  suggests that change in v e l ocity can 
be fully c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by the geometrical pr op erties of 
space. Ac ce l e r a t e d  mo tion does not betray, any more than 
does uniform motion, the action of an external ' f o r c e ’ . In 
E i n s t e i n ’s physics, all motio n is ’e f f o r t l e s s ’ , all objects 
drift through space, irresis tibly ’f a l l i n g ’ along their 
w o r l d - I i n e s . A c c e l e r a t i o n  is simply a ben ding of space, a 
contortion in its ’n o r m a l l y ’ fiat metric. Ail moti o n  has 
finally become ’n a t u r a l ’ .54
4
The n a t u r alnes s of motion, however, is no longer 
predi cated upon the pro per ties of matter. N o w , space and 
matter are g e o m e trica ll y linked. The character of space 
is, first of ail, ’d e f o r m e d ’ by the matter it contains.
’Our world is not E u c l i d e a n ’ , Einst ei n warns: ’The
geometrical nature of our world is shaped by masses and 
their v e l o c i t i e s ’ .:5 Large c o nc entrati on s of matte r curve 
space and w o r l d - 1 i n e s  running through such regions 
converge, thereby, ac c e l e r a t i n g  objects. Equally, however, 
such co ncen t r a t i o n s  of matte r can be viewed simpl y as 
’d e n s e ’ regions of space: ’Hatter is where the
c o n c e n tration  of en erg y is great, field where the 
co n c e nt ration of energy is s m a l l ’ .2£ The categorical 
distinc ti on b e tween matter and space is dissolved. ’We 
could regard m a t t e r ’ claims Ei n s t e i n  directly, ’as the 
region in space where the field is ex tremely s t r o n g ’27 - a 
statement which might be taken as the logical implicat ion 
of gene ral ising M a x w e l l ’s field theory. The cosmos, it 
appears, is composed  of nothin g but space, or rather s p a c e ­
time, va ri ously condens ed and w a r p e d : ’A thrown stone is,
from this point of view, a changing f i e l d ’ .=s The 
rela tiv ising of abso lu te space, that is to say, implied the 
overthrow also of classical co nceptions of matter as 
substance separate from the ’e m p t y ’ extension, or ethereal 
medium, con ta in ing it.
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Hi dden P e r v er si ties
Re lativ it y T h eory interpreted the sensibl e world as a 
specific instance of more general laws, the v a r i at io ns in 
which were observable, for us, only in exceptional 
circumstances. The imm ediate exp er ie nce of the world 
exposed us dir ec tly to only a small segment of its 
relations. Inconc eivably high relative velocities 
estranged us from this common  sense reality. Re as o n  led 
us, when these ’e x t r e m e ’ situations were considered, to 
bizarre results. A rational image of nature  no longer 
seemed con gr ue nt with  the ’system of' the w o r l d ’ as a 
mechanism; the relational system of universal physical 
causality which, in the bo urgeois world, had becom e 
’ i n t u i t i v e ’ broke down under the stress of internal 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n s . 39 These inco nsistenci es arose not only in 
Relativit y Theory, but appeared, with even greater force, 
when mechanical ideas were applied to Insensibly minu te 
atomic interactions.
In 1900 Max Planck succeeded i 11 showing that the 
ele c t r o m a g n e t i c  energy dis tr i b u t i o n  withi n a close d system 
not oniy tended towards an e qu ilibri um  condit io n in 
accordance with B o l t z m a n n ’s form ul ation of the gas laws, 
but did so in a series of discrete ’ j u mps’ .A 0 En er g y  was 
absorbed and emitted by el ementary particles of ma tt e r  in a 
discontinuous fashion; in quanta whose value was a 
universal constant, independent of any variat io n in the
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empirical c i rc umstanc es  of the system as a w h o l e . 41 
Bo lt zm ann had resorted to a statistical ap proach  to 
t h ermo dy namics as a mathematical conven ience and supposed 
that, in reality, an ’underlying'' m e c hanism pr ovided a 
continuous netw ork of physical causes wholly d et er mining 
the mo ti on  and energy level of each particle* Planc k 
argued, however, that B o l t z m a n n ’s theoretical results, 
which were e xt en dable to all forms of radiation, could be 
supported only by infering a real physical d i s c o n t i n u i t y  in 
the process of ab s o r p t i o n  and emission.
E i n s t e i n  sim il ar ly argued that light must be 
considered a dis cont inuou s form of radiation. In a paper- 
publ ish ed wi thin a few weeks of his ’E l e c t r o d y n a m i c s  of 
Moving B o d i e s ’, he proposed a ’q u a n t u m ’ in t e r p r e t a t i o n  of 
the p h o t o - e l e c t r i c  e f f e c t . 4,2 When  a piece of metal is 
illuminated it p eriodi ca lly expels ele ctrons in rapid 
motion. The vel oc ity of the emitted electrons  dep ends on 
the w a v e - l e n g t h  and not the intensity of the incident  rays; 
it is independent, that is to say, of the di stance of the 
light source. If light is cons id ered as the w a v elike 
def or ma tion of an elastic ether, then its en er gy  level, its 
capacity to impart motion, would p r o g r e s s ! v e y  de cline with 
distance. If, however, light is co nsidered as a stream of 
’p h o t o n s ’ or light quanta, the co n s t a n c y  of the p h o t o ­
electric effect becomes c o m p r e h e n s i b l e . 413 E i n ste in  was also 
forced to the co nclusio n that the metal absorbed and 
emitted radiati on in discrete amounts or ’p a c k e t s ’ He was
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able to show that experimental  results had been reached
that were cons is tent with such a view and quite 
inconsi ste nt with the classical wave theory.
In spite of the serious logical dif ficult ie s into 
which it seemed to lead, the ’ quantum* theory made rapid 
strides. D i s c o n t i n u i t y  and du ality appeared e v e r yw here and 
refused to be unif ied or integrated at some ’h i g h e r ’ 
theoretical level. The more successful it became  in 
predic tin g experimental effects, the more my st e r i o u s  did 
the theory a p p e a r . 44 Sy s t e m a t i c  problem s were pushed into 
the ba ck g r o u n d  for some time with the success, in 1913, of 
B o h r ’s ’q u a n t u m ’ view of at om ic s t r u c t u r e . 41 A growing 
body of exp erimental work, such as that on the p h o t o ­
electri c effect and on rad ia tion p a r t i c u l a r l y  con n e c t e d 
with Rutherford, n e c e s s i t a t e d  a revisi on of the classical 
con cep tion of an atom as an indivisible, imp en etrabl e and 
simple body. The atom was itself a struc ture of simpler 
particles, but if this were the c a s e , what ac c o u n t e d  for 
the st abi lit y of this structure? Bohr developed the 
’p l a n e t a r y ’ view of the atom with a pos iti ve ly char ged 
nucleus and a number of neg a t i v e l y  charged elec t r o n  
satellites. He suppos ed that atoms of a part ic ular el ement 
possess a finite number of discrete energ y states, 
’station ary  s t a t e s ’ , in which neither emi ss io n nor 
a bs orp tio n of energy can occur. Atoms may ’ lump’ from one 
st ationary state to another with a c c o mpan yi ng  e m i s s i o n  or 
absorption. He felt, at this point, that classical
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me chanics were adequa te  to describe the ’sta ti on ary s t a t e s ’ 
but broke down when app lied to the ’t r a n s i t i o n s ’ , which 
remained f u n d a m e n t a l l y  i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e . ^
B o h r ’s theory had c ons id erable success in a c c o u n t i n g  
for the spectral patterns ass oc iated  with di fferent  
elements, and even more in providing a rational fou n d a t i o n  
for M e n d e l e v ’s pe r i o d i c  table and, consequently, for 
chemicai t h e o r y - 67 The dis contin uo us nature of en ergy 
states, the a c c e p t a n c e  of which B o h r ’s theory fi nally  made 
respectable, posed acute and fundamental problems that 
could not be ignored for long. Imagine a piece of 
radio act ive material. It is unstable, its large complex 
atoms tend to break down into simpler and more stable 
structures, in the process emitting a variety of e n e r g i s e d 
particles. It is a strange instability. One atom, 
m ec ha n i c a l l y  identical to every other in the sample, 
suddenly tran sf orms itself. It has existed in its original 
state for perhaps several thousand years. Another atom may 
persist in its original conditon for several tho us and more 
years before it too follows its companion. In terms of 
classical science, there seemed no possible e x p l a n a t i o n  of 
either the ’h o w ’ or the ' w h e n ’ of this process. Yet, as a 
process wi th in  the sensible world, it followed its own 
laws. The precise number of such ’ l u m p s ’ in a defined 
period of time, the nature and intensity of the re s u l t a n t  
radiation could all be predicted with admirabl e accuracy.
4b2
a p p ro ac h to thermodynamics. There the methematicai 
formalism had been justified by an appeal to an as yet 
un kn ow n ’u n d e r l y i n g ’ mechanism. Even so, it had been 
embarrassing. Lore nts admitted, in an opening remark at 
the first Solva y Congres s at Brussels in 1911. that, ’We do 
not u nder st an d why a lump of iron does not glow at room 
t e r m p e r a t u r e ’ .bE Just when physicists had reached down, as 
it were, to a deeper level of nature, nature itself seemed 
to dissolv e into in eo mprehens ibe processes. It was not 
simply a matter of a more ingenious a p p l i c a t i o n  of ex istin g 
ideas. Using conventional concepts Bohr claimed, ’a 
descr i pt i on of a t o m ! c  processes in terms of space and t i me 
cannot be car ried through in a manner free from 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n ’.A9 From the point of view of the ’or d i n a r y  
d e s c ri pt ion of physical p h e n o m e n a ’ , indeed, ’the qu a n t u m  
theory rep resen ts an es se ntially irrational e l e m e n t ’ .70
The g e n e r a l i s a t i o n  of quantum theory during the 1 9 2 0 ’s 
by de Br oglie , Heisenberg, Born and Sch roed inger 
intensified rather than resolved this ’ i r r a t i o n a l i t y ’ . The 
w a v e - p a r t i c 1e du ality was taken by de Broglie to be 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of any physical process whatever.
Ev erything we called a ’p a r t i c l e ’ had a ss oc iated wi t h  it 
wavelike chara cteristics, and every wave p h e n o m e n o n  was 
ass oci ated with particular p a r t i c l e s . 71 If the General 
Theory of R e l a t i v i t y  had united matter and space in a new 
intimacy, quant um theory bound them together in the same
paradox. The fundamental ch ar ac t e r i s t i c s  of matter and 
energy, taken se parately or in interaction, were 
in express ible through a single, logically uniform, and 
p h y s icall y meaningful set of concepts. Prog r e s s i v e  
formalisation, p a r t ic ularly  in S c h r o d i n g e r ’s elegant ’wave 
m e c h a n i c s ’ , did nothin g to resolve the d i f f i c u l t y . 72
Heisenberg, in particular, of feres a p a r t i c u l a r l y 
u n c o m p r o m i s i n g  fo rm u l a t i o n  of the conceptual problem. 
’Qu an tu m t h e o r y ’-, he says bluntly, ’does not all ow a 
comp letel y ob jective d e s c ription  of n a t u r e ’ .73 Classical 
physics had been founded on the p o s s ibil it y of ’d e t a c h e d ’ 
obse r v a t i o n  of nature. The fundamental ’v a r i a b l e s ’ of any 
mechanical syste m could be a c c u r a t e l y  and ind ep en dent 1y 
measured. The 1 imitations on our kno wledg e of physical 
events were purely practical. In the s ub -atomic  world of 
quantum physics this was no longer the case. Our k n o w le dge  
of such systems is, in principle, limited. H e i s e n b e r g  
introduced his principle of ind eter minac y as a p r o blem of 
measurement. Any exper iment we might perf orm  to de t e r m i n e  
the pos it ion of,' for example, an ele ctron  would, by the 
Comp ton  effect, alter its mo m e n t u m  in an u n p r e d i c t a b l e  way. 
And any pr oc edure  which might acc u r a t e l y  me as ur e its en erg y 
would be temp orall y imp r e c i s e . 74 Ue could not know the 
future state of a system because we could not c o m p l e t e l y  
know its present state. In H e i s e n b e r g ’s view this was 
something more than a limitation on our k n o w ledge  of the 
world. The Indeterminacy Relations, as he p r e fe red to
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describ e these limitations, were ail that we c o u 1d know, 
and therefo re to ask if an electron could n o n e t h e l e s s  be 
conce ive d as a de fi ni te but unkowable ma gn itude a s s o c i a t e d  
with a spe ci fic location made no s e n s e . 73 Even if the 
classical laws held, we could never at the s u b a t o m i c  level 
d et ermine physical var iables with su fficient p r e c i s i o n  to 
apply them.
B o h r ’s own view of H e i s e n b e r g ’s deri v a t i o n  of 
In det erminac y Relatio ns  un derwent  c on si derable  ch anges over 
a period of y e a r s . 74 From an early view of qu a n t u m  physics 
as a ’ limiting conditon' of classical mechanics, he 
deve lop ed a methodo logical postulate of C o r r e s p o n d e n c e  and 
finally of Comp lementari ty. By the late twenties, the 
u n r e a s o n a b l e n e s s  that had been or iginal ly  co nfined  to 
highly s pecia li sed studies of radiation, na me l y  that ’there 
were two inc ompa tible models... each well co nfirmed; yet 
evidence for the one const i tuted cou n t e r - e v i d e n c e  for the 
o t h e r ’ , was wi dely felt in all fields of physical 
e n q u i r y . 77 Bohr, influenced perhaps by Hof' f ding to a 
K i e r k e g a a r d i a n  a d m i ra ti on of paradox, argued that the 
f u n d a m e n t a 1 d u a 1i sms of quantum phys i cs did not stem  s i m p 1y 
from dif fe re nt co nvent ions of d e s c r i p t i o n . 73 They  did not 
arise as the ar b i t r a r y  but incompatible points of view  from 
which nature as a whole might be analysed, nor did they 
orig ina te in diff erences in the type of ph e n o m e n a  se lected  
by each as central to physical structure. Each view, one 
as so ciated with mea su rement of mom en tum and energy
455
(particles) the other- with d e t e r minat io n of freque ncy and 
w a v e le ng th (waves), was essential to the d e s c riptio n of a 1 1 
physical phenomena- The logical incons istencies  in physics 
was no more than a rea l i s a t i o n  of the fundamental 
d i scon ti nuities  of nature. Any phys ic ally realisti c theory 
must contai n logical incompatibilities- Rather than aim at 
the c onst ru ction of a un ifor m and complete ’system of the 
w o r 1 O' « or be sat is fied with either a vague or a purely 
f o r m a 1 ’a 1g o r i t h m i c ’ approach, the physi cis t should aspire
to the c o n s t r u c t i o n  of internally consistent, pre cise but 
contra d i c t o r y  images of n a t u r e . 7 9
The ’C o p e n h a g e n ’ i n te rp retatio n of quantum physics, was 
generally acc ep ted within  the com munity of physics, but in 
a ’h a r m l e s s ’ form- The math ema tical formalism, itself 
quite free of vagueness  or contradiction, was held to be 
perfectly ad equ at e and the ’p h i l o s o p h i c a l ’ problems raised 
by Bohr were regarded as inessential complications, arising  
from an unfo r t u n a t e  insistence on at tempting to ’p i c t u r e ’ 
the processes ’d e s c r i b e d ’ by the theory. B o h r ’s views, 
however, were coh erent and s y s t e m a t i c - 80 And the issues 
were central to the scientific  u n derstan di ng of the natural 
world. The indeter minacy relations, the deep 
un pr ed i c t a b i l i t y  of matter, the failure of strict 
causality, the irreducible ’weirdness' of the q u a ntu m world 
could only be grasped if we supposed that, prior to its 
termination in an obs erv able ’e v e n t ’, the fundamental 
constituents of nature existed in their own peculiar
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playworid; both ’h e r e ’ and ’t h e r e ’ both ’n o w ’ and ’t h e n ’ 
only relin quishing the freedom of inherent possibil ities 
when forced to do so by the e x p e r i m e n t e r ’s conscious 
probing. Even the more p o s i t i v i s t i c a 11y inspired 
He is en berg expresses himself in K i e r k e g a a r d i a n  language on 
this fundamental issue. The mathematical for ma lism of 
pr o b aility  theory introduces, ’something standing in the 
middle be tw een the idea of an event and the actual e v e n t ’ . 
It is a ’strange kind of physical reality just in the 
middle between p o s s ib ility and r e a l i t y ’ .81
Thus, ’qu antum theory does not allow a c o m p letel y 
objective d e s c riptio n of n a t u r e ’82 not be cause of its 
limitation but becau se  of n a t u r e ’s own inherent 
p 1 ayfuIness. The primordial world resists definition; 
di stribu ted over every pos si bi lity it only r e l u cta nt ly 
alienates itself into the fixed forms of the classical 
sci e n c e s .8 3
Modern science has gone much fur t her than cri t i ca 1 
ps yc hology in ’d e c o m p o s i n g ’ the subject. In the classical 
sciences, the ego recon structed the world from its own 
point of view and d i scovered within it a pict ure of its own 
inevitable structure: well formed, systematic, whole. The
inner collapse of the bourgeois ego signalled an end to the 
fixity and sys te ma tic structure of the bou rgeoi s cosmos.
One privileged  point of o b s e rvat io n was replaced by a
complex interat ion of viewpoints.
The new rela t i v i s t i c  vi ewp oin t was not itself a product of 
sc ientific  ’a d v a n c e s ’ , but was part rather of a general 
cultural and social t r a n s f or mation  which exp res se d itself 
in a variet y of ’m o d e r n ’ m o v e m e n t s . 84 It was no longer 
c onc eivable  that ’n a t u r e ’ could be reconstr uc ted as a 
1o g i c a 1 whole. The incompleteness, indeterm in acy and 
a r bitr ar in ess of the subject now reappeared in the natural 
world. Na tur e that is, like personal existence, makes 
itself known only in fra gmented images.
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Notes to Chapter til even
1. ’There is no ’’r e a l i t y ” for u s . ’ Nie tzsche (1974), p. 
121. Cf. note * 7 2 ’ c h . 10.
2. N i e t z s c h e ’s madmen who declares that ’God is dead. God 
remains dead. And we have killed h i m ’ , is filled with 
au the ntic spirituality. Nie tzsch e (1974), p. iSl. But as 
the abs olu te reality ex pressed  in G o d ’s exist ence is human 
per so na lity it is the ’rational self* which is dead.
3. Rober t Musil was one of the few really important modern 
writers with a deep u n d e r s tanding  of c on tempora ry  
scie nt ific m o v e m e n t s . £ i gni f i cant 1y he opens his thesis on 
Mach - whi ch he wrote before turning to literature - riot 
simply with an orthod ox e x p r essi on  of ph i 1osophi c a 1 
sce pticism but with the confide nt a s s e rtion that ’Exact
sci ence has shown that there are no such things as causal 
c o n n e c t i o n s ’ ! Musil (1982), p. 15, (emphasis added).
4. See Freudent'nal (1986). A L e i b ni zian relational 
physics, rather like an He ge lian relational social theory, 
would tend however to a syst emati c a b s t ra ction at odds with 
any form of subv ersive modernism.
5. Bos co vi ch (1961) in the mid- ei g h t e e n t h  century proposed 
a conceptual reduction of matter to identical ’point- 
m a s s e s ’ co nn ected by an oscilla to ry force whose st re ng th  
and directio n varied by distance. These ’perf ec tly 
indivisible and n o n - e x t e n d e d  p o i n t s ’ , ibid. p. (105) have 
some of the elusive properties  of mod ern q u a n t a , it is 
hardly surpri sing that his work was ignored by his 
contemporaries.
6. Amrine, Zucker and Wheeler (1987).
7. Carnot (1960), and for a clear d escri pt ion of his work, 
Segre (1984), pp. 192-200.
8. Kline (1972), .pp. 861-881, and Kline (1954), pp. 410- 
431.
9. Hendry (1986), pp. 6-45, calls the first approach  
’m e c h a n i s t i c ’ and the second ’d y n a m i s t i c ’ . Both, however, 
are part of the ’c l a s s i c a l ’ scie nti fic picture of the 
world; one begins with individuated  ’o b j e c t s ’ and treats 
’f o r c e s ’ as secondary, the other regards ’f o r c e s ’ as the 
more fundamental. Both aimed at a complete, logically 
coherent, ’system of the w o r l d ’, and both could claim, with 
some justification, the authority of Newton. For the
under lying equi va lence of both see p ar ti cularl y M e y e r s o n  
(1930), p p .  63-103.
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10. Meyer s o n  (1930), pp. 215-18, was among the first to 
draw the at t e n t i o n  of a no ns c i e n t i f i c  aud ience to the 
signficance of this point. See also Grunbaum  (1973), pp. 
£13-14. Max Planck (1925), p. 19, also makes it clear that, 
all reversible  proc esses are idealisations of nature.
11. Ibid., p. 31: ' Thus the lav*; cannot dire ctly express 
r e a 1i t y ' .
12. Ibid., p. 265. An idea developed within  the classical 
framework most p ow erfully  by Eoltzmann. See Bo ltzmann  
(1974), pp. 13-32. Segre (19S4), pp. 237-245,
13. Carnot  (I960), p. 9.
14. M e y er son (1930), p. 265
15. Particularly- as expounded by Gru nb aum (1973), pp. 209- 
219.
16. This is the physical meaning of Bolt zmann's  cele b r a t e d  
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T WEL VE
THE C H ARM  OF D E C ADENC E
within the classics.! bourg eo is wof 1 q , cosmos and 
psyche tend to draw apart. The success of the physical 
sciences justifies attempts to ’e x p l a i n ’ the psyche in a 
m ec ha nistic  fashion. But the failure of such attempt s 
encourages a superficial dist i n c t i o n  bet ween an 
’ i r r a t i o n a l ’ domain of s ubj ec tivity on the one hand, and a 
’r a t i o n a l ’, objective, order of nature on the other. In 
time, however, the social logic of universality, 
indiv idu ation and exchange relations which is implicit in 
both becomes expressed, in a p p a re ntly incompatible forms, 
in both domains.
With a co nspic uous display of e q u i f i n a 1i t y , both 
travel by differe nt  routes through disillusionment, to 
paradox, to solipsis m and aquire the exotic tr app ings of 
’m o d e r n i t e ’ at about the same t i m e . 1 Neither realm can
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d e v slop to th3.t p» o i n t o t  s y s t e m a t i c self -closure w h 1 c h 
would ’c o m p l e t e ’ them. Mechanical accounts of acti on 
decline and finally give way to irrational ’ l e a p s ’, to 
outbursts of refr actor y and disench an ted energy. And each 
domain  becomes more fully ’d e c o m p o s e d ’ when the el ementar y 
processes, from whi ch in some sense they must be 
constructed, a.re found to be outrageously' free of 
constraint. The ’s c i e n c e s ’ of both subject and object 
become infected with playfulness; an ineradicable 
arb it ra riness  is- re d i s cov er ed in their foundations.
The intellectual re volution of mo de rnism does not imply 
the demise of the classical bourgeois, worldview, far less 
the commodit y form in which the latter is most c o m p le te ly  
embodied. Mod e r n i t y  is a cultural spasm; a radical but 
ineffectual trans f o r m a t i o n  of classical rationality. The 
completeness and pr ofundity of its break with the science 
of pleasure has to be balanc ed against its ex o t i c i s m  and 
lack of s e r i o u s n e s s . 2 In recapturin g a sense of the 
primordial fun of experience, it isolates it in fact at an 
extremity we can visit only in our imagination. E i n stein  
and Bohr, like K ierk eg aard or Nietzsche, are d e s c ribi ng  
reality, but in rev ealing its truth they place it safely 
beyond our grasp. We must live in a mundane and pleasa nt 
world; n o n - r e 1 a t i v i s e d , n o n - q u a n t i s e d , free of paradox.
Just as we exclude from this ’system of the w o r l d ’ any 
direct a p p r e hen si on of our own tr an sformative powers (fun), 
or any symbolic ex pression of estrangeme nt (happiness), we
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erGet, ahead of it su to speak« an unattainable world of 
another kind, one filled with fascinating a r b i t r ariness  
(excitement i .
It is easy to believe, then, that quantu m physics, and 
all the other decorat ive ab surdity of mo dern  culture  has 
little to do with our immediate exp eri en ce of the world. 
Truth has eluded us and leads its own- in co mp r e h e n s i b l e  life 
beyond our grasp.' What interests us, however, is more 
immediately c o mpr eh ensible  and still t ha nkfull y obeys the 
laws of ca usalit y and n o n -c o n t r a d i c t i o n .
Yet if we have found a clue to the separate but linked 
cosmological schemes of fun, happiness and pl ea su re in the 
related but different social relations of the bour geois  
world (freedom from 1 a b o u r /d e p e n d e n c e , mutual
obligation/h ie rarchy,  al ienated 1a b o u r / i na i v i duali o n ),4 can 
we not discover another social form from w h ich exci tement 
is given reckless birth? A social relation pecu liar to its 
cap tivating p e r v e r s i t y ? 5
In earlier chapters the notio n of reason was 
di sti ng ui shed through a series of putati ve opp ositions. The 
reasonable, civ ilised and self-control led adult over 
against the unreasonable, unci vilise d and emotional child 
or savage; the rational western mind as di stinct from the 
clouded and irrational su per sti tion of the primitive.
These dist inc tions were associated with the d e v e l o p m e n t  of
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capitalism, first cf all with an ability  and wil li ngn ess to
wo r k , and sbcqhci 1 y wit n a raci 1 i ty i or s x c n s n ^ £ j with the 
general social d i st i net ion between pr oduction and 
c i r c u l a t i o n . 6 In the modern, period, however such 
di stinctio ns lose their exclusive and oppositional 
character. Re as on  and unreas on come together in an 
intolerable pur i f i cat i on of e x p e r e i n c e . 7 This process is 
as sociated  p a r t i c u l a r l y  with the sphere of consumption. It
is c o n s u m p t i o n  which creates the realm of the mode rn 
irrational, and -therefore the realm also of the mode r n 
rati o n a 1.
Consum pt ion
In order to elucidate  the con nect io n be tw een modern  
forms of the rational and irrational and be tw een both and 
the process of consumption, it is helpful to look aga in at 
F r e u d ’s psychology, but this time in the con tex t of 
twentieth ce ntu ry science, rather than n i n e te en th ce ntury 
b i o 3 ogy or anthr o p o l o g y .
F r e u d ’s an alyti c viewpoint is ad mi rably relativistic. 
The fra mework of ab sol ute internal space and time (the 
utilitarian matrix of pleasure and identity) is c o m p l e t e l y  
dissolved. The i nd i v i d u a 1 no longer exists as a poi nt of 
integration of his own experience, or tel os of his own 
u n i n t erru pt ed recollection. The normal individual is
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b e w i ldere d by himself, as much as he is by the world. He is 
no more a privile ged observer of himself than he is of the 
cosmos. The only ’c o n s t a n t ’ of the psychic world is an 
ar bi t r a r i l y  chosen value, a self-identity, a groundless 
’ I’ , which cannot any longer impose itself upon the flux of 
e xp eri enc e with the vigour of the bou rgeois ego. Yet even
in the modern world the constancy + + I T T  to x  i n i ’ ’ a e f o r m s ’ t h e
space ano time or classsical subjectivity, botn 
pe rce p t u a l l y  and in memory, a fitful selfhoo d ’d i s t o r t s ’ 
the prev iousl y cert ain framework of u t i l i t a r i a n  
expectations.® This, as in E i n s t e i n ’s physical theory, is 
not ob servable  in ’n o r m a l ’ life, but can be detect ed only 
in ’a b s e n t ’ moments when the ’ I’ is absor be d into the ever- 
changing me tric of immediate expereince. The para pra xes 
and jokes, the dreams and neurotic symptoms that we still 
tend to think of as the unc ontro ll ed d istor ti ons due to an 
inattentive ego, are better viewed as the psyc hic  flux 
within which the ’ I’ is a temporary ’d e f o r m a t i o n ’ .
F r e u d ’s ’r e l a t i v i s m ’ , in o th e r  words, is n o t h i n g  to do 
with moral indecisiveness. It is more akin,, as is 
E i n s t e i n ’s theory, to a M le ts schean ’t r a n s v a i u a t i o n ’. What 
had previou sly been concept ua lised as a ’f r a m e w o r k ’ or as 
the dimensions w i t h 1n wh i c h objects could be defined and 
events observed, ceased to have any ab solute m e a n i n g . The 
psychic ’m a t e r i a l ’ of the self could no more stand apart 
from its own ex pe rience and memory, than could a physical 
object exist as anything other than a pa rticular wr inkle in
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spacetime. The sep ar atene ss and subst a n t i a l i t y  of the 
bourgeois ego, its di f f e r e n t i a t i o n  from an infinitised and 
homogenous inner space of ' p u r e ’ subjectivity, can no 
longer be maintained. The pe rsistent illusion of 
’f o r e g r o u n d ’ and ’b a c k g r o u n d ’ , of things standing out from 
non-things, is exposed.
There is more here than a vague analogy. There is a 
formal, though not a rigorous, re la t i o n s h i p  b e tween  the 
’obj ective s c i e n c e ’ of nature and the ’subjective 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ’ of the psyche. F r e udian psychol og y and 
E i n s t eini an  physics are alike in both rejectin g the 
classical market model of reality. The ’frame of the 
w o r l d ’ no longer appears as the self-evident, unchang in g  
and ho mogeneou s dim e n s i o n a l i t y  of classical m e c h a n i s m , 5 but 
is made an aspect of its substance. The inner world, its 
primordial immediacy sunk beneath the threshold of 
experience is, like the cosmos, fragm en ted and relativised. 
The ’self.’ no longer constitute s a ’ l o g i c a l ’ totality, it 
appears rather in a bew ilde ri ng variety' of incompatib le and 
contradi ct ory experiences.
There are, furthermore, co nspic uous ’q u a n t u m ’ elements 
in F r e u d ’s analyti c w r i t i n g s . 10 The psyche is 
conceptualis ed as an ’energised s y s t e m ’ capaba bi e of 
assuming a fixed number of positions. His early ’Project 
for a Scie ntific  P s y c h o l o g y ’ , in spite of its evid ent  
indebtedness to the m e c h a ni st ic traditions, bears a
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r ese mblance  to P l a n c k ’s struggle with the gas laws. 
Something appr o a c h i n g  thermod ynamic e q u i l ibrium is assumed 
as the norm for the ’psychic a p p a r a t u s ’ . A certain level of 
external ’s t i m u l a t i o n ’ (energy) is ’a b s o r b e d ’ as 
perception. Be yond a par ticular level, however, any 
additional stim u l a t i o n  puts the appa ratus  into an ’e x c i t e d ’ 
state, in which perceptual processes are ’c o n v e r t e d ’
(emi i t t a ) as motor activities, al lowing trie system to 
return to a con d i t i o n  of e q u i l i b r i u m . 11 Freud, more 
readily than Planck, gave up the assu mption s of mechanism. 
As an interpre tive guide however, rather than a causal 
theory, the notion  of ’e x c i t a t i o n ’ and ’c o n v e r s i o n ’ 
continued to play an important part in F r e u d ’s w o r k . 12
Even more significantly, Freud was well aware of the 
impossibi 1 ity of the ’o b j e c t i v e ’ o b s e rv ation of psychic- 
life. Here again, his ideas changed very c o n s i d e r a b l y  over 
a number of year s . i n h i s ear 1y ana 1yt ic w o r k , he he 1 d 
firmly to a faith in E n I i g h t e n e m e n t . To elucid at e the 
inner meaning of n e u ro tic symptoms was to cure t h e m . 13 
Later, however, he came to view the ’tra nsferen ce  r e l a t i o n ’ 
as the key to the anal y t i c  s i t u a t i o n . 14 The an al yst could 
not remain apart from the world he was trying to 
investigate. Nor could his ’i n t e r f e r e n c e ’ be allowed for by 
some mechanical calculation. The sig ni ficance  of the 
observer was not that he ’d i s t u r b e d ’ the system he wished 
to investigate but, more importantly, the i n te rr ogatio n 
itself brought to light the reality he ha 1f - sus pe cted lay
hidde n in the p a t i e n t ’s psyche. The analyst colabor-ated 
with the patient to fully realise those elemental impulses 
which, until they were provoked into a vis ible form, 
existed in an indete rmi nate but still potent world of 
possibility. Freud, one feels, would have been quite at 
home with the ’C o p e n h a g e n  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n ’ . O b s e r v a t i o n  
cannot be ’o b j e c t i v e ’ , but is not for this reason rendered 
meaningless. There is, in other words, no fundamental 
differe nc e b e t we en  an act of ’o b s e r v a t i o n ’ and any other 
act; just as in -physics there is no fundamental d if fe rence 
be tween  an ’observation* event and any other e v e n t . 15 The 
pro tean world of pos si bility  terminates, in an 
un p r e d i c t a b l e  fashion, in ’e v e n t s ’ , and the scie nt ist has 
no option but to part ic ipate  in such events.
In att emp ti ng to describe the psyche, Fre ud  is driven 
to the same extremities as the quantum physicist. Quite 
apart from the appa rently  d is co nnected  (or con n e c t e d  but 
incompatible) elements within the psyche, each well formed 
part on closer ex amination  was found p r o li fic of 
c o n t r ad ictory  images. The ’s i m p l e s t ’ dream proved to be 
ine xha ustible  source of competing and paradoxical meanings. 
No neurosis would relent in the face of an ' e x p l a n a t i o n ’ oi 
its synmptoms. A casual joke both conceals and reveals 
violent and amb ivalent feelings. Ps yc hic  images cannot be 
given a simple ’r a t i o n a l ’ tran sl ation be cause reaso n is 
itself just one of these images; a d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  segment 
of the primordial world to which it remains fat ally
attracted.
Freud proposes a re lat ivised ’m i c r o p h y s i c s ’ of the 
p s y c h e , a n d , correspondingly, Bohr adopts a ps yc ho-ana  1yt i c 
approa ch to N a t u r e . 16 Both, that is to say, having 
rejected the determ i n a t e n e s s  and endless caus ality  of 
mechanism, are prepar ed to accept incomplete, a r b i tr ar y and 
c o nt radict or y images of reality. Both find in reason 
itself, or rather in reason ’d i f f r a c t e d ’ in another, tiny 
clues to a vast and per ple xing world that.lies hidden 
within the c on ve ntions of our normal experience. The 
u nco nscious  is the qua ntum world of the psyche. It ’knows 
no c o n t r a d i c t i o n ’ .17 Each of its e lement ar y images can 
refer si mu lt a n e o u s l y  to different and inc ommens ur able 
systems of m e a n i n g . 18 Many of its elements are 
in t e r c h a n g e a b l e . 19 It exists as a con tinuous flux from 
which, inexplicably, the settled world of ev er yd ay 
per ceptions and ex perience is d is ti nguish ed  - yet never 
quite distinguished.
In the bou rge oi s world, the psychic ’con st ant of 
a c t i o n ’ had
been as effe c t i v e l y  masked as had been its natural 
counterpart. But once admitted as a p o s s i bi lity the 
irrationality of the ’s e l f ’ , its fragmentation, and 
incompleteness became perfectly obvious. The philosoph ical 
problem of ’qu antum p s y c h o l o g y ’ is thus rather d i f f e r e n t  to 
that raised by physical questions. The d i s c o n t i n u i t i e s
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withi n the psyche are directly ex per ienced and the everyday 
world cannot escape them. F r e u d ’s ps ycholog y may be 
logically u n s a t i s f y i n g  but it certa inly ’makes s e n s e ’ . Ue 
are willing to admit ir ra tionality of ourselves, indeed 
only the mad refuse to do so. But we still cling to a 
rational image of nature as the inherent truth of things, 
and c onseq ue ntly find n a t u r e ’s elemental processes 
profoundly  s t r a n g e . 20
Rational ind ivid ua tion is there for e only one ’m o d e l ’ 
of human activity- The obligation  to impose upon 
primordial e x p e ri en ce an ever more cle arly defined self 
identity is subve rted by a tendency to give way to its 
elemental incongruity. In F r e u d ’s psychology, the pursuit 
of pleasure osci llate s with the hope of exci t e m e n t . The 
’e g o ’ can no longer be unde rstood as the n e c essa ry  outcome 
of a cont inuous ’d e v e l o p m e n t ’ . K ie rkegaar d had alre ady 
exposed the emp tiness of such a view, but Freud went much 
further in his an aly sis of ’ i l l u s o r y ’ selfhood. The ego, 
like matter, is differ e n t i a t e d  from the ’primar y p r o c e s s ’ 
by the obse rvation  of a rule rather than the a p p 1ication - of 
a mechanical ’f o r c e ’.
What gives matter its i m p e n t r a h i i i t y , its hardness, 
when its elem en tary constitu en ts are tiny in relation to 
the ’ s p a c e ’ wn i ch they a.ppear to occupy i The answer 
offered by Pauli takes the form of a grammatical rule 
rather than a physical ’c a u s e ’ . The E x c l usion P r i n c i p l e
475
prohibits any two electrons sharing the same ’quantum 
n u m b e r ’ . This results in a ’q u a n t i s e d ’ space around each 
nucleus, provi di ng for the more complex elements a 
c h arac te ri stic set of physical and chemical ’p r o p e r t i e s ’ .21 
The ’s o l i d i t y ’ of the ego is similar ly constructed. A 
series of pro hibiti on s organises the con tinuous  flux of the 
primary process into an interior ’s p a c e ’ upon which can be 
’mappeci’ t ne f e a r. u r e s of tTi e ’outside w o r l d ’ , ano an 
objective ’s e l f ’ which can move and act within it. An 
Excision P r i nciple defines for each ’s e l f ’ a set of unique 
features which preserves the personal identity of each 
i niisr wo r id. T n e psyche' s e x c lus io n p r i n c i p 1 e however is a 
mere convention. It is far less difficult  to envisage, and 
in doing so to act ua lly invoke, the primordial inner 
freedom of un iimite d psychic intercahnge, than to imagine 
the un di f f e r e n t i a t e d  particle ’s o u p ’ that was nature before 
time and space had any m e a n i n g . 22
The fact that co smologists now regul arly describe the 
’polymorph p e r v e r s i t y ’ of the very early universe, and seek 
to under stand the pre sent st ructure of the cosmos i n 
relation to this singular origin, should not be un d e r s t o o d 
simply as the result of ’o b j e c t i v e ’ s c i e ntific  p r o g r e s s . 23 
The process of ’s e 1f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g ’ is s tr uctura ll y 
similar, and conforms to a common ’g r a m m a r ’ . This is not a 
matter, as it is for the cosmo logy of happiness, of a 
direct compar i son of macro co sm and microcosm. The 
rejection of m e c hani sm  and the formati on  of new images of
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space and time derive in both cases front changes in the 
social relations of capitalism, changes that is to say, in 
the direct ex pe rie nce of the world.
The classical bourg eois world was e xper ie nced through 
a network of a l i e na te d relations. It was just this which 
lent it its logical coh er ence and o ve rwhelm in g objectivity. 
The p s y c h e ’s relation to an ’outside w o r l d ’ was first of 
ail of need and then of desire. In e xpre ss ing itself as 
desire, it d i f f e r entiat ed  from itself ’o b j e c t s ’ the 
a pp ro p r i a t i o n  of which  would ’d e v e l o p ’ its po te n t i a l i t y  for 
absolute indivi du ation and completeness. The world of 
objects was pr im ar ily a world of commodities. Objects 
bound to each other through the, logical and practical, 
process of exchange. Their c i r c ula ti on was governed by a 
classical rule of mechanism, a pr inciple of c o n s e r v a t i o n  
which insisted that in every exchange  no value was lost or 
gained. In such a world, pr oductio n was con ce aled as a 
’n a t u r a l ’ process and c on sumpti on  ’s u b j e c t i v i s e d ’ and 
pe rsonalise d as desire. Circ ul ating commodi ties ideally 
formed a distinct realm within  which the m e c h a n i s t i c  
illusion was born. Every exc hange was reversible, and 
linked with every other by an un in t e r r u p t e d  chain of 
causes. The ’ law s’ of exchange were binding and 
i r r e p r o a c h a b 1e . C o n s u m p t i o n  was the process th ro ugh which, 
in sa tisfying his various needs, the individual could 
’a t t a c h ’ himself to this ideal system. Con sumption, beyond 
'the level of mere survival, was the process in whi ch inner
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unique nes s realise d itself in the world. Desire  was the 
determi na tion of the self, and endowed particular 
commod ities with the spec i a 1 a11eact i venes s of ant i c i patory 
satisfaction. To consume was t.o possess part i cu 1 a r 
commodities, those which had received and re fle cte d the 
inner mov eme nt of the self as desire.'24 C o n s u m p t i o n  was 
therefore a process of individuation; it was above all 
others the speh ere  of self-realisation.
The p e c u li ar ly di stincti ve character of the mod er n 
sciences, in a d d i t i o n  to their special subject matter, 
describe a new re la t i o n s h i p  of self and world, and a new 
form of consumption. The d i stance be tween subject and 
o b j e c t , 25 is su dd en ly overcome. The self no longer exists 
as the desire stretc he d between itself and the distant 
image of itself which it had attached to an object. The 
self could exist only as a continuous f l u x . 14 The object 
world, or rather the co mmo dit y world, draws closer. The 
ego ceases to be define d by a force (desire), but falls 
eff ort less ly  along its path of least resistance, the 
geodesic of cont inuous consumpt i o n . To consume does not 
di sti nguish and individuate, but joins and m e r g e s . 27 We no 
longer consume ' r a t i o n a l l y ’ in the pursuit of pleas ur e (the 
form of self-realisat ion), but ’ irrational l.y’ in the hope 
of excitement.
Excitement, unlike pleasure, expresses itself openly 
and outwardly. The hidden and inward ’m a i e u t i c  a r t ’ opens
into a direct appeal to o t h e r s * 23 Excitement, which might 
occur anywhere, is never contained* It com munic at es itself 
directly and does not require pre-ex is ting social 
relationship s to ’c h a n n e l ’ its meaning- In an excited 
state strangers become friends through mutual consumption. 
The a n o n ym ity of the modern metrop olis is therefore, as 
Freud as well as Simmel noticed, the pr ivileged setting for 
modern, exciting, e x p e r i e n c e . 29 The met ro po lis is exciting 
just beca use it is an ony mou s and and unsettled; capable 
therefore of receiving ever new impressions and reflec ting  
them. The met ro polis is the ideal social ’b 1a c k - b o d y ’ , in 
perfect e q u i 1ibrium, abs orbin g and radiating each new wave 
of fashion, each u n p r e d ictab le  surge of opinion.
’O b j e c t - c a t h e x e s ’ are no longer sought as ' t e s t s ’ of 
the ego against the world. There is 7*10 strenuous effort 
here to bridge the gap created by desire. In {principle any 
commodity might prove exciting, and in an excited state any 
commodity might be consumed. There is no guarantee  that 
something found satisfy ing  once will prove sa tisfying a 
second or third time. The distr i b u t i o n  of e x c i t e m e n t  in 
relation to the comm odity world is random i s e d , so that the 
attainment of subjective sat isfa ctions can never becom e the 
object of precise calculation. The ego has a new acc i d e n t a 1 
relation to the object world.
The ideal commodi ty  therefore ceases to have any 
personally d i s t i ng uishin g features. Pr operly speaking
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c q m m o d i ties should become identical one with anothe r , o r 
reduced at least to a few fundamental ’t y p e s ’ * As the 
possib ili ty of excitment. is no more than an arbit rary 
relationship, we cannot choose what to consume on the basis 
of the c o m m o d i t y ’s own d i s t i ng ui shing features. If they 
are all the same the chance of success is man ife st ly 
equalised* No promise is made. The c o m mo di ty will not 
n e c e ssari ly  bring pleasure, but in consuming  it there is a 
thrilling p o s s i b i l i t y . 30 C o n s u m p t i o n  in being freed from 
the cycle of need, want and satisfaction, is made 
permanent. P a r a d o x i c a l l y  it is as its sat isfact io ns have 
become ep is odic that consumi nmg has be com e an ideally 
continuous process. 31
The only really important di s t i n g u i s h i n g  
c h ar acteri st ic  of the c o m m o d i t y , for the c o n s u m e r , is its 
n o v e l t y . It is newness that is craved as the most probable 
stimulant of e x c i t e m e n t . 32 This fundamnetal cond ition 
allows the homo genous and isotropic c o m m odity world to be 
inherently expansive. As di stinct from all me chanis ms  an 
’arrow of t i m e ’ marks its most superficial appearance.
F r e u d ’s patients suffered from the disea ses of 
c o n s u m p t i o n . 33 The n e u rotic is, literally, overly 
excitable. He does not consume because every potential 
’o b j e c t - c h o i c e ’ has aged before it can be possessed. The 
’c a t h e x i s ’ has become so superbly mobile that it keeps too 
far ahead of the ego and is dis tribu te d too ’t h i n l y ’ over
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the object world w h ic h c onsequ en tly takes on a unif or mly  
drab and u n i n s piring appearance. The psychotic, 
conversely, is not excitab le enough. The ’cathexis' never 
leaves the ’muff led i n t e r i o r ’ and he remains indifferent to 
any possibility. The ps ychotic consumes himself; the 
neurot ic lacks the self with which he might cons ume the 
world. As t y p e s , they serve to define a model of regulated 
insatiability; the ideal modern consumer, or better the 
ideal consumer of moderni t y . An open a c c e pt an ce of the 
ephemeral and insubstantial, a conscious i d e n t if ication  
with the ’arbitrary, fleeing and transitory' as the 
accidental r e l a t i o n s h i p  of selfhood. The Man With out 
Qua 1i t i e s , as Musil does not tire of repeating, is the same 
as ’qua lities wi th ou t the m a n ’ .
The notion  of exci t e m e n t , then, like the other ’s u b j e c t i v e ’ 
terms, fun, happiness  and p l e a s u r e , describ es both a form 
of immediacy and a picture of the cosmos. These  terms 
stand so to speak on the boundary between natur e and the 
psyche and from them the app rop ri ate d escr ip tive languages 
for each realm have been developed. This is po ss i b l e  on 1 y 
because these terms initially describe fundamental social 
relations. Exci tement is not confined therefore to the 
process of c o n s u m p t i o n  but can be r ed is covered  in any 
social sphere.
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C i r c u 1 at i on
Since the eig hteen th  century, a close as so c i a t i o n 
be tw een the social process of c i r c ula ti on and the 
attributes of reason has been maintained. It is the sphere 
of cir cul at ion whic h appears most read ily to co nform on the 
one hs.no to the met apnysical re qu ireme nts of pure 
th o ugh t, 34 and on the other to the principle of mechanism. 
This is par ti c u l a r l y  the case when the general process of 
c ir cu lat ion is re pr esented by money rather than any 
pa rticular class of commodity. it can then be described 
both as a conceptual and as a natural system. From the 
first pe rspect ive its ’t i m e l e s s ’ qual ities become its most 
si gni ficant characteristi cs; its universality, its absolu te  
mobility and fluidity, its power to represent  any value, 
and to bring together any co mmodities  no matter how distant 
in time and s p a c e . 33 In the second p e r s pecti ve  the 
’m a t e r i a l ’ character of money becomes more evident. Its 
interaction with all other commodities, wh ich defines the 
relat ion ship among commod ities themselves, follows a 
principle of c o n s e r va t i o n . In any excha nge in which money 
acts as a universal equiv alent value is c o n s e r v e d . Money 
seems to purify the process of exchange  of all accidental 
and extraneous elements. It was just in this 
’c o n d e n s a t i o n ’ of conceptual and physical principle s that 
the classical notion of reason existed.
It is ail the more signifi cant then that Simmel is
able to find in the modern money form all the relativities, 
dis con tinuities, and con tradi ct ions ce le bra ted in the new 
s cient if ic  imagination. Money embodies a new social logic. 
It is a logic discovered, however, in a more c on si stent and 
a more general a p p l icatio n of already existing social 
assumptions. Just as Ein st ein brings to light the 
n on i n t u i t i v e  implications of an orthodox belief in the 
un iversali ty of nature, and Freud unc ove rs the radical 
co ns eque nc es  of viewing the self as a rational pursuit of 
pleasure, Simmel describes the new social world that grows, 
unc ont rollably, from the appare nt ly un p r o v o c a t i v e  idea that 
money c on st itute s a general e q u i v a 1ent of all v a l u e s . 3A
The general process of exchange, Simmel points out, 
tends to ’o b j e c t i f y ’1 value. It ’c o n v e r t s ’ purely 
subjec tiv e judgments into, ’objective, sup ra-personai 
re lat ionship s b e t we en o b j e c t s ’ .37 And it is only in
exchange that ’o b j e c t s ’ can take shape from, ’the chaoti c
material of our images of the world and the c o n t inuous flux 
of i m p r e s s i o n s ’ .38 Money as the ’auton om ous m a n i f e s t a t i o n  
of exchange r e l a t i o n s ’39 is therefore the general me diu m 
through which our ’ images of the w o r l d ’ become o r d er ed and 
rationalised. It is its very lack of particula r 
q u a l i t i e s 40 which allows money to become a general 
’si gnif i e r ’ of exchangeability, and therefore of all that
is most fundamental to rational social life. ’The
philosophical signi ficance  of m o n e y ’ ,he argues, ’ is that it 
represents within the practical world the most c e r t a i n
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i m a g e ... of ail b e i n g ’ .41 And as it, ’rep resents pure 
int eraction in its purest form; it makes c o m p r ehen si ble the 
most abstrac t c o n c e p t ’ .42
In ad ditio n to being the general repre s e n t a t i o n  of ail 
relations, and therefore the im mediate ly a v a i lable  form for 
the con ce pt uia 1isation of reality, the deve l o p m e n t  of money 
as a general social mec ha nism en ormous ly  extends the range 
and power of ’r a t i o n a l i t y ’ . Honey is a pure means in 
social life, and- its general d e v e l op me nt lengthens the 
chain of purpo sive ac tivities that we can project into the 
future, and provides  a common language into which the 
plurality of qual i t a t i v e l y  differen t values can be 
translated and c o m p a r e d . 43 It is, as Max Weber also argued 
in a somewhat differe nt context, the f oundat i on of 
c a 1c u 1a b i 1ity in social r e l a t i o n s . 44
The indiffer ence of money to any part ic ular value, its 
charact er less ’d i m e n s i o n a l i t y ’ and its pure i n s tr umenta li ty 
also make it, however, sus ceptible to new forms of 
irrationality. The ult imate goal of any chain of pur posive 
action tends to become detached from the sequence of 
m e a n s . 45 Money, in this respect, is only the most extreme 
example of a general process inherent in the growth of 
social complexity. But just as money most comp le tely 
embodies the central rat iona lising tend encies of 
capitalism, so it most openly expre sses the sub ver sive  
tendencies of modernism. Simmel is a c u tely  conscio us  of
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the inherently co n t r a d i c t o r y  notion of ra tional it y as ’pure 
i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y ’ . All particular values, in finding a 
rational form of representation, are in fact made less 
realisable. L i f e ’s, ’ultimate purpose i s f 1 oat ing above the 
teleological s e q u e n c e 4 41
M o n e y ’s p r o d ig al ity of int er-re lations leads the 
individual into a network of connections within which he 
becomes lost. An earlier sense of worth and di gnity which 
came from the power to use money is o v e r taken  by a kind of 
’d i s p e r s a l ’ of the ego over a see mingly infinite variety of 
possible ’p r o j e c t s ’ .47 It seems pref era ble to possess 
money rather than the specific values for which it might be 
exchanged. In mon ey pos si b i 1i ty is stored, and in 
possibility, apparently, lies freedom. We have return ed to 
the familiar p s y c holo gy  of the El t h e r /O r . The loss of 
reality K i e r k e g a a r d  so brillian tly des cribed through the. 
literary expe ri ments of the ’young m a n ’ finds its social 
meaning as a money fetish. We have returned also to the 
still unfamiliar world of a later ’C o p e nhag en  
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n ’ . Money  is a ’quantum p h e n o m e n o n ’ . Its 
’r e a l i t y ’ is somehow hypothetical and provisional.
Initially nothing in the social world seems more precise 
than money. Yet its effect is to render reality strange ly  
vague and d r e a m l i k e . 45 The pre po nderan ce  of intellect over 
sentiment-in modern times, which is itself, ’the 
consequence of m o n e y ’s character as a m e a n s ’ ,45 should not 
be mistaken for a general ’r a t i o n a l i s i n g ’ process. In
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fact, as the human ’c o n t e n t ’ of social life exists 
pri marily in ’s e n t i m e n t s ’ , the formalism of money has the 
effect of ’d i s t a n c i n g ’ the psyche from the direct 
ap pre h e n s i o n  of reality.
The per ver s i ons of money r e 1 a t i ons a r e , therefore, 
typical rather than othe rwise  of the mode rn situation. 
Simmel writes striki ng ly of the stim ulatio n of w is hf ulness 
in the money r e l a t i o n . 50 In its ’e x t r e m e ’ forms of greed 
and avarice, we see a ’p u r e ’ relation to money. An 
ove rwh elmi ng  wish for money, for an object w i thout 
qua 1i t i es , is only the r ea lisatio n of m o n e y ’s real nature. 
And the p o s s es sion of mon ey is an adult and legitimate 
fantasy.
Simmel hints in these passages at a new p s y c h o l o g y  of 
excitement. If sat isfac ti ons are only a c c i d e n t a l l y  related 
to the p o s s ession  and co ns umption  of commodities, then 
money itself becomes, for the first time, a genuine 
commodity. The a c q u i s i t i o n  of a c h a r a c t e r 1 ess ’e q u i v a l e n t ’ 
can bring no more than an a n t i c ip atory pleasure, but to 
possess modern money might be truly exciting. Honey has 
just the right ’t e x t u r e ’ for the ideal commodity, a 
divisble substance, ho mo genou s and isotropic, it does not 
divert its possessor with super f i ci a 1 par ticularities. In 
greed and avarice S i m m e 1 identified a new dis tr ust of 
commodities, or what, from a different viewpoint, mig ht be 
termed secular despair. The comm odity  is de scr ibe d by a
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’p ro ba bility  f u n c t i o n ’ ; the chance that it might 
pr ec ipi tat e a state of groundless excitement* But 
frequently it will fail to do so. To at tac h to money itself 
the hope of excitement, to make it g 1 a m o r o u s , avoids the 
recurrent dis a p p o i n t m e n t s  of ’r e a l ’ consumption. Each 
’q u a n t a ’ of money is identical to the last, but abov e a 
magic and wh ol ly indeterm inant threshold, its possessor 
will glow with  excitement. In the ’s a v i n g ’ in a n x ie ty a 
wish for money, rather than any specific  value, dis plays  a 
certain rational force.
More directly, Simmel illustrates the new psy c h o l o g y  
by the inverse phenomenon. E xt ravaga nc e is not genuine 
purchase or c o n s u m p t i o n  so much as a form of r a d i a t i o n . It 
is no more than exc it em ent in s p e n d i n g . 51 E v e r y t h i n g  hard 
and ’ i m p e n e t r a b l e ’ in the self has been dissolved. The 
ego, identifying itself ’r a t i o n a l l y ’ as means, is wholly 
’v o l a t i l i s e d ’ into the sphere of circulation. This sphere, 
however, in pe rf ectin g itself as pure i n s t r u menta li ty has 
lost the synthe ti c unity which was the fou nd at ion of the 
E n l i g h t e n m e n t ’s ciaim to Reason. Its inner world consis ts  
then in a m u l t i p l i c i t y  of inherently m eanin gl ess 
’p r o j e c t s ’ . 52 The ’e g o ’ is fragmented. Its most 
strenuous efforts to ’r e a l i s e ’ itself in the world issues 
in a series of d i s c o nne ct ed ’a d v e n t u r e s ’ , each once again 
expressive of no thing more than an ephemeral excitement.
Simmel argues that a less florid but more wid esp read 
cynicism, and a. c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  m e t r o poli ta n ’b l a s e ’ 
attitude, are indicative of the same dissolution. There is 
a typical, ’ reduc tio n of the con crete values of life to the 
med iating value of m o n e y ’ -33 Mon ey is fun da mentall y 
a n t a g o n i s t i c  to ail d i s t i n gu ishing  characrteristics. Its 
general indiffer ence imposes a. new kind of ano n y m i t y  and 
erodes the social form of the p e r s o n a l i t y . 34
The c o n t in ui ty and fluidity, the unb ro ken mediation, 
of the c i r c ulato ry  process, on closer inspection is seen to
be sustained by irrational and in commen su rable acts of
abandonment. The contrast bet ween classical and mo dern 
science is replicated, or rather that ant ith es is is itself
a red is cover y of the f r a g m en tation  of the sphere of
circulation. And as with the b r e a kd ow n of a single, 
coherent and sy stematic  ’system of the w o r l d ’ , the 
c o ntra di ct ion upon which it founders proves to be 
intractable to any ’t h e o r e t i c a l ’ solution. It is not 
simply a contrast between, on the one hand, a ’s t a t i s t i c a l ’ 
d esc ription  of an ’i n d i v i d u a t e d ’ micro-world, and on the 
other, a cau sa lly complete and d e t e r m i n i s t i c  e x p l a n a t i o n  of 
the gross quali ties of a macro-world. Rather the 
element ary  processes - themselves neither ’m i c r o ’ or 
’m a c r o ’ - that make up the sphere of circ u l a t i o n  prove 
r e c a 1ci trant to rational analysis.
The ’ i r r a t i o n a l i t y ’ of c i r c ulati on  has two dis ti nct
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aspects. Firstly, as with any formal logical system, it can 
never he coinp 1 £ t e . ■* J i he r a n  ona 1 1 ty of any ' sys t e m ’ of 
social interact ion depends upon its c o n t e n t . Th i s content 
however cannot be ex pressed within the system itself, which 
is composed only of interconnected m e a n s . = * By investing 
money, which is pure instrumentality, with the gravity of 
an ’ultimate e n d ’ the rationalit y of means becomes 
tran sfo rmed into the irr ati onality of disc o n n e c t e d  psychic 
adventures. And secondly, the primordial reality in which 
c ir cu lation  takes root, when it does expand into a general 
form, loses the sharpness required of r a t i o n a 1 
distinctions. Its fundamental relations, flau nti ng their 
arbitrariness, becom e decadent with excitement.
Pro du ctio n
The un iv erse appears to be homo genous and i s o t r o p i c . 57 
The self seems to be composed of its own images. It is 
somewhat odd there for e that we should be so con vi nced of 
duration, that an ’arrow of t i m e ’ imparts a p artic ul ar 
direction to the order of nature, and shrouds naked 
selfhood in a bio graphical narrative. This is not the case 
in the cos mo logy of fun or of happiness, and only with 
qua 1ification can it be said of the co smology  of 
pl e a s u r e . 5a How can relations among identical elemen ts 
take on the chara cte r of an immanent ’d e v e l o p m e n t ’?
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If cosmos and psyche are viewed as images, of each 
other and of particular types of social relation, then we 
can unde rs tand this curious ’a s y m e t r y ’ as a re prese nt ation 
of the historic role of pr od uct ion in the cre ation of 
modern society. The world of commodities, like the 
’d e v e l o p i n g ’ self and the ’e x p a n d i n g ’ universe, if it is to 
exist at all must con tinua ll y extend its boundaries. From 
the u l t i matel y irrational ’s i n g u l a r i t y ’ of No rt h w e s t e r n  
Europe around 1600 (the date of B r u n o ’s execution), the 
ca pit alist mode of p r o d uc ti on irr esis tibly expands. The 
unity of this mode can be grasped only as a picture of 
continu ous  and uni nterr up ted d e v e l o p m e n t . 29
This was first of all a g e n e r a lis at io n and ex tension  
of prod uc tion within  a larger ’s p a c e ’ of the ’u n d e v e l o p e d ’ 
world. Both in principle and in fact this e x p ansi on  was 
limited by simple geographical exhaustion. It nonethe le ss 
provided for almost three hundred years the 
’c o s m o g r a p h i c a 1’ framework of ca pi talist  production.
During this period it was always possible to v i s u al is e the 
market expanding independ ently of p r o d u c t i o n  itself. 
C ap it alism sent ahead of itself so to speak an ideological 
halo. The benefits of a ’r a t i o n a l ’ c i v i l i s a t i o n  were to be 
bestowed upon the world at large. And as a c o n s e q u e n c e  of 
this act of farsighted charity newly made ’r a t i o n a l ’ 
workers and consumers were drawn into a system of commod i ty 
exchange. New processes of prod uc tion ’n a t u r a l l y ’
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f g 1 1 o wed. h l!
The inherent tendency to equi librium  within such a 
cosmographical scheme was cle arly exp ressed in Ne w t o n i a n  
sc i e n c e . 4 1 When c a p i tal is m expanded to fill the avai la ble  
space of the world it ought to ’settle d o w n ’ to the 
stability of the cosmological model , and loot: forward to 
th-e s 1 ow decay of inevitably increasing e n t r o p y . This of 
course did not occur, and it is the endlessly  inventive 
dynamism of the com mo di ty which invests the re v o l u t i o n  in 
modern co sm ology with its social significance. Capital 
accumulation, w i th ou t regard to the ’c l a s s i c a l ’ limitations 
of the market  found new ex pa ndabl e forms. The ’a b s o l u t e ’ 
di me ns ionali ty  of the market, its inde pendenc e from the 
commodities exc hanged upon it, turned out to be illusory. 
The market is itself an aspect of production, locally 
’d e f o r m e d ’ by the mass of co mmo dities in it and d i r ec tl y 
expandable, perhaps infinitely so, through the crea ti on of 
new exchange values. Pro ducti on  is best u n d e rs tood 
relativistically. The ’f l a t ’ Euc l i d e a n  and in dependent  
space of the market gives way that is to say to the exotic  
complexities of ’ imperfect c o m p e t i t i o n ’ .
It is not simply a matter then of large c o r p orati on s 
monopol is ing pro d u c t i o n  and, by ideological means, 
ma nip ulating  the ’n e e d ’ for a partic ular c o m m o d i t y . 4,2 
Hoderrt commodit ies are no longer sub se rvient  to the market; 
they are not tied ’r a t i o n a l l y ’ to needs or .desires. The
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wis hf ul ness they might satisfy is intrin sicall y renewable 
and unlimited* The ’s p a c e ’ for their exc hange is crested in 
the same moment that the comm od ity is produced. Continuous 
production, however, does not make the world dense with 
co mmo dities because any commodity, to be exciting, must be 
n e w .63 Nove lty  is the only aistingui shahle feature of the 
ideal commodity, and perpetual nove lty is the commodity 
w o r l d ’s own ’arrow' of t i m e ’ . E x c i te ment breaks the symetry 
of all classical equi libri a and pre cipi ta tes the dizzying 
adv ance of modernism. Exc it in g co mmodities can be endlessly 
produced and the sphere of production, in pri nci pl e still 
co nstrai ned by the fiction of a ’market e c o n o m y ’ , is best 
des cribed in a formula commonm to Nic holas  of Cusa and the 
modern  cosm ol ogist as ’finite but u n b o u n d e d ’ .i4 There is 
always room for somet hin g new because n o v e l t y  is a 
’t i m e l i k e ’ rather than a ’s p a c e l i k e ’ tr an s i t i o n  in the 
c o m m o d i t y ’s w o r i d l i n e . * 3 The overrI dn g tenden cy wi thin 
classical thought towards the ’spatia 1i s a t i o n ’ of all 
categories brought expa nsi on to a halt. But mo dern thought, 
in ’t e m p o r a l i s i n g ’ space, confirms the po ss i b i l i t y  of 
endless d e v e l o p m e n t . 44
Pro du ctio n is primarily, then, the cre at io n of new 
values. This of course places an insigni fi cant con str ai nt 
on the hom oge ne ity of commodities. Newn ess  must become 
recognisable, it has to be represe nted by some, p r e f er ably 
minimal, sty listic fea t u r e . 4*7 Once classical sta bi li ty had 
been swept a s i d e , 4 B the appealin g idea of p r o d u c t i o n  as
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perpetual cr eation was given a direct cosmological 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . * 9 The ’steady-state* model, as its name 
implies pr eserved a fun dament al ly spatial notion of 
stability (the unive rs e had always been much as it appears 
to us), and a c c oun te d for the Hubble exp an sion on the 
hypothesis of the cont in uous cre at io n of m a t t e r . 70
A deeper c o s m o g r a p h i c a 1 picture of moderni ty  emerged 
in the so called ’Standar d M o d e l ’ .71 The large-scale 
spatial struc ture of the universe appe ars  to be very nearly 
isotropic. This was given impressive c o n f i r m a t i o n  with the 
discovery of a universal bacgro un d rad ia tion of about 3 
degreees Kelvin m e a su re d in any d i r e c t i o n . 72 The most 
economical account of this d i s t r i b u t i o n  of matter and of 
its presently observ ed  expans io n is to suppose a time!ike 
variation. By reversing the process we are led back to a 
singular origin, some fifteen to twenty bi lli on  years ago, 
from which sprang the entire detect ab le uni ve rse in its 
present f o rm .73 Modern cosmology  seeks to account for the 
observable uni verse  by a physics of this origin. The 
present ’ laws of n a t u r e ’ cannot be simply ge neralised to 
the very early universe. In the first moments of the ’Big 
B a n g ’ the few types of fundamental particles interacted 
freely with each other, and the ’f o r c e s ’ of natur e were 
coalesced into a single interactive ru le.74 As the 
universe cooled and expanded, a series of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s  
occurred, prohib iting cert ain interactions and e s t a b l i s h i n g
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cer ts.i n basic  d i s t inet i cts . 7 s
The co rresp on dence be tw een  modern c o s mo logy and modern 
p s y c ho lo gy is fairly evident. Both place primary 
s ignif ic an ce on o r i g i n s . More than this they interpret 
the present in terms of a primordial, undif ferentiat ed, 
reality. They define the struct ure of cosmos and psyche as 
t h e.sp on ta neous  br eak ing of symetries inherent in such a 
primordial reality. This co rres p o n d e n c e  should not be be 
viewed as an ext en sion or extrap o l a t i o n  of a ’ t h e o r y ’ of 
the commodity. It is not ideological in form, it is rather 
an int erp re tation  of the commodity  itself.
The com mo dity worId indeed is heavy with its own 
history. Each act of prod uction  is a small theatrical 
recr eat ion of the origins of capitalism. T h r o u g h  it a 
primordial e qu iv alence of human labour to all other 
c om mo dities is establ ished  and then concealed. In 
a li en ating itself, human labour takes on the general 
ch a r a c t e r i s t i c  of all commodities, and beco mes 
i nd i s t i ngu i s h a b 1e from t h e m . Labour s i m p 1y exists, 
alon gsi de other commodities, and enters into an ind efinite 
sequence of exc hanges with them. But as co mm o d i t i e s  are 
' k n o w n ’ prim ari ly through c os nu mption  the entire process of 
pro du ctio n becomes, as a result, ’ i n v i s i b l e ’ . New 
com modities con ti nu ally appear, e f f o r t l e s s l y  e x t en ding the 
social and psychic space of modern life. .They appear as so
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many s t  i m u  i a n t s to excitement. It is only by an act of
critical refl ection that we can discover the human content 
’f r o z e n 1 within them, and discover from this the peculiar 
ci r cums tances of the i r b i r t h .
This is a peculia r ’h i s t o r y ’ . Its n a r ra ti ve content 
does not unfold as a nec essar y sscjusncfi of cause and 
effect. Rat-her, for any a r b i tra ri ly chosen point, a common 
origin is post ulate d and ’p r o v e d ’ as its essential 
’p r e c o n d i t i o n ’ . .’E v e n t s ’ are linked together through their 
embodying in diffe rent ways these preconditions. The 
’o r i g i n ’ of the co mmidity is covertly carried forward into 
modern society in much the same way, therefore, that our 
early expe rie nce is disguised and protecte d by the adult 
psyche, or the initial conditio ns of the hot ’big b a n g ’ are 
embedded in the pres ent  dist r i b u t i o n  of matter and 
e n e r g y .7 6
So deeply embedded that p r o d uction no longer requires 
justification; its exi stence is not in doubt. Indeed, so 
secure has it become that, no longer fearing c r i t icis m it 
can allow su bjectivity the free do m-to seek excitement.
This, in its turn, encoura ges  the ’e x p e r i m e n t a l ’ 
consumopt io n essential to the contin uous a c c u m u l a t i o n  of 
capital. The political genius of cap it alism has always lain 
in its principle d defense of ’f r e e d o m ’ : initially from the
constraint of ’t r a d i t i o n ’ in the ex t e n s i o n  of ma rket 
c a 1c u 1a b i 1i t y ; then to allow the ’rational i n d i v i d u a l ’ the
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unha mpere d pursuit of his own interests*, and finally to 
release the psychic energy of wishful ness. Each step is 
founded upon a more highly ’e n e r g i s e d ’ state of cap it al ist 
production. Only in the initial stage is an ’i d e o l o g i c a l ’ 
control over pr od uction  e s s e n t i a l , 77 and a close relation 
between pro du ction and c onsumpt io n established. Th ereaft er  
the bifu r c a t i o n  of ’o b j e c t ’ and ’s u b j e c t ’ beco mes possible 
as ’w a n t s ’ are expre ss ed and acted upon in c o n f o r m i t y  to a 
causally effe ct ive ’r a t i o n a l i t y ’ common to both. In modern  
society even the* fiction  of reason, placing a theoretical 
limit upon the se l f - e x p a n s i o n  of production, has been 
dispensed with. The accidental relati on to the commodity, 
which at an earlier ’stage of d e v e l o p m e n t ’ would have been 
hop ele ssly disruptive, proves the best guarantee of 
’g r o w t h ’ .
Classical science, as the intellectual and practical 
mastery of the world of immediate expe rience is also 
secure. It is still the ’r e a l ’ science of the e n g i n e e r . 73 
Beyond the realm of the technologist, however, we are free 
to speculate. The t h e o r e t i c a 1 sciences, infected with this 
new freedom, are able to indulge, albei t within  an enlar ge d  
framework of reason, the most exotic images of reality. The 
marriage of particle physics and cosmo lo gy seeks in the 
origin and fou nd at ion of things a bizarre other world upon 
which the coh erence of our own more prosai c world depends.
A world filled with ’virtual’ events; with particles born 
in the first moment of time only to spend the rest of
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eternity, as the cosmos cooled b e n eath  the tem pe ratur e at 
which they could interact with any other particles, to no 
’p u r p o s e ’ ; with ’q u a r k s ’, both charmed and strange that 
can never now be liberated from their tiny hadron ic  
prisons; with mult i-d imensiona l superstrings, wrapped in 
themselves, to make the el ementary ’q u a n t a ’ of space as 
baffling as its large-scale s t r u c t u r e . 75'
The ’ g i v e y m e s s ’ of the co mmodity  world encou ra ges the 
decadence of theoretical imagery and allows reason to 
escape the co nstraint of production. Practical ma s t e r y  of 
nature is assidu ou sly renewed, but becomes tangential to 
the life of reason. Indeed, the rational and the 
irrational become in some circums ta nces
i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . 30 Reason becomes ’ i n f e c t e d ’ with a 
beguiling strangeness.
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THE SYM ME TRY OF CREATION
The deco mposed  subject ex pe riences quite a dif fe rent 
world to that of the integrated and rational self. Nature 
no longer confronts him as a ’s e l f - enc lo sed world of 
b o d i e s ’ .81 Cosmos and psyche, during the classical period, 
having been sepa rately and indep en de ntly c o n s t r u c t e d  from 
the laws of nature, were thrown together again, giving rise 
to a series of fragmente d and ’m i x e d ’ images.
These images take on a mea ning only in r e l ation to the 
classical ’system of the w o r l d ’ . They offer their 
separate, i m p r a c t i c a 1 and ef fec tiv e o p p o si tion to the 
co mpletio n of sci en ti fic rat ion al ism as the e x c lusive  
ca r rier of bou rgeois c o ns ciousn ess. E x c 11 e m en t Is a pa rt i a I 
co smology then, and relishes the fact. It exists as a 
defiant gesture against the philosophical ab stractedne ss, 
facile individualism, and tot alis in g me c h a n i s m  of the 
classical sciences. It is a pe r v e r s i o n  of rather than an 
al te rnat iv e to the cosmology of pleasure. And as m o d e r n i t y  
exists only as a perv ersion of c a p i t a l i s m  this could hardly 
be otherwise.
4‘dS
Not that excitement  lacks anyth ing in pr of u n d i t y  or 
originality. It is nothing if not radically perverse. 
Indeed, it is only through its subv ersive thor oughnes s that 
we have come to app re ci ate the true cha racter o f 'the 
classical w o r l d v i e w . 53 The ’c o s m o l o g y ’ of e x c i tement is 
best viewed, in fact, as the cons equen ce  of pr es erving  the 
most fun da menta  1 princip les  of the c 1 ass i c a 1 picture.
Nature must everywhe re be the same; and in order that this 
should be so, the more superficial un ifo r m i t i e s  of 
Ne wtoni an  science must be ’r e l a t i v i s e d ’. Once this is 
accepted, the Lap 1acean am bition  to render the cosmos .into 
a single eq ua ti on is thwarted. The rever sible relatio ns of 
the classical system are then found to be an inc omp lete and 
inadequate r e pr esenta ti on of a moment torn from the real 
flux of nature.
This tr an si tion was ’s i m u l t a n e o u s l y ’ e f f ected  in the 
d e c o m p o s i t i o n  of the self. The ra tionall y integrat ed pe rso n 
fragmented into a col lec tion of discrete e x p e r i e n c e s , ’each 
containing a separate and incom patible  ’i n t u i t i o n ’ of the 
sel f,53 and any one of which was likely to u n d e r m i n e  the 
synth eti c unity of consciousness.
The sys te matic totality of both cosmos and psyche 
di ssolved into partia 1 and paradoxical images. The causal 
me chani sm  which had been central to both had, at the limits 
of observation, broken down. The fundamental s i m p l i c i t y  and 
symmetry of the rational str uc ture which had been their
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common pr operty  was therefore pushed back in 
of the world. Reas o n  was itself transformed 
process. The rational interconnec tedness of 
elements had been conc ep tualise d as a causal mechani 
this m e c h a n i s m  could be expressed as q u a n t it at ive 
c o n s e rvat io n laws; now in their turn the c o n s e r v a t i o n  
could be viewed as but imperfect replicas of the s' 
c o n s t itut iv e of primordial nature. The reality of 
and psyche thus became com prehen si ble as the 
symmetry br eaking,of a primordial u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  
this primary process, the origin and t r ans ce ndence of 
difference, reason and unrea so n m e r g e . 84
The parallel de co m p o s i t i o n  of cosmos and psyche, 
mutual rejection  of a totalising mechanism, is not to 
un derstood  as the generali sation of a single ’ i d e a ’ 
or iginat ing in one particu lar discipline. Nor should 
interpreted as part of a general cultural d e c a y . B= 
the ’me c h a n i s a t i o n  of the world p i c t u r e ’ can be seen 
mode of thought most appr opriate to the d ev el opment  
commodity world, so the perverseness  of pos t-clas 
modernism  should be viewed, wherever it arises, 
expressive of a new relationship to this 
to the ap pearanc e of a new commodity  relation. The la 
of relativi tie s and quanta, as
symptom formation, invokes a 
inherent in the arbit ra ri ness  
And in common with cosmos and
to the origin 
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s m ,
1 aws 
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of the modern  c o m m o d i t y  form, 
psyche, the c o m mod it y is
500
UVi +•rstood ’h i s t o r i c a l l y ’ . A singular process of symmetry 
break i ng gives rise to the d i f f er ent i at i ons of the social 
world, est ablish in g the spheres of production, cir c u l a t i o n  
and c on sumpt io n upon which both reason and its perversitie; 
are f o u n d e o .
Excitement, by its very nature, cannot be a 
comprehensive, exclusive, or exha us tive cosmology. An 
accidental rel at ion to the c o m m odi ty  is possibl e only 
provided that, at- another level, p ro du ction is org anise d 
still on the basis of clas s i c a l l y  conceived rational 
necessity. In liberating wishes into the sphere of 
co nsumpt ion it is assume d that ’a u t h e n t i c ’ needs co nti nu e 
to be met within the framework of ’e v e r y d a y ’ c a 1c u 1a b i 1ity
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CONCLUSION; Intimate C o s m o l o g y
The bourgeoi s world, for a time, b e l ie ved itself to be 
in po ss essio n of a uni qu ely ’r a t i o n a l i s i n g ’ power. The 
s c i e ntifi c revo lu tion provided it with a means to eradi ca te  
the ignorance and to subdue the errors c o r r uptin g less 
fortunate views of the world. Tod ay we are only too ready 
to c o n g r atula te  ourselv es upon o u t g ro wing such rash 
optimism. Yet, for the most part, we u n c r i t i c a l l y  accept  
the dis ti nctions  be queath ed  to us by lust such optimism. 
Science and Re ason can still appear as dif fe rent 
ex pressi ons on the w o r l d ’s benign face. Object and subject 
go their separa te unrelated ways. Ue u n h e s i t a t i n g l y  
’e x p l a i n ’ isolated events wit hin the physical or the 
psycho 1o g c i a 1 world with an appeal to universal p r i n cipl es  
and causal laws.
It has been the purpose of this work to show that such 
optimi sm has never been justified. The project of 
bourgeois thought was not, and could never have beeen, 
carried through to its putative conclusioon.
It is rather too simple to say that this is a
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co nseguen ce of a ’c o n t r a d i c t i o n ’ inherent in capitalism; 
that bourgeois  culture must betray in the incom pleteness  of 
its syst em atic asciences. the inc om mensur ab ility between 
use- vai ue and e x c h a n g e - v a 1u e . The language of 
' c o n s e q u e n c e s ’ c o v e r t 1y 'accepts the ex clusive validity of 
the very view of the worid we wishe to challenge. This is 
why que stions of 'causality' and in par tic ular of 
'historical e x p l a n a t i o n ’ have been avoided. These problems 
are part of the classical worldview, and remain the co nc er n 
of what is h e r e  called the science of pleasure. A critical 
re co ns t r u c t i o n  of the bourg eoi s worldview, however, must 
now be made from a point of view which, so to speak, has 
been only half released from the to ta lis ing am b i t i o n  of all 
'classical' theory. The resuit is bound to appear, by 
outmoded but still au tho r i t a t i v e  conventions,
’u n s y s t e m a t i c ’ or even ’ i n c o h e r e n t ’ . As the a l t e r n a t i v e  is 
to recycle a form of 'theory' founded upon an illusion of 
rigour this may be a risk worth  taking. It might even 
stimulate a cer tain amount of intellectual 'excitement'.
The central task therefor e is not to ’e x p l a i n ’ but to 
discriminate. Here the 'official' d i s t i net i ojn b e t w e e n 
object and subject takes on an air of ideological 
simplicity. The formal 'antinomies' of the classical world 
force the varieties of human exp erie nc e; including the 
varieties of its modes of thought, into a single relation. 
Conf ron ted with its stark choices the ' c o r r e c t ’ an swer is 
always obvious; only the de mo ni c clings to the negative.
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The supe ri ority  of the objective, universal, n e c essary and 
rational is clear to all.
From the per sp ec tive of the present however it is 
clear that the bou rg eois theorist was never so confide nt as 
he would have us believe. The rational cosmos and its 
equally rational psyche had to e s t a bl ish their supremacy, 
not so -much over the rec al citrant  material of their, own 
imperfectly developed  theories as ag ainst the res is tance  of 
relations which could not find a place wi thin any of their 
imperat i ve oppos i t i o n s . These re 1 at ions did not be 1 ong to 
the modern world and ought simply to be forgotten. But 
they were not forgo tt en and now that the demands of 
'rationality' have been relaxed somewhat their c on tinuin g  
presence can be more easily detected. Old di sti n c t i o n s  re- 
emerge and contest the ex clu sive ground of reason. They do 
not make their chall en ge on the basis of any formal claim, 
to do so would be to admit defeat at once because, in those 
terms, science i_s_ more rational than magic or religion.
They propose rather a new d i v ision  of e x p e rienc e w i thi n 
which the undoub ted s uperio ri ty of s c i e ntifi c rati on ality 
can be c o n t a i n e d .
The 'classical' worldview, therefore, is only part of 
bourgeois cosmology; that part which  knows only the science 
of pleasure. In co ntras ting it in diff erent  ways with the 
cos mologies of both fun, happi ne ss and e xc it ement ' i d e a s ’ 
are not being pitted one ag ai nst  another. The key
c 1 as si f i c a l o r y  terms used here, fun, happiness, pleasure 
and ex ci temen t are d e l i b er at ely ch osen as words rather than 
c o n c e p t s . They are rich in ass ociations ; ass ociat io ns  
which i be com i 71 g more se 1 f - co7isc i ous separate themselve s 
from each other to describe fu nd a m e n t a l l y  di fferent 
relationships.
The cosm ol ogy of fun is not a naive or impo veris hed 
accou7it of the same world as that descr ib ed by the 
classical scie7itist or psychologist. It captures  and 
conveys a world of its own, a world which the scient is t ca;i 
Q7ily ignore. A d es criptio n of this world of m e t a m o r p h i c  
freedom leads direc tly to its intellectual e l a b o r a t i o n  as 
an order of signs. Si milarl y a hi e r a r c h y  of symbols 
emerges from a7i attempt to coiivey the i7iner me aning  of the 
cosm olo gy of happiness whi ch lies equa lly outide the scope 
of classical reason. The ’system of the world*, as a 
la7iguage of causality, is exclusive, in other words, to the 
classical picture of the world. * Beyoiid * causa 1 i ty we 
cannot yet (should we try?) lay claim t o .a total v i s i o n  of 
reality. But in the cosmo log y of eKciteisent as the 
e n  1 oyment of its incomplete a7id c o n t r a d i c t o r y  images we 
have decisivel y rejected the classical w o r l d ’s sea rc h for 
sy ste matic order. This is as true of the ’modern* 
sci entist as it is of the moderii Jiovel 1st or painter. The 
'ideal* (rather than typical) sci ent is t is now closer to 
Cal v i n o ’s bewi ld ered Mr. Palomar tha3i to Thomas M a n n ’s 
s e l f - c on fiden t' Pr ofess or  K u c k u c k . 1
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Fun, happiness, pleasure and excitement, that is to 
say, c o n s t it utive inner worlds of meaning the elements of 
which cannot he ’t r a n s l a t e d ’ from one to another. Each is 
a ss oci ate d with a dif fe rent apparatu s of thought (order of 
signs, hi er archy  of symbols, system of causes and network 
of images), and d i f f er en t i n t e 11e c t u a 1 pr eo c c u p a t i o n s  
(description, exposition, explanation, interpretation), 
each is ’expressive* of a diffe rent social rela ti on 
(absolute dependence, personal subordination, ma rke t 
freedom, ieisure relations), and each cons truct s a 
d if ferent ’ob ject w o r l d ’ (toys, goods, commodities, 
images). The list might be arbi t r a r i l y  extended, ar r a n g e d  
into groups, cross tabulated and d i a g r m a t i c a l l y  
consecrated. The t em ptatio n to formalism  remains powerful, 
but can be resisted. Each di st in g u i s h i n g  term, the centr e 
of its own world and not just a means to trigger a series 
of cognate terms (terms that are divis ions w i t h i n  the 
science of pleas ur e as much as they are dist i n c i o n s  among 
the di fferent cosmologies), is better left unmolested.
These distinctions, if they are real, invite their own 
forms of exploration; and if they are not, cannot by any 
amount of ’r a t i o n a l ’ an aly sis be made so.
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Notes to Chapter Twelve
1. Mach, whose writ ings on mecha nics were among the 
severest crit icisms of classical science, was oddly 
relu ctant to consider newer 'relativistic* or 
phenomeno logical psychologies. His insistence on the 
’r e l a t i o n a l ’ aspects of experience could not conceal that 
he was at heart a sensationalist. See Mach  (1976), p . 6; 
Hiebert, in Macham er and Turnbull (1976); Musil (1982).
2. Inc reasingly the classical bou rge oi s con c e p t i o n  of 
rationa li ty has been allied with technological systems, 
rather than to s c i e nt ific theories, as pointed out, from a 
somewhat dif fe rent pe rspective by, e.g. Marc use  (1964), pp 
19-32, and Haberma s (1971), pp. 81-123.
3. The Comp 1ementar i ty Pri nc ip le is by no means res t r i c t e d  
to a part ic ular interpre ta tion of quantum physics, Folse
(1985), pp, 27-31. It has become quite c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of 
m ode rn tho ught to regard empirical reality as only  one, 
u su all y arbitrary, selection  from a range of theore tical  
pos sibil it ies the gen era lity of whi ch cannot be r a t i o n a l l y  
reconstructed.
4. ’B o u r g e o i s ’ is here used as a bro ader conc ept than 
’c a p i t a l i s m ’ . The latter refers p r i m ar il y to the rational 
order of the commodity, the former to the forms of life in 
fact susta ined by such an order.
5. There is no suggest io n here that a par ticu la r social 
relation is the ’c a u s e ’ of a new cosmological view; 
p ar ti cularl y as ther langauge of ’c a u s a l i t y ’ is f o r eign to 
such a view.
S, Again, it is not that e i ther p r o d uc tion qr_ e x c hange
holds the key to a process of rationalisation. Ra ther each
sphere of ac t i v i t y  is marked by a typicai o p p o s i t i o n  
be tween rational and non-rational forms.
7. Cf. above Ch. 3.
8. It is wi thin just such a framework that F r e u d ’s work is
still fre que ntly read; thus Rieff (1965) makes of him an 
orthodox bourg eois moralist, and H a r tm an n (1964) cl aim s him 
for ’ego p s y c h o l o g y ’ .
9. tfapek (1961), pp. 135-140. F r e u d ’s initial a t t e m p t  at a 
psychological synthesis was couched in m e c h a n i s t i c  terms 
and was quic kly  abandoned. Freud S.E., Vol.l, pp. 283-399.
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10. There is then a cons i derab 1 e irony i ri Freud being 
regarded as a ’d e v e l o p m e n t a l ’ psychologists.
11. See Freud S.E., Vol.l, pp. 312-321.
12. E s p e ciall y in important theoretical works, for exam ple 
in The Int er pretat io n of Dreams S.E., v o l . 5. pp. 537-44, 
573-S2, 610-17; and the Introductory Lectures S.E., v o l . 16. 
pp. 356-57.
13. Ereuer and Freud S.E., vol.2, p. ISO.
14. In 1912, Freud S.E., vol. 12. pp. 99-108, 159-171.
15. Mu rdoc h (1987)', pp. 94-103
16. An a p p roach which does not, of course, b o r r o w  sp e c i f i c  
concepts from psycho-analysis. For an ap p r o a c h  w h ich  does 
see B a c h elard (1964).
17. Thus, in dreams for example, ’Tho ug ht s wh ic h are 
mutually c o n t r a d i c t o r y  make no at te mpt to do away wi t h  each 
other, but pe rsis t side by s i d e ’ , Freud S . E . , v o l . 5, p . 596.
18. A p p r o x i m a t e l y  what Freud refered to as ’c o n d e n s a t i o n ’ , 
see Freud S.E., v ol .4, pp. 279-82.
19. And ’d i s p l a c e m e n t ’ , see Freud S.E., vol. 4, pp. 305-09.
20. Thus F e y n m a n ’s wa rn ing remark; ’ ..I think I can sa fely 
say that no body u nd erstand s qu antum m e c h a n i c s ’ , qu oted in 
Hey and Walters (1987), p. 1. Under standing, that is to 
say, is still identified with classical s ci entific  
rationality. B e r g s o n ’s att em pt to shift the p h i l o sophica l 
fou nda tion of natural knowled ge to activ e intu i 1 1 o n , was 
largely ignored. See Capek (1971), p p . 30-51.
21. Feinberg  (1977), pp 59-63; Hey and Walters (1987), pp. 
76-8; Fe yn man (1965), v o l . 3, 4/13, remarks that: ’ In fact, 
almost all the p e c u l i arities  of the material world hinge on 
this wonderful f a c t ’ .
22. Oil the ’partic le  h o n e y m o o n ’ of the very early u n i v e r s e  
see R o w a n - R o b i n s o n  (1985), pp. 230-88; Barrow and Silk 
(1984); Weinb er g (1977).
23. In fact H u b b l e ’s account of the observed r e d sh if t of 
distant objects was accep ted almost at once and in the 
absence of reliabl e data. Wagoner and Go l d s m i t h  (1982), p. 
103-4; Harr i s o n  (1981), 208-9; Silk (1980), pp. 43-49; 
Peebles (1971), pp. 6-7.
24. See for example Veblen (1925), p. 29; ’ It be comes
i n d i s p e n s a b 1eto accummulate, to acquire property, in order 
to retain o n e ’s good n a m e ’ . And Douglas and Isherwood 
(1978), pp. 25-55.
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25. A distan ce  common to the natural sciences and to 
bourgeois psychology.
26. C f . above Chapter 3 for spe cific re fer ence to the 
writings of B e r g s o n  and Proust  in this regard. W i t h i n  a 
more ac ad emic tradit io n William James (1980), vol.l, pp. 
224-400, and p a r t i c u l a r l y  pp. 373-379, is most fully aware 
of the i n s t a bi lity inherent in the classical model.
27. This much at least can be granted to the critics of 
’mass s o c i e t y ’ , see p ar ticul ar ly Ri esm an  (1965).
28. Ki er k e g a a r d  re.fered to his p s e u donymou s works as a 
’maieuti c a r t ’ ; meaning literally ’o b s t e t r i c ’ , they were 
intended as an ’ indirect c o m m u n i c a t i o n ’ and, in an extreme 
version, a means of dec eiving people into the truth. 
K ierke ga ar d (1962), pp. 147-50.
29. Simmel, Wolff ed. (1950), pp. 409-24.
30. Consumption, that is to say, is a g a m b 1e , and while the 
comm odi ty cannot be guaranteed to induce a state of 
excitement, the risk involved in its a c q u i s i t i o n  can. It 
thus remains ’r a t i o n a l ’ to consume, whatever the outcome.
31. A superficial paradox to be sure. B e h a v i o u r i s t  
p sy ch olo gists have long been aware that i nte rm ittent reward 
is the most secure foundati on of habit.
32. The ’failure r a t e ’ , never fully determined, is more of 
a known qua nt it y for old commodities. Gi ven that it is 
always high new co mm odi tie s are always ’wor th  a t r y ’ . 
Additionally, as fam iliar it y and excitement  seem to be 
inversely related, the p robab il ity of e x c i t e m e n t  decre as es 
with repeated use.
33. From this per sp ective  Freud can be viewed as c o n t i n u i n g 
the tradition of the E n l i g hten me nt rather than of 
ni ne teen th  centur y medecine. See above, ch. 1.
34. An as so c i a t i o n  explored by Th o m p s o n  (1961) and Sohn- 
Rethel (1978) but made evident first, and most strikingly, 
by S i m m e 1.
35. C h ar ac te risti cs  of money analysed  in the G r u n d r 1s s e , 
Marx (1973), pp. 146-51, and summed up in his aphorism,
’All commodities are peri shabl e money; mon ey  is the 
imperishable c o m m o d i t y ’ . Ibid., p. 149. See, from a 
different perspective, Douglas in Firth ed. (1975).
36. Thus, ’Money is the purest form of the t o o l ’ . Simmel 
(1978), p. 210; ’ ..money is de tac hed from all s p e cific  
contents and exists only as a q u a n t i t y ’ ; ibid., p. 216.
37. Ibid., p. 79. Th ough even before it is o b j e c t i f i e d  in 
exchange, ’s u b j e c t i v e ’ value exists as a form that is never
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’me re ly  c a p r i c i o u s ’ , but, ’exists in our c o n s c i ousness  as a 
fact that can no more be altered than can reality i t s e l f ’ : 
i b i d . , p. S3.
38. Ibid. p. 108.
39. Ibid. p. 119.
40. Simmel points out that, ’Money is the r e p r e s en tative of 
abstract v a l u e ’ , (emphasis added), and e xp li citly draws 
attenti on  to the linguistic di st i n c t i o n  be tw een signifier 
and signified. Ibid., p. 120.
41. Ibid. p. 128 (emphasis added).
42. Ibid. p. 129. He continues: ’Thus money is the
adequate ex p r e s s i o n  of the r e l a t ionship  of man to the 
w o r I d ’ .
43. Ibid. p. 231.
44. See, for example, Weber (1978), p. 107-9, a
c a l c u l a b i 1 t t y ' w h i c h  si m u l t a n e o u s l y  depends upon a number of 
other formal and historical conditons.
45. Because of the length, co m p l e x i t y  and o b j e c t i v i t y  of
the ’sequence of p u r p o s e s ’ ’g i v e n ’ in the co n d i t o n  of
modern society.
46. Ibid., p. 235. One is remind ed of K i e r k e g a a r d ’s 
depiction of ’a e s t h e t i c ’ existence; the young man of 
E i t h e r , ’hovers above e x i s t e n c e ’.
47. Comp are  pp. 326-31, on the role of money in the 
development of the sense of individual worth with, for 
example, pp. 389-94, on1 money and the ideal of distinction. 
Thus ’Money tho ro ughly destroys that se lf - r e s p e c t  that 
characteri se s the d i s t i n g u i s h e d  p e r s o n ’ : ibid., p. 394.
48. A process Marx noted as a general c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of 
capitalism, see, for example, Marx (1976), pp. 1052-3, only 
after he had cons idered it in re lation to money, Marx
(1973), pp. 196-99.
49. Simmel (1978), p. 429.
50. See p arti cu larly pp. 238-47, on greed and avarice.
Simmel is d e a l r y  aware of the u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y  inherent in 
the wishful relati on to a commodity; ’the re lati on  of wish 
to its fulfilment is an infinit ely  dive rse one, b e caus e the 
wish almost never allows for all aspe cts of the obj ect and 
its effect upon u s ’ : i b i d . , p. 243. If wishes are
’t r a n s f e r e d ’ to money, as a, ’thing a b s o l u t e l y  lacking in 
q u a l i t i e s ’ , this particular source of u n c e r t a i n t y  is 
a imini s h e d .
51. I b id ., p. 248.
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52. S i m m e l ’s d i s c ussi on  is reminiscent, not only of 
K i e r k e g a a r d ’s d e s c r iptio n of aestheti c despair, but of 
D o s t o e v s k y ' s  c ele br ation of u nce rt ainty in The G a m b l e r .
53. Simmel (1978), p. 255.
54. Ibid. p. 296.
55. For an interesting discus si on of the implica ti ons of 
incompl eteness in a number of fields see Ho f s t a d t e r  (1979)
56. An idea central also to Max Weber view of mod ern 
society, for a brief d i s c uss io n see Gerth and Mills eds.
(1964). pp. 77-128.'
57. This is u s u all y refered to as the Cosm olo gical 
Principle, or C o p e r n i c a n  Prin ci ple and d e s c rib es  the large- 
scale str uc tu re of the universe. In its m o d e r n  form it is 
us u all y attr i b u t e d  to Milne, or Ei n s t e i n  who puts it 
succin ct 1y, ’a 11 places in the u n i vers e are a l i k e ’ : quoted 
in H a r r i s o n  (1981), p. 88. See also Pe eb les (1974), pp* 
31-42; Silk (1980), pp. 51-5; Rees, Ruff ini and Whee ler 
(1974), pp. 270-5; and for a fuller historical di sc u s s i o n  
B arr ow and Tipler (1986), pp. 367-444.
58. In the classical sciences not only are all mo v e m e n t s  
ideally reversible, the cosmos as a whole is stable and 
’c o m p l e t e ’ . The ’s e l f ’ simil arl y is com po sed of internal 
’e x c h a n g e s ’ and co nstit utes in itself a ’f i n i s h e d ’ 
structure.
59. A view rec en tly championed by Braudel and his school, 
rather than by conventional Marxists. Wall erstein, for 
example, used the rev ealing title His torical C a p i t a l i s m  as 
an int roduction  to his work.
60. Though not of course without a good deal of blo odshed.
61. And most di re ct ly by Laplace, see £apek (1961), p. 122.
62. Far less of these develop me nts spelli ng the end of 
capitalism, as periodically, since Sch um peter (1943), is 
suggested. See, for example G a l b r a i t h  (1967).
63. A typical comment for example from On The G e n e a l o g y  of 
Mora 1s : ’Europe is rich and inventive today above all in 
means of exc i tat i o n ; it seems to need nothing so mu c h  as 
stimulants and b r a n d y ’ ; Nietzsc he (1969), p. 159 (emphasis 
added). And there is nothing so exciting as novelty, ’what 
di st ing uis hes truly original m i n d s ’, is the a b i l i t y  to see, 
’as new what is old, long familiar, seen and o v e r l o o k e d  by 
e v e r y b o d y ’ , ibid., p. 176. Of course, as most pe ople are 
not original in this sense, they require the artifical 
stimulus of novel commodities, or at least a good illness, 
as, ’being sick can even become an en ergeti c s t i mu 1 us for
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1 if e ’ : ibid., p. 224.
64. A view pe rsu a s i v e l y  espoused by Hawking (1988).
65. £apek (1S71) argues that Bergson, in intr odu cing  
•duration into nature, is one of the most important and 
neglect ed  sources of modern cosmology-. Even in Weyl and 
Minkowski, he claims, there is no genuine s u c c e s s i o n  and 
time is aga in  reduced to a spatial order as, ’b l i n d f o l d e d  
c o n s c i ousness  creeps along its world line to discover the 
f u t u r e ’ : £ap ek (1961), p. 165.
66. Bohm suggests that if genuine duration is introduced 
into natur e then no fixed mode of being can remain 
pe rma ne nt or any conceptual di st i n c t i o n  remain inviolate. 
Nature  then beco mes a ’qual itati ve  i n f i n i t y ’ implying that, 
’the deve l o p m e n t  of the un iv erse i n t i m e  will lead to an 
i ne xh aus tible di v e r s i t y  of new t h i n g s ’ : Eohm, in Cap ek ed.
(1976), p. 559.,
67. Ideally, as wi t h  m o t o r  car license plates, by dating.
68. Classical e q u i l i b r i u m  on the large-scale was a 
tenacious assumption. E i n s t e i n  in 1917, fin ding no stable 
solut ion  to his new field equations, felt obli ged to 
introduce an a r b i t r a r y  cosmological constant. See Na rlik ar
(1977), pp. 111-2. Yet, ten years later, H u b b l e ’s di s c o v e r y  
of a dire ct c o r r e l a t i o n  be twee n dista nc e and a p p a r e n t  
rece ssi on velo ci ty of distant objects was very q u i ck ly 
accepted. Peebles (1971), p. 7.
69. Bondi (1961).
70. This proved s o c ia lly as well as s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  wide of 
the mark. Matter is again treated as so mething ’d i f f e r e n t ’ 
from space-time, and ’'creation’ is reaily a device to 
maintain a ’t i m e l e s s ’ equilibrium.
71. There are a number of var i a n t s , open or closed, finite 
or infinite, dependin g on the choice of constant. Silk
(1980), pp 94-99; Harriso n (1981), pp. 293-307.
72. By Penz ias and Wilson  in 1965, Silk (1980), p»p. 75-9.
73. Several non technical accounts of mo dern c o s m o l o g y  take 
this approach, for example: Wald (1977; Wei nb erg (1977); 
Goldsmith and Levy (1974); and for int eresting va r i a t i o n s  
Rowan- R o b i n s o n  (1985) and Barrow  and Silk (1984).
74. Ro w a n - R o b i n s o n  (1985), pp. 236-41, 288; We i n b e r g  
(1977), pp. 101-6. Barrow and Silk (1984), p.ix, de s c r i b e  
this primordial state of nature as a period, ’when all the 
laws of physics were on an equal footing, all n a t u r e ’s 
element ary  constituents, heavy and light, int eract ed  fr eely 
and democratically. The most exotic particles known, or 
even dreamt of, by man were liberated to pa rt i c p a t e  in this 
unre str ai ned i n t e r c a h n g e ’ .
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75. The un iverse retains clues to its orig i n a 1 p 1 ayf u 1nes s . 
Weinb er g (1977), p, 149, points out that: ’The present
unive rs e is so cold that the symmetries among the differe nt  
particles and interactions have been obscur ed  by a kind iof 
f r e e z i n g ’ . Thus there is in the pres ently obs erva bl e 
unive rs e an ’imbalance' of matter over anti-matter, and of 
photons over protons, as well as a ’d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ’ of 
different forces. See p artic ul arly Ba rro w and Silk (1984) 
on these and related observations. One is f o r c ef ully  
reminded of F r e u d ’s theory of sexual ’d e v e l o p m e n t ’ ,a kind 
of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  and ’c o o l i n g ’ , from an original ’h o t ’ 
state of ’p o l y morph perversity'.
76. And cos mologi st s formulate their acc ou nts of the 
unive rs e in terms of the spcific initial condi ti ons of the 
universe, rather than in terms of c o n t i n u a l l y  actin g M a w s  
of n a t u r e ’ ; and aim from these c o n d it ions at, ’not hi ng less 
than a complet e reco ns t r u c t i o n  of the past hi story of the 
u n i v e r s e ’ . Barrow and Silk (1984), p. 208.
77. In W e b e r ’s famous argument a sp irit of c a p i t a l i s m  is 
one of the ’ initial c o n d i t i o n s ’ of cp a i t a l i s m  itself. See 
also Abercrombie, Hill and Turner (1980), pp 95-127.
78. This is the case even where ’new t e c h n o l o g i e s ’ make use 
of effects, such as lasers, which remain c l a s s i c a l l y  
incomprehensible.
79. Barrow and Silk (1984); Fein be rg (1977); W e i nberg  
(1983); Po lki n g h o r n e  (1979); and Pagels  (1982), for these 
and many other modern exoticisms.
80. See above Ch. 3.
81. Husserl (1970), p. 60.
82. H e y e r s o n ’s "Identity and Re alit y dates from 1908, prior 
that is, to much of the turmoil of m o d e r n  science, but not 
of course prior to the general cultural tran s i t i o n  of of 
which science was to form such a sign i f i c a n t  part.
83. A view p o w e rf ul ly expre ssed by Be r g s o n  and P r o u s t  as 
well as by Freud; see above Ch. 3.
84. Symmetry, that is to say, has largely r e p laced  ’ f o r c e ’ 
as the most fundamental of physical concepts. See Gal-O r
(1981), p. 30-1; Davies and Bro wn (1988), p p . 33-47, and 
more generally (and technically), Sh ub nikov and Ko p t s i k
(1974).
85. As represented, for example, by Lukacs (1980).
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Notes to Conclusion
1. Calvino C1S83), Mann (1958). Ku ck uck  is of course a 
critical and comic portrait. His w o r l d l y  n a i vete does not 
impinge, however, on his scie nt ific authority. His 
portrait of the cosmos rivals H u m b o l d t ’s in its classical 
self-confidence.
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